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DATED February, 1974

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

SOVIET MARXISM, ARAB SOCIALISM AND ARAB NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF EGYPT

by

© AIDA MESHAKA

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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EDMONTON, ALBERTA

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled SOVIET MARXISM, ARAB SOCIALISM AND ARAB NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF EGYPT submitted by Aida Meshaka in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology.

Arthur K Davis
Supervisor

C. Caldarola

External Examiner

Date 17 November, 1973

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to NAGUIB AZAB as a small token of thanks for placing his knowledge of Egypt and the Arab world at my disposal.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Soviet Marxism, Arab Socialism and Arab Nationalism: The Case of Egypt

by

Aida Meshaka

Doctor of Philosophy

in Sociology

University of Alberta, 1974

Dr. Arthur K. Davis, Chairman

One of the vitally important phenomena of our times has been the disintegration of colonialism and the spread of nationalism in the colonies. The Soviet Union has been supporting the "national liberation movements," and Marxism has spread to the developing countries, where it became mixed with a strong element of nationalism. This relation between Marxism and nationalism is puzzling thinkers all over the world, for the Marxist theory originally considered nationalism a bourgeois phenomenon.

In the present study, we shall deal with the various theories on nationalism. Taking some of the main Western writings on nationalism as a background, we shall concentrate on the Marxist theory of nationalism and its evolution as it was transformed from a theory of revolutionaries in the opposition, to one of rulers in power.

We shall also show the modifications that occurred in it as it tackled the political realities of the national liberation movements in the Third World.

As an illustration, we shall use a case study on Arab Socialism in Egypt, and its views on Arab nationalism.

Our study will center around the following points:

1. Is nationalism a recent phenomenon connected with the rise of the bourgeois state?
2. Is the nation based on objective or subjective factors?
3. Is the nation characterized by cohesion or class struggle?
4. Does social cohesion have a national or an international base?
5. What types of nationalism are there? (This includes the relation between nationalism and ideologies).
6. Nationalism and the Third World: the relations of the Soviets and the Third World.

In comparing between the various above-mentioned theories we shall attempt to answer these basic questions concerning nationalism.

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I am especially indebted to Dr. Arthur K. Davis, who supervised this dissertation, and wish to express my sincere gratitude to him for his guidance, insightful remarks and encouragement. During our work together I came to admire in him a rare combination of humaneness and strength, as well as the respect for truth of a true scholar.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I INTRODUCTION 1

Purpose 4

Procedures 15

II NATIONALISM IN WESTERN WRITINGS 17

1. Nationalism and the Bourgeois State . 17

2. Objective and Subjective Factors of the Nation 25

3. Cohesion and Class Struggle 35

4. Nationalism and Internationalism . . . 46

5. Types of Nationalism 50

6. Nationalism and the Third World . . . 57

Footnotes 71

III SOVIET MARXISM AND NATIONALISM 83

1. The Nation and Capitalism 85

2. Objective and Subjective Factors of the Nation 89

Objective Factors 92

Common Economy 92

Common Territory 98

The State 101

Common Language 106

Common Culture 111

Subjective Factors 116

Will 116

CHAPTER PAGE

3. Class Struggle and Cohesion 121

Pre-socialist Stage 121

Classes Under Socialism 130

4. Nationalism and Internationalism . . 136

Pre-socialist Stage 137

Socialism 143

The Soviet Union 144

The Socialist Bloc 152

5. Types of Nationalism 169

6. Relations of the Soviets and the Third World 177

National Liberation Stage 180

Neocolonialism 191

Soviet Aid 192

Non-capitalist Stage 194

National Conflicts and Power Struggle 200

Footnotes 210

IV ARAB SOCIALISM AND ARAB NATIONALISM IN EGYPT 236

1. Arab Nationalism and the Bourgeoisie . 236

Arab Socialism and Arab Nationalism . 250

Weakness of the Bourgeoisie 260

Growth of Public Sector 270

2. Objective and Subjective Factors of the Nation 277

Objective Factors 278

CHAPTER PAGE

Economy 278
  No Complementarity 279
  Hopes of Integration 293
  No Integration 298
Territory 317
Race 324
Language 338
The State 350
Religion 364
National Character 377
Subjective Factor: Will 385
3. Class Struggle and Cohesion 396
4. Nationalism and Internationalism . . 412
5. Types of Nationalism 418
Stage of History 419
Relation Between Socialist Ideology and Nationalism 423
6. Relations Between Marxism and Arab Socialism 433
The National Liberation Stage 439
Stage of Non-capitalist Development . 440
Stage of National Conflicts 441
Footnotes 451
V CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 484
1. The Nation, the Bourgeoisie and Historical Materialism 486
2. Objective - Subjective Factors . . . 488

CHAPTER PAGE

3. Class Struggle and Cohesion 498

4. Nationalism and Internationalism . . 500

5. Types of Nationalism 503

6. The Soviets and the Third World . . . 505

***

BIBLIOGRAPHY 510

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Description	Page
I	Trade between Arab countries, and its percentage to their total external trade	283
II	Trade between Arab countries	284
III	Libya's Petroleum Exports (daily average in millions of barrels)	287
IV	Libya's Imports, 1969 (in thousands of Libyan pounds)	288
V	Egypt's Trade with England Percentage to Total Trade (1836-1955)	290
VI	Egypt's Foreign Trade by Geographical Area (19600-65)	291
VII	Egypt's External Trade (1969/70).	292

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the vitally important phenomena of our century, particularly since the termination of the second world war, has been the disintegration of European empires, and the spread of nationalism among their colonies, clamoring for political and economic independence.

In a world divided between two main opposing power blocs and their respective ideologies, the two opponents are trying to win over the Third World countries to their way of thinking and their side. The U.S.S.R. has attempted to ally the deveoping countries to the socialist block in a joint struggle against western capitalism, and now claims to be the protector of the national liberation movements. The Western states, on the other hand, are making every effort to stop the developing countries from going communist. New developments are emerging in China and these modify the picture sketched above. However, they are outside our present scope.

Despite the fact that nationalism plays a central role on the world stage today, sociologists have paid relatively little heed to it (apart from a book by Znaniecki, an article by L. Wirth, a chapter by Gerth and Mills ...), even though it has a bearing on a number of sociological interests such as social change, ethnic minorities, modernization and social stratification. Even less attention has been paid by sociologists to the relation between Marxism and nationalism, though Marxism has become an integral part of sociological thought, and any changes in it should immediately be studied and interpreted.

Marxism, in one form or another, is already the official ideology of a large portion of the world's population. Its influence has also spread to the developing countries, some of which have attempted to formulate their own local brand of socialism, ex. African socialism, Arab socialism ... These recent socialisms tend to include a strong element of nationalism, and are sometimes called "national socialisms". This requires clarification, for Marxist theory was originally opposed to nationalism and considered it a bourgeois phenomenon. How then can it accommodate the present Soviet support of nationalist movements and how can nationalism and socialism unite into a single theory? And if any differences show up between the theory and practice of Marxists, how does this affect the original theory?

This relation between Marxism and Nationalism in the Third World - particularly in countries that have adopted a socialist ideology of some sort - is puzzling thinkers in all parts of the world.

Marxist studies on the topic have lacked a comprehensive theoretical framework and tended to be simple reactions to the individual concrete events. This has led to many false hopes and disillusions on both the Soviet and nationalist sides; as well as contradictions that threatened to discredit the original Marxist theory itself. The Soviets have felt the need to reevaluate the whole situation and are at present carrying out studies on the topic.

In the West, many studies on traditional Arab nationalism exist, but the recent period of "Arab socialism" has not been so thoroughly studied and existing writings are often partial and tentative in nature.

The confusion is quite understandable, for the newly born union of nationalism and socialism - in Egypt, for example - has been passing through an experimental stage, in which its features were still unclear and often contradictory.

Born without a theory of its own, it has been groping uncertainly for a path, an identity, an ideology it could call its own. To find it, it has looked both inward and outward, both to the past and to the present for models to follow. This was no simple task, for the world at present is full of controversy, and this goes for the socialist bloc as well.

The Egyptians have invited Marxists of various different hues to give lectures in Cairo and write their viewpoint in the press - Soviets like R. Ulyanovsky (chief expert for International Affairs, particularly for Asian, African and Latin American countries, affiliated to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), East Germans like Rathman and Schilling, the Hungarian G. Lukacs, the French Communist rebel Roger Garaudy and others, in addition to the traditional close relationship with Tito of Yugoslavia.

At the same time there was the desire to create an independent ideology rather than to follow blindly some external model, and this meant turning to the local cultures, Arabism, Islam... and various experiments - unions with Arab countries, cooperation with rightists, cooperation with leftists, the imposition of socialism from above ... There has also been the influence of ebbs and flows, victories and defeats.

At present, the national-socialist experiment in Egypt has been in existence for over a decade, and has accumulated so many experiences that new events are often likely to be mere repetitions of old ones. The time is ripe for scholars to take stock of the past, and attempt to evaluate it as a whole rather than in piecemeal fashion.

Purpose

In the present study we shall try to find out what Marxist theory actually says about nationalism. As Marxism has now taken several different forms (Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav), however, we shall confine ourselves to the

Soviet type.

In order to achieve a proper perspective of the Marxist views on nationalism, it is necessary to have some idea about western writings on the topic, though this is not the focus of our study. This will enable us to place the Marxist views in the theoretical context against which they developed, and note the similarities and differences between the Western and Marxist writers. There is a tremendous variety of viewpoints among Western scholars. Not directly connected with policy-making, each one of them carries out his research independently, often reaching results that seem to contradict those of others, as there is little effort to achieve an overall view of the problem.

In Chapter II we shall give a brief survey of what some Western scholars have written about the nation and nationalism. This will include the epochs to which they link the rise of the nation; the use they make of objective and subjective factors in defining the nation, how they deal with the question of cohesion and class struggle, their attitude towards nationalism and internationalism, the types of nationalism they mention, and their attitude towards the national liberation movements of the Third World countries.

In Chapter III, Part 1 on "The Nation and Capitalism;" we shall examine Marx's original linking of the nation with the bourgeoisie and the modern Soviet writers' modification of this stand in dealing with nations in the Soviet Union and the Third World.

In the section on "Objective and Subjective Factors of the Nation," we shall examine the factors included in Stalin's definition of the nation, find out whether they are objective (since Marxists differentiate between their own definition and Western ones on the basis that the former is materialist and the latter idealist), and trace the changes that have occurred in them.

In the factor of "Economy" we shall examine Marx's original linkage of the nation with the bourgeoisie and the effect on this theory of the growing internationalization of the capitalist and socialist economies, and the creation of new nations in the U.S.S.R. and the Third World without passing through capitalism.

Under "Territory" we shall show how this factor was affected by the encounter with the Third World where artificial boundaries were imposed by imperialism.

In "State," we shall examine Stalin's original stand towards this factor and the effects of the Third World and the nationality question in the U.S.S.R. on modern Soviet writings.

Under "Language" we shall trace the effect of the relative stability of language on the theory in terms of infrastructure and superstructure, and the influence of circumstances in the Third World on the significance of the factor itself.

Under "Culture" we shall discuss the dilemma faced by the Soviets as they tried on the one hand to adapt to the persistence of nationalism in terms of culture in the USSR, with the slogan of "Socialist in content, national in form," and on the other hand, their attempts at Russianization, as seen in the changing of the slogan to "international in form." We shall also trace the effect of the Third World, as seen in the inclusion of new elements like tradition and religion in the definition of the nation.

In "Will" we shall trace the different stands taken by Marxists with regard to supporting the self-determination and the will of the people. Through this we shall try to find out whether they give priority to nationalism or socialism.

In Part 3, "Class Struggle and Cohesion," we shall trace the attitude of Marxists towards class struggle and cohesion before and after they attain power (in accordance with Ossowki's differentiation between the attitude of rebels and rulers), and we shall examine the new types of conflict that appear under socialism and their expression in the new models of socialism appearing outside the U.S.S.R.

With regard to the national liberation movements, we shall examine the fluctuations in the Marxist stands towards emphasizing class struggle within the colony or supporting cohesion against imperialism.

In Part 4, "Nationalism and Internationalism" we shall consider internationalism before and after the achievement of socialism. In the pre-socialist stage, we shall check whether the proletariat in the capitalist countries has actually shown itself to be internationalist as Marx expected, and whether capitalism has confined itself to national boundaries; and study the attitude of Marxists towards the integration of states into larger units.

In the socialist stage, we shall mention some of the measures taken to achieve the merging of nations within the Soviet Union and the resistance shown to them. We shall then move on to the Socialist bloc and analyse some of the differences that have arisen between the socialist countries and between Communist parties in the world, despite their common ideology.

In Part 5, "Types of Nationalism," we shall check whether Marx's successors have, like him, linked nationalism only to one stage of history and considered it to be of only one type - the bourgeois; or whether, like Western scholars, they allow of many types, regardless of stage of history. And as they faced the national liberation movements of the colonies, we shall note the fluctuation in the priority they gave to socialist ideology or nationalism, and the effect this had on the stages of historical materialism, and on Marx's economic criterion for the change from one stage to the next.

In Part 6, "Relations of Soviets and the Third

World," we shall trace the developments in the attitude of Marxists towards the Third World in general and Egypt in particular. This will cover the stage of the national liberation movement against imperialism and that of the transition of the backward countries to socialism via the "non-capitalist path" and will show the changes in the Marxist stand towards the national liberation movements and the local Communist parties in both stages.

After analysing the writings of the Soviet Marxists, we shall give (in Chapter IV), an illustration of the national liberation movement by means of a specific case - Arab Socialism and Arab Nationalism in Egypt and their encounter with Soviet Marxism.

In Part 1, "Arab Nationalism and the Bourgeoisie," we shall examine the relationship between Arab nationalism and the bourgeoisie not only from the viewpoint of the autocratic authority seeking an Islamic and Arab unity (which is often used by Western writers), but also from that of the Egyptian nationalist movement, which rejected the idea of Arab nationalism on the basis of secularism and anti-colonialism. We shall then describe the attempts made by Arab Socialists to create a state of mind that would replace the Egyptian identity with an Arab one; then the emergence of the Egyptian identity after the 1967 defeat, and the Arab Socialists' utilization of traditionalism to consolidate Arab nationalism. Finally, we shall study the economic conditions to find out whether or not the Egyptian bourgeoisie had any interest in Arab nationalism.

In Part 2, "Objective and Subjective Factors of the Nation," we shall discuss the factors included in the Stalinist definition of the nation and a few others, as applied to the Arab case, in order to find out whether they are objective, or whether they are influenced by ideology, and subjective.

In the factor of "economy" we shall survey the present conditions of the Arab economies from the viewpoint of their complementarity or lack of it. We shall then discuss the Arab aspirations towards changing the existing conditions and effecting an economic unity through treaties, the implementation of these treaties and the problems relating thereto. We shall also deal with the recent attempts to form an economic union between Egypt and Lybia. The focus of our study will be to find out whether the economic factor is an objective reality or whether the important thing in the Arab logic is the stress on aspirations and the creation of a state of mind, by simply drawing up treaties but without studying their feasibility, or actually applying them.

In "Territory" we shall trace the influence on this factor of ideology, i.e. the traditionalist ideas concerning expansionism, the effect of secularization during the period of Egyptian nationalism in fixing the boundaries, and the trend of Arab socialism towards using traditionalism with a view to surpassing the national boundaries in the name of Arab nationalism.

In "Race" we shall trace the influence on this factor of traditionalism with its emphasis on the Islamic religion as an integrative factor, and modernization and secularization which admit the conflict of nationalities in terms of race, the tendency of Egyptian nationalism to separate the Egyptian identity from the Islamic Turkish or Mameluke one.

We shall also explain the various trends of thought in Arab socialism, one openly traditionalist, putting Islam in the place of a race, and another mixing a religious content with a secular form, and in expressing this complex stand, coloring history.

In "Language," we shall discuss whether language is truly an objective factor or whether the important thing in the logic of Arab nationalism is the concept of language itself and its revolving around the question of traditionalism and modernization. We shall trace the increased importance of language at the expense of religion during the emergence of Arab nationalism, then the deemphasis of the importance of unity of language during the period of Egyptian nationalism, and finally the preponderance of subjectivity in the period of Arab socialism with its utilization of traditionalism in relation to language with a view to creating the required state of mind.

As there has been no common Arab state except in

Islamic history, the "state" factor becomes only an aspiration based on the historical heritage. In the factor of "State" we shall thus discuss the concepts relating to this heritage in the secular logic of Egyptian nationalism which reveals the schisms in Arab history, and separates religion from the state (i.e. the Caliphate). We shall then study the concept of Arab Socialism, torn between this secular background which appears in its views of the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate and the traditionalist trend, shown in its extolling Islamic unity in the distant past. The reversion to traditionalism and the changing of the concept of the Ottoman Caliphate is hidden under a secular form, with a view to creating the aspiration for a common state.

In the factor of "Religion" we shall examine the various meanings given to religion, i.e. whether there is one Islam or several, the many types being caused by the question of modernization vs. traditionalism. We shall take as a case study the meaning of the religious factor in Egypt and Lybia.

In "National Character" we shall discuss the variations in the concept of national character from the viewpoint of Egyptian nationalism and of Arab Socialism, the former using a rational method without exaggerations and the latter using exaggerations which open the door to psychological explanations.

In the factor of "Will," we shall deal with the

Egyptian will in relation to Arab nationalism, and check whether the popular will is involved or whether it is a will imposed from above, attempting to create an Arab state of mind and utilizing the state's power in so doing.

In Part 3 on "Class Struggle and Cohesion," we shall discuss the meaning given by the ruling Arab Socialism to cohesion and the relation of cohesion to the class struggle. This claim of cohesion will be checked by examining the relation of the socialist authorities with the Egyptian Left. The new types of conflict that appear under socialism revolving around the question of democracy and the transfer of power will also be covered.

In Part 4 "Nationalism and Internationalism," we shall examine the Arab Socialist view of internationalism and its rejection of the Marxist explanation, as well as the role of Arab nationalism in seeking an internationalism within the framework of the Arab countries.

In Part 5, "Types of Nationalism," we shall examine the characteristics of Arab Socialism and its place in the stages of historical materialism, as well as the effects of the jumping of stages on the definition of Arab Socialism. We shall also deal with the relation of these definitions with the struggle for power. The question of the priority given to socialist ideology or nationalism will be dealt with, the relative increase in importance in the idea of nationalism at the expense of socialist ideology and the present inclination towards separatism despite verbal declarations to the contrary.

In Part,6 "Relation between Marxism and Arab Socialism," as a background, we shall cast a glance at how Arab socialism views neocolonialism as this influences the former's expectations in its relationship with the Soviets. We shall trace the development of this relationship during the period of the national liberation movement and the period of the non-capitalist path. At the end of the latter period, we shall show the national conflicts and the relation between them and the power struggle.

The final Chapter V will consist of the conclusions. Here we shall make a comparison between the Marxist and Arab Socialist stands, taking some Western scholars as a background.

In the chapters on the Western writers, the Soviet Marxists and Arab Socialism and Nationalism, we shall use the following points as a focus, as they provide a basis for comparison:

1. Is nationalism a recent phenomenon connected with the rise of the bourgeois state?
2. Is the nation based on objective or subjective factors?
3. Is the nation characterized by cohesion or class struggle?
4. Does social cohesion have a national or an international base?
5. What types of nationalism are there? (This includes the relation between nationalism and ideologies).
6. Nationalism and the Third World. (In Chapter III

this will deal with 'Relations of the Soviets and the Third World' and in Chapter IV with 'Relations Between Marxism and Arab Socialism).

Procedures

The present study will thus start off on a theoretical note - a background of Western thought of nationalism and an analysis of Marx's views on the question. It will then trace the interaction between Marxist theory and practice, as Marx's successors, Lenin and Stalin, and the post-Stalinist leaders and writers tackled the political realities of the "national liberation movements."

To illustrate this, we shall then make a case study of Arab Socialism and Arab nationalism in Egypt, and their encounter with Soviet Marxism. This will necessitate some historical background covering the period since the 1952 "revolution" in Egypt, but the main emphasis will be on the Arab socialist phase which began with the nationalizations of 1961, till today. The preceding Egyptian nationalist period will be given as a background only.

In our research we shall use Soviet magazines, newspapers and books (translated into English), and Egyptian publications (in Arabic), in addition to those available in the West.

It is expected that the present study will throw light both on the developments taking place in the Marxist theory and on the complex phenomenon of nationalism.

CHAPTER II

NATIONALISM IN WESTERN WRITINGS

In the present chapter we shall briefly review some of the main trends of thought found among Western scholars writing on the topic of nationalism. Though this is not the focus of our study, it will provide us with a background against which to compare the Marxist writings and understand them better.

We shall study the eras to which the scholars link the rise of the nation, the objective and subjective factors they use in defining the nation, how they tackle the question of cohesion and class struggle, their attitude towards nationalism and internationalism, the types of nationalism they mention, and their attitude toward the national liberation movements in the Third World.

1. Nationalism and the Bourgeois State

Scholars writing on nationalism do not agree on its origin. A wide variety of dates and epochs is given for its beginnings, stretching from tribal times till the rise of the bourgeois system in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Though the term "nationalism" is not always employed, the question of social cohesion, solidarity and loyalty to the larger group has been of interest to philosophers since ancient times.

Some scholars trace the beginning of nationalism to tribalism. L.L. Snyder says it is not a new phenomenon but a revival of older trends, and existed "in cruder form in the tribalism of primitive peoples."[1]

C.J. Hayes also considers tribalism as a kind of nationalism, and points out that each tribe has "a distinctive speech or dialect, a peculiar pattern of social organization, and cultural and religious observances, a special set of oral traditions, and a particular manner of initiating its useful members into the full life and lore of the tribe and of inculcating in them a supreme loyalty to it."[2]

C.A.O. Niewenhuijze writes of the "comprehensive integrity of prime society"[3] which is reminiscent of the "folk" society of Robert Redfield, the "mechanical solidarity" of Emile Durkheim, the "sacred" society of H. Becker and the "gemeinschaft" of Ferdinand Toennies. All of these are characterized by a high cohesion based on kinship, face to face relationship, cultural unity and consensus.

An inside view of tribal solidarity was given by the 14th century Tunisian writer Ibn Khaldun. He spoke of the strong tribal discipline and intense esprit de corps of the desert nomads. All members of the tribe were bound together by kinship ties.[4]

F. Znaniecki traces nationalism back to classical antiquity.[5] Here we find the tribes settled on a defined territory, so that it is possible to address one's loyalty to the city, which is above all factions. Classical Greek writings show that "patriotism" already existed.

In the Greek city-state, we find Pericles, leader of the Athenian democracy, delivering a "patriotic" funeral oration in honor of soldiers fallen in the war with Sparta.

> I would have you day by day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her, and when you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it...freely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering which they could present....[6]

Plato was interested above all in the unity and harmony of society. He considered common race, language, law and religion as desirable, and believed unity could be achieved only if there were justice, by which he meant the division of labor and the specialization of functions, which puts every man in his proper place and gives him his due.[7]

In actual life the city was rent by party struggles which at times led a faction to prefer its own advantage over that of the state itself and be unpatriotic. The aristocrat and the common man were only too likely to make common cause with their own kind in another state.[8] The oligarchic parties in all cities looked to Sparta for support, and the popular factions to Athens.[9]

Also interested in achieving harmony in the state, Aristotle sought the golden mean, the balance between extremes.[10] The government should be a mixed form of oligarchy and democracy, its social foundation being a large middle class maintaining a balance between the very rich and the very poor.[11]

The city-state differed from more primitive groups in that it was self-sufficing. This referred to its territory, its means of economic support, its political independence, and above all to the fact that it produces the conditions necessary to a really civilized life.[12]

In the Greek city-state, only Greeks could be citizens, and could participate in political life. Foreigners were considered inferior. This division between races had to be modified somewhat as the political unit expanded from the city-state to the empires, in which the rulers had to deal with many different peoples, and obtain their loyalty to one state.

Ruling over Greeks and Persians, Alexander of Macedon somehow had to bring the two together into a single unit. He and his officers married Persian women, he adopted Persian dress, and he drafted Persian cavalry into his own army. He called together his Persian and Macedonian captains and urged them to regard the whole world as their home, and all good men as their brothers.[13]

The Romans met similar problems in their vast empire, and they had to make some concessions to other races in order to preserve the unity of the empire. In A.D. 117, the emperor Hadrian standardized Roman law, making all legal procedures the same throughout the empire.[14]

Under Marcus Aurelius (161-180 A.D.), the sense of unity, the reconciliation of peoples seems to have been sufficient for Greek writers to say that "an attack on Rome is an attack on us." Gradually the Roman citizenship was granted to more and more foreigners until in 212 A.D. Caracalla granted it to all free men throughout the empire.[15]

The Stoic philosophy, a branch of Cynicism which had helped to destroy the bases of the Greek city-state, gave a positive moral meaning to the world-wide state and universal law. It outlined the conception of a world-wide human brotherhood united in the bonds of a justice broad enough to include them all. Men, it said, were by nature equal, despite differences of race, rank and wealth. It insisted that the State, no less than the city, ought to lay moral claim upon its subjects' loyalty and not merely exact their obedience by force.[16]

The Christian religion was similar in many aspects to Stoicism. Religion had played a role in the cohesion of tribes and of city-states; and in the Roman Empire it became wedded to the state when Constantine was converted, and made it the official religion. Even when Rome collapsed, the Catholic Church remained as a unifying force in the old territories of the Western Empire. Retaining

Rome as its own capital, it kept Roman tradition alive through its laws, its language, its universal outlook, and its organization.[17]

Some western scholars trace the beginning of the nation to the Middle Ages. Boyd C. Shafer holds that modern nations probably have their origins in the 12th century.[18] E.H. Carr traces the rise of nationalism to the gradual dissolution of the medieval unity of empire and church and the establishment of the national state and the national church. The essential characteristic of this period, he says, was the identification of the nation with the person of the sovereign.[19] Morris Ginsberg gives the 14th century as the starting point for national consolidation,[20] and illustrates the formation of nations round a dynasty, with the cases of France and England.[21]

In the middle of the 15th century there was a tremendous growth of monarchical power in all of West Europe. Royal power grew at the expense of the nobility, the free cities and the clergy. By the 16th century all royal governments adopted the policy of exploiting national resources, encouraging trade and developing national power. The bourgeoisie allied themselves with the king, and supported the concentration of military power and the administration of justice in his hands.[22]

One 16th century thinker who is usually linked with nationalism is Machiavelli. Living in an era of war-ridden city-states, he desired the unification of Italy and her preservation from internal disorder and foreign invaders. He placed his hopes in a powerful sovereign who would achieve internal equilibrium and proceed to unify Italy. Machiavelli laid great importance on patriotism.[23]

The Mercantilist doctrine helped to create a feeling of national separatism and jealousy, thus stimulating the nationalist trend. Every state was assumed to be the potential commercial enemy of every other, and the prosperity of each was supposed to depend upon an exclusive policy of monopolizing the trade of colonies, and restricting the commerce of neighbors.[24]

A number of writers link nationalism with the bourgeoisie. Hans Kohn considers nationalism to be no older than the second half of the 18th century. Its first great manifestation was the French Revolution.[25] S. Symonolewicz also links it with the French Revolution, and C.A.O. Niewenhuijze sees it reappearing at this time. E.H. Carr considers the second period of "middle class" nationalism to stretch from the Napoleonic wars till 1914.[26] B.C. Shafer considers the 18th century to have seen the "popular nationalism" of the middle classes.[27] C.J.H. Hayes holds that "modern nationalism" emerged in the 18th century. L.L. Snyder writes that modern nationalism may be dated from the English, American and French Revolutions.[28] R. Emerson links it with the bourgeois system.[29]

As the bourgeoisie rose to power they tried to justify popular sovereignty, representative government and the right of revolution.[30] The social contract theories of John Locke and J.J. Rousseau helped to destroy the divine right theory and to justify the revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries in England, France and America.[31]

According to Rousseau a community has a corporate personality. The "general will" of the corporate self sets the standards valid for its members. The doctrine implied the reduction of government to a mere agent of the general will.[32] Rousseau's "general will" has had a great influence on modern scholars of nationalism. A number of them (ex. H. Kohn, R. Michels) consider "will" to be the essential element in the formation of the nation or nationality.

Rousseau set up patriotism as the supreme virtue, and the source of all other virtues.[33] Though he himself was talking about the small city-state, as the setting for participatory democracy, his revival of patriotic feeling was adapted to the modern national state and contributed to the growth of nationalism.[34]

From the preceding brief survey, we find that scholars have given many different dates and epochs for the origin of nationalism, ranging from tribal times to the 18th century. Yet despite this enormous range of difference there is a tendency to stress the importance of the modern bourgeois era since the French Revolution. Even those writers who trace nationalism back to earlier days, still link "modern"nationalism with the 17th and 18th centuries.

2. Objective and Subjective Factors of Nation

Several writers such as F. Znaniecki, K. Deutsch, and D. Rustow, have pointed out that in attempting to define "nation" or "nationality" scholars have divided their constituent elements into "objective" and "subjective" categories. Rustow writes that a distinction has been made "between the objective characteristics of nationhood (e.g. geography, history, economic structure)" and "subjective characteristics (e.g. consciousness, loyalty, will)...."[35]

Some writers like B.C. Shafer, C.J.H. Hayes, C. Bay, H. Tennessen and the group of scholars who contributed to the report of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, use both objective and subjective factors in their definitions. For example B.C. Shafer defines the nation as "some unit of territory, a people with a common past and some cultural characteristics as a common language, and an independent government (actual or hoped for)."[36]

Most writers, however, use the objective factors as preconditions for the existence of a nation, rather than as essential factors in its definition. Writing about objective factors, Morris Ginsberg says "there is no inclusive set of factors which are both necessary and sufficient to create the sense of nationhood or to ensure national cohesion."[37] Hans Kohn voices a similar opinion "...common descent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions, and religion...none of them is essential to the existence or definition of nationality."[38]

Opinions are divided about each objective factor, as may be seen from the arguments for and against each one given below.

Some writers, stress the importance of common descent. For instance W.B. Pillsbury considers it essential if a nation is to be a unit in the fullest sense.[39] O.D. Engeln speaks of the ancient origin of racial antipathies and of national groups being universally based primarily on kinship or race.[40]

The majority of writers, however, deny that race is basic to nationality, or that there is an inborn sense of hatred among races. They even question the existence of pure races at all. Bernard Joseph states that from the scientific point of view there is no such thing as purity of race, and traces this back to such factors as exogamy, commerce, the slave trade and war.[41]

Hans Kohn points out that though descent seemed of great importance to primitive man, modern nationalities are "mixtures of different races... The great migratory movements of history and the mobility of modern life have led everywhere to an intermingling, so that few if any nationalities can at present claim anything approaching common descent."[42]

Religion is considered by some writers as a factor of the nation. An essential bond between people in tribal days, kinship tended to become divisive rather than integrative on higher levels of organization in peasant society. Herman Israel points out that a supplementary basis for solidarity was needed, and was found in religion.[43]

Hans Kohn finds that religion was the great dominating force before the rise of nationalism in modern times. This was the case in Western as well as Eastern Christianity, in Islam and in India. The rise of nationalism, however, was accompanied by transformations in the religious attitude of man.[44]

C.J.H. Hayes states that there are striking parallels between contemporary nationalism and medieval Christianity.[45] And H. Israel suggests that nationalism itself is a type of religion in the modern world.[46]

M. Ginsberg, however, disagrees with the many writers who suggest that modern nationalism is a substitute for religion and that it gains in strength in proportion as religious faith declines. Taking the case of Scandinavia as an illustration, he shows that the nationalist movements there were often led by members of the clergy, and that there was no conflict between the church and the said movements.[47]

B.C. Shafer points out that the churches themselves became national.[48] And D. Baly sees that one of the characteristic features of a threatened society is a "return to religion" and therefore expects nationalist movements in newly independent countries to be allied with "resurgent religions."[49]

Territory is sometimes used as a factor of the nation. Henry Main believed that for all groups of men larger than the family, the land on which they live tends to become the bond of union between them.[50] Harold Laski felt that the actual physical territory formed the framework of the national ideal, and that without it the sentiment of nationality would lose the warmth and concreteness which constitute a large part of its appeal.[51]

On the other hand, Rustow considers the national frontier as a polemic rather than a scientific concept. "It is not mountains, valleys, or islands that constitute nations," he says, "it is their human inhabitants."[52]

A common history is another element sometimes used. The strongest cause for the feeling of nationality, says John Stuart Mill is "identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past."[53]

D.A. Rustow disagrees, however, and considers a common history as "equivocal." In Europe, he points out, few areas have not changed political control many times over the centuries.[54]

Karl Deutsch holds that instead of being automatically united by a shared history, men cannot share the historical events through which they live unless they are already united. As an example he gives the Czechs and Germans in Bohemia whose very nearness in a single country has merely embittered their conflicts.[55]

In the heyday of European nationalism language was more frequently invoked than any other criterion.[56] According to Fichte, those who speak the same language belong together and are by nature an inseparable whole.[57]

Rustow, however, considers language not to be an adequate criterion for nationality. Language is not fixed and politics shapes languages as much as language shapes politics. In nearly half the countries of the world less than 70 per cent of the population speak the same language, and in one out of four there is no linguistic majority.[58] H. Kohn also says that there are many nationalities who have no language of their own - like the Swiss who speak four different languages. The English-speaking nations represent different nationalities with frequently conflicting aspirations.[59]

J.J. Rousseau stressed the importance of customs and traditions for nationality. Hans Kohn, on the other hand, shows that these often vary from locality to locality, and in our times they tend to become standardized all over the world, and to change with great rapidity.[60]

J.S. Mill identified nationality with the state.

Boyd Shafer includes an independent government (actual or hoped for) as part of his definition of the nation, as do Christian Bay and Hermann Tennessen. C.W. Mills and Hans Gerth stress it in their definition of the nation:

> A nation is a body of people which by cultural traditions and common historical memories is capable of organizing a state, or at least which raises the claim for such an autonomous organization with some chance of success.[61]

R. Emerson also stresses the role of the state, for if the enquiry is pressed back in time, he says, it will be found that there was a state structure, or at least a political system approximating a state, which coincided with the modern nation in terms of territory and people.[62]

Hans Kohn considers the state as "the most important outward factor in the formation of nationalities.... The condition of statehood need not be present when a nationality originates; but in such a case...it is always the memory of a past state and the aspiration toward statehood that characterizes nationalities in the period of nationalism."[63] Yet despite its importance, the state is only one of the "objective" factors, which are non-essential.

D.A. Rustow points out that a state's boundaries may not coincide with the limits of national self-consciousness; the state may include ethnic minorities that do not feel the same national allegiance and exclude national groups beyond the borders.[64]

Culture is mentioned by some writers. Don Luigi

Sturzo considers the nation to be a people organized on the basis of its traditions, history, language, and culture.[65] F. Znaniecki writes of the "national culture society" which has a common and distinct secular, literary culture and an independent organization functioning for the preservation, growth and expansion of this culture.[66] Hans Kohn shows that in Eastern Europe the cultural element preceded the political one in the formation of nations.

The factor of economy is not mentioned as often as the others, and many writers ignore it completely. F.H. Golay writes about the protectionist policy adopted by developing countries with a view to maintaining a tolerable equilibrium in external payments while pursuing an economic development policy implemented by a high level of investment. They also "de-alienize" their economy and protect their inexperienced indigenous entrepreneurs.[67] Albert Breton considers economic nationalism to result in a redistribution of income in favor of the middle class, not in the creation of the maximum possible wealth.[68]

R. Emerson agrees that nationalism has been influenced by economic forces, but he holds that national communities cannot be explained in economic terms.[69] The consolidation of a political system, he says, is an almost indispensable pre-condition for the building of an integrated economy.[70]

Karl Deutsch has attempted to use a purely objective criterion in speaking of political cohesion, "social communication." Methods such as statistical analysis and content analysis are applied to mail flow, telephone traffic, and other measurable transactions to demonstrate the efficacy of the communications approach.[71]

While scholars use objective factors as preconditions for the existence of the nation, they consider the "subjective factors" to be the essential ones, in the definition of "nation," "nationality," and "nationalism." Leonard Binder writes that nationalism is "inherently a subjective sentiment from which nothing further may be logically derived."[72]

Most writers consider the most essential factor to be a feeling or "state of mind," H. Kohn writes, "Nationalism is a state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people."[73] Different writers have given it varying contents such as loyalty, solidarity, sense of belonging, consciousness of kind, feeling of pride...

The feeling of belonging to the group is mentioned by Morris Ginsberg, Wayland F. Vaughan, Crane Brinton,[74] R. Emerson[75] and Max Weber.[76] F. Znaniecki writes of the solidarity of people in a nation: H.A. Gibbons speaks of a solidarity of privilege and obligations with all others living under the same political unit. D.E. Apter defines nationalism as the "ideology that embodies...primordial sentiments based on race, language, tribe or other factors relevant to the maintenance of solidarity or identity.[77] "Consciousness of kind" is mentioned by Sydney Herbert[78] the "self-consciousness of a nation" by George P. Gooch.[79] "Identification" with the nation is mentioned by F.H. Allport,[80] and C.A.O. Niewenhuijze.[81] J.S. Mills speaks of "common sympathies"[82] and H. Kohn of "sympathy with all fellow members within the nationality...distrust of fellow men outside the national orbit."[83] "Loyalty" to the nationality may be found in H. Kohn's definition,[84] and in Crane Brinton's.[85] B.C. Shafer calls it "devotion to their nation."[86]

Halvdan Koht writes about the less pleasant side of nationalism, the sense of "superiority" and the hatred of other nations.[87]

Ever since J.J. Rousseau's "general will," the democratic element of the will, the inclusion of the whole people in the nation, and the participation of the people in determining their own fate has been an important part in definitions of the nation. Robert Michels writes, "Nationality consists of a single element - the will of the people."[88] Hans Kohn similarly says, "the most essential element is a living and active corporate will. Nationality is formed by the decision to form a nationality."[89] Ernest Renan calls the existence of a nation a "daily plebiscite."[90]

The element of will is directly connected with the bourgeois type of nationalism. Leonard Binder writes "the only solid content of nationalism: the politicization of the masses and the derivation of political legitimacy from the real or purported will of the masses."[91]

Some writers use a metaphysical element like "spirit." George Hegel, for instance was not interested in the will of the masses, which he considered as rabble, and spoke of a "World-Spirit," a world force which visited the peoples in a predetermined order and endowed them with exceptional vitality for some special task.[92] After having sojourned among the Oriental and Classical nations, it had now taken up its abode among the Germans.[93] Reacting against the individualism of the French Revolution Hegel stressed the nation above the individual. The genius or spirit of the nation (Volksgeist) worked through individuals, largely independent of their conscious will, and created art, law, morals and religion.[94]

Some writers look upon nationalism as a psychological aberration or defence mechanism. The horrors of World War II with its exaggerated fascist and Nazi nationalism and hostilities towards out-groups and minorities, led to a number of studies on prejudice as part of a complicated personality syndrome, and to a linking of nationalism with characteristics like anxiety, instability, a sense of inferiority...

T.W. Adorno's authpritarian personality viewed outgroups with hostility while being submissive to the in-group, according to the "ethnocentrism scale."[95] Edward Shils pointed out that these authoritarians could support the "radical left" as well as the "reactionary right."[95]

Milton Rokeach traced the over-identification of "dogmatic" persons with absolute authority and a cause to feelings of isolation, self-hate and misanthropy.[97]

Nationalism, previously considered a good thing, now took on pathological characteristics. Kenneth Apple wrote of "delusions of grandeur."[98] Edmund Ziman of "dependency needs"...[99]

Retaining a more balanced view, Christian Bay and H. Tennessen wrote of two types of nationalism, the "power-oriented" authoritarian type, and the "people-oriented" democratic one.[100]

From the above survey, we find that the factors of the nation have been divided into "objective" and "subjective." Scholars do not agree about the validity of the various objective elements, or about which ones should be included. Some writers use a combination of both objective and subjective elements, but most of them consider the "objective" elements as nonessential, and stress the importance of the "subjective" ones, though here again they use several different ones.

3. Cohesion and Class Struggle

Though the term "nationalism" is not always used, the question of social cohesion, solidarity and loyalty to the group, has been of interest to philosophers since ancient times, and continues to challenge sociologists today.

Many writers have compared society to a living organism, an integral whole, with each part fulfilling a function that contributes towards keeping the whole organism alive. It is towards the larger unit, whether it be a tribe or city-state, or nation that the ultimate loyalty of the individual is supposed to go.

As any excessive factionalism or class struggle tends to destroy the cohesion of the community, and may even affect the loyalty of individuals towards it, writers interested in maintaining the unity of society, point out the need to tone down the class struggle, stress the peaceful division of labor, and the importance of each individual's accepting his station in life.

Describing the life of small nomadic groups, Ibn Khaldun spoke of their esprit de corps, based on familial ties. Once they conquer some weakened civilized state and settle in the city, however, their social solidarity weakens, and the various "classes comprising the city tend to group themselves according to their political and economic interests rather than their blood relations."[101] As the cycle of rise and fall takes its course, decadence sets in, factions arise in the city, struggling to wrest power from each other,[102] and there is the threat of revolution. Eventually the city is conquered by another wave of desert nomads.[103]

Plato saw society in organismic terms. Societies arise out of the needs of men, which can be satisfied only as they supplement each other. Exchange of services implies the division of labor and the specializing of tasks. Justice is the proper inter-relation of functions and classes. It is constituted by each class sticking to its own job, minding its own business, and not meddling with the business or aspiring to take on the job of the other.[104]

In actual life, however, the city was divided into factions, and Plato complained of the extreme violence and selfishness of party struggles which at times led the factions to place their own interest above that of the city, and collaborate with outsiders against their own state.[105] Plato attributed this factionalism to the discrepancy of economic interests between those who owned property and those who did not. Even in the smallest city, he said, there are two cities, a city of the rich and a city of the poor, eternally at war with each other. As a root-and-branch remedy he advocated the abolition of property, but at the very least he believed it necessary to do away with the great extremes of poverty and wealth.[106]

Hoping to achieve harmony and unity, he also suggested a mixed state which would keep a balance between extremes, a combination of oligarchy and democracy.[107]

Aristotle compared economic classes to an animal's organs.[108] He also advocated a mixed form of government, of oligarchy and democracy. Its social foundation was the existence of a large middle class, maintaining a balance between the very rich and the very poor.[109]

In the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas emphasized the organic unity of society. The division of labor, he said, was the result of the inequality of human capacities. Therefore the organization of society according to class and profession was something willed by God. No man should try to rise beyond the limits of his class; to seek to reform the social order would be to meddle with what God had planned.[110]

Machiavelli hoped that a powerful sovereign would be able to hold in check competing interests, and achieve an internal balance.[111]

Hegel also considered it a function of the monarchy to maintain a balance between the lower orders of society and the governing class.[112] This latter class was fitted by birth and training to rule, and embodied a long tradition of hierarchical authority. It represented the general will and the reason of society, and was the guardian of the whole public interest.[113]

In modern sociology one can trace the same "organismic" viewpoint with its stress on a peaceful division of labor, and acceptance of the class structure.

Witnessing the deterioration of the old social order as a result of the French and Industrial Revolution, and the conflict between capital and labor,[114] Auguste Comte suggested the reconstruction of society, with every social class ranked on a hierarchical scale based upon the importance of its function.[115] He divided the material and industrial power among bankers, merchants, manufacturers and agriculturalists, with bankers possessing the most authority.[116] The social order, he said was based on the division of labor.[117] It was a collective organism possessing the attribute of universal consensus.

Emile Durkheim lived in an age of severe political, economic and religious schisms and factional struggles which undermined the national unity of France. The very fabric of society was threatened by the collapse of its norms and organization, and extreme individualism was leading to unhappiness and an increase in suicide. Durkheim joined the movement of "solidarisme" and focused much of his writing on the phenomenon of social solidarity.

The corporations he suggested as a solution, would not only act as a buffer between the state and the atomized individuals, but would also make labor and management genuinely solidary. They would act for the welfare of the whole, and thereby reduce industrial strife, and curb the appetites of individuals.[118]

The individual, evaluated by others solely upon the basis of his merit and functional contribution, would not wish for more than his condition legitimately required, and he would feel the justness of the hierarchy of social functions.[119]

A similar organismic view and acceptance of the class system may be found in Structural-Functionalism. According to N. Timasheff, the basic functional theorem is: "A social system is a real system in which the parts perform functions essential for the persistence (eventually the expansion or strengthening) of the whole, and therefore are interdependent and more or less completely integrated."[120]

In dealing with social stratification the Functionalists Davis and Moore show it to be inevitable, functional, and based on merit. Starting from the proposition that no society is classless, they attempt to explain the functional necessity which gives rise to stratification, the requirement faced by any society of placing and motivating individuals in the social structure.[121] Any society, they say, must motivate its personnel to fill the various positions which are necessary for the production of goods and services, and the functioning of its institutions, and to perform the duties of these positions diligently. Some positions require particular talents and are more important than others. In order to motivate the appropriate individuals to aspire to these positions, to acquire the required training, and to perform their duties with diligence once in them, differentially distributed rewards are necessary.[122]

Even Social Darwinists who stress the element of conflict in society, see a correlation between intergroup conflict and intragroup solidarity.[123] Bagehot pointed out the superiority of compact groups over loosely knit ones. Group cohesion, he held, is the main prerequisite for victory in group struggle.[124] W.G. Sumner distinguished between we-groups and they-groups. Whereas the members of an ingroup are bound in a relationship of peace, order and law, their relationship to all outsiders is one of hostility. Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, war-likeness without - all grow together.[125]

Several writers on nationalism point out its negative correlation with the class struggle. F. Znaniecki writes that the realization of the ideal of a culturally united and socially solidary national society is expected to overcome political division and class conflicts.[126]

Christian Bay and H. Tennessen express it very clearly:

> The manipulation of nationalist ideas...create ...a solidarity cutting across class lines and thus tending to counteract whatever stimuli there are towards a class struggle; they tend to channel revolutionary energies and other kinds of aggression toward outgroups instead of rulers...[127]

Western scholars have linked nationalism with several different social classes, depending on the epoch in which they believe nationalism had its beginnings.

Halvdan Koht, B.C. Shafer, C.J.H. Hayes and E.H. Carr stress the role of monarchs in the rise of nationalism. Carr states that beginning with the dissolution of the medieval unity of empire and church, there was an identification of the nation with the person of the sovereign.[128]

Boyd C. Shafer feels that the nobility in addition to the monarchs had a role in building nations.[129] C.J.H. Hayes considers that the upper classes played an important role only in 18th century English nationalism, but not elsewhere.[130] The Royal Institute of International Affairs report points out that though in general aristocrats stood against nationalism, in some cases they backed it when it was likely to maintain, strengthen or restore their privileges.[131] Hans Kohn writes that in the second half of the 19th century nationalism was regarded as the political doctrine of the upper classes, of the rightists in the political spectrum of the age.[132]

Most writers make some mention of the role of the middle class in nationalism. Hans Kohn stresses the middle class with the rise of nationalism in the 18th century.[133] E.H. Carr, considers that from the Napoleonic wars till 1914, the nation was identified with the middle class or third estate.[134] L.L. Snyder writes that when the middle class began to feel that the nation belonged to the property owners, not merely to the king, modern nationalism assumed much of its character.[135] L. Wirth and K.S. Symonolewicz also link nationalism with the middle class.

Some writers like L. Wirth, K.S. Symonolewicz and F. Znaniecki also stress the role of the intellectuals. Znaniecki writes: "The formation of a national culture society...originates with independent individual leaders in various realms of cultural activity, who gradually create a national culture....[136] Most national rebellions are preceded by the formation of private associations of intellectual nationalists."[137]

E.H. Carr considers that between 1914 and 1939, there was a socialization of the nation, and national policy was founded on the support of the masses.[138] Hans Kohn finds that in the 20th century, nationalism has spread to the masses.[139] Boyd C. Shafer speaks of the loyalty of modern workers to their nations.[140] The Royal Institute of International Affairs points out that in 1914 the socialist parties representing the workers joined in voting the war credits.[141] Morris Ginsberg on the other hand, thinks that the movement for independence was often initiated by small minorities without much regard for the will of the masses.[142]

Bay and Tennessen point out that nationalism can be used by rulers as a means of social and political control, and also by rebels who have their own interpretation of the national interests, and by people who have not yet won their desired independence.[143]

From the above survey we find that writers interested in social cohesion have usually shown an acceptance of the social class system and tried to tone down the class struggle, while stressing the peaceful division of labor.

Various classes have been linked with nationalism -

the monarchs and nobles, the bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, the masses...but special importance has been given to the role of the bourgeoisie, at least in its connection with "modern" nationalism.

It has been pointed out that nationalism can be used by both the rulers in preserving the status quo, and by rebels in trying to change it.

In analysing the nationalist movements in the developing countries, a number of writers tend to stress the leading role of middle class intellectuals, and show that the movement spreads to include the whole nation.

According to Hans Kohn, the economic structure of these countries formerly rested upon the land ownership and agriculture, and the dominant class was the wealthy landed nobility. As the new types of economic activity arose, under the influence of the capitalist West, a new dominant class began to appear, the middle class merchants and the urban intelligentsia.[144] Originating with the middle-class intelligentsia, the movement finds support in the labouring masses, the peasants and workers. Alien domination leads to common action of all classes.[145]

Emerson points out that the first round of resistance to alien encroachment is led by those who formerly held power, in the attempt to preserve the old society and their status in it. But when this round fails, they are replaced by the newly risen, Westernized elements who take the lead in the drive for independence and modernization.[146]

This new elite consists of the intelligentsia and the professional men,[147] usually urban[148] and middle class.[149] It is usually joined by the rising indigenous entrepreneurs and businessmen.[150] The usual failure of such men to get an effective hearing for their case through rational argument and persuasion leads them to create mass parties or movements. They are joined by labor leaders, and the door is opened to the emergence of leaders with less Western education and orientation.[151]

Kautsky also emphasizes the role of intellectuals who, he says assume the leadership of nationalist movements. In addition to their usual ideological role, they also play the role of the industrial capitalists of the West in industrializing the country. Included among the "intellectuals" are the new army officers who frequently become the dominant force among the intellectuals. Industrial workers, in conflict with their foreign employers, furnish the nationalist movement with recruits, and trade unions tend to become adjuncts of the nationalist movement. Though the peasants do not initiate any nationalist movement, they can become an important mass base for such a movement led by intellectuals. The declining old middle class of tradesmen and craftsmen in the towns is very anti-foreign, and also feeds the anti-colonialist nationalist movement. Closely tied to the colonial economy and to the aristocracy, native capitalists may become anti-nationalist, but they also resent foreign competition, and may join the nationalist movement. While the conservative side of colonialism preserves the aristocracy, its modernizing aspects threaten its power. Even among the aristocrats, there may be important forces who join the ranks of the nationalist movement and lead its traditionalist wing. Anti-colonial nationalism, in short, can unite all the major social classes in underdeveloped countries.[152]

Peter Worsley too stresses the predominance of the intelligentsia in the new elite,[153] professionals, teachers and lawyers.[154] The middle class elements who provide the political leadership are the Western-educated minor civil servants, not the small or large businessmen,[155] though the latter also make their contribution to the movement.[156] Elite nationalism is eventually replaced by mass nationalism,[157] and reaches a revolutionized peasantry,[158] and the industrial workers.[159] Unity in the face of imperialism over-rides class hostilities; and national independence takes priority over class struggles.[160]

Znaniecki also holds that "most national rebellions are preceded by the formation of private associations of intellectual nationalist."[161]

4. Nationalism and Internationalism

Nineteenth and twentieth century liberalism held that the boundaries of governments should coincide with those of nationalities. John Stuart Mill identified nationality and state, and called for the independence of the nation-state.[162]

Lord Acton did not agree, for he believed a single-nation state would be absolutistic and would reduce to a subject condition all other nationalities that might be within the boundary. He favored multinational units in which there would be no oppression of nationalities. But he cannot be considered as "internationalist," for his ideal was the British and Austrian Empires, which included distinct nationalities without oppressing them (according to him). He looked upon the races as being unequal, and hoped that "inferior" races would be raised by living in political union with races intellectually "superior."[163] Thus his brand of multinational union was an imperialistic one rather than a union of free and equal peoples.

The nationalism of Western Europe, particularly in its beginnings, is usually looked upon as "democratic," "humanitarian," "liberal," "cosmopolitan," and is linked with the spread of democratic rights to the masses and individual liberty. Hans Kohn writes that at its beginning nationalism was "...a great inspiration, widening and deepening the understanding of man, the feeling of solidarity, the autonomous dignity of the masses...it increased individual liberty and happiness...it was a great force of life, spurring on the evolution of mankind."[164]

Morris Ginsberg points out that in the nineteenth century nationalist movements were on the whole "liberative. Hence it was natural to regard them as based on the principles of liberal democracy."[165]

This promising beginning did not last, however, and movements which began as liberative passed into "phases of authoritarianism within and aggression without," in Ginsberg's words. A feeling of "disillusion" set in concerning nationalism, particularly in connection with the aggressive type that arose in Germany, Italy and Japan[166] and brought disaster upon the world. C.J. Hayes differentiates between "original" nationalism and the aggressive "derived" type. Hans Kohn differentiates between the democratic West European nationalism and the authoritarian type that arose in Central and East Europe.

Writers suggested the creation of multi-national and international units of organization superseding the nation. E.H. Carr considered the nation to be obsolescent and the best hope of achieving social justice, equality of opportunity and freedom from want for all to lie in "a balanced structure of international or multi-national groupings both for the maintenance of security and for the planned development of the economies of geographical areas and groups of nations."[167]

F. Znaniecki wrote of "world society"[168] Hans Kohn said that the individual liberty of man has to be "organized on a supranational basis. Democracy and industrialism...have both outgrown the national connection."[169]

This does not mean a total rejection of the nation, however, Hans Kohn still supports nationalism insofar as it allows for the liberty of countries and a beneficial diversity.[170] He considers it to be an important factor in preventing any one or two of the strongest powers from establishing their hegemony over the whole globe or over a large part of it. "Nationalism is a form of resistance to imposed uniformity, a bulwark of beneficial diversity, individuality, and liberty of collective groups."[171]

Morris Ginsberg also points out that nationalism can be used for good as well as for evil. It retains its value, he says, "a) as asserting the right of peoples to freedom from alien domination; b) in stressing the importance for mankind of a diversity of cultures; and c) of providing peoples in those areas of the world which are in the process of freeing themselves from foreign rule with the energy and vitality needed in the struggle for liberation, and with sufficient community of feeling and outlook to enable them to build up viable states."[172]

Amitai Etzioni sees a long-run trend toward integration in which functions, authority and loyalties are "transferred from smaller units to larger ones; from states to federations; from federations to supranational unions; and from these to super-systems."[173] Eventually, he believes it possible that "the highest super-system, that of a global society, might develop."[174] Karl Deutsch, on the other hand, denies that there is any clear-cut automatic trend towards internationalism.[175]

There seems to be nothing automatic in some of the factors that Etzioni mentions in writing about the attempted European supranational unions. About the European Economic Community, he says that an external elite, the United States, required some degree of intra-European economic cooperation as a condition for receiving funds under the Marshall Plan and thus encouraged the union of the six countries that formed the EEC.[176] Soon, he adds, the union acquired the additional function of countering Soviet military expansion, i.e. an external threat.[177]

As for political unification, Etzioni says it is so far only a "grand design."[178] Attempts to develop supranational control over shared political activities, in which the members of the EEC do engage, have not yet succeeded.[179]

5. Types of Nationalism

Writers have mentioned a wide variety of types of nationalism, each of them putting forth a typology of his own. We shall give below just a few illustrations of such typologies.

E.H. Carr mentions four periods:[180]

1st period: begins with the gradual dissolution of the medieval unity of empire and church and the establishment of the national state and the national church, and terminates with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The nation is identified with the person of the sovereign, and mercantilism reigns.

2nd period: stretches from the Napoleonic wars till 1914. The nation is identified with the middle class, and nationalism has a democratic and potentially popular flavor. Laissez faire reigns, there is a single world economy and British commercial and naval supremacy.

3rd period: culminates in 1914-1939. The masses achieve political power, and there is an alliance of nationalism and socialism. There is a startling increase in the number of nations, the single world economy is replaced by a multiplicity of national economies and the setting up of protective tariffs. Nationalism becomes totalitarian and catastrophic. It spreads to backward countries, and goes bankrupt in the West.

4th period: The U.S. is a melting pot of nations, and the U.S.S.R. embraces a multiplicity of nations. It is the age of international and multinational groupings.

Boyd C. Shafer gives the following divisions:[181]

- From 1100 to 1600 in western Europe, the monarchs built large territorial domains and imposed a common national authority. Sometime around the 18th century, the middle classes began to feel that the nation belonged to all the property owners. Popular nationalism in contradistinction to dynastic nationalism was beginning. All native inhabitants of a nation considered themselves citizens entitled to national rights. National governments made the churches national and created national armies.
- 19th century: nationalism spread over the world. The

Asian, African and American nationalism developed, sparked by hatred and fear of foreign oppression more than hope for the achievement of liberties. Tariffs protected national economic interests, banks and industries became national.

C.J. Hayes states that since the 18th century, the Western world has experienced five varieties of nationalism:[182]

1. Humanitarian Nationalism: attempted to promote the welfare of all humanity by means of mutual respect of national states or national cultures, and based itself on the doctrine of natural law. Among the philosophers mentioned here are Bolingbroke who preferred an aristocratic form of government, Rousseau whose idea of popular sovereignty led indirectly to the doctrine of national self-determination, and Herder who spoke of folk-character or national soul.

2. Jacobin Nationalism: this was based on democratic nationalism and appeared after 1793. Originally humanitarian, it became intolerant and militant. The Jacobins cemented the unity of the French people by violent means, and got involved in a war of conquest, ex. Barere and Carnot.

3. Traditional Nationalism: aristocratic nationalism became traditional, and was characterized by dislike of rationalist thinking and respect for historical continuity. Ex. in England, Burke put forward the doctrine of organic growth in politics. In France, Bonald turned his attention

to historical, traditional France. Romanticism and the love of ancient Germany inflienced Friedrich Schlegel's nationalist thinking, which included the idea of racial superirority.

4. Liberal Nationalism: stressed the absolute sovereignty of the national state but sought to limits its authority by stressing individual liberties. It sought to redraw the political mpa of the world so that each nationality should have an independent state of its own. Liberals desired the liberation of oppressed peoples and the creation of national states, ex. Bentham, Guizot, Mazzini...

5. Integral Nationalism: inherited the respect for national and historical traditions from traditional nationalism. It was jingoistic, militarist and inclined to imperialism. In domestic affairs it was illiberal. It subordinated persona liberties in the "national interest;" ex. in France Barres and Maurras and the Action Francaise movement; in Italy Gentile, Gioberti, d'Annunzio and Mussolini; in Germany Hitler. (Hayes also included Russian Bolshevism, here, equating it - wrongly we think - with Fascism).

Hayes also differentiated between original and derived nationalism. A nationality which has once been oppressed but which has obtained its freedom, transforms its "original" nationalism into a "derived" nationalism which renders it reactionary, militarist and imperialist.

L.L. Snyder puts forth the following divisions:[183]

- 1815 - 1871: Nationalism was a force for unification.

It helped to consolidate the states that had outgrown feudal division, and to unify others that had long been split into hostile factions, ex. Germany and Italy.

- 1871 - 1900: Nationalism was a force for disruption. Minorities in Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and other conglomerate states called for independence based on geographic unity, common language, interests, culture, traditions, customs and sometimes a nonexistent "race."
- 1900 - 1918: Nationalism was a force for aggression. It became virtually identical with imperialism. The collision of opposing national interests came with explosive impact in World War I.
- 1918 - to date: This period he calls "New Nationalism." The Forces making for nationalism were present in great degree from 1919 to 1939. After World War II, nationalism emerged somewhat tamed in the West, as Britain, France and the Netherlands relinquished their overseas colonies. The threat of Communist expansion also led the Western Nations to form regional federations. But nationalism persisted in the Soviet Union, and emerged in Africa, Asia and the Near and Middle East.

Louis Wirth considers the types to represent various stages in the same nationalistic movement:[184]

- Hegemony Nationalism: 19th century movements of national unification, ex. Italy and Germany based on factors like contiguity of territory, similarity of language and kinship of culture. These movements which had been nourished by the memory of previous dynastic unions of separate states, by a common history, language and culture, eventually became defined in political terms with an integrated state and national sovereignty as their goal. The decisive factors were the economic, political and military advantage to be derived from consolidating smaller principalities into larger units.

After a nationality has achieved political autonomy, it sometimes redefines its aims in terms of empire or becomes chauvinistic, ex. pan-Germanism, pan-Slavism, fascism.

- Particularistic Nationalism: based upon the secessionist demand of national autonomy. Such movements begin with a striving for cultural autonomy or toleration, and then develop into the demand for political sovereignty, ex. Norway, Ireland. The many potential national ties which the Austrian, German, Russian and Turkish empires had conquered became revivified by the developments in Europe, resulting in the collapse of these empires.
- Marginal Nationalism: nationalistic movements characteristic of border territories and populations such as Alsace, Lorraine, Silesia, Schleswig...
- Nationalism of Minorities: racial ethnic, cultural or merely political minorities.

Hans Kohn differentiates between a democratic western nationalism and an authoritarian Eastern type:

- Western: in England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland.

It is characterized by a pluralistic, open society, individual liberty, cosmopolitanism. It was preceded by the formation of a national state or coincided with it (in the 18th century), and was based on the middle class.

- Non-Western: in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia nationalism arose later, and at a more backward stage of development. It grew in protest against the existing pattern and found its first expression in the cultural field. It was authoritarian and emotional, resorting to myths of the past and dreams of the future.[185]
- 19th century: Nationalism became the doctrine of the upper classes, of the rightists in the political spectrum.
- 20th century: Nationalism has become a revolutionary movement, demanding the welfare of the underprivileged classes. By the middle of the 20th century, all young nationalist movements became "socialist." The trend is towards "pan-nationalism."[186]

From the above typologies we find that despite the differences between them the writers mention at least some of the following:

- Dynastic nationalism (Carr, Shafer)
- Early democratic, liberal nationalism (Kohn, Hayes, Shafer)
- Imperialistic type (Kohn, Hayes, Snyder, Wirth)
- Fascistic, aggressive type (Kohn, Hayes, Snyder, Wirth)
- Unification type (Wirth, Snyder)
- Conservative upper class type (Kohn, Hayes)

- Socialistic type (Kohn, Carr)
- Nationalism of Minorities (Snyder, Wirth)
- Nationalism of colonies (Snyder, Wirth, Shafer, Kohn)

Though a wide variety of types is mentioned, there is an emphasis on the liberal nationalism of the middle class bourgeois type.

6. Nationalism and the Third World

Following the expansion which arose with the Commercial Revolution and Mercantilism in the 17th and 18th centuries, the enthusiasm for acquiring colonies abated, and many, like Sir Henry Parnell, decried it as wasted effort. In England imperial sentiment waned, and Gladstone spoke of a "Little England."

In the last quarter of the 19th century, however, there was a revival of imperialism and overseas expansion, and the European nations engaged in a scramble for territory in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The anti-colonial school lost its influence, and a generation of imperial apologists emerged in England.

Social Darwinists spoke of the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest. Nationalists and racists in all the major countries argued that it was the destiny of their own "master race" to dominate backward peoples. The Anglo-Saxon race, according to Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke was destined to conquer the world.

It was the "white man's burden" to civilize the backward peoples of the earth, without expecting any gratitude for his efforts, according to Rudyard Kipling, the apostle of imperialism. Sir John R. Seeley urged that British ideals be extended all over the globe. Aggrandizement was a duty, he said, for it would bring an end to the reign of robbery and murder in countries like India. Josiah Strong of the U.S.A. contended that it was the mission of the Anglo-Saxon race to carry its ideals of civil liberty and Christianity to the peoples of the earth.

"Altruism" apart, the economic interests that lay behind expansionism could be noted in Joseph Chamberlain's demand for the acquisition of markets with a view to providing employment for Britain's workers, and Dilke's emphasis on the economic and military value of uncivilized tropical areas.[187]

A few voices arose against imperialism. John A. Hobson wrote a book on imperialism in 1902 which had a great influence on Lenin. In it he stated:

> Overproduction, in the sense of an excessive manufacturing plant, and surplus capital which could not find sound investments within the country, forced Great Britain, Germany, Holland, France to place larger and larger portions of their economic resources outside the area of their present political domain, and then stimulate a policy of political expansion so as to take in the new areas... The powers of production...exceed the growth in consumption ...more goods can be produced than can be sold at a profit...more capital exists than can find remunerative investment.[188]

The machinery of government, he said, was used by private interests, mainly capitalists to secure for them gains outside their country. War and militarism were a means to this end, and there was a tremendous growth of naval and military expenditure - all borne by the general public. While garnering the profits resulting from imperialism, the financial, industrial and professional classes make use of "patriotism," and with noble phrases express their desire to "extend the area of civilisation, promote Christianity, extirpate slavery, and elevate the lower races."[189]

The "inevitability" of imperialism, said Hobson, was a fallacy. It could be avoided by a redistribution of consuming power.

> It is not industrial progress that demands the opening up of new markets and areas of investment, but mal-distribution of consuming power which prevents the absorption of commodities and capital within the country. The over-saving which is the economic root of Imperialism is found by analysis to consist of rents, monopoly profit and other unearned or excessive elements of income, which, not being earned by labour of head or hand, have no legitimate raison d'etre. Let any turn in the tide of politico-economic forces divert from these owners their excess of income and make it flow, either to the workers in higher wages, or to the community in taxes, so that it will be spent instead of being saved, serving in either of these ways to swell the tide of consumption - there will be no need to fight for foreign markets or foreign areas of investment.[190]

W.S. Blunt criticized British policy and became a sympathizer of Muslim aspirations. The whole white race, he said, was reveling in violence, as though it had never pretended to be Christian.

The French novelist Anatole France called imperialism the most recent form of barbarism, and showed how it served the military people, shipowners, army contractors and shady politicians. The French Socialist Jean Jaures strongly opposed militarism and imperialism, and warned of an awakening of the colonies.[191]

In 1917, Lenin attacked imperialism, and identified it as the highest stage of capitalism (see Chapter III). Joseph Schumpeter provided a reply to Lenin. Imperialism, he said, was atavistic in character, a survival from the past. The carrier of imperialist ventures is the machine of warriors created by wars that required it, which now creates the wars it requires.[192] A purely capitalist world offers no fertile soil to imperialist impulses. Its people are essentially of an unwarlike disposition.[193] In the distant past, imperialism needed no disguise, but today it has to be carefully hidden from public view. No ruling class can openly afford to regard war as a normal state of affairs.[194]

More recently (in 1954) Raymond Aron also denied Lenin's thesis, which he considered to be superficial and mythical. He believed that actual relationship between economic interests and diplomacy is more often the reverse of that accepted by the Marxists. Often, he says, diplomatic alignments are determined not by economic rivalries but by considerations of power, by racial or cultural affinities, or by the passions of the masses.

> None of the colonial undertakings that caused important diplomatic conflicts in Europe was motivated by the quest for capitalist profits; they all originated in political ambitions that

> the chancelleries camouflaged by invoking 'realistic' motives. In other words, the actual relationship is most often the reverse of that accepted by the current theory of imperialism: the economic interests are only a pretext or a rationalization, whereas the profounder cause lies in the nations's will to power.[195]

During the first world war, the principle of self-determination was used by President Wilson and Britain's Lloyd George as a slogan. In 1916, President Wilson declared that "every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live." Though he included the principle of self-determination in the first and second drafts of the League Covenant, it found no place in the final draft.

According to Harold S. Johnson, the principle was convenient in that it assisted during the war to weaken the resisting power of Germany's allies. Alfred Cobban concludes that the more the work of the Peace Conference is studied, the less it seems to have been under the control of the principle of self-determination. Frederick Schuman points out that whenever there appeared a possibility of reducing further the territory and power of the defeated states, self-determination was appealed to, and the populations were given the opportunity to express their wishes through plebiscites.

In no case was national self-determination recognized to the detriment of the victorious allies.[196] The Treaty of Sevres slashed the territory of the Ottoman Empire to one-fourth of its original size. Turkey was forced to cede a number of territories not to the peoples inhabiting them but to the Allies. Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia were made mandated territories and placed under the unwanted tutelage of Britain and France. Turkey was deprived of all rights to Egypt, over which Britain had established a protectorate on December 18, 1914.

In drawing up the Versailles treaties, the Great Powers completely ignored the wishes of the peoples whose destinies they were deciding. The representatives of these peoples were not even admitted to the Paris Peace Conference.[197]

The end of World War I was the signal for the effective beginning of the great upsurge of nationalism which reached its fruition after 1945.

During World War II, self-determination became one of the principles for which the allies avowedly fought. The signers of the Atlantic Charter, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote that they "desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." Later, Churchill asserted that the Charter was not intended to apply to colonies, but was concerned with the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the states and nations of Europe under the Nazi yoke.[198]

The wartime denunciation of autocracy and fascism inevitably rubbed off on imperialism, and the themes of democracy, self-determination, human rights and antiracialism were promptly put to anti-colonial use.[199]

The colonial revolt reached flood tide in the years immediately after the second world war. Waves of anti-imperialist unrest appeared in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The whole edifice of imperialism shook and collapsed.

According to Jack Woddis, in 1919 over 1,200 million people out of a world population of 1,800 million, i.e. almost 70%, were in colonies, semi-colonies or dominions. By 1966 direct colonial rule had disappeared over most of Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Only some thirty million people, i.e. less than 1% of mankind. remained under European rule (or American).[200]

In some cases, as in Indochina, Indonesia and Algeria, the imperialist powers fought to retain their position; in others, such as the Philippines, India, Burma and Ceylon they yielded with greater or less grace.[201]

In 1955 the Bandung Conference was attended by Asian-African countries and called for the abolition of imperialism, and the recognition of the equality of all races and nations large and small.[202] It was followed by a number of similar conferences.

As the number of new states increased, they were able to have more say in the United Nations. On December 14, 1960, the General Assembly adopted the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples'. Subjection of peoples to alien subjugation was resolved to be contrary to the Charter of the U.N., and it was recommended that political power in all dependent territories be transferred to the people in accordance with their freely expressed will.[203]

On December 20, 1965, the U.N. General Assembly invited all states to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial territories. In effect, legitimate nationalist movements were granted an international status.[204]

The colonial question proved to be a bone of contention between the West and the Communist bloc. The Soviet Union supported the right of self-determination for colonies in the United Nations, and was accused of trying to drive a wedge between the colonies and the West. The West felt suspicious of any Communist moves in the direction of the former imperial domains.[205]

In turn, the Western powers attacked the Soviet Union for its own "imperialism," and emphasized the need for self-determination within the "satellite" states.[206] The U.K. and the U.S.A. referred to satellitism as a new form of colonialism.[207]

On various occasions, western spokesmen attempted to defend their colonial activities. Sir Anthony Eden said in 1952 that Britain guided the colonies "towards self-government." Warring tribes were welded into nations. Law, justice and respect for human rights were established, replacing the "rule of the jungle" and the despot.[208]

The Communists allowed the West to take no credit for the new freedom of the colonies, but laid it at the door of the Soviet stand on self-determination in the U.N., and the "national liberation movements" in the colonies. In fact, they said, the Western powers were trying to maintain their hegemony over the third world through "neo-colonialism."

When we turn to the scholars who have written on nationalism, we find that though they often condemn the aggressive type of nationalism, it is usually when the aggression is directed towards a European people. Where "backward" countries are concerned, however, they are less strict in their condemnation, and may even approve of it.

There is a tendency to consider the European countries as "superior," and the colonies as inferior. Lord Acton held that inferior races are raised by living in political union with intellectually superior races, and considered the British and Austrian empires as an ideal.[209]

Hans Kohn considered that Europe "has so amply demonstrated its superiority over older...civilizations that they have been unable to withstand its penetration."[210] For him, it was a question of the stage of civilization reached in the course of history. The essential thing was the "transition from a feudal, medieval, religious framework to a new age of machine industry and rationalized trade and of critical and liberal thinking."[211]

Imperialism thus acquired a "civilizing mission."

In the words of Hans Kohn, "without doubt imperialism, especially British imperialism, was a bearer of civilization, like imperialism in past days. Inequality in the level of civilization and civilizing energy are of the very essence of imperialism."[212]

Among the "blessings" conferred by Great Britain on her colonies were: ideas of freedom, formation of character, orderly administration, impartial justice, security, order, financial and industrial development, economic prosperity, democracy...[213]

As for France, her "blessings" were: ideas of equality, liberty, democracy, representative bodies, administrative reform.[214]

Rupert Emerson also considers that imperialism was "the instrument by which the spiritual, scientific, and material revolution which began in western Europe with the Renaissance was spread to the rest of the world."[215] It taught the colonies democracy and nationalism.[216]

This does not blind the writers to the evils of imperialism, however, or make them believe in its claims of bearing the "white man's burden" of service to the backward peoples.

Though Hans Kohn speaks of the "civilizing" mission of imperialism in one place, he states in another that "Imperialism...is an expression of the collective egotism and love of domination of the...nations."[217]

In Asia and Africa, he says, "European powers found the necessary raw materials, and thither they exported their cheap mass production, which they transported in their own ships. They invested large sums of money for which they received considerable profits in return. Again, the colonies offered a wide field of highly paid activity to the sons of their "ruling class."[218] Control of the great trade routes was one of the central problems over which the powers wrestled with one another.[219]

They induced the colonies to concentrate mainly on the production of a single raw material, thus rendering them entirely dependent on the industrial countries economically and therefore politically.[220] They took care to prevent any deeper measure of Europeanization of popular education, and of modernization of native trade and industry.[221]

Exploitation and the lust for power were cloaked beneath a veil of morality, and a claim that justice and benefits were being conferred on the colonies.[222] Racial arrogance had a demoralizing effect on the subjugated peoples, killing their self-respect.[223]

Emerson shows the same ambivalence towards imperialism. Though it has conferred "benefits" on the colonies, it is characterized by the desire for power and profit.[224] It kept industrialization in the colonies at a "low and generally inconsequential level."[225] Towards the natives, the Europeans showed arrogance and racial discrimination,[226] and when they settled (in Africa for instance), they limited "democracy" to their own community.[227]

John H. Kautsky sees imperialism as both a conservative and a modernizing force,[228] and points out that nationalists in the colonies accuse imperialism of opposing industrialization.[229]

Peter Worsley considers imperialism to be a modernizing agent. Writing about India, he says, "the impact of the British conquest of India, however destructive of the indigenous economy, and however exploitative, nevertheless ultimately set Indian society on the path to modernization."[230]

The national liberation movement of colonies has evoked varying reactions from the writers on nationalism. A number of them adopt a superior attitude towards the "backward" nations and look down on their nationalism or disapprove of it. Some deny the existence of nations in the first place and hardly consider it as nationalism at all. Symonolewicz, for instance says "They are "nationalist" movements behind which there are still no nations, not even cultural or ideological unities from which such nations could easily develop. Their unity is predominantly of a negative type - it rests on their common opposition to...colonial rule."[231]

Wirth goes so far as to say, "Today we find nationalism even where there is no evidence of the existence of a nation, such as in Egypt, in India and in China, where the masses have not even been touched by enlightenment."[232]

Carr considers that in the period 1914-1939 there was a "catastrophic" growth of nationalism, a "startling" increase in the number of nations - i.e., the period in which nationalism spread to the Arab world, India, and the Far East. It was natural for the less privileged countries to wish to industrialize, but economic nationalism led to multiplied competition for narrowing markets, and the results were "disastrous."[233]

He considers the nationalism of the non-western nations to be inferior to that of Europe. "In Western Europe," he writes, "nationalism had grown in soils fertilized by the traditions of Christendom, or natural law, and of secular individualism. Nationalism was now spreading to countries where every Christian or European tradition was alien..." and "inhibitions...unknown."[234]

Unlike the other writers who look down on the colonies and their nationalism, Znaniecki shows respect for it. He regards the nationalism of "backward" peoples as the attempt of "natives trying to defend their land from foreign invasion;"[235] and as their efforts "to develop the industrial production of their own nationality and to counteract the importation and use of foreign products,[236] as well as to achieve complete independence and free their nationalities from foreign domination."[237]

Hans Kohn approves of nationalism in the Hither East and considers it "progressive."[238] "It is exercising the intellectual and economic function that it exercised in Europe a hundred years ago," he writes, and describes it as "a struggle for freedom, the dawning consciousness of the national individuality."[239] Nationalism is the "intellectual form assumed by the need of incipient capitalism."[240]

Emerson also holds that nationalism still has a contribution to make to the development of the non-western peoples. It has an "essential role to play for peoples undergoing the kind of social and psychological transformation which that revolution (which originated in Western Europe) imposes on them."[241]

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER III

SOVIET MARXISM AND NATIONALISM

In the present chapter we shall analyse what Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and some modern Soviet theorists have to say about the nation and nationalism.

To understand the Marxist writers it is necessary to keep in mind that they were not only theoreticians but men of action as well, who had to apply the theories to actual situations. Marx was actively involved in revolutionary activity, and Lenin, Stalin etc. were not only revolutionaries but eventually rulers as well.

The Marxists themselves always stress the unity of theory and practice; so it is important to trace how these two have interacted and affected each other. According to the Soviet Philosophical Encyclopedia, dialectical materialism stipulates the "...unity of the...abstract and the concrete..." and "...practice as the criterion of truth."[1]

Communists claim that their policies are based on Marxist theory, which they consider to be a universal law. At the same time, however, the theory must not be applied automatically; it must be interpreted creatively.

According to the Declaration of the Conference of

Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries held in Moscow in 1957,

> Marxism-Leninism requires a creative application of the general principles of socialist revolution and socialist construction, depending on the specific conditions in each country, and does not permit mechanical copying of the policies and tactics of the Communist Parties of other countries.[2]

Creativity should not be overdone, however, and there must be no "exaggeration of the role of these peculiarities and departure...from the universal Marxist-Leninist truth..."[3]

The two opposites "universal law" and "creativity" are usually stated together, in typical dialectical style; so in order to differentiate between one thinker and the next it is necessary to find out on which of the two opposite poles each of them places the greater emphasis or importance.

The stress on "creativity" may be seen in the pragmatic approach of Lenin, who made such remarks as "We are marching to our class goals by all possible paths."[4] Again, in his report to the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920, he admitted, "We...are often obliged to compromise, to bide our time, since we are weaker than the international imperialists."[5]

Khrushchev showed a similar flexibility in the application of theory. In 1960 he wrote:

> "We live in a time when we have neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin with us. If we act like children who, studying the alphabet, compile words from letters, we shall not go

> very far. Based on Marxist-Leninist teaching, we must think for ourselves, we must thoroughly study life, analyze the present situation and draw conclusions that are useful to the common cause of communism.[6]

In the interaction between theory and practice, what happens to the theory itself? Does it remain the same, or is it modified in the process of application?

A modern Soviet writer, Simoniia, points out that the national liberation movements in the last couple of decades have "promoted an increased interest in matters of theory, and attempts to reinterpret some of its postulates."[7]

Speaking of the need to refine the means for the joint theoretical work of the Communist Parties, Brezhnev says, "we favor the regular holding of international theoretical conferences."[8]

In the present chapter an attempt will be made to show the interaction that has taken place between Marxist theory and practice in the field of nationalism, and the modifications in the theory that have resulted therefrom.

1. The Nation and Capitalism

Unlike Western writers, who link the nation to a number of different historical stages, Marx held that the origin of the nation lay in the feudal period when the bourgeoisie was still the rising class, and reached its culmination during the capitalist epoch. He wrote:

> It is the epoch which had its rise in the last half of the fifteenth century. Royalty with the support of the burghers of the town, broke

> the power of the feudal nobility and established the great monarchies, based essentially on nationality within which the modern nation and modern bourgeois society came to development.[9]

It is the bourgeois class that creates the modern, unified nation-state.

> It does away with the scattered state of the population and of the means of production, thus leading to political centralization. Independent or but loosely connected provinces become lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier, and one customs tariff.[10]

Engels delved further back into the past and wrote about "ancient nations." In "The Origin of the Family," Engels spoke about how, during the lower stage of barbarism, the North American Indians spread over the continent, and "through division, tribes became nations, entire groups of tribes."[11]

Moving on to the ancient Greeks, he states that in the Homeric poems "we find most of the Greek tribes already united into small nations."[12]

At times he utilizes the term "people" instead, in speaking of the Roman and German tribes, yet he equates them with nations, for he says, "those German tribes which had combined into peoples...the same as had developed among the Greeks of the Homeric Age and the Romans of the ...time of the kings,"[13] during the upper stage of barbarism.

As for the modern nationalities. Engels says that they "grew out of the slime of the Roman world,"[14] and traces the birth pangs of the new civilization to the ninth century.

Little attention has been paid by Marxist doctrine to this aspect of Engels' thought, and the whole stress has been laid on modern nations instead.

Following in Marx's footsteps, Lenin links the rise of the nation with the bourgeois class.

> It was in the period of the downfall of feudalism and absolutism, the period of the formation of the bourgeois democratic society and state when the national movements for the first time became mass movements and...drew all classes of the population into politics.[15]

Stalin based himself on Marx and Lenin.

> Nations...developed in the epoch of rising capitalism, when the bourgeoisie, destroying feudalism and feudal disunity, gathered the parts of nations together and cemented them.[16]

After the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the creation of the Soviet Union, the formerly bourgeois nations did not disappear. This led Stalin to add a second type of nation - the Soviet nation - to the first bourgeois type. Soviet nations, he said, "developed and took shape on the basis of the old bourgeois nations after the overthrow of capitalism in Russia."[17]

Recent writings in the Soviet Union reveal a trend away from Marx's original linkage of the nation with capitalism.

G. Starushenko points out that new nations are being formed under socialism without passing through the capitalist stage. He concludes that:

> There are two ways in which socialist nations come into existence; either by transformation

> of bourgeois nations along socialist lines or by the transformation of the national groups, which had not developed into bourgeois nations under capitalism, into socialist nations.[18]

In the mid-60's, discussions have taken place in the U.S.S.R. concerning the question of nation and nationality, and some writers have expressed opinions that differ greatly from the traditional line of thought.

M.S. Dzhunusov, for instance shows that nations appear even where there is no capitalist economy. He speaks of:

> ...the development of peoples directly into socialist nations, skipping the capitalist stage, and the awakening to national life of numerous peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America...[19]

He goes on to point out that the distinction between "nation" and "people" has been "absolutized", despite the fact that in some instances K. Marx and F. Engels called peoples "ancient nations" as opposed to "modern nations."[20]

The thesis that a "people" is characteristic of slave-owning and feudal societies, he says, was "interpreted too literally in our writings, making it impossible to understand why peoples continued to exist after...the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R."[21]

This leads him to disconnect ethnic processes from socio-economic development. "Ethnic processes", he says, "though influenced by socio-economic development, are relatively independant." Peoples continue to exist under capitalism and socialism.[22]

Speaking of developing countries, Ponomarev points out that they are generally agrarian and very backward technically. Many of them are still divided into tribes and "the process of formation of nations has not been completed."[23]

They do not have to become capitalist to form nations; instead they can resort to "national democracy", a form of transition to socialism. "A national-democratic state creates the conditions for successfully...consolidating nations."[24]

Though there has been no official rescinding of Marx's linkage of the nation with capitalism, modern Soviet writings are becoming more and more disconnected from it. References are sometimes made to Engels' broader interpretation, which included "ancient" as well as "modern" nations. The formation of nations is thus seen to occur under any of a number of systems: pre-capitalism (Engels), capitalism (Marx), national democracy (Ponomarev), and socialism (Starushenko).

2. Objective and Subjective Factors of the Nation

Though Marx, Engels and Lenin wrote about the nation, they gave no precise definition for it. It was Stalin who first made a thorough study of the national question and came out with the definition of the nation that became the standard one in the Soviet Union. His work and definition are still widespread in Soviet literature at present, but as Stalin himself has fallen out of favor since his death, at times no credit is given to him at all, even when his works are quoted. Starushenko, for instance, copies Stalin word for word without admitting his debt to the defunct ruler.

It was during the winter of 1912-1913 that Lenin studied the problem of nationalism, and he asked Stalin to formulate his ideas on the nationality problem.[25]

Lenin agreed with Stalin's definition of the nation. When Stalin's "Marxism and the National Question" appeared in 1913 in the magazine Prosveshcheniye (Enlightenment), Lenin, who was editor of the magazine, objected to the proposal of members of the editorial board to consider the article open to debate.[26]

Stalin gave the following definition of the nation:

> ...a historically evolved, stable community of people, based upon the common possession of four principal attributes, namely: a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifesting itself in common specific features of national culture.[27]

None of these characteristics, he said, is by itself sufficient to define a nation, but it is enough for a single one of them to be absent, and the nation ceases to be a nation.[28]

Long considered as official doctrine, Stalin's definition has recently come under attack in the Soviet Union. It is no longer considered a sacred, unchangeable dogma.

Rogachev says that the great changes that have taken place in national relationships, and the evolution of nations in the Soviet Union and other countries have made "the further elaboration of the theory of the nation imperative."[29]

Recently, historians, philosophers, ethnographers and jurists have been discussing various problems of the theory of the nation, and the editors of Voprosy istorii opened the pages of this magazine for discussion of the question.

Rogachev attacks Stalin's definition for being "based on historically limited material, taken chiefly from the life of European nations."[30]

Dzhunusov agrees and points out that the transformation of bourgeois nations into socialist nations, the development of peoples directly into socialist nations without passing through capitalism, and the new nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America need to be taken into consideration."[31]

According to Dzhunusov, the growing diversity and complexity of national development in the present epoch has led some scholars to suggest that Stalin's definition be supplemented. Others feel that since it is correct, it does not need to be supplemented. Still others consider the definition "basically wrong," yet offer no solution to the problem. He concludes that "all attempts to devise a new definition boil down in the main to supplementing and modifying the existing definition."[32]

As for the official party line, it has retained the Stalinist Definition of the nation unchanged.[33]

Marxists divide theories on the national question into two categories - materialist (their own), and idealist (capitalist ones). Basing himself on Lenin's writings, G. Starushenko states:

> There are two theories concerning the national question, one for each of the class camps in the world of today - the Marxist historic and economic theory expressive of the scientific views of the working class, and the idealistic, psychological theory expressive of the views of the bourgeoisie. These two theories give different interpretations of the origin and essence of nations.[34]

The "materialist" definition of the nation is that given by Stalin. Here we shall take each of the four elements mentioned by Stalin in turn: economy, territory, language and culture, and try to find out how far the Soviet writers have in fact been "materialistic" in their analysis. We shall also see what they have to say about such additional factors as the state, and will, which are often used as factors of the nation by Western writers.

Objective Factors

Common Economy[35]

The economy constitutes the very foundation or infrastructure of society, and is the most imortant element of the nation for the Marxists. It is this stress on the economy which makes for a "materialist" definition.

Marx linked the appearance of the nation with the capitalist economy and wrote that "The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property...."[36]

In 1914, Lenin counterposed the historical-economic theory to O. Bauer's idealistic theory of the nation, and mentioned the economic factor in addition to the territorial and linguistic ones.[37]

As we have seen, in Stalin's definition of the nation, the common economy[38] takes pride of place. Until today, Stalin's formula is still used in the U.S.S.R., but as it leaves many questions unanswered, modifications have been suggested to fit it to reality in the capitalist, socialist and developing countries.

With regard to capitalist countries, the economy is no longer strictly confined to national boundaries, and is growing more international over time[39], yet nations continue to exist. Already in his time, Marx noted that the bourgeois economy had created a world market.[40] Lenin gave greater importance to the international aspect of the capitalist economy. The second stage of capitalism, he said, saw the "creation of the international unity of capital, and of economic life in general."[41] Stalin followed in Lenin's footsteps. Capitalism, he said, showed a tendency to "internationalize the means of production and exchange."[42]

Recent Soviet writers like Rogachev and Sverdlin also tackle the question of the growing internationalization of economies.[43]

The Marxists predict that in the future there will be a unified world, but at present despite the growing internationalization of the economy, nations still thrive in the capitalist system.

The same problem exists in the Soviet Union. How can one explain the continued existence of nations though there is no longer a separate economy for each nation in the U.S.S.R.? In the words of Rogachev and Sverdlin "...nations are not separated economically to such an extent as to warrant speaking of a separate national economic community of each one."[44]

The writers content themselves with a "part" of an economy as a base for the nation:

> As unified as the country's economic organism may be, it consists of parts, and the economic relations among these parts still manifest themselves as national-political relations.[45]

This implies that a nation does not need a "whole" economy as a base for its existence; a mere fraction of an economy will do just as well.

Other problems present themselves in the Soviet case. Already with Stalin one noted the attempt to explain how the nation continues to exist even after the economy has become socialist. The result was the admission that there were two types of nation - bourgeois and Soviet.

Another phenomenon that needed explanation was the continued existence of "peoples" in the U.S.S.R. even though these were supposed to be characteristic of slave-owning and feudal societies.[46] This made it necessary, according to Dzhunusov, to "reexamine the idea that all prenational types of ethnic communities vanish from the scene with the disappearance of precapitalist forms of society."[47]

Dzhunusov reacts by disconnecting ethnic processes from the economy. Ethnic processes, he says, "though influenced by socio-economic development, are relatively independent."[48] This implies that the economic factor can no longer serve as the basic element in the definition of the nation.

The same writer considers the common economy to be existent even in social units that precede the formation of nations - in "peoples" and even "tribes,"[49] This implies that one cannot differentiate between the nation and previous ethnic communities simply on the basis that the former is characterized by a common economy, since all ethnic communities have some kind of common economy.

It was also necessary to explain the creation of new nations in the U.S.S.R. These, according to Starushenko, consisted of backward nationalities which did not already have a common economic life, and had to be assisted to create it, ex. the Tajiks and Kirghizes.[50] This implies that nations can be created by an act of will by the state, even where they do not have a common economy to start with.

Where the Third World is concerned, the Communists support the colonies' desire for self-determination, yet find it difficult to apply the Stalinist criteria of the nation to them, and consequently ignore them when necessary. Starushenko writes:

> Marixm-Leninism prefers self-determination on a national basis, for it helps solve the national

> question in a most democratic manner. But it is not against self-determination on an un-national basis if it contributes to liberation from the foreign or social yoke.[51]

The criterion of a common, bourgeois economy often does not apply to the colonies. Some countries, like Egypt, had highly developed civilizations in the past, and a common economy, centralized on account of the Nile, but the Stalinist definition would not consider them as nations (since the nation is supposed to have appeared with the rise of the bourgeoisie). Others, consisting of various tribes, did not have a common economy. In a number of cases, the Communists did not expect the backward countries to pass through the capitalist stage at all, and spoke of them as having chosen the "non-capitalist" path. If the theory of the nation was not to stand in the way of national liberation movements and self-determination, the stress on the economic factor had to be lessened and greater importance given to subjective factors like aspirations and will.

Starushenko got around the problem by calling the colonies "peoples" (subject of the right of self-determination), and in defining the term left out the criterion of a common economy.[52] Rogachev and Sverdlin, in dealing with the "transitional" type of nation found in the underdeveloped world, also lessen the importance of the economic factor, or eliminate it altogether, saying that in our time "a nation may begin to form without developed internal economic exchange."[53]

Thus we find that in attempting to explain concrete realities in the capitalist countries, the Soviet Union and the developing countries, modern Soviet thinkers tend more and more to disconnect the "nation" from the "economy".

If we add up the various hypotheses put forward by Marxist writers we find that a nation can have a pre-capitalist, capitalist or socialist economy; that its economy can be international, national or only a part of a national whole. And the nation is not alone in having a common economy, as a people or even a tribe can also have one.

This enormous range of explanations seriously undermines the "common economy" as a criterion for the nation, and the "materialist" base of the Marxist definition of the nation.

If the early Marxists had considered the economy as a criterion for the nation without tying it to a specific historical stage, many of these problems of interpretation might not have arisen. It is their focus on a specific class - the bourgeoisie - that led to distortions of history. Their interest was confined to the capitalist system, and their aim was purely political - the class struggle; this colored their definition of the nation and made them limit it to a very narrow framework. This created many problems in explaining phenomena in the modern world and in the developing countries, and forced the modern Soviet writers to disconnect the nation from the capitalist framework and even at times from the economy altogether.

One question that the recent Soviet writers do not tackle, is whether a "common economy" was a prerequisite even for the nations of Europe themselves. If we view the classic case of the bourgeoisie in dialectical terms, then it was a "rising" class, aspiring towards a common capitalist economy that was still in the process of developing but did not yet actually exist in crystallized form. There is scope here for the aspirations, the will, the subjective element that are disregarded when a fully developed common economy is made a prerequisite of the nation. There is a certain contradiction here between the flexibility of the dialectic, which stresses development and change, and the somewhat static application that has been made of it in the theory of the nation with its requirement of a "common economy."

Common Territory

Marx included "territory" in his model of the bourgeois nation, when he wrote about "independent, or but loosely connected provinces...lumped together into one nation, with...one frontier..."[54]

Lenin insisted on a common territory as a base for the nation. He rejected the notion of national-cultural autonomy, and stated that national culture must be based on territorial contiguity.[55] For instance, he held that the Jews did not comprise a single nation as they lacked a common language and territory.[56]

In 1928, the Soviets attempted to settle the Jews on a territory of their own in the Far East, and proclaimed Birobidjan as the Jewish Autonomous Region in 1934, and as the Jewish national centre in 1936.[57] This experiment did not succeed, however, and in 1966 Dzhunusov wrote that some peoples were unable to take advantage of the Soviet economy as a material base for developing into a nation, either because of their size or natural geographic conditions, or both. He gave the example of the Jews, who live mainly in cities. The Jewish nationality, he said "by virtue of its historically evolved dispersion and its social composition, cannot develop into a nation."[58]

There are cases of other nationalities in the U.S.S.R. which did succeed in forming nations. According to Starushenko, in Central Asia, the nationalities formerly split up and incorporated in various tsarist provinces were reunited into integral Union and Autonomous republics.[59]

Though "common territory" is considered to be a basic element of the nation, in fact the Soviet government has taken into consideration the will of nationalities to form a single nation, by granting them the territory they lacked.

In the case of the Third World it was difficult to apply the criterion of territory. In many colonies, the colonialist powers created artificial boundaries that might include various different tribes and national groups under one state. This problem may be seen in many African countries, and led to tensions between them after they obtained self-determination. The Organization for African Unity tried to settle the claims of the various states, but found that it would mean a reparcelling of all the countries concerned. They decided that it would be best to leave the boundaries as they were, and accept the status quo left behind by imperialism.

At a conference in Adis Ababa in May 1963, the President of Somalia said:

> The problem of Somali boundaries does not differ from similar problems in Africa. It means not minor rectification but a changing of all the Somali boundaries, which have been divided between the mother country and adjacent countries.[60]

At this conference several heads of state expressed the need to prevent any attempt at reexamining the boundaries drawn up by imperialism, as this would lead to revolutions and wars between African countries.[61]

To deal with such confusing situations, Starushenko utilizes the term "people" instead of "nation" for colonies, and makes it very flexible, so that it may or may not include territory, depending on the definition given to it. In one place, Starushenko defines a "people" as having "a common territory, a common historic destiny, and a common aim."[62] In another he says:

> peoples...have a common territory, possess one or more common traits (historic, cultural, linguistic, religious, social, etc.), and

> strive to achieve a common aim through self-determination.[63]

Finally he gives up altogether and states that a people "does not require any precise definition because all problems of self-determination must be solved concretely in each given case."[64]

This vagueness in the definition allows for great flexibility in policy, for self-determination may be granted or withheld depending on whether one decides to consider the community claiming it a "people" or not.

The State

Though Marx gave no precise definition of the nation, he did mention the "state" several times in discussing the rise of bourgeois nations. In one place he speaks of "one nation, with one government, one code of laws...one frontier..."[65], in another of "the centralized state power...serving nascent middle-class society as a mighty weapon in its struggles against feudalism...assumed ...the character of the national power of capital over labor...of an engine of class despotism..."[66]

Engels mentioned the state in ancient Rome "based on territorial division and difference of wealth"[67], and in modern nations.[68]

Stalin deliberately excluded the state in his definition of the nation, as its inclusion would have given rise to political problems in relation to the colonies:

> All oppressed nations which have no independent statehood would have to be deleted from the categories of nations; furthermore, the struggle of oppressed nations against national oppression and the struggle of colonial peoples against imperialism would have to be excluded from the concept 'national movement' and 'national liberation movement....' /This/ leads to the justification of national imperialist oppression.[69]

In Stalin's time the colonies were still fighting for political self-determination, and the utilization of the "state" as a criterion for the nation would have stood in the way of national liberation movements in colonies having no independent state of their own.

At present the former colonies have achieved political independence, and have a state of their own. This has led to a corresponding change in the writings of modern Soviet thinkers. A number of them (Matsakanyan, Rogachev, Sverdlin, Dzhunusov, Starushenko) mention the state as an element in the backward countries.

As we have shown, however, these new states often have artificial boundaries drawn up by the colonialist powers, and include different tribes or national groups. As they cannot be called nations in the Stalinist sense, Starushenko gives them the right of self-determination by calling them "peoples", a vague term that can include any bonds, including common statehood.[70] There is an implication here that the existence of the state may itself lead to the formation of a new nation, and allowance is made for such an eventuality.

What Starushenko only implies, is stated clearly by Rogachev, Sverdlin and Dzhunusov. Dzhunusov writes:

> The national rebirth and development of formerly oppressed peoples demonstrates that the establishment of national statehood accelerates national consolidation.[71]

Starushenko's term "people" allows for political manoeuvers. In cases of conflict between a state and a national group or tribe under its jurisdiction, the Soviets may decide to support the "state" (as in the case of Nigeria), or if the rebellious tribe proves to be sufficiently strong to obtain self-determination, the "state" criterion can be ignored.

Stalin gave the nation priority over the state - a revolutionary outlook that stresses the people's will rather than the authorities. Starushenko also excludes the "state" from the definition of the nation, but he makes exceptions wherever convenient. In his analysis of the reunification of the two Germanies he puts the state before the nation, and insists on the existence of two separate states, demanding negotiations rather than elections, as the latter would mean that West German deputies would predominate in a united parliament.[72] For political reasons, the theory is ignored, and the ends are expected to justify the means.

Another reason for Stalin's excluding the "state" was that he feared it would invite trouble within the Soviet Union. In their revolution, the Bolsheviks had tried to win over the many oppressed nationalities of the Russian empire against the Csars, by promising them the right of self-determination and secession. Some of them (like Finland) had taken this offer seriously and actually seceded. It was thus preferable to avoid using the "state" as a condition for the nation, as it would:

> provide justification for the bourgeois nationalists in the Soviet Republics who argue that the Soviet nations ceased to be nations when they consented to combine their national Soviet Republics into a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.[73]

There are still separate states in the U.S.S.R. until today, and the Party Program of the 22nd Party Congress included a thesis to the effect that "nations flourish under socialism, and that the existing forms of national statehood enjoyed by the peoples of the U.S.S.R. should be fully exploited and further perfected."[74]

A discussion concerning nationhood took place in the U.S.S.R. in the years 1964-66. In speaking of socialist nations, a number of writers (S.T. Kaltakhyan, M. Mnatsakanyan, V.V. Rudnev, Rogachev and Sverdlin) included common statehood as a characteristic of the socialist nation. For instance, Mnatsakanyan wrote about national statehood as "an inseparable part of socialist nations."[75]

This does not accord with the policies of the Party leaders, however. More in keeping with the party line is P.G. Semenov who wrote that national statehood of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. was just a Bolshevik "tactic". Lenin was against dividing Russia up into national entities, and it was only "extreme exacerbation of the nationality question...in particular the appearance of independent national states on the fringe of the Russian empire" that forced him to have recourse to the principle of federation.[76]

Semenov points out that the thesis that national statehood is an attribute of a socialist nation is erroneous as it ignores that the Party line is to abolish the frontiers between individual Soviet republics, and liquidate the national statehood of these republics.[77]

In "The Foundations of Scientific Communism," a work published in 1966 by the Party Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences, and compiled by prominent Soviet theoreticians like P.N. Fedoseyev, Y.I. Bugayev, and G.P. Frantsov, the Stalinist definition of the nation is retained without any changes or additions whatsoever. It regards national-territorial formations "not as ends in themselves, not as eternal, immutable categories, but as transitional states on the way to complete unity between nations and nationalities."[78]

In fact, in recent times there is more talk of the merging of the various nationalities in all spheres of social life, and of the appearance of a new and unified nation "the Soviet people" which is said to have arisen with all the necessary attributes, including a common language - Russian.[79]

Common Language

Engels mentioned the factor of common language in speaking of ancient nations. Among the North American Indians, he showed how, as the tribes spread over the continent and became nations "the languages change until they not only become unintelligible to other tribes, but also lose almost every trace of their original identity."[80] As for the early Germanic nations, he said, "Their common language, in which there were only variations of dialects, was the expression and the proof of their common descent."[81] With regard to the modern nations which arose following the collapse of the Roman empire, he wrote, "...the Latin dialects of various provinces were becoming increasingly differentiated."[82]

Lenin regarded linguistic community as part of the nation, and Stalin named it as one of the basic factors of the nation.

If we analyse the factor of language we find that it is not a materialistic one. Stalin himself gave it a unique position, and excepted it from the laws of dialectical and historical materialism.

N.Y. Marr, the unchallenged authority in the field of Soviet linguistics for three decades, had defined language as belonging to the superstructure of society.

He held that language was developed as a weapon in the class struggle, and that it evolved by abrupt leaps produced by technological advances.

On the premise that language belonged to the superstructure, a new supra-national "language of socialism" could be anticipated which would prevail after the victory of Bolshevism. Marr insisted that an international language was necessary as a pre-condition to realizing a classless society.[83] By placing language in the superstructure he made it open to change.

In 1950 a controversy arose in the U.S.S.R. concerning the nature of language. The Pravda published an article attacking Marr's whole school of thought, and Stalin took part in the debate, refuting Marr's arguments. In the following year, his letters were published as a book, entitled "Marxism and Linguistics."

While social phenomena are usually classified either under the infrastructure or superstructure of society, Stalin said that language "cannot be ranked either among bases or among superstructures."[84] As the superstructure is connected with production only indirectly through the base, it reflects changes of development of the productive forces only after these have caused changes in the base. Language, on the other hand, "is connected with man's productive activity directly" and thus "reflects changes in production immediately and directly without waiting for changes in the base.... At the same time, language is connected to the superstructure.[85] It is "an instrument with the help of which people communicate with one another, exchange thoughts."[86] It is "directly connected with thought."[87] Thus language is directly connected with all man's activities, "from production to the base, and from the base to the superstructure."[88]

Whereas each base has its own superstructure which disappears with it, Stalin stated that language "is the product of a whole number of epochs and...exists immeasurably longer than any base or any superstructure."[89]

Whereas elements of culture are usually linked to the class system, language was created not by any specific class, but "by all society, by all the classes of society, by the efforts of hundreds of generations."[90]

The dialectical law which stipulates that change begins with evolutionary, quantitative change and then becomes revolutionary and qualitative, does not apply to language:

> The transition of language from one quality to another did not take the form of an explosion, but by the gradual and prolonged accumulation of the elements of the new quality...and the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.[91]

Thus it is not possible to conclude from Stalin's explanation that language is a "materialistic" element, as it is directly connected to both the materialist base and the idealist superstructure of society. In fact the laws of dialectical and historical materialism seem to be inoperative when it comes to an explanation of language.

Recent writers consider language to be even less materialistic than Stalin. Rogachev and Sverdlin consider it as part of culture,[92] i.e. the superstructure.

A question one may ask here is, what made it necessary for Stalin to disconnect language from the infrastructure of society. Theoretically speaking when the capitalist infrastructure is replaced by a socialist one, the bourgeois nation with its national language, is supposed to give place to an internationalist, socialist superstructure and single world language.

In actual life, the Soviets found it necessary to retain the separate languages after the 1917 Revolution, as they were dealing with backward and largely illiterate populations, and it would not have been possible to unify the language and use Russian (which is considered the "international" language) all at once in educating the masses. It was necessary to use local languages and only slowly start the process of Russianization.

Stalin said, "Education in the mother tongue is important in furthering mental development of the workers, who have little opportunity to learn foreign languages."[93]

As language was not changing with the infrastructure, Stalin excepted it from a purely materialist analysis, and made it depend on a number of different elements, ranging from the infrastructure to the superstructure. This allowed for great flexibility of analysis. If Russianization succeeded, then the effect of the infrastructure could be stressed, and if it failed, then the permanence of language could be brought out.

Dealing with a reality in which languages "possess an extraordinary stability and tremendous power of resistance to the policy of assimilation,"[94] Stalin tried to preserve the theory of the nation by reformulating it and making it more flexible.

A price had to be paid for this fluidity, however. By disconnecting language from the infrastructure, Stalin - however unwillingly - laid the theoretical seed for the recognition and acceptance of separate languages and nationalities under socialism.

In the case of the Third World, the Soviets wished to help the colonies in their struggle against imperialism. Yet the colonies sometimes had no common language as they consisted of a conglomeration of tribes and national groups, and therefore could not be considered "nations" in the Stalinist sense.

In order to get around this theoretical impasse, Starushenko calls the colonies "peoples" which he holds have the right to self-determination. In defining "peoples", at one time he does not include language at all, and at another time mentions it but does not consider it essential.[95]

Thus the criterion of language is modified or ignored according to the requirements of the political situation.

Common Culture

Culture is not a materialistic element at all. Marx considered man's cultural life as the superstructure of society, which plays a secondary role to the economic foundation.

> The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society - the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness.[96]

Though there are differences in culture between the classes, the ruling class "imposes its own ideas on the whole epoch."[97] Each infrastructure has its own superstructure.

Lenin, stressing the class content of culture, considered that every bourgeois nation consisted of two nations, every bourgeois culture of two cultures, one of the bourgeoisie, the other of the proletariat.[98]

Stalin made a common culture one of the essentials of the nation, yet he also took into account the differences in culture between the classes:

> In the early stages one may still speak of a "cultural community" between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but as large-scale

> industry develops, and the class struggle becomes more and more acute, this community begins to melt away.[99]

In theory, once capitalism disappears, one would expect the national cultures to pass away with it. In reality, however, the Soviets found it necessary to retain the separate cultures and languages, and to start the merging process only very gradually.

Thus, though the infrastructure of the Soviet Republics had become socialist, their superstructures remained "national", each nationality keeping its own language, arts, customs and culture in general. At the same time, no matter what language was used, it had to express the same Soviet ideology. Stalin stated, "We are building a proletarian culture...which is socialist in content...and national in form."[100]

Today Russianization has proceeded to such an extent that Russian is known at least as a second language by all citizens. So Stalin's slogan of "socialist in content, national in form," has come under attack, the aim being to change it to "socialist in content, international in form."

A reader sent a letter to the Literaturnaya Gazeta, describing Stalin's slogan as an "empty phrase," and saying:

> An international culture has been developing among us since the first days of the formation of the U.S.S.R.... If we are to speak of form, it is essentially international nowadays.[101]

In reply, several writers, (G. Lomidze, Zinger, Dzhusoity, Braginsky...) attacked the Stalinist slogan. For example, Braginsky wrote that a new correlation between national and international confronts the Soviets in the mid-twentieth century. In this period of the rapprochement of socialist nations there is an internationalization of art forms, and it is necessary to free oneself "from the grip of preconceptions about 'national spirit'."[102]

Recent writers do not agree about the importance of "national character". Some of them, like Zinger and Dzhunusov, consider it important. Dzhunusov writes "not only nations, but also pre-national forms of ethnic communities (tribes, clans, peoples...) have specific traits of mentality."[103] Some scholars like Rogachev consider it to be of secondary importance and not decisive in a nation's life.[104] Others like S. Tokaov exclude ethnic psychology, considering that it only confuses everything.[105]

Surovtsev thinks that national character has been "fetishized" and made "responsible for the facts we have not explained." The result is "arbitrary, subjective improvisations on the theme of what the national character 'wants', 'what it doesn't want', and how it chooses to 'manifest itself' in art."[106] He agrees with V. Piskunov who says:

> Scholars follow a closed circle - national character is expressed in national

> distinctiveness /of art7 national distinctiveness is determined by the national character; without feeling any embarrassment about trying to explain one unknown by another unknown.[107]

Stalin had stressed the element of psychological makeup or national character in dealing with culture. Modern Soviet writers include elements like tradition and religion, which Stalin had ignored. The most important reason for these changes is the need to accommodate the Third World countries, which were excluded by the Stalinist definition of the nation.

Rogachev, for instance, thinks it necessary to include tradition into the definition of the nation "in order to stress the differences between genuinely national, stable features of spiritual life from all that is superficial, temporary and transitory...."[108] By tradition, however, he does not mean all traditions. He specifies that traditions must be "progressive" and not "reactionary,"[109] He includes "traditions of struggle for liberation,"[110] thus showing that he is trying to accommodate the underdeveloped countries into the definition of the nation.

He disconnects the traditions from the infrastructure, and shows that they can outlast it:

> Traditions, which evolve under conditions of a specific socio-economic formation remain and go on living, along with other characteristics of a nation, even after the material conditions that produced them have changed substantially. Their relative independence and stability are particularly noticeable in everyday life.[111]

The Marxist theory being a materialist one, it is diametrically opposed to all religions. Marx considered religion to be the "opium of the people,"[112] and the Soviets have tried to combat "superstitions" of all kinds. Obviously enough, religion has not been included in the definition of the nation. Today, however, some Soviet writers like Starushenko accept religion as one of the possible bonds tying together the "peoples" of the backward countries.[113]

Though the recent writers criticize Stalin's "culture" factor for its vagueness, they are equally vague themselves when they speak about tradition, for example. Tradition is reinterpreted according to convenience, some traditions being accepted because they are "progressive" and others rejected as "reactionary."

This vagueness allows for political manipulation. When Stalin's slogan "socialist in content, national in form" is attacked and replaced by "socialist in content, international in form" the exact meaning of "international" is not specified. If socialism is the equivalent of internationalism, then the slogan becomes unnecessarily tautological. As Russian is considered to be the "international" language in the Soviet Union, however, "international in form" becomes the equivalent of Russianization.

Stalin was constantly trying to adapt theory to the requirements of reality, but the new Soviet writers do not seem to confine themselves to any formula any longer. For instance, they could have expanded the "culture" factor to include tradition and religion, so as not to destroy the Stalinist formula, but they gave them separate categories instead.

Stalin had already started the process of disconnecting language from the economic infrastructure. The recent writers carry this a step further by disconnecting tradition from the infrastructure as well.

Subjective Factors

Will

While some Western writers stress the element of "will" in the definition of the nation, Stalin leaves it out. Concepts in Marxist thought that come close to "will" are "consciousness," which the proletariat must acquire in order to carry out the revolution that will bring it to power, and "self-determination" in the case of oppressed nations seeking their independence.

The Marxist stand on the importance of human will is an ambivalent one, containing the two contradictory elements of freedom and necessity. Freedom is the knowledge of necessity. Though one cannot go against the laws of nature, if one understands them, one can use them instead of being ruled by them. Engels wrote:

> Active social forces work exactly like natural forces: blindly, forcibly, destructively, so long as we do not understand, and reckon with

> them. But when once we understand them, when once we grasp their action, their direction, their effects, it depends only upon ourselves to subject them more and more to our own will, and by means of them to reach our own ends.[114]

On the one hand, Marx held that society would evolve inevitably from one stage of history to the next as a consequence of developments in the mode of production. He wrote, "With the change of the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed."[115] The general impression given was that history was inevitably marching from one set stage to the next and would finally reach socialism. At times Marx showed some flexibility on this point. In writing on the Russian question, for instance, he admitted that one should not turn his historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people was fated to tread.[116] Yet in "The Bourgeoisie and the Counter Revolution," he did not show the same flexibility, but stated that the revolutions of 1648 and 1789 were not English and French revolutions, but revolutions of a "European pattern."[117]

On the other hand, he gave an important role to the "consciousness" of the working class in its struggle with the bourgeoisie. Only when the working class became a class "für sich" (for itself, i.e. self-conscious) rather than merely "an sich," could the class struggle really emerge.[118]

In addition to history and the proletariat there was a third agent involved in historical evolution: the Marxist revolutionaries, whose aim was the introduction of socialism. They played a vital role, for on the one hand, history does not speak for itself, and it was they who had to interpret it; and on the other hand, the proletariat cannot carry out its historical task unaided, but needs the leadership of its vanguard, the Communist Party, which provides it with the required political consciousness, helps it to form into a class, and leads it towards the revolution that will introduce socialism. As Marx writes:

> The Communists...theoretically...have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.
>
> The immediate aims of the Communists is...formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.[119]

The Marxists' aim (and will) was the achievement of socialism, and they used all means to achieve it. History was interpreted as inevitably marching toward socialism. If the proletariat's will coincided with the march of history towards socialism, it was considered to have a true consciousness. But if it wanted anything other than socialism, it was considered to have a "false consciousness" and its leaders were accused of being bribed (ex. their nationalist attitude during World War I).

The same applied to the will of nations to self-determination. It was taken into consideration by Marx only if it coincided with the march of history. This made him ignore the will of colonies to achieve independence (ex. he opposed the Indian mutiny against the British) for he believed that colonialism would push them into a higher stage of evolution. (See Class Struggle and Cohesion).

Since Lenin's time (and especially since Khrushchev's), the national liberation movements of the backward countries have been supported, as they help to destroy the greatest enemy of socialism -- Western imperialism and thus helped to forward the march of history. Thus in supporting the claim of colonies to self-determination, Starushenko considers "will" as the basic factor, saying "the decisive factor in the solution of the question of self-determination is the will of the self-determining people."[120]

If the self-determination of a country is considered to be against the interests of socialism, however, the "will" of the peoples is ignored. In the case of Germany, for instance, an election would mean the victory of West Germany over East Germany, so it is rejected in favor of negotiations between the two states. In the case of Biafra, the secessionists were considered to be prompted by imperialism, and therefore opposed by the Soviets.[121] Their "will" was not taken into consideration.

In the Soviet Union, the various nations are expected to merge voluntarily, in accordance with the predicted merging of nations into a single "zone." The Soviet state has taken deliberate steps to ensure that the merging actually does take place. Any opposition to these measures is considered to be "bourgeois nationalism" rather than the "will of the people," and is consequently stamped out.

Today a number of backward nations are supposed to be skipping one or more stages of history and entering socialism via the "noncapitalist path." Recent Soviet writers accept this deviation from the Marxist scheme of history since it leads to socialism, and as this is happening through the conscious choice of these countries, they now emphasize the importance of "will," Rogachev emphasizes the conscious element in national development but limits it to the new nations:

> Whereas the formation of nations on a capitalist base was spontaneous, the transitional type of nations, developing on a non-capitalist base, are marked by growth of awareness in the national processes. The conscious element in the development of the new nations is increasing.[122]

Thus we find that any means of achieving socialism is accepted - it may be the inevitable march of history, regardless of the will of the people, and it may be the will of the people regardless of the stages of the Marxist scheme of history. In the final analysis, it seems to be the "will" of the revolutionaries to achieve socialism that really matters.

3. Class Struggle and Cohesion

According to Stanislaw Ossowski, rebels tend to stress the class struggle, while rulers emphasize the aspect of cohesion in society. He writes:

> Those who defend the existing social order... present the structure of their own society in terms of a functional scheme or one of non-egalitarian classlessness. Revolutionaries, on the other hand, tend to view the world in terms of a dichotomy with opposite attributes.[123]
>
> Marxian methods...are rarely found suitable from the viewpoint of the ruling or privileged groups for the analysis of their own society. On the other hand they are a useful weapon against outside enemies.[124]

On the basis of this dichotomy, we shall divide the present section into two parts:

1. The pre-socialist stage: the attitude of Marxist revolutionaries towards the class struggle, revolution, the role of the party.

2. The socialist stage: the attitude of Marxists, now in power, towards the class struggle and cohesion.

Pre-socialist Stage

Marx and Engels stressed the importance of the class struggle, which, they said, characterized all of history.

> Freeman and slave...lord and serf...oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted... fight...that each time ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes.[125]

Under capitalism, the conflict is between the two main classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat:

> Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other – bourgeoisie and proletariat.[126]

The proletariat organizes itself into a class with the help of the Communist vanguard, and wages the class struggle against the bourgeoisie.[127] Finally the revolution raises the proletariat to the position of ruling class, and capitalism is replaced by socialism.[128]

The nationalist ideology, which views the nation as a cohesive, integral whole instead of as conflicting classes, Marx considered to be a tool of the bourgeoisie: "The cause of nationality is deliberately espoused by the capitalist class, first to consolidate, and later, to retain its own power."[129]

The class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat applied only to Europe. The colonies were still too backward, either feudal or prefeudal, and did not even have a proletariat. They needed to be modernized and brought into the capitalist age, thus leading to the creation of the proletariat. Marx held that West European colonialism would achieve this purpose and draw the backward colonies into the mainstream of civilization. He wrote:

> The bourgeoisie...draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization.... It compels all nations, on pain of extinction,

> to adopt the bourgeois mode of production.... It compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst.[130]

Marx and Engels were against the nationalism of colonies as this would stop the process of modernization.

The expected revolutions did not occur in Western Europe, and instead of acting in a class-conscious, revolutionary manner, the proletarians supported their own bourgeois governments during World War I, an "imperialist" war, according to the Communists.

Lenin accused the "labor aristocracy" of having been bribed by the bourgeoisie, and of deserting the ranks of the working class.

> Rich and powerful states...plunder the whole world simply by "clipping coupons".... Obviously, out of such enormous superprofits ...it is possible to bribe the labour leaders and the upper stratum of the labour aristocracy.[131]

Unable to rely on the docile proletarians of Western Europe, Lenin turned for support to the colonies, which were experiencing an anti-imperialist upheaval. He attempted to rally the national liberation movements in the colonies around the Soviet Union in the joint struggle against Western imperialism.[132] In his report to the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920, he proposed to support the national liberation movements. It was in the interests of the Communists to do this, he said, for otherwise "socialism in Europe" would "not be secure."[133]

From Marx's internal dialectic, Lenin shifted the emphasis to an external dialectic between whole nations - the imperialist countries and the colonies.

> The international proletariat is divided into two camps (the respective proletariats of the oppressed nations and the oppressing nations). Expressed in terms of nations this involves a world divided into two main groups - of colony-owning countries on the one hand, and colonies, on the other.[134]

In his report to the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the East, Lenin frankly declared this shift in emphasis from the class struggle to the conflict between nations, and considered the latter as an integral part of the socialist revolution:

> The socialist revolution will not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgeoisie -- no it will be a struggle of all the imperialist-oppressed colonies and countries, of all dependent countries against international imperialism.[135]

To rekindle the European class struggle, it was necessary to stop the bribery of the labor aristocracy. The main enemy became imperialism, the source of superprofits, and Lenin tried to use the national liberation movements of the colonies to strengthen the international socialist movement. He said, "the Social Democrats are for utilizing all national movements against imperialism for the purposes of the Socialist revolution."[136]

While Marx had coined the slogan, "Workingmen of all countries unite,"[137] Lenin put forward a new one, "Proletarians of all lands and all oppressed peoples, unite."[138]

In a speech to Mscow Party Nuclei Secretaries on December 6, 1920, he explained,

> Of course, from the standpoint of the Communist Manifesto this is wrong, but the Communist Manifesto was written in entirely different conditions, whereas from the standpoint of present-day politics, this is correct.[139]

In the colonies, Lenin deemphasized the class struggle and supported the national liberation movements. "The Communist International should collaborate provisionally with the revolutionary movement of the colonies and backward countries, and even form an alliance with it."[140] This meant cooperation with the bourgeoisie, since as he said, "Every nationalist movement can only be a bourgeois-democratic movement, for the bulk of the population in backward countries are peasants, who represent bourgeois-capitalist relations."[141]

This policy of cooperation with the bourgeoisie aroused some criticisms from Marxists in the colonies. At the Second Congress of the Comintern in the mid-20's, contrasting theses were presented by Lenin and M.N. Roy, an Indian Communist. Roy opposed any alliances with "bourgeois nationalist governments and forces." Lenin considered it more important to break the "imperialist encirclement" by backing nationalists who were fighting against imperialism.[142]

Differences in priorities were thus apparent between some Communists in the colonies who had their local situations to face and considered a class struggle necessary, and the Soviet leader who viewed the matter in international terms such as assisting the international socialist movement and demanding a cohesion of the national liberation forces.

Stalin tried to achieve a reconciliation, at least in theory, between Marx's class struggle and Lenin's call for a national front and cohesion.

In practice his policies fluctuated; in some cases he stressed the class struggle (as Marxists in the colonies like M.N. Roy had previously requested), and in others he supported Lenin's stress on a national front.

In 1928 he took a hard line, in 1935 he advocated a united front against fascism, in 1948 he reverted to a hard line and Zhdanov's two-camp theory which was accompanied by Communist uprisings in Asia, and in the 1950's he swung back to a policy of collaboration (see Relations of the Soviets and the Third World).

The theoretical justification for these fluctuations was a division of the colonies into categories depending on the stage of their development and of the proletariat and Communist party.[143] In the last resort the categorization was a subjective one depending on the political situation, the strength of the Communist party, and the political consciousness of the population, rather than on economic foundations. His stand may be understood from the following quote:

> Whether the proletariat rallies to the banner of bourgeois nationalism depends on the degree of development of class contradictions, on the class consciousness, and degree of organization of the proletariat. A class conscious proletariat has its own tried banner and it does not need to march under the banner of the bourgeoisie.[144]

If his support of the class struggle led to isolating the Communists from the masses, he reversed it and urged them to collaborate with the national liberation movement, even though there had been no change in the economic conditions of the colony. Had he used an economic criterion, the national liberation movement should have been followed by a class struggle and not vice versa.

Khrushchev returned to a Leninist line, stressing nationalism at the expense of class struggle in the backward countries. At the 1960 Conference of World Communist Parties, the national liberation movement was considered so important that it ranked second only to the socialist bloc as a world revolutionary force. The struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat was relegated to third place.

> The chief result of these years is the swift growth of the might and international influence of the world socialist system, the active process of disintegration of the colonial system under the blows of the national liberation movement, the growth of class struggles in the capitalist world.[145]

In the developing countries internal unity was stressed rather than class struggle. It was necessary for workers to collaborate with other classes, including the national bourgeoisie, which was now considered progressive, in a common front against imperialism.[146]

It was no longer considered essential for the working class and the Communist Party to lead. It could collaborate and at times even amalgamate with other parties.[147] And where the party did not exist, trade unions could take over the leadership role.[148]

It was now considered acceptable to cooperate with the national bourgeoisie, and even to let it take the leading role. To avoid criticisms on this count, the bourgeois and petty bourgeois leaders were called "revolutionary democrats," and the political setup "national democracy."

Even in Europe, Khrushchev played down the element of class struggle and revolution. Unlike Marx and Engels who advocated the use of violence, Khrushchev no longer considered a violent revolution as necessary. He even accepted the possibility of reaching socialism through democratic elections, in a gradual, non-violent manner. The theme of "peaceful" transition to socialism may be found in the 20th Congress of 1956, and was repeated in the 21st Congress of 1958, and the 1960 Conference of 81 Communist parties. In his Report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev said:

> It is not true that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society...the working class, by rallying around itself the toiling peasantry, the intelligentsia, all patriotic forces...is in a position to defeat the reactionary forces...to capture a stable majority in parliament, and transform the latter from an organ of bourgeois democracy into a genuine instrument of the people's will.[149]

At the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U. in 1961, Khrushchev even suggested that the proletariat could purchase the means of production from the bourgeoisie:

> It may well be that...there will arise in certain countries a situation in which it will be preferable for the bourgeoisie...to agree to the basic means of production being purchased from it and for the proletariat to "pay off" the bourgeoisie.[150]

Brezhnev seems to have swung back to a Stalinist stand and fluctuation between the class struggle and national front. There are signs of a renewed emphasis on the class struggle between proletarians and bourgeois. Instead of being third in importance, it now takes second place after the conflict between the socialist and capitalist camps. The struggle between the national liberation movements and imperialism has sunk to third place. The Second Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in 1969 stated in its basic document:

> Three great forces of our time - the world socialist system, the international working class and the national-liberation movement are uniting in the struggle against imperialism.[151]

In the backward countries there is still support for national liberation movements, but a new emphasis on the class struggle may be noted, and the national bourgeoisie is no longer always considered as progressive.

> The process of internal social demarcation ...is intensifying...the elite of the national bourgeoisie...opposes social progress and the pursuit of a consistent anti-imperialist course. An increasingly sharp class struggle is developing on this basis.[152]

On the whole, Brezhnev is less certain than his predecessors that the newly liberated countries are bound for socialism, and his tone is more cautious.

> The future path of these states has not yet been determined with sufficient precision. An intense struggle for the future is under way there between the progressive forces and domestic reactionaries supported by the imperialists.[153]

Classes Under Socialism

Do the rulers of socialist states try to give a picture of a cohesive society as Ossowski says? And does socialism in fact put an end to class struggles and achieve national cohesion?

After the revolutionaries take over power there follows the nationalization of the means of production and the liquidation of the bourgeoisie. This is a strife-filled period in which the new socialist state itself carries on the class struggle.

Yet once the bourgeois class has been eliminated, is it still possible to speak of a class struggle? In 1937 Stalin proclaimed the intensification of the class struggle. This implied a continuation of the early counter-revolutionary resistance met by the Soviet regime at its beginnings.

After Stalin's demise, his "class struggle" principle came in for sharp criticism. It was now explained as an ideological justification for his reign of terror and the Great Purge of 1937.[154] George Lukacs pointed out that Stalin purged Bukharin and others and then made a theory out of it - that the class struggle becomes sharper under socialism.[155]

The Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti said that the theory was used to excuse all sorts of errors, "Every evil, every obstacle...all was due to sabotage, to the work of class enemies, counter-revolutionary groups operating clandestinely, etc."[156]

These accusations implied that in fact there was no counter-revolutionary activity, and that the "class struggle" principle was merely a tool in the political and ideological field, an excuse for getting rid of political opponents, covering up for errors, and using dictatorial means.

In the 20th Party Congress, Stalin's "class struggle" thesis was rejected, yet it reappeared in 1956 and 1961, long after the consolidation of the socialist system. In 1956, Partinaya Zhizn said that the fact that there was no class antagonism did not mean "that there were no more manifestations of the class struggle in Soviet society." It was still necessary to fight bourgeois ideology and the enemies of the socialist system.[157]

Again in 1961, the class struggle theme was used in the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U.:

> The class struggle does not disappear in the period of the building of socialism. The general trend of class struggle within the socialist countries in conditions of successful socialist construction leads to consolidation of the position of the socialist forces and weakens the resistance of the remnants of the hostile classes. But this development does not follow a straight line. Changes in the domestic or external situation may cause the class struggle to intensify in specific periods.[158]

Do classes continue to exist under socialism?

According to Soviet writers, classes still exist in the U.S.S.R. Stalin spoke of workers, peasants, and intellectuals (considered a stratum).[159] More recently, P. Kopnin wrote of class distinctions "between workers and peasants...between workers of mental and manual labor, and between workers of varying skills."[160]

Stalin called the classes "nonantagonistic" and pointed out that none of them can appropriate the labor of another class.[161]

There is no longer an employer class that can be accused of exploiting the workers; so there can no longer be the traditional class struggle.

Yet there are new contradictions that have emerged under socialism. According to the Bulgarian Communists P. Gendev and A. Politin some of them result from socialism itself.[162] R. Kopnin speaks of "contradictions inherent in a socialist society" but considers them non-antagonistic and not destructive.[163]

There are differences in income between the classes. At first the Soviet regime attempted to eliminate economic differences between workers, but low productivity of labor and the extraordinarily high rate of labor turnover forced it to change its policy. In 1931, Stalin launched an attack against "equality-mongering" and wage equalization, and began a movement for personal incentive based on differential rewards.[164] Substantial financial incentives were offered to highly skilled workers, scientists and technicians, industrial managers and intellectuals.[165]

There are also differences in power between them. Milovan Djilas, in "The New Class," argued that Communist Party officials had come to constitute a new ruling class, with special privileges and economic preference because of the administrative monopoly they held.[166] Raymond Aron held that the members of the ruling group constituted a unified elite having absolute and unbound power.[167] Palmiro Togliatti criticized the Soviet system for the excessive increase of bureaucracy in the life of the Party and the country.[168]

If any class in society felt dissatisfied with its share of the national income or decision-making power, it was not likely to lead to clashes with the other classes, however, since they did not employ one another. The only employer was the state, which was also the center of all decision-making. It is the state that plans the economy and decides on the allocations and priorities: foreign policy or local development, heavy industry or consumer goods, the city or the countryside, technicians and the intelligentsia or the unskilled workers. These priorities have led to many a clash between members of the bureaucracy.

Khrushchev seemed to realize the conflict centering around the state, and he tried to solve it, at least verbally, by adopting the concept of the "all people's state" at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961:

> The dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission and has ceased to be indispensable in the U.S.S.R.... The state ...has...become a state of the entire people, an organ expressing the interests and will of the people as a whole...there no longer exists an exploiter class which must be suppressed, and thus the entire population is represented by the state.[169]

So far, no ideology has arisen in the Soviet Union to give political expression to the "contradictions" that exist. If it appears, it may cause a deep cleavage in the national unity. T.B. Bottomore holds, however, that the absence of an organized opposition is no indication of harmony and cooperation since it is a result of coercion.[170]

Among Marxists outside the Soviet Union, a number of new ideas have germinated, and new "models" of socialism are being suggested.

The Yugoslavs have criticized the bureaucratic, etatistic Soviet model with its centralization of power and decision-making. They have introduced worker-ownership and self-management in industry, thus giving the workers a say in the distribution of the national income. They also introduced the rotation system in the bureaucracy in 1963, with a view to preventing agglomerations of bureaucratic power.[171]

The French Communist Garaudy has advocated a "democratic" model of socialism as opposed to the dictatorial Soviet model. He also pointed out that the scientific and technological revolution has increased the importance of the role of intellectuals. He expected that in the west, they would join the workers in a new historic bloc that would play the leading role in social progress. Like the Yugoslavs before him, Garaudy has been accused of revisionism, for there can only be one model of socialism according to the more traditional Marxists, and the proletariat must play the leading role according to Marx's theory.[172]

The new theories arising in various socialist countries are often interpreted as expressing the differences in national interests that exist between them. Yet they may also be laying the seeds of a new tendency that takes into account the differences in interests that exist between the various strata within each socialist country.

Conclusion

Thus we find the Ossowski's generalization tends to overlook the changes that occur in socialist countries in the period following the revolution when the class and political struggle actually continues; the continuation of a political struggle (struggle for power) after the bourgeois class has been eliminated; and the new types of struggle that emerge after socialism has been fully established.

Ossowski also does not delve into differences between the various leaders, one (like Stalin) intensifying the political struggle even after the bourgeoisie has been liquidated, and speaking of a permanent revolution and the threat of counter-revolution; and the other (like Khrushchev) cloaking the new contradictions arising in the socialist system under the image of cohesion, of an "all people's state."

Ossowski tends to emphasize political rationalization and overlook the actual development that takes place in the socialist countries; and he also stresses only one type of rationalization given by socialist rulers - that stressing the cohesive aspect of society (like Khrushchev's "all people's state"), but ignores the opposite rationalization concerning an intensification of the class struggle (given by Stalin).

4. Nationalism and Internationalism

The idea of internationalism may be divided into two stages:

1. The stage of the struggle to achieve socialism.
2. The stage of international integration

following the achievement of socialism.

Pre-Socialist Stage

For Marx, the ultimate basis of cohesion is class, not nation. He links the loyalty and cohesion of the proletariat to internationalism, not nationalism, thus elevating it to an international level. When the proletariat takes over power, all national barriers will come down, and the whole earth will be united into one integral whole. In the present section we shall attempt to trace what happened to these ideas, as Marx's successors faced the realities of nationalism.

According to Marx, the nation itself was a creation of the bourgeoisie, and nationalism was a bourgeois phenomenon, a tool used by the bourgeoisie in retaining its hold on the masses.

> The ruling class imposes its own ideas on the whole epoch. In this case the ideology is a nationalistic one, which the bourgeoisie utilizes first to consolidate, and later to retain its own power.[173]

Within the capitalist society itself, there had also arisen the proletarian class which was international in nature and outlook.

> While the bourgeoisie has separate national interests, big industry creates a class, the proletarians, which in all nations has the same interest and with which nationality is already dead.[174]

The proletarian has more in common with workers of other countries than with the other classes in his own nation, and Marx emphasizes the "common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality."[175]

The internationalism of the proletariat was put to the test - and failed - during World War I. The workers of each country took a nationalist stand by supporting their own bourgeois government. This led Lenin to accuse the labor leaders of having been bribed by the superprofits of imperialism.

The idea of internationalism here would provide the international conditions most appropriate for the carrying on of the class struggle on the national level. It would help to prevent the capitalists from utilizing the proletariat in fighting imperialist wars and thus weakening the revolutionary movement and the class struggle.

Instead of unity, however, there was a serious split in the international working class:

> The international proletariat is divided into two camps (the respective proletariats of the oppressed nations and the oppressing nations). Expressed in terms of nations this involves a world divided into two main groups - of colony-owning countries, on the one hand, and colonies on the other.[176]

Stalin and Khrushchev made similar accusations against the Western proletariat. Khrushchev berated them for their treachery and for taking nationalist stands.[177]

Differences had already appeared between the stands and interests of the Communists of Europe and those of the colonies, as seen in the controversy between

Lenin who advocated cooperation with the bourgeois nationalists in the colonies, and the Indian Communist M.N. Roy. Stalin tried to unite the proletarians of Europe with the oppressed nations.

> The interests of the proletarian movement in the advanced countries and of the national liberation movement in the colonies require the fusion of these two aspects of the revolutionary movement into a common front against the common enemy, imperialism....
> Hence the necessity for a...struggle against the Great-Power chauvinism of the Socialists of the dominant nations...who do not want to support the struggle of the oppressed peoples in 'their' colonies for emancipation. Hence the necessity of fighting the national reserve, narrow-mindedness and aloofness of the Socialists in the oppressed countries who have no desire to look beyond their national 'village pump.'[178]

What about capitalism? Has it turned out to be "national" in character? Lenin showed that while capitalism is national in its beginnings, it becomes international in its mature state, outgrowing the framework of national states.[179]

> Developing capitalism knows of two historical tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of national life and of national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, the creation of national states. The second is the development and growing frequency of all sorts of relations between nations, the breaking down of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, and of economic life in general, of politics, of science.... Both tendencies are the universal law of capitalism. The first predominates at the beginning of its development, the second characterises capitalism mature and approaching its transformation into a socialist society.[180]

Stalin noted that capitalism tended to amalgamate the world into one:

> The development of the world market, the perfection of the great rail and sea routes, the export of capital ... bound all kinds of people by the ties of the international division of labor and universal interdependence.[181]

This was a "progressive" process since it created the material conditions for a future world socialist economic system, but it took the form of the subjection of certain peoples by others, of imperialism. There was an "irreconcilable contradiction" between the process of economic amalgamation of peoples and the imperialist methods used. The result was a revolt of the oppressed peoples against imperialism, and an instability of the imperialist system.[182]

The capitalist countries themselves are not fully united by any means. They still compete and have wars. Their unity is greatest in the face of the common threat of socialism.

Khrushchev notes the existence of two opposite trends in the capitalist world:

> One is the trend towards joining all its forces against socialism, and the other towards an aggravation of the contradictions between the imperialist powers, and also between the imperialist powers and the other countries of the capitalist world.[183]

Marx predicted that in the future socialist world the whole earth would be united into one unit, without any national barriers. Only then, he said, would the separate individuals be liberated from the various national and local barriers.[184]

This implies a support for the integration of nations into larger units, until finally there is a total integration of all nations into one whole. And in fact we do find, in the writers we are dealing with, a preference for big nations, and a dislike of separatism which leads to fragmentation into smaller political units.

Marx himself was never in favor of small states, of splitting up states, and he considered the separation of an oppressed nation as a step towards federation, towards future concentration.[185]

He approved the formation or unification of large "revolutionary" nations like Germany,[186] and had little sympathy for small nations. Once he wrote about Poland, "A nation which can raise at best only twenty thousand to thirty thousand men does not count."[187]

Marx and Engels supported the large, progressive nations to such a point that they approved of their conquering backward feudal or prefeudal countries, as this was in the interest of civilization.

Lenin too was more interested in the fate of large nations than small ones:

> The interest of the liberation of a number of big and very big nations in Europe stands higher than the interest of the movement for liberation of small nations.[188]

Even when he supported self-determination of oppressed nations, he did so with a future concentration of nations in mind.

> To defend this right does in no way mean to encourage the formation of small states, but on the contrary it leads to a freer...wider and universal formation of larger governments and unions of government - a phenomenon more advantageous for the masses and more in accord with economic development.[189]

Recent writers, like Starushenko, still show the same preference for big nations and a dislike for separatism. Even when separatism is found necessary, it should be only temporary and eventually lead to integration. Starushenko writes:

> Generally speaking, Marxists do not favour artificial creation of many small states. The advantages of big states from the viewpoint of economic progress and the interests of the broad masses have become obvious. Disunite to unite - such is the Marxist formula on the question of self-determination.[190]

Does this support for the integration of nations mean a support for all types of integration? It does not; it only includes integration that is considered to be in the interest of socialism. If it is in the interest of capitalism it is combatted.

The Soviets do not approve of any integration among capitalist countries. They combat the trend towards economic, political and military integration in Europe today, as it is anti-socialist.

Khrushchev accused the European Common Market of being in the interest of monopolies and against that of the people. The aggressive military blocs like NATO and

SEATO are aimed at enslaving the people, and are spearheaded against the socialist system. There is a direct link between the Common Market and NATO. He warned the smaller countries that they will lose their sovereignty and be forced to follow in the wake of big imperialist powers, and particularly the U.S.A.[191]

Socialism

Marx predicted that under socialism the whole earth would unite into a single unit.

Stalin differentiated between several stages within socialism. The first was the stage of "socialism in one country," which creates favorable conditions for the "renaissance and flowering of the nations."

Second comes "socialism on a world scale," or the "world dictatorship of the proletariat.- This, in turn, is divided into two stages. In the first there will be a "growth and flowering of the formerly oppressed nations and national languages, the establishment of equality among nations, the elimination of mutual national distrust, and the knitting together and strengthening of international ties among nations."

In the second stage, a single socialist world economy is built up. The nations feel the need to have, in addition to their own language, a common international language, and the two exist side by side. Several zonal economic centers will develop a common language for each group of nations. Finally, these centers will combine into one common world socialist economic center, with one language.[192]

The Soviet Union

Though the Soviets' policy aimed in the long run at amalgamating the whole Soviet Union into a single tightly integrated unit, in the short run it was necessary to take into account the existence of several nationalities.

The period of "socialism in one country," Stalin admitted "cannot create the conditions necessary for the amalgamation of the nations and national tongues of the world into one integrated whole. In fact this period created favorable conditions for the "renaissance and flowering" of the nations, and it even increased the number of languages and awakened to new life several little known nationalities.[193] Eventually this encouragement of national cultures would create the conditions necessary for their fusion.[194]

In the meantime, though the cultures were "national in form" they were being sovietized in content. Stalin used the slogan of "national in form, socialist in content."[195]

While Stalin started the process of integration, Khrushchev attempted to accelerate it. Here we shall mention a few of the important measures taken with the aim of merging the nationalities into a single Soviet people.

Language: As in other multinational countries (ex. U.S.A.) the trend in the U.S.S.R. has been towards the spreading of the language of the largest and strongest ethnic group to the others, and its adoption as the lingua franca.

After the Revolution, the Latin alphabet was adopted. In the mid-1930's, however, Stalin ordered the systematic eradication of the Latin alphabet in favor of modified cyrillic alphabets. The non-Russian languages were purged of cultural importations from abroad and infused with Russian loan words. The Russian language became the lingua franca.[196]

According to E.V. Tadevosian, the Russian language has become the second native tongue of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. He considers it the "precursor of a zonal language for dozens of different nationalities." At present it is spoken as the native tongue by nearly 60% of all Soviet peoples (while just over 50% of the Soviet population is Russian).

In 1959, almost ten and a half million non-Russians gave Russian as their mother tongue.[197]

The entire intelligentsia, according to Djunusov, in all the republics knows the Russian language in addition to its native language. The publication of literature in the Russian language in the national republics is increasing.[198]

Tadevosian takes this as a sign of the beginning of the erasure of linguistic differences - the most stable of all ethnic differences.[199] Yet a number of writers have doubts about the success of Russianization. A Western writer, Harry Lipset sees no significant increase of Russification. The position of minority languages in Soviet education has remained at about the same level during the period 1957-67.[200]

According to the periodical Fil. nauki., increasing bilinguality need not necessarily signify loss of national identity. It may even enhance people's interest and love for their own original language. For instance the census figures on Bashkirs who consider Bashkiri as their native tongues have increased over the years: From 54% in 1926, they went up to 58% in 1939, 62% in 1959, and 66.2% in 1970.[201]

Common Economy: There has been an attempt to unify the nationalities through economic unification. The 22nd Party Congress mentioned the attempt to "promote the socialist division of labour among the republics, unifying and combining their economic efforts...."[202]

Tadevosian points out that the productive forces increasingly "outgrow the bounds of the national republics taken individually." He gives as examples the great hydraulic engineering and power systems whose scope extends far beyond the borders of the republics. The Toktogul power and irrigation Center in Kirgizia is capable of serving 7,500,000 acres in Kirgizia, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan. Steps have been taken to establish large economic districts that cut across the various republics.[203]

Common Territory: There is an attempt to make the Soviet peoples consider the territory of the Soviet Union as a single unit. The boundaries separating the republics, says Tadevosian, are losing their significance. When progress demands it, the boundaries are changed. For instance in 1963 Kazakhstan gave Uzbekistan more than 8,700,000 acres of the Hungry Steppe for use in cotton growing.[204]

Migration: An attempt is being made to merge the various ethnic groups in the U.S.S.R. through an extensive migration of peoples.[205]

The Russians are spreading throughout the various republics of the U.S.S.R. Whereas in 1926 only 5% of the total number of Russians lived in the other republics, by 1959 the number had risen to 14.2%[206] They have come to form a sizable proportion of the population in several republics: about two-fifths in Kazakhstan, one-third in Kirgizia, one-fourth in Latvia, one-sixth in Turkmenia, one-seventh in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Tadjikstan, and one-tenth in Moldavia and Georgia. At the same time there is a reduction in the percentage of the indigenous nationalities in the various republics; the most striking changes having taken place in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. For instance the percentage of Kirgiz in the Kirgiz S.S.R.

diminished from 66% to 40.5%, and only 27.1% of the Tatars live in Tataria.[207]

Common Culture: There is an attempt to unify the cultures of the various nationalities into a single Soviet culture. According to the 22nd Congress of 1961:

> Obliteration of distinctions between classes and the development of communist social relations make for a greater social homogeneity of nations, and contribute to the development of common communist traits in their culture, morals and way of living.[208]

According to Djunusov, the Soviet peoples have shaped common traditions based on the new type of socialist relationships, and their modes of life are becoming more similar. For instance the collective farmers are using certain features of Russian rural costumes.[209]

Tadevosian states that there has "come into being a new...historical community of people - the Soviet people..." with the U.S.S.R. as their common socialist fatherland...a common socialist economy, a common social and class structure, and common intellectual and moral characteristic, as well as a common goal of building communism.[210]

Soviet Patriotism

The Soviet government places great value on "love for the motherland," and "patriotism" has become a solid virtue of the Soviet citizen.

During the second world war, Stalin tried to encourage the patriotism of the Soviet peoples in the defence of the motherland against the Nazi invaders. The heroes of Tsarist Russia - Peter the Great, and even Ivan the Terrible - became heroes of the Soviet Union, and Tsarist generals like Suvorov and Kutusov were treated with great respect in rewritten histories.[211] Wars like that of 1812 were described as defensive wars, fought in defence of "Mother Russia."[212]

Ponomaryov points out that socialism consolidates the nation.

> The crystallisation of the socio-political unity of a nation is accompanied by a powerful surge of patriotism...only under socialism does a nation truly feel it is a single whole and acquire a oneness of will and action. This firm unity of society, of the nation, is an achievement of socialism, striking proof of its superiority over capitalism, which disunites people.[213]

The Soviet Union, in the words of Kommunist, is a "close family, where though each lives in his own home, the land and the economy are one and indivisible."[214]

Bourgeois Nationalism

The Soviets have often met with active resistance on the part of the republics to their attempts to wipe out national differences. Such resistance is labeled "bourgeois nationalism," or "chauvinism," and severe measures, including purges, are used in stamping it out.

In 1959 several republics showed opposition to the educational reform acts which allowed a free choice of languages in the schools, as this deprived the republics of the right to make the native language compulsory for pupils of their own nationality in Russian-language schools.[215]

Russians complained that the Baltic republics compel personnel of other nationalities to study the language of the local population.[216]

Kommunist attacks "localism" expressed in opposing the interests of "one's own republic to the interests of the entire state."[217] Some have one-sided views of their own sovereignty and demand budgetary autonomy.[218]

Accusations have been made against republics which oppose the exchange of personnel and show exclusiveness in the utilization of personnel of various nationalities.[219]

Some complain about the growth of the population of other than the indigenous nationality, and about ethnic differences disappearing.[220]

Some republics restore "backward" customs and mores that hamper communist construction, under the guise of "national traditions."[221] Retreating into their narrowly nationalist traditions, some are unwilling to adopt the "superior" experiences of other peoples.[222]

The historians of Kazakhstan, Bashkir and Tataria among others have been accused of idealizing the history of the people and giving negative evaluations of the Russian state.[223]

An Estonian newspaper points out that Lenin never spoke about any immediate disappearance of national peculiarities, languages and cultures.[224] An Estonian lecturer, suggests that fusion can take place without Russification, on a regional basis:

> Why cannot the national art of the Uzbek people, with its rich cultural heritage, become in the future the center of cultural unity of the peoples of its linguistic group? We presume that it is possible.[225]

These few illustrations which crop up in Soviet publications as well as Western ones, show that regionalism is still a problem in the U.S.S.R.

Despite all efforts at integration, the various Soviet leaders have realized how difficult it is to wipe out national differences, and they keep postponing the final merging of nations to an ever more distant future.

Lenin stated that national and state differences would remain for a long time, even after the dictatorship of the proletariat had been established on a world scale.[226]

Stalin discovered that "nations and national languages possess an extraordinary stability and tremendous power of resistance to the policy of assimilation."[227] He postponed the amalgamation of nations to the very distant future.

The 22nd Congress of 1961 predicted that the obliteration of national distinctions, and especially of language distinctions would be a considerably longer process than the obliteration of class distinctions.[228]

Some modern writings even deny the disappearance of ethnic groups. Djunusov says:

> It would be mistaken to say that the building of communism signifies the 'abolition' of ethnic distinctions.[229]

A. Mordinov reassures his readers that "merging" is not a synonym of "disappearance," i.e. even after nations have merged they will not disappear."[230]

The Socialist Bloc

In keeping with their long-range strategy of uniting the whole world, the Soviets are trying to integrate the countries of the socialist bloc economically, militarily, politically and ideologically.

In January 1949, representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the U.S.S.R., and Czechoslovakia met in Moscow to found what is now the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Later it was joined by the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Mongolia. Since 1964, Yugoslavia has participated in some of its work. The meetings are attended by observers from North Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba.

Initially they coordinated mutual deliveries rather than the sphere of production.[231] Up to 1955 the C.M.E.A. more or less confined its role to the registration of bilateral commercial agreements between its members. In 1955 and early 1956, it began to work on a pattern of specialization for the region, and drew up balances of key materials to harmonize the total supply and demand for these in the entire bloc.[232] The coordination of long-range plans ranged from prospecting and research to coordination of levels of production and marketing, including the mechanism of capital investment and construction.[233]

Some major cooperation projects have been carried out like the "Friendship" oil pipeline, the unification of member countries' power systems, the joint freight car pool, and the international Bank for Economic Cooperation.[234]

The Warsaw Pact has served as a tool for the military integration of the socialist bloc countries. As Ponomaryov points out, the main burden of the defence of the socialist system falls on the shoulders of the Soviet Union.[235]

The Warsaw Treaty organization also serves as the main center for coordinating the foreign-policy activity of the socialist countries.[236] Political consultations between leaders of the Communist parties of the socialist countries have become a system.[237]

Differences

Though the countries of the socialist bloc have a common Marxist ideology, there is always the possibility that differences will arise between them as to applications of theory, interpretations, and interests. Here we shall trace a few of the areas in which such differences have occurred.

Economy: Following the termination of World War II, many bitter feelings were aroused on account of the heavy reparations demanded by the Soviet Union from countries that had been allied to Germany.[238]

The "joint stock companies" set up brought complaints that the Soviets had not paid up their share, using instead the German assets they confiscated, and accusations of exploitation from Yugoslavia for instance.[239]

The Soviets were accused of charging the other socialist countries more than the West for Soviet exports, and paying them less for imports (ex. for Polish coal and Rumanian oil).[240]

Following the threat of revolution in the Communist bloc in the early 1950's, the Soviet Union cancelled reparations, dissolved the joint stock companies, adjusted prices, and even offered the other countries credits.[241]

Economic relations by their very nature include losses and gains, and conflicts can easily arise over national interests regardless of ideology. In the case of the socialist countries, as the economy is state run, economic differences may take on a political hue.

Protection of national interests, (the Yugoslav paper Politika points out,) is immediately identified with nationalism and confronted with the international interests of socialism.

> National interests...have to be subordinated to international interests. He who does not accept this postulate is labelled a nationalist ...who is competent to determine what the international interests of socialism are?[242]

In the purge trials conducted in the aftermath of Tito's defection in 1948, for instance, the Bulgarian Vice Premier was accused of selfishly defending Bulgaria's interests without regard to fraternal relations. He was criticized for arguing over every bargaining point, over the exchange of the ruble, and over prices.[243]

Objections were raised about the specialization of the C.M.E.A. Rumania, for instance feared that this would perpetuate the backwardness of the underdeveloped countries.[244] Rumania would remain an agricultural state heavily dependent on imports of industrial goods from other nations in the Eastern bloc,[245] while her wish was to go in for heavy industry,[246] and be independent, relying on her own resources. The Declaration issued by the Rumanian Communist Party Central Committee in April 1964 states:

> The successful solution of economic tasks depends above all on exploitation by a country of its own potential, on intensive use of its own forces, and on maximum exploitation of its own resources.[247]

The Chinese adopted the thesis of "reliance on one's own forces" following their unhappy experience with the Russians in 1960. After starting the industrialization of the country, the Russians withdrew their technicians overnight in 1960, taking their blueprints and designs with them. The Chinese were left with unfinished plants, and had to guess how they might be completed.[248] Their reaction was to replace the slogan of "superindustrialisation" with that of "agriculture is the basis of economic development,"[249] and to decentralize their industry.[250]

Aid Priorities: The Soviets often mention the fact that they are rendering aid to other, less developed countries of the socialist bloc. The Conference of Communist Parties in 1960 attributed "the successes of the socialist countries...above all, to the...help of the Soviet Union...."[251] It is only with the assistance of the Soviets that the others will be able to reach the stage of Communism.[252]

As the Soviets are helping a large number of countries, including the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America as well, it is not possible to meet everyone's wishes. Priorities have to be set, particularly as the U.S.S.R. itself must maintain a reasonably high standard at home, since it is the showcase of socialism to the world at large. The priorities may lead to competition between recipient countries and even to clashes with the Soviet Union.

One example here is China, which was offended by the Soviets' support of "bourgeois" India at the expense of Communist China. While China got the Mig 15 and 19, India and Indonesia got the Mig 21.[253] The Chinese paper Jen Min Jih Pao indignantly wrote:

> How is it possible, from the standpoint of a Communist, to mention socialist China and India, which is dominated by the upper

> bourgeoisie, in the same breath? How can aid for reactionaries be placed in the same category as aid for a class brother?[254]

The Soviets, having built up socialism in their own country, can now turn their attention to international fields of endeavor, and with a more international outlook than their socialist colleagues, may assist developing countries with the aim of hitting at Western imperialism. But the newer socialist countries are still in the process of consolidating the new system internally, and insist that priority be given to their needs.

Territory: The friction between the U.S.S.R. and China reached such proportions that it even manifested itself in military clashes over territory.

The question of disputed territories existed some 20 years ago, but at that time the Soviet and Chinese Communists were on friendly terms. In 1957-58, the Amur River, of which the Ussuri is a tributary, was proclaimed the "river of friendship."[255]

It was in 1963-64 that Mao Tse Tung publicly raised the issue of the vast seizures by Czarist Russia in the 19th century of territory belonging to the Manchu empire, as well as the transformation of the Mongolian People's Republic into a Soviet satellite after 1921. In a talk with Japanese socialists on July 10, 1964, Mao stated:

> There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union. On the basis of the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union brought Mongolia under its domination

> under the pretext of guaranteeing that country's independence.... About one hundred years ago, the region to the west of Lake Baikal became Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other points have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented the bill for this list.[256]

All the treaties by which the present frontiers were determined were negotiated between Manchu emperors and Russian tsars. They were forced upon a weak and unwilling China, and their terms bore more heavily on China than Russia; Mao considered them as "unequal treaties."[257]

In March 1969 actual clashes took place on a disputed island in the Ussuri River. The Chinese ambushed and inflicted heavy casualties on an outnumbered Soviet unit. The Soviet side retaliated two weeks later by annihilating a Chinese unit.[258]

At the 24th Party Congress, Brezhnev spoke of the Soviet determination to defend Soviet national interests at all costs against any Chinese encroachments. Marshal A.A. Grechko, Soviet Defense Minister said that any aggressor who violated Soviet borders would be severely punished.[259]

In August 1972, the Soviet government accused China of trying to stir up hatred by publishing a new "peace atlas" that claimed more than 900,000 square miles of Soviet territory as its own. This included Mongolia, most of Kazakhstan, parts of Turkmenia and Uzbekistan, and Siberia from north of the Ussuri River to the

Pacific.[260]

The Chinese have also tried to arouse the other socialist countries which have territorial problems with the U.S.S.R. In 1964 Mao called attention to the plight of the other countries by explicitly listing their claims along with China's own - Poland's eastern lands, the Czechs' sub-Carpathia, Rumania's Bessarabia, and Germany's East Prussia. Only Rumania responded openly by surfacing the historical record of her possession of Bessarabia.[261]

Such clashes are not in keeping with the Marxist ideology which attributes rivalries only to the capitalist world. The Communist world should be immune to any such strife.[262]

Rivalry: China is attempting to compete with the U.S.S.R. over leadership of the developing countries. Pravda accused the Peking leaders of striving to use the "heroic freedom struggle of the peoples in their global intrigues that stem from the Great Han dreams of becoming new emperors of the "Great China," that would rule at least Asia, if not the whole world."[263]

The Soviets accuse the Chinese of trying to isolate the Third World countries from the socialist bloc, and form a bloc of their own under their own hegemony. They:

> tried to knock together their own bloc in the national-liberation movement and to place it in opposition to the united anti-imperialist front that was set up at the Bandung Conference in 1955....
> The Peking leaders want the new bloc, if it is set up, to follow the Chinese line in world

> politics and try to pass themselves off as a new center that will issue directives as to what the young developing countries should and should not do...[264]

They try to keep the Soviet Union out of conferences as it is allegedly a non-Asian power and therefore has no business to be there.[265] They even use racist arguments to keep the Russians out.

> The Chinese delegates tried more than once to make the representatives of the Asian and African countries distrust Russians, Czechs, Poles and peoples of other socialist countries merely because they are white.[266]

The stream of Russian insults is met by equally vitriolic accusations from the Chinese, and their Albanian ally. They call the Russians "revisionists," "social imperialists"...and warn the developing countries against Soviet "aid."[267]

> The modern revisionists also talk about "economic cooperation and economic aid". But they have no sincere desire to help the Asian and African countries to develop their independent national economies...they sometimes provide the machinery while holding back the key units and parts: sometimes they provide equipment while withholding technical knowledge, trying all they can to make the Asian and African countries economically dependent on them...They have even gone so far as to cancel aid, withdraw experts and tear up contracts as a means of applying pressure.[268]

Ideology: Though the socialist countries all have a Marxist ideology, it is always possible for differences in interpretation, tactics and application to arise.

Considering themselves to be the vanguard of the world communist movement, the Soviets expected the other countries to follow their example. Some other countries did not approve of some aspects of the Soviet model of socialism and wanted to apply Marxism in a different manner. The Yugoslavs, for instance, criticized the Soviets for their bureaucratic methods and disregard of the aspirations of the workers.[269] They opted for a different road to socialism, which included self-management in industry, and the rotation of government officials.[270]

The Rumanian I. Serbanescu wrote in 1970:

> The founders of socialism never produced a "model", let alone a "uniform model," of socialism. Historic experience has frequently proved that one must not apply indiscriminately the methods and organisation forms which existed and were valid in one country in other conditions and other stages of history.[271]

The Poles also expressed their dissatisfaction at having had to imitate the Russian model in Stalinist days.[272]

Leadership of Communist Movement: The Soviets accuse the Chinese of trying to seize the leadership of the world Communist movement. Brezhnev accuses the Chinese of aspiring to be a great power:

> The struggle for hegemony in the Communist movement and against the Marxist-Leninist parties is inextricably bound up with the great-power aspirations of the present Peking leadership.[273]

While they are revisionists they accuse everyone else of deviating from Marxism, and want to impose their ideas on the whole world.

> Mao Tse-Tung's ideas have been pronounced the Marxism-Leninism of the present epoch. Chinese

> propaganda openly proclaims the task of "hoisting the banner of Mao Tse Tung's ideas over the entire globe"... The Peking leaders level accusations of "revisionism" against any party that does not share their views and aims.[274]

Not content with polemics, they are now trying to destroy the communist movement through schismatic activities. They form schismatic groupings in the various countries calling them "Marxist-Leninist parties,"[275] and are seeking to create an anti-Soviet orbit of their own.[276]

They even try to destroy the Soviet regime in the U.S.S.R. through "appeals to the Soviet people to stage a revolution and change the social system"[277], in Brezhnev's words.

Independence: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union for a long time held a special place by virtue of its historical role as the first party to succeed in building socialism. Its experience established its right to comment authoritatively on ideological matters. Its power placed the other socialist states in debt to the U.S.S.R. which helped them to build socialism and protected them from the imperialists.

Communists felt that their fate was linked with the Soviet Union, and were unwilling to pit their views against those of the C.P.S.U.[278] According to Ponomaryov,

> Other Marxist parties...considered it their prime duty to defend the Soviet republic. To preserve socialism in the Soviet Union was to safeguard the cause of socialism generally. This was the focal point of proletarian internationalism in the first stage of the epoch ushered in by the October

Revolution.[279]

A speaker at the Ninth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1966 put it in these words:

> Thirty years ago Georgi Dimitrov, revered by the World working class, had pointed out that the attitude to the Soviet Union was the touchstone of loyalty to Communism and internationalism.[280]

As the Communist parties came into power in the various countries and had to tackle their own national problems, the authority of the Soviet Union as the sole interpreter of Marx was challenged.

Yugoslavia led the way in 1948, and stood firm in its claim for independence despite all the pressure put on it - from propaganda campaigns, to boycotts, to border incidents. It gradually developed its own model of socialism which had an influence on Communists in other countries.

China not only took an independent road but was even accused of trying to steal the leadership of the Communist world movement from the Soviet Union. It also urged the other socialist states to break away from the Soviet Union. The only one to do so was Albania, which became China's ally, and attacked the Soviets virulently.

The Soviets had to deal with uprisings in East Germany, Hungary and Poland in the 1950's. A more recent challenge was that of the Czech liberalization movement in 1968. Alarmed at the internal changes being made in Czechoslovakia, the five-power Warsaw meeting in July 1968 sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Czech Communist Party stating:

> Each of our parties is responsible not only to its working class and its people, but also to the international working class and the world Communist movement, and we cannot evade the obligations following from this....That is why we believe that the decisive rebuff to the anti-Communist forces and the decisive efforts for the preservation of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia are not only your but also our task.[281]

On August 2nd, 1968, Dubcek took to the airwaves to address his people, and assured the Soviets that the Czechs were quite capable of defending socialism:

> I wish to stress that our army is not only a firm component in the defense of our socialist community but also a sufficient guarantee of the defense of our state frontiers, and by the same token, of the frontiers of socialism.[282]

To justify the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia the "Brezhnev doctrine" was enunciated, giving the Soviet Union the right to intervene in the affairs of any other Communist state if subversion or distortion of its socialist system would endanger the existence of other states.

Soviet leaders became concerned to prove the invasion's legality. At first they said that they entered Czechoslovakia in response to an appeal for help by some of her representatives against the counter-revolutionary forces. Later they gave an ideological explanation, differentiating between "socialistic" sovereignty and "abstract" sovereignty, and rejecting the contention that Czechoslovakia's sovereignty had been violated.[283] Three years later they were still trying to justify their action. In 1971, Brezhnev stated in his report to the 24th Party Congress that socialism in all of Europe was threatened:

> It was clear to us that what was involved here was not only an attempt by imperialism and its accomplices to overthrow the socialist system in Czechoslovakia. What was involved was an attempt in this way to strike a blow at the positions of socialism in Europe as a whole, and to create favorable conditions for a subsequent attack against the socialist world by the most aggressive forces of imperialism.[284]

The Czech invasion had an adverse effect on Soviet influence in the socialist bloc. Rumania refused to participate in the invasion, and Hungary contributed only a token force and strongly hinted at her disagreement with the action taken.[285] Peking was disturbed as it feared a repetition of the action in other countries like Rumania and Albania.[286] Albania's attitude may be seen from the following quotation from the paper Bashkimi in 1970:

> The collaborationist Husak clique continues the heavy purge of the Czechoslovak Communist Party...eliminate all those who may oppose the plans of Husak's Moscow masters.... The U.S.S.R.-Czechoslovak friendship treaty ...will make the country a province of the Soviet Union.[287]

Virtually all the Western European Communist Parties and the Japanese party made their opposition plain. The Italians condemned the invasion in the sharpest terms. Some party members accused the Soviet Communist Party of "imperialism."[288]

The French Party objected to the Czech invasion, but when one of its leaders, Roger Garaudy, criticized the Soviets too harshly, the party accused him of interfering in the internal affairs of another party.[289]

The Czech incident did nothing to abate the socialist countries' desire for independence from the Soviets. In 1969, Tito said at the Ninth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party:

> Adhering consistently to the principle of cooperation with all parties and movements on the basis of equality, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia does not agree with attempts aimed at creating some sort of new international center, which would obstruct revolutionary development and dampen the creative initiative of individual Communist parties and progressive movements.[290]

The Rumanian Constantin Vlad wrote in 1970:

> The world socialist system comprises countries which evolve as distinct entities, with their own individual qualities and within their national borders; they are independent and sovereign states. Internationalism, understood as solidarity and cooperation, is only possible AMONG EQUALS.[291]

In the West, there are different opinions about the extent of independence the various Communist countries enjoy. Some writers, like Olgin, consider that "A Cominform of Communist parties loyal to that of the Soviet Union... is...an accomplished fact."[292] Others, like Charles Gati consider the socialist countries to be independent or semi-independent, and the label "Soviet bloc" to be anachronistic.[293] C. Wright Mills agrees with the latter view.[294]

The Soviets keep on assuring their socialist colleagues that they are equal, and that there is no leading center in the Communist movement. At the 23rd Party Congress of 1966, Brezhnev stated:

> The C.P.S.U. is against any kind of hegemonism in the Communist movement: it is for truly internationalist equal relations among all parties.[295]

Yet they also repeat the phrase that was used in warning the Czechoslovaks before the invasion. "Each Communist Party is responsible for its activity to its own working class and people, and at the same time to the international working class."[296]

When any country opts for an independent course of its own, it is accused of nationalism. At the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969 Brezhnev said:

> The imperialists...count on nationalism in their struggle against the forces of socialism and against the revolutionary movement. They hope in this way to disunite and splinter the Communist movement and to pit revolutionary detachments against one another. Bourgeois propaganda tries in every possible way to slander the principle of proletarian internationalism and artificially to counterpose it to the principles of independence, sovereignty and equality among the national detachments of the workers' and Communist movement.[297]

Polycentrism has also affected the Communist parties in the capitalist world. After World War II some of the European Communist parties had become very large and strong, particularly in France and Italy and they began to make their views heard. Togliatti demanded greater independence for the individual parties. The situation had changed, he said, to such an extent that the Soviet example "can and must no longer be compulsory." A "polycentric system" was being developed and even inside the Communist movement it was no longer possible to speak of a unified leadership.[298]

G. Lukacs pointed out that Stalinism has put an end to the feeling of sympathy that European socialists used to feel towards the Soviet Union. The latter, he said was no longer considered as the model. The European socialist does not consider the life of the Soviet worker or peasant as a socialist one.[299]

There was also the possibility for differences in interests and interpretations to arise between the various parties and the Soviet one. The Soviet Union now acts as a government in the field of international politics. Though it claims to act in the interests of the world socialist revolution, its actions may sometimes clash with the interests of Communist parties of other countries which have to tackle their own internal problems and class struggles. To take an extreme case as an example, the Soviet government has at times found it necessary to assist countries that are persecuting and even killing their local Communists, ex. Turkey during the reign of Mustafa Kamal.

Conclusion

Though socialism as a revolutionary theory (when not in power) inclines toward the internationalism of the working class as a means of achieving international solidarity against the common enemy (capitalism); the actual relationships between socialist countries, i.e. the working classes in power, show that it is possible for them to take nationalist stands in protecting their interests and obtaining the greatest possible returns in economic dealings, and in demanding the freedom to make their own interpretation and application of socialism.

Thus the liquidation of the capitalist state does not prevent the working class once in power from adopting a nationalist stand in its relations with other working classes.

It may be noted here that the conflicts concerning economic returns and the freedom of applying Marxism found in international relations, also constitute the new forms of conflict that arise within each country, and lead to the appearance of new Marxisms (as we have seen in Class and Cohesion).

In multinational states this raises the question of whether the most advanced working class which has carried out the revolution and obtained the largest share of power, is not also likely to incline towards a nationalist solution to the problem of nationalities.

5. Types of Nationalism

Western scholars deal with nationalism on the basis that it can have various different characteristics and types - democratic, expansionist, national liberation...; it has an independent existence of its own and continues to exist regardless of changes in the type or ideology and may transform itself from one type to another. Even if they do not approve of a type, like the expansionist, for instance, they still recognize its existence (ex. Kohn).

In classical Marxist thought, nationalism is a temporary phenomenon that appears only at a specific stage of history, with the bourgeoisie, and disappears with the achievement of socialism. So basically there is only one type of nationalism - bourgeois. The study of nationalism is thus linked to ideology and a specific stage of history. The closest equivalent to the Western "type" of nationalism we can find in Marxist thought is the "stage of history." The bourgeois system constitutes one of the stages of history in historical materialism, so the "type" of nationalism can only be studied in the framework of the historical stages. The stress here is on the stage of history or type rather than on nationalism per se.

The question we pose in the present section is whether Marxist thought has remained the same or whether the changes it has undergone point to a rapprochement with Western thought i.e. that nationalism may be of various different types and is not inevitably linked with the stages of history.

It should be noted here that when changes are effected in Marxist theory they are made by means of new formulae that leave the original theory unchanged - at least in appearance.

As nationalism was originally linked with a specific stage of history - the bourgeois, and was expected to end with it, we notice that the new formulae deal with nationalism by adding new divisions to the stages of history.

Marx divided history into several stages:

> In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois methods of production as so many epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society.[300]

Capitalism would eventually be succeeded by socialism.

This formed the basis of the standard scheme of history laid down in Stalin's "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" and adopted as dogma by the Soviets.

> Five main types of relations of production are known to history: primitive communal, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist.[301]

Marx laid down an objective economic criterion for the transition from one stage to the next. Society passes from one stage to the next only when the economic infrastructure is ready for the change.

> No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed, and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society.[302]

Any attempt to impose a change through ideas alone is "utopian".

> The final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought not in men's brains, not in man's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in the changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought not in the philosophy, but in the economies of each particular period.[303]

Marx gave importance only to the nationalism of the advanced capitalist nations of Western Europe, which he considered as "revolutionary," and supported the unification of Germany. As for the feudal countries and backward colonies, he ignored their nationalism theoretically, but implied its existence in practice by opposing it. (ex. the Czechs whom he considered as, a "reactionary" nation, and the Indian mutiny against the British, which he opposed). Thus he gave priority to the type of nationalism or its stage of historical development rather than to nationalism per se.

Lenin, above all a realistic, practical politician, recognized the existence of national liberation movements in the colonies as he could make use of them in the interest of the European proletarian movement, by combatting imperialism and its bribery of the labor aristocracy. Unlike Marx, he placed the priority on the nationalist movement rather than on the type of nationalism and the colonies' stage of historical development.

He no longer considered the bourgeois nations as revolutionary like Marx. On the contrary, they had now become reactionary, and their nationalism was the arch-enemy. He did not think, like Marx, that they had a modernizing influence on the colonies. He divided the capitalist stage into two parts.

> 1. ...the period of the downfall of feudalism...of the formation of the bourgeois-democratic society and state when the national movements for the first time become mass movements.
>
> 2. ...the period of definitely...crystallized capitalist states...with a strongly developed antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeois...eve of the downfall of capitalism... developed capitalism while bringing the nations that have already been fully drawn into commercial intercourse closer together and causing them to intermingle to an increasing degree, pushes into the forefront the antagonism between internationally united capital and the international labor movement.[304]

Fitting Marx's ideas into the first stage, Lenin inverted them in the second, imperialist stage.

Stalin sought a reconciliation between the ideological stand of Marx and the nationalist one of Lenin, once giving priority to the ideology or type of nationalism, and another time to the national liberation movement, regardless of its ideology.

He theorized this compromise by dividing the colonies into three categories:

> We have now at least three categories of colonies and dependent countries. Firstly, there are countries like Morocco, which have no proletariat or almost no proletariat, and which industrially are completely undeveloped. Secondly, there are countries like China and Egypt, which are industrially little developed, and which have a comparatively small proletariat. Thirdly, there are

> countries like India, which are capitalistically more or less developed, and which possess a more or less numerous national proletariat.[305]

The less developed they were, and the weaker the local communist parties, the more he inclined toward collaboration with the nationalist movements.

Khrushchev returned to Lenin's viewpoint, giving priority to nationalism over ideology. He considered the national liberation movements so important that he ranked them second only to the Soviet bloc as a world revolutionary force.[306]

To avoid criticisms of cooperating with the bourgeoisie of the backward countries (of the kind Lenin received from M.N. Roy), Khrushchev created a new stage of history called "national democracy", which would replace capitalism and constitute a transition to socialism via the "non-capitalist path."[307]

The backward countries were no longer divided into stages of development but were expected to skip the stages of history and enter socialism regardless of their backwardness.

The national liberation movement was redefined and given a mixture of nationalist and socialist characteristics, making it look closer to socialist ideology.

National democracy was characterized by a struggle against imperialism and feudalism, agrarian reforms, the development of national industry, the expulsion of foreign monopolies, a national front of all democratic classes, the democratization of public life, the establishment of a state sector, and cooperation with the socialist countries.[308]

While in the past, development was expected to be internal, coming as a result of the ripeness of economic circumstances, and any attempt to impose socialism before its time was considered "utopian," the modifications in the theory allowed for such utopian change, on the basis that internal conditions could be developed through assistance from outside - so long as it came from the Soviets (if it was from the West it was considered neo-colonialism).

Under Brezhnev, there has been a swing back to a more Stalinist attitude, with more emphasis placed on the type of nationalism, stage of historical development or ideology, rather than on nationalism per se.

The Soviets no longer show the optimism of Khrushchev's time about the inevitability of a socialist future for the developing countries. The imperialists and internal reaction are attempting to draw these countries along the capitalist path.[309]

The future no longer looks assured; it cannot be predicted whether the developing countries will become capitalist or socialist. It will depend on the outcome of the class struggle now taking place.

Nationalism is no longer always considered progressive. It is sometimes used as a tool by the imperialists, and becomes reactionary.[310]

The national liberation movements are not as reliable as Khrushchev hoped. They are now relegated to third position (instead of second) among the world revolutionary forces.[311]

Conclusion

In order to understand the Marxist stand with regard to the relation between the various types of nationalism and the phenomenon of nationalism per se, one needs to ask whether priority is given to the type i.e. ideology or stage of history, or to nationalism per se.

We find that the stress on nationalism appeared primarily in relation to the colonies. It was rationalized through the creation of consecutive subdivisions of the stages of history.

The application of several different historical stages to the same case made the stages lose their objective character, and become open to subjective, political use.

These changes brought Marxist thought closer to that of Western scholars who consider nationalism to have an independent existence, with ideology or stage of history being considered as its characteristics.

6. Relations of the Soviets and the Third World

In the present section we shall trace the developments in the attitude of the Marxists towards the Third World in general, and Egypt in particular.

As we have seen, Marx linked nationalism only to the bourgeois stage of history, yet he had to take into account the nationalist movements that were actually afoot in feudal or prefeudal colonies in his own day.

Marx and Engels considered the Western capitalist countries to be progressive; as for the colonies, they were in a backward stage of history, feudal or prefeudal. The people in the colonies were backward and inferior and were defined in the most unflattering terms. Engels wrote about the Algerian bedouins that they were a "nation of robbers,"[312] and described the "ignorance, cupidity and corruption of the Persians."[313] Marx wrote about the "hereditary stupidity" of the Chinese.[314]

Writing in the New York Tribune on April 15, 1853, Marx said about the mob in the great cities of the Near East (which in every important coup d'etat has to be won over by bribes and flattery):

> Certainly there will be, sooner or later, an absolute necessity of freeing one of the finest parts of this continent from the rule of a mob, compared with which the mob of Imperial Rome was an assemblage of sages and heroes.[315]

Marx and Engels supported the colonialist expansionism of western capitalist states, as they considered that this would draw the backward colonies into the mainstream of civilization.

Engels considered the conquest of Algeria as "an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilization," as it "forced the Beys of Tunis and Tripoli and even the Emperor of Morocco, to enter upon the road of civilization."[316]

Colonialism would assist in destroying the feudal system and draw the whole world into the next stage of history - capitalism.[317]

Marx actually provided an apologia for Western imperialism and in the New York Tribune of April 7, 1853, he wrote:

> As the Koran treats of foreigners as foes, nobody will dare to present himself in Mussulman country without having taken precautions. The first European merchants, therefore, who risked the chances of commerce with such a people, contrived to secure themselves an exceptional treatment and privileges, originally personal, but afterwards extended to their whole nation. Hence the origins of capitulations.[318]

The capitulations, it should be noted, assisted foreigners to penetrate and eventually take over total control of the economy in Egypt.

Since colonialism was beneficial, Marx and Engels opposed the rebellions of natives against their European conquerors. When a national revolt against British rule broke out in India in 1857 Marx opposed it, and wrote:

> One is startled by the conduct of the British commander at Meerut - his late appearance on

> the field of battle being still less comprehensible than the weak manner in which he pursued the mutineers....
> Any notion...of the mutineers being able to keep the ancient capital of India against the British forces would be preposterous... the whole Bengal Presidency must be reconquered.[319]

Engels, for example, showed no sympathy for the Egyptian nationalist movement. While the Egyptians looked upon Ahmed Orabi as the leader of a national revolution against the ruling Turks and invading British troops, Engels wrote in a letter to E. Bernstein on August 9, 1882:

> It seems to me that in the Egyptian affair you are making too much of the so-called National Party. We know little about Arabi, but I am prepared to wager ten to one that he is an ordinary pasha who does not want to concede tax collecting to the financiers, because in the old Oriental fashion he prefers to put the taxes into his own pocket. I think that we can well...be against the English brutalities while by no means siding with their military adversaries of the moment.[320]

Marx and Engels expected that the peoples of Asia and Africa would rid themselves of foreign rule after the social revolution in Europe.[321] They only expected this liberation to take place in the far future.

Thus we find that Marx emphasized the economic and class factors. Colonialism would modernize the colonies, creating the new capitalist economy which would bring into being the proletarian class.

He gave priority to the march of history from one stage to the next (leading finally to socialism) over the self-determination of colonies, ignoring the will of backward peoples and opposing their revolts against colonialism.

His attitude towards the colonies was similar to that of Western writers and their "White Man's Burden" stand. In the long run, however, he expected the colonies to be liberated after Europe itself went socialist.

National Liberation Stage

Unlike Marx, Lenin no longer regarded the Western capitalist states as progressive, and he reversed Marx's policy towards their colonial expansion. It was no longer a "mission" that would civilize the backward countries; it was a form of exploitation and should be combatted. It was the latest form of capitalism - and therefore the main enemy.

He also reversed Marx's policy towards the national liberation movements in the colonies and gave them his full support.

He resolved the theoretical differences between himself and Marx by dividing capitalism into two stages, an early one in which feudalism was destroyed and the capitalist national states arose, and a later stage of "imperialism" which he described as follows:

> Imperialism is capitalism in that state of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance;

> in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.[322]

Lenin has been criticized for linking "imperialism," an ancient phenomenon, with capitalism. One example is Schumpeter, who regarded imperialism as an atavism that has nothing to do with capitalism. Imperialistic conquest is made only for the sake of conquest or success.[323]

Lenin tried to differentiate between the ancient type of imperialism and the capitalist type.

> Colonial policy and imperialism existed before the latest stage of capitalism and even before capitalism. Rome, founded on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and practised imperialism.... Even the capitalist colonial policy of previous stages of capitalism is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital. The principal feature of the latest stage of capitalism is the domination of monopolist associations of big employers. These monopolies are most firmly established when all the sources of raw materials are captured by one group.... Colonial possession alone gives the monopolies complete guarantee against all contingencies in the struggle with competitors.... Typical of the old capitalism, when free competition had undivided sway, was the export of goods. Typical of the latest stage of capitalism when monopolies rule, is the export of capital.[324]

He gave as one example, Egypt, a colony in which the British capitalists were exerting every effort to develop cotton growing (in 1904 out of 2,300,000 hectares of land under cultivation, 600,000 or more than one-fourth were under cotton);.... In this way they would be in a better position to defeat their foreign competitors, to monopolize the sources of raw materials and form a more economical and profitable textile trust in which all the processes of cotton production and manufacturing would be "combines" and concentrated in the hands of one set of owners.[325]

The world, said Lenin, had become divided into a handful of usurer states and a vast majority of debtor states. Great Britain granted loans to Egypt, her navy played the part of bailiff in case of necessity, and her political power protected her from the indignation of her debtors.[326]

Imperialism had a destructive effect on the revolutionary character of the European proletariat. The superprofits derived from imperialism were used in bribing the upper crust of the working class. As a result, the expected social revolutions were not forthcoming, and the beleaguered Soviet Union could not expect any help from its European comrades in the immediate future.

Lenin turned instead to the colonies, where national liberation movements had aroused the population in a revolutionary struggle against imperialism. In his report to the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920, Lenin proposed to support the national liberation movements. It was in the interests of the Communists to do this for otherwise socialism in Europe would not be secure. The leaders of European Social Democracy looked down on the colonial peoples, and rejected the idea of their being entitled to equality.[327]

Lenin, on the other hand, wanted to make use of the liberation movements in the interests of socialism.[328]

It was important to link these national movements to the international workers' movement so as to coordinate the attack on the common enemy - imperialism. The national liberation movements became an integral part of the world socialist revolutions.[329]

As the colonies were still economically backward, they hardly had any proletariat, and it was thus necessary to cooperate with the bourgeoisie.[330]

Though the Communists were to collaborate with the nationalists and even form an alliance with them, they were not to amalgamate. It was essential for the proletarian movement to maintain its independence even if it was in an embryonic stage. This collaboration would be a temporary one. The Communists were expected to rally and train the elements of proletarian parties, which would eventually fight against the bourgeoisie of their own nation.[331] The peasants could also be trained and form peasant soviets which would be potential organs of class warfare against the native ruling classes.[332]

Stalin was torn between Lenin's emphasis on oppressed nations and the Marxist class-struggle line. He tried to compromise between the two by dividing the colonies into three categories, depending on their industrial development, and the size of their proletariat.

The less developed they were, and the weaker the local Communist party, the more he inclined toward collaboration with the nationalist movements. The more developed the country, and the stronger the local Communist party, the more he inclined towards an internal class struggle.

He considered Egypt and China to be in the intermediate category - industrially little developed, and with a comparatively small proletariat. In countries like these where the national bourgeoisie was already split into a revolutionary party and a compromising party, but where the compromising section of the bourgeoisie could not yet become welded with imperialism, the Communists should pass from the policy of a united national front to the policy of a revolutionary bloc of the workers and petty bourgeoisie. In such countries, he said, this bloc might assume the form of a single party of workers and peasants like the Kuomintang, on the condition, however, that this peculiar kind of party actuall represented a bloc of two forces, the Communist party and the party of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie. The task of this bloc was to expose the temporising spirit and inconsistency of the national bourgeoisie and to wage a determination struggle against imperialism. A party with such a dual composition was both necessary and expedient, and as long as it did not restrict the freedom of the Communist Party to carry on agitation and propaganda, and as long as it facilitated the actual leadership of the revolutionary movement by the Communist Party. A party with such a dual composition was neither necessary nor expedient if it did not answer all these requirements; for it could only lead to the communist elements becoming dissolved in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, to the Communist Party losing the proletarian army.[333]

Stalin warned against either overrating or underrating the importance of the revolutionary element in the liberation movements. Any overrating of the idea of a national front constituted a deviation to the Right and threatened to submerge the Communists in the nationalist movement. Any underrating of the importance of the national front would isolate the Communists from the masses.[334]

The division of colonies into categories allowed for great flexibility in policy. Depending on how advanced the colony was considered to be, its national liberation movement could be supported or opposed.

If we trace Stalin's policies towards the colonies, we find that he swung back and forth between a Marxian class struggle and a Leninist nationalist struggle.

In 1920 Lenin, fearing the "capitalist encirclement" of Russia, had sought an alliance with the national liberation movements with the aim of weakening imperialism.

In 1921, Stalin wrote that the struggle the Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intellectuals were waging for the independence of Egypt was objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite the bourgeois origin and bourgeois title of the leaders of the Egyptian national movement, despite the fact that they were opposed to socialism. He considered it to constitute a blow at imperialism.[335]

In 1927 the Kuomintang in China turned against the Communists despite their alliance, leading the Comintern to reverse its decision about cooperating with nationalists. The Sixth Congress of the Comintern stated that it was necessary to reject the formation of any kind of bloc between the Communist Party and the nationalists; complete political independence should be preserved, and a relentless struggle should be waged against the bourgeois nationalists. Communists accused the respective national movements of their countries of betrayal, of selling out to the imperialists.[336]

The leaders of the Wafd Party which led the Egyptian nationalist movement, as well as leaders of the Arab national movement, elsewhere, were all considered potential enemies and traitors.[337]

The Communist parties were to advocate an agrarian revolution, rouse the masses of the peasantry to overthrow the landlords, and combat the reactionary influence of the clergy. Their task was to lead the people in a direct attack upon the bourgeois state.[338]

The 1928 policy isolated the Communists from the national liberation movements and from the people. Also the growing threat of Nazi Germany made it necessary to revert to a policy of the national front, and this was duly decided upon at the 7th Congress of the Comintern in 1935.

The leader of the Syrian Communist Party, Khalid Bakdash, reminiscing about the Seventh Congress of the Communist International which he attended, writes:

> Dealing a smashing blow at sectarianism and orienting the Communists on the struggle for the unity of the working class and of all democratic forces against fascism and the danger of war, on the unity of all patriotic forces in the struggle against imperialism, it was truly a historical turning point.... The Seventh Congress, while putting forward the united front tactic called for safeguarding the integrity of the Communist Parties.[339]

After the war, capitalism seemed to be decaying, and the two-camp theory of Zhdanov in 1948 proclaimed that the world was divided into two camps, one led by the Soviet Union, the other by the United States. There was a reversion to the militant 1928 Comintern thesis.[340]

In Burma, Malaya, the Phillippines, India and Indonesia, the Communists broke with the nationalist movements. The national bourgeoisie, they said, had gone reactionary and was collaborating with feudalists and imperialists. Class struggles were advocated and uprisings instigated with the aim of seizing power.[341]

This hard line failed, and the West set up the Marshall Plan, NATO...; the Korean war also proved to be a stalemate.[342]

Once again cooperation with the national liberation movements was sought, and the national bourgeoisie was described as being progressive. Civil war tactics were shelved.

Khrushchev returned to a more Leninist policy and stressed nationalism more than class struggle. He fully supported the national liberation movements, and gave them priority over the European proletarian movement.

As the U.S.A. tried to set up military blocs and to establish military bases in various countries surrounding the Soviet Union, the latter came to welcome non-alignment on the part of Third World countries and their rejection of military bases on their territory, as it weakened the West.[343]

Egypt's rejection of the Bagdad Pact was duly applauded.[344] At the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. in 1956, Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union wanted:

> To consolidate untiringly the bonds of friendship and cooperation with Egypt and other countries which refuse to be involved in military blocs; to cooperate with all forces seeking to preserve peace. To develop and strengthen friendly relations with neutral countries.[345]

The assistance given by the Soviets to Egypt is a familiar story, the sale of Czech arms in 1955, the Soviet support in the Suez Canal war of 1956, the building of the High Dam, the agreement concerning which was signed in December 27, 1958, and the construction of which began in 1960; the financial and technical aid....

At the time, the Communists considered the military regime in Egypt to be bourgeois. According to R. Palme Dutt, the 1952 revolution represented the victory of "the national bourgeoisie." As for the working class, its trade unions were controlled by the government and the strike of textile workers was brutally put down with the hanging of its leaders.

> A political regime of repression of the Left was maintained with imprisonment of the principal Communist leaders. The Communist Party in common with all political parties other than the National Union controlled by the government, was banned.[346]

Following the Iraki events of the winter of 1958-1959, in which armed Communists massacred nationalists, Nasser conducted a major propaganda campaign against Communism, the enemy of Arab nationalism and unity. He accused the Arab Communists of being foreign agents.[347]

Khrushchev complained about this at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on January 27, 1959. He said:

> Since pronouncements against the ideas of communism have recently been made in the United Arab Republic and accusations have been brought forward against Communists, I as a Communist deem it necessary to state

> that the Communists are wrongly accused of contributing to the weakening or splitting of the national effort in the struggle against imperialism. The reverse is true. There are no people more steadfast and devoted to the cause of the struggle against colonialists than communists.... The struggle against the communist and other progressive parties is a reactionary affair.[348]

During the years 1959-1961, the World Marxist Review published letters describing the imprisonment of Communists in Egypt and Syria, and the death of a number of them under torture. Titles like "Reign of Terror in the United Arab Republic" (December 1960) and "Against the Persecution of Democrats Foul Murder" (July 1961), reveal the Communists' opinion of the Egyptian military regime at the time.

Mention was made of these events in the 1960 Conference of 81 Communist parties in Moscow:

> Democratic organizations are being outlawed and are forced to go underground, and thousands of fighters for the cause of the working class and the cause of peace have been thrown in prison. On behalf of the Communists of the world, the conference expresses proletarian solidarity with the glorious sons and daughters of the working class and the democrats who are languishing in dungeons in the United Arab Republic.... Open fascist terror continues to rage in some countries.

The Soviets did not go beyond verbal complaints, however, and they did not stop their aid to Egypt. As Khrushchev put it,

> We do not conceal the fact that we and some leaders of the U.A.R. have different view in the ideological field.... Differences in

> ideological views must not hinder the development of friendly relations between our countries and the cause of the common struggle against imperialism.[349]

Thus, the important thing for the Soviets at the time was the struggle against "Western imperialism," rather than an expectation that the Third World countries would turn socialist.

Neo-colonialism

In the 1960's, the Soviets accused the West of a new and subtler form of imperialism - "neo-colonialism." While formally recognising the independence of their former colonies, they were now trying to keep them under their economic and political sway.

Khrushchev accused the European Common Market of trying to bind a number of newly-free countries to the economies of the imperialist states and keep them in subservience. The imperialists force such countries to maintain their former colonial pattern of economy, and try to flood them with their industrial commodities, keeping them as agrarian raw material appendages.[350]

One means of plundering the dependent countries, said K. Ponomarev, was unequivalent exchange. The monopolies pursue a policy of lowering prices of goods produced in the underdeveloped countries, while increasing prices of their own industrial products. As a result, the monopolies are becoming monstrously rich while the dependent countries are becoming poorer and poorer.[351]

Raw materials and agricultural products constitute about 80% of the exports of Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, wrote William Grey.

> On the eve of the Second World War, the underdeveloped countries had to export 40% more raw materials than fifty years before to pay for the same quantity of manufactures.[352]

U.S. aid to underdeveloped countries and its gifts of U.S. farm "surpluses" were included under neo-colonialism. It aimed at stemming the spread of communism and it was used as a "means of exerting all-round political, economic and military pressure." It actually amounted to investing capital in military and political considerations in order to preserve a foothold in Asia, Africa and Latin America.[353]

Neo-colonialism included a military aspect. Countries receiving American aid were expected to join aggressive blocs and to allow the establishment of military bases on their territory.[354] It also had political characteristics. Its arsenal, wrote R. Ulyanovsky, contained plots and coups d'etat, blackmail and threats, military provocations and outright intervention.[355]

Soviet Aid

As Western "aid" was "neo-colonialist," anyone accepting it was considered reactionary and collaborating with imperialism. As an alternative, the Soviets offered their own "aid" to the backward nations - credits and technical assistance given on very generous terms. By 1965, they had granted 3,500,000,000 rubles in credits for the economic development of these countries. Some 660 enterprises and other projects were being built in 27 countries with Soviet credits.[356]

The Soviet Union helped these countries stand on their feet and break away from the imperialists. It provided them with credits, technical assistance and weapons; it helped them to industrialize and gave them an alternative market ... in the years 1955-65, the volume of Soviet foreign trade increased 2.4 times, but its trade with the Asian and African countries increased more than elevenfold.[357]

Altogether, out of a total of $5 billion in economic credits and grants extended by the Soviet Union, between 1954 and 1966, to underdeveloped countries, the Middle East received about 40% - $2 billion; of Soviet exports to developing countries, the share of the Middle East was also about one third of the total.[358]

Trade with Egypt grew from $15 million in 1954 to $184 million in 1961; Soviet exports rising from $7 million to $97 million, imports from $8 million to $80 million. By 1966 the volume of trade had reached $314 million; by 1967, $380 million. Trade with Egypt was based on the agreements of 1958, 1960 and 1964, which concerned the Aswan dam and many other projects, including an atomic reactor, industrial plants and irrigation systems.[359]

At this time, Soviet aid aimed primarily at combatting the West and its influence on the Third World. In his report on the 1960 Moscow Meeting of 81 parties, Khrushchev stated that "the aid of the U.S.S.R. and other socialist states to the countries that have won independence pursues but one aim - to help strengthen the positions of these countries in the struggle against imperialism."[360]

Non-Capitalist Stage

Soviet aid had another aspect, however. It was given first of all to the state sectors,[361] and it was hoped that it would stimulate interest in socialism. The growth of the working class and other changes in the social structure would make it possible for all former colonies eventually to take the "non-capitalist" way.[362]

The Pravda wrote on June 28, 1964 that Soviet aid was:

> strengthening the public sector of the economies of these countries. The development of the state sector and the introduction of planning principles, in economic construction are strengthening the non-capitalist tendencies of a number of young states and are contributing to profound socio-economic changes in their life...frequently anticapitalist in their nature.[363]

In the U.A.R. comprehensive nationalizations took place in 1961, 1963 and 1964. Ramzi and Leykovsky used the U.A.R. as an example of the rapidly growing appeal of the ideas of socialism and the desire to realize them in practice. For instance, they wrote the Charter of National Action of the U.A.R. (1962) declares:

> The socialist solution to the problem of economic and social underdevelopment in Egypt - to achieve progress in a revolutionary way - was never a free choice. The socialist choice was a historical inevitability imposed by reality, the broad aspirations of the people and the changing nature of the world in the second part of the 20th century.[364]

The first stage of the relationship between the Soviets and Egypt, in which Khrushchev gave priority to the national liberation movement rather than ideology, and in Leninist fashion supported the national front (in this case the military regime) and kept pressures low-key (and only verbal), gradually gave way to a second stage.

In the second stage began the transformation of the national liberation movement from anti-imperialism to anti-capitalism and a fusion with socialism. Starting under Khrushchev, this stage continued for a while under Brezhnev.

In his book "Path to Progress," the Soviet economist V. Tyagunenko wrote that beginning as revolutions whose immediate aim is attaining the people's political independence from imperialism, the national liberation movements later acquire the nature of revolutions directed against capitalism in general. He analysed the nature of economic and social transformations in the U.A.R., viewing these processes as part and parcel of the general course of historical development in the era of the transition from capitalism to socialism.[365]

The backward countries no longer needed to pass through all the stages of Marx's scheme of history. Regardless of their economic backwardness, they could skip the capitalist stage and proceed through the "non-capitalist path" straight into socialism. The only condition was a close collaboration with the Soviet Union. The Soviets stressed that only with the aid of the U.S.S.R. the backward countries could progress along the non-capitalist path and by-pass capitalism.[366]

The Soviets now considered themselves as the personification of the proletariat:

> World socialism is, objectively, the embodiment of the leading role of the proletariat, providing even in countries where there is no working class - that firm ideological foundation without which scientific socialism is impossible.[367]

The non-capitalist path, said Ulyanovsky, was the road to socialism for countries still in the precapitalist stage or in transition to capitalism. It "combines the tasks of the general democratic and the socialist revolution."[368]

The likely political setup during this period was a "national democracy," characterized by a struggle against imperialism and feudalism, agrarian reforms, the development of national industry, the expulsion of foreign monopolies, a national front of all democratic classes, the democratization of public life, the establishment of a state sector, and cooperation with the socialist countries.[369]

The idea of "national democracy" was a novel one suggested by actual experiences rather than traditional theory. Ponomarev wrote:

> The idea of the national democratic state advanced by the Communist and workers' parties (1960) is not the fruit of ivory-tower meditations: life itself has given rise to it.[370]

Since late 1962, Soviet policy placed its reliance on non-Communist "revolutionary democrats" and others to lead their countries into the "non-capitalist path" of development which would lead to socialism.[371]

A discussion was held in 1964 under the auspices of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, a branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, at which a consensus was reached about the possibility of the leadership of non-proletarian segments of society.[372]

National democracy, said Sobolev, could be established under the leadership of "any democratic class - the working class, the peasantry, or the small urban bourgeoisie. In some countries the leading force may be the intelligentsia, including the revolutionary army officers."[373]

The need for a Communist Party was no longer felt to be essential, for the revolutionary democrats were carrying out the very policies advocated by the Communists. According to Mirsky:

> It often happens that the revolutionary democrats who have assumed the historical mission of breaking with capitalism, carry out the same basic social and economic transformations that have been advocated for decades by Communists.
> The leading circles of Algeria, the U.A.R., Burma, Ghana, Guinea and Mali develop the state sector in every way and deprive foreign monopolies of control over the economy, pursue a progressive and anti-imperialist foreign policy and are establishing friendly ties with the socialist countries. In these countries, the economic positions of the local bourgeoisie are being undermined, the exploiter classes are deprived of influence and important agrarian reforms and industrialization are carried out.[374]

Not only were local Communist parties to cooperate with other classes, but they could even amalgamate with other nationalist parties. In some cases, it was argued that their existence was not necessary at all. At an academic conference on the centenary of the First International in Moscow, in late September, 1964, a Nigerian Communist stated that in one-party states such as Ghana, Algeria and the United Arab Republic it was not necessary to found purely Marxist-Leninist parties. Communists could use their knowledge to guide others toward the Communist goal, and place their services at the disposal of the government. It would be sheer dogmatism to insist on a proletarian revolution.[375]

Sobolev pointed out that in countries where no Communist parties exist, the role of the revolutionary vanguard may to some extent be played by the trade unions.[376]

On March 15, 1965, the Egyptian Communist Party dissolved itself, and its members joined the Arab Socialist Union.

The regime in Egypt was painted in glowing terms. Landa wrote about the complete control by the government over industry and the banks, the agrarian reforms in favor of the peasantry, the abolition of the principal strata of the business classes, important revolutionary achievements:

> Socialization of the means of production and abolition of the exploitation of man by man, the doing away with...capitalist and feudal classes, and radical solutions of the agrarian question are today the officially proclaimed goals of the ruling parties and governments of the U.A.R.[377]

Landa considered the ruling party of the U.A.R., the Arab Socialist Union, to stand for "scientific socialism."[378]

In 1968, Ulyanovsky praised the Arab Socialism of Egypt. The "socialism" of some other Third World countries (ex. in Africa) originated from their hatred of imperialism, and was therefore emotional, ideological and voluntaristic. Egypt's "Charter," on the other hand, stated that the socialist solution was a historical inevitability, and recognized the class struggle as inevitable. It was therefore closer to scientific socialism[379]

Ulyanovsky adapted to the religious heritage and said that socialists must take this into consideration.

Up till 1968 Ulyanovsky wrote of the possibility for backward countries to bypass the capitalist stage, so long as they allied themselves with socialist countries.

He attacked Western critics who said that the African and Asian countries were not ready for socialism, as "right wing" socialists. His criticism also included Mao Tse Tung and the leaders of some Communist parties (in Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya), as they opposed the possibility of skipping the capitalist stage, and rejected "national democracy" as the most effective political form for the transition of a country to non-capitalist development.[380]

National Conflicts and Power Struggle

While the first part of Brezhnev's rule was a continuation of the second stage which had started under Khrushchev, the 1970s witnessed the appearance of a third stage in the relationship with the Soviets, one of national conflicts and internal power struggles. We shall focus on this period as it shows the change that occurred.

The second stage had completed its role and gone as far as it could in bringing about a transformation to socialism.

Now the question of who was to rule came up. The Communists were no longer satisfied with having the revolutionary democrats in power. Socialism which had previously been considered as consisting of nationalization, was now redefined as the transfer of power to the people (with the assumption that it was the Marxists who represented the people). Nationalization was even redefined as a measure of state capitalism. (See Chapter IV).

It was now considered necessary to change the balance of power within the national front "in the interest of the working people."[381]

The leaders who were previously called "revolutionary democrats" were now spoken of disapprovingly as "military, bureaucratic and parliamentary bourgeoisie."[382]

While previously the Communists had been encouraged to cooperate and even amalgamate with the national movements, now they were told to avoid amalgamation.[383] The need for an independent Communist Party was expressed once again.[384] As we have seen, the Egyptian Communists had dissolved their own party in 1965 and amalgamated with the Arab Socialist Union.

A number of criticisms were made against the rule of the revolutionary democrats. The National Democracy was accused of being undemocratic. The executive machinery lacked popular support. The state and army were far removed from the people.[385] It was necessary to ask for democracy, at least until the working class assumed power - then the non-Marxist socialists (to use Ulyanovsky's terms) would be replaced by a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants.[386]

Criticisms were levelled at the ideology of the revolutionary democrats. They now were looked upon as coming from a petty bourgeois, traditionalist background and as merely copying Marxism.[387]

In the past, G. Mirsky had believed that scientific socialism would inevitably result from non-capitalist development.[388] In 1971, Ulyanovsky was far less optimistic, and stated that the petty bourgeois ideology, characterised by nationalism, and religiosity would remain unchanged for a long time.[389] This was in contrast to his acceptance of religion as a reality of life in 1968.

Ever since 1966, Marxists in Egypt had mixed the national liberation movement and socialism under the slogan of "fusion" or "marriage" between them. Now Ulyanovsky differentiated between Marxist and non-Marxist socialism.

Criticisms were levelled at the economic bungling that had occurred. The nationalizations had been too hasty and were harming the economy. The public sector was not yet capable of supplying the essential goods.[390] The nationalization of private trade had an adverse effect on economic life and led to discontent among the people.[391] It was necessary to improve techniques and productivity in agriculture.[392] The state sector had proved to be inefficient, its labor productivity was lower than that of private enterprises, wages were lower, organization of production backward, and the quality of output inferior. It had become the acme of waste and inefficiency.[393] In short, what was needed, according to Ulyanovsky, was a New Economic Policy like the one Russia had introduced after the revolution.[394]

In the past, the Soviets had considered Western aid as "neo-colonialist" and expected their own aid to make backward countries by-pass capitalism. They were assisting so many countries at the same time, however, that they could not meet all their demands. They also had to think about their own internal needs, for all this aid was at the expense of their own development. In a speech given in Cairo in January, 1971, N.V. Podgorny repeated what Soviet writers had been saying over the past several years:

> Our country is giving you assistance not because we have any surplus capital. We have no such surplus.[395]

There were frequent reports from the Communist bloc of popular discontent with excessive generosity in extending aid to Cuba, such as was expressed during the May Day demonstration in Prague in 1964.[396]

In October, 1965, the primacy of domestic politics was stressed by a Pravda editorial which emphasized the Soviet leaders' determination to stop the excessive proliferation of Soviet foreign aid. This article made it clear that the socialist countries considered the acceleration of progress on the road to Communism to be their primary internationalist duty. Soviet aid programs, rather than disposing of surpluses, required the diversion of money and equipment urgently needed by the Socialist countries for their own purposes. Brezhnev confirmed this position during the 23rd Soviet Party Congress in March, 1966.[397]

After Khrushchev's fall, the brakes were applied; there was a general shift of priorities away from the national liberation movement towards Communist construction in the U.S.S.R. It was not a radical break, the first indications appeared during the last months of Khrushchev's rule. The change was caused partly by the growing strain on the Soviet economy of the many commitments to the new nations.[398]

The net outflow of Soviet aid fell from about $155 million in 1966 to $125 million in 1967. In 1967, Communist aid offers were 45% lower than in 1966; there had been reductions also during the two previous years.[399]

The Soviets now changed their theory. The backward countries would not enter socialism through Soviet aid alone. They were now allowed to seek Western aid as well. Writers pointed out that it was not always advantageous for a backward country at an early stage of its industrialization to expel or exclude all foreign investors.[400] Tyagunenko stated that countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America could not count on the socialist countries to satisfy all their needs in capital, equipment and technical aid. They would have to satisfy a considerable part of their needs through the imperialist countries.[401]

Neo-colonialism could no longer be considered a stable principle relating to a new form of imperialism. Its interpretation varied with the immediate interests of the Soviets.

Ulyanovsky, who had previously ignored the Marxist stages of history, now returned to them. Though in 1968, he had accused those who thought the backward countries were not ready for socialism of being revisionist, in 1971, he adopted the same attitude himself. The non-capitalist countries were not building socialism at present, he said, because the political, cultural, economic and social subjective and objective conditions were not present.[402]

The "jumping of stages" had proved to be "utopian" and the Soviets reverted to the more classical Marxist scheme of historical evolution, at least when they were criticizing the application made by others.

The backward countries were divided into categories just as in Stalin's time. But while Stalin's categories were based on the closeness of countries to independence, now the basis was their closeness to socialism. Ulyanovsky divided the non-Marxist socialisms into three types: national reformist, utopian and revolutionary democratic. The last was closest to scientific socialism because it recognized the class struggle and was anti-imperialist.[403]

Now, as in Stalin's time, the categorization permitted a very flexible policy. The backward countries could be supported or not supported depending on the Soviets' interpretation of their stage of development.

The national liberation movement was no longer considered to be part of the internationalproletarian movement. Lenin had said that the national liberation movement would become part of the world revolution. Previously Lenin's words had been interpreted as a fusion between the national liberation movement with the proletarian movement. Now Ulyanovsky reinterpreted them as meaning that the national liberation movement, though it was part of the world revolution, was not part of the proletarian movement. He thus destroyed the concept of fusion between the two.[404]

The criticisms were not one-sided, however. A quick glance at the Soviet press in the years 1971 and 1972 reveals the Soviets to be on the defensive, constantly trying to deny "allegations" and "rumors" which they said were the handiwork of imperialists and their agents, the Arab reactionaries.

In October, 1971, Pravda wrote about:

> The anti-communist and anti-Soviet campaign that is being whipped up by the imperialists and their agents...to split the ranks of the revolutionary Arab fighter-patriots and incite quarrels between the Arab countries and their most loyal friends and allies.[405]

There were rumors that the Russians were trying to Sovietize Egypt and in May, 1971, the New Times published a denial by Sadat.[406]

In 1971, a group of pro-Soviet ministers and heads of the Arab Socialist Union were removed from power. The Pravda published an article by Y. Primakov, Assistant Director of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economics and International Relations, saying:

> The purposeful representation of these events - which were purely domestic in character and had no connection with any particular 'orientation' of the U.A.R. - as a 'clash between pro-Soviet and pro-Western forces in Egypt' has begun in the West.[407]

In July and August, 1972, the Soviet press tried to show that Soviet military personnel had not been ousted from Egypt, but had simply completed their mission and were being given a warm send-off.[408]

In August, 1972, the Soviets denied allegations that the U.S.S.R. was interested in a state of "neither war nor peace" in the Near East and was trying to maintain its "military presence" in Egypt.

They accused those who appealed for "reliance on Arab forces alone" and others who demanded a struggle against "alien forms of socialism" and "the communist threat" as extremists or religious fanatics.[409]

Those who alleged that the Soviet Union was not giving the Arab countries sufficient weapons for the struggle against Israel and that it was interested in freezing the situation in the Near East were accused of being right-wing forces disseminating slanderous fabrications.[410]

Those who took up the slogan of "peoples' war" and the method of guerilla struggle for the solution of the Arab Israeli struggle were called ultra-left and followers of Peking.[411]

A.N. Kosygin denied that the Soviet Union had entered into some kind of "deal" with the imperialists on the question of a Near East settlement to the detriment of the Arab countries' interests.[412]

The illustrations we have given show that the stage of the fusion into socialism had evolved into a stage of conflicts in terms of national interests and power between socialists (Marxist and non-Marxist). In Chapter IV, we shall take this point up again from the viewpoint of Arab Socialism in order to evaluate the situation.

Conclusion

The foregoing study shows that the Marxist theory has evolved on the basis of differentiating between two basic stages in the backward countries; first, a stage of national liberation and secondly, a stage of socialism, the two being related in practice though not in theory.

The evolutionary process within each of the two has been similar. In the national liberation stage, the emphasis was at first on the support of the national liberation movement and the national front (Lenin). It then changed to a flexible policy balancing between a support of the national liberation movement and a relative support of the Communist Party in the colony (Stalin).

In the socialist stage, the emphasis was at first on the support of the socialisms of the Third World (Khrushchev) and then became a flexible and cautious policy taking into consideration the internal situation of the Communist Party (Brezhnev).

In other words, the stable strategic factor is the consolidation of Marxism and a support of the internal Communist Party in all stages, and the tactical factor is the support of the national liberation movement or the socialisms of the Third World.

FOOTNOTES

The reader will note that the following abbreviations have been employed in these Notes:

Many of the translations from the Soviet press are found in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Citations from this publication have been rendered as CDSP.

A number of articles referred to may be found in the Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., cited here as BISU.

Some translations of Soviet articles are found in Soviet Studies, referred to here as SS.

World Marxist Review is cited as WMR.

Current History is rendered as CH.

Soviet Sociology is cited as S. Soc.

The Egyptian magazine Al-Tali'a is represented by AT.

1. P. Kopnin, "Dialectics," Soviet Philosophical Encyclopedia, Vol. I, (1960). The Soviet Review, Vol. IV, No. 4 (Winter 1963-64), p. 50.

2. "Communique on Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries," Pravda, Nov. 22, 1957, p. 1, CDSP, Vol. IX, No. 47 (Jan. 1, 1958), p. 5.

3. Ibid.

4. V.I. Lenin, Right of Nations to Self-Determination (New York: International Publishers, 1951), p. 26.

5. R. Ulyanovsky, "Leninism, Soviet Experience and the Newly-Free Countries," New Times, No. 1, (Jan. 1, 1971), p. 18.

6. The New York Times, 25 June 1960 quoted in C. Wright Mills, The Marxists (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 471-2.

7. N.A. Simoniia, "On the Role of 'National Socialisms' in the Revolutions of the Nations of the East," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 4 (1967),pp. 47-58; *S. Soc*., Vol. VI, No. 3 (Winter 1967-68), p. 36.

8. Speech by L.I. Brezhnev at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on June 7, 1969, "For strengthening the Solidarity of Communists, For a New Upswing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," *Pravda*, June 8, 1969, pp. 1-4, *CDSP*, Vol. XXI, No. 23 (July 2, 1969), p. 3.

9. *Marx and Engels Selected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962, Vol. II,) p. 62.

10. *Ibid*., Vol. I., p. 38.

11. Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 85.

12. *Ibid*., p. 93.

13. *Ibid*., pp. 131-132.

14. *Ibid*., pp. 141-142.

15. Lenin, *op. cit*., p. 15.

16. Joseph Stalin, *The National Question and Leninism* (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), p. 5.

17. *Ibid*., p. 8.

18. G. Starushenko, *The Principle of National Self-Determination in Soviet Foreign Policy*, trans. Ivanov-Mumjiev (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.), p. 25.

19. M.S. Dzhunusov, "The Nation as a Social-Ethnic Community," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 4 (April 1966), pp. 16-30. *CDSP*, Vol. XVIII, No. 23 (June 29, 1966), p. 24.

20. *Ibid*., p. 27.

21. *Ibid*., p. 28.

22. *Ibid*.

23. K. Ponomarev, "Concerning the National-Democratic State," *Kommunist*, No. 8 (May 1961), pp. 33-48, *CDSP*, Vol. XIII, No. 22 (June 28, 1966), p. 5.

24. Ibid.

25. Mary Matossian, "Two Marxist Approaches to Nationalism," The American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. XVI (December 1957), p. 489.

26. Dzhunusov, op. cit., p. 25.

27. Stalin, op. cit., p. 3.

28. Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p. 12.

29. P.M. Rogachev and M.A. Sverdlin, "On the Concept 'Nation'," Voprosy istorii, No. 1 (January 1966), pp. 38-48; CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 21 (June 15, 1966), p. 14.

30. Ibid.

31. Dzhunusov, op. cit., p. 24.

32. Ibid.

33. P. Urban, "A Soviet Discussion on the Concept of Nationhood," BISU, Vol. XIV, No. 5 (May 1967), p. 46.

34. Starushenko, op. cit., p. 15.

35. Karl Marx speaks of the economy and its relation to the superstructure as follows:

> "In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society - the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or what is but a legal expression for the

> same thing - with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters.... Then comes the period of social revolution.... No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed."

Karl Marx: "Excerpt from A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", Marx and Engels. Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. Lewis S. Feuer, (New York: Anchor Books, 1959), pp. 43-44.

36. Marx - Engels, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 38.

37. Rogachev, op. cit., p. 15.

38. Stalin defines the economy and its relation to the superstructure as follows:

> "The instruments of production wherewith material material values are produced, the people who operate the instruments of production and carry on the production of material values thanks to a certain production experience and labour skill-all these elements jointly constitute the production forces of society.
>
> Another aspect of the mode of production, is the relation of men to each other in the process of production, men's relations of production....
>
> Consequently, the mode of production, embraces both the productive forces of society and men's relations of production....
>
> Changes in the mode of production inevitably call forth changes in the whole social system, social ideas, political views and political institutions - they call forth a reconstruction of the whole social and political order.
>
> Whatever is the mode of production of a society, such in the main is the society itself, its ideas and theories, its political views and institutions....
>
> First the productive forces of society change and develop, and then, depending on these changes and in conformity with them, men's relations of production ...change."

Joseph Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism (New York: International Publishers, 1960), pp. 28-31.

39. The process of internationalization has not affected all areas and industries equally. Its modern form may be seen in the multinational corporations which have spread all over the Western World.

40. Marx and Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, p. 26.

41. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, p. 196.

42. Ibid., p. 126.

43. Rogachev, op. cit., p. 15.

44. Ibid., p. 15.

45. Ibid.

46. Dzhunusov, op. cit., p. 28.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., p. 24.

50. Starushenko, op. cit., p. 27.

51. Ibid., p. 198. By "unnational" Starushenko means "not national".

52. Ibid., p. 196.

53. Rogachev, op. cit., p. 19.

54. Marx-Engels Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 38.

55. Alfred A. Greenbaum, "Soviet Jewry During the Lenin-Stalin Period," SS, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (July 1965), p. 406.

56. Dzhunusov, op. cit., p. 25.

57. Greenbaum, op. cit., p. 416.

58. Dzhunusov, op. cit., p. 28. One assumes that he is speaking of Jews in the U.S.S.R. only, and not in Israel.

59. Starushenko, _op. cit_., p. 25.

60. Butros Butros Ghali, "Al-Munaza'at al-Ifriqiyya wa Taswiyatuha bi al-Turuq al-Silmiyya" (African Conflicts and their Settlement by Peaceful Means), _Al-Siasa al-Dawliyya_, Vol. IV, No. 13 (July, August, September, 1968), p. 129.

61. _Ibid_.

62. Starushenko, _op. cit_., p. 196.

63. _Ibid_., p. 197.

64. _Ibid_., p. 198.

65. _Marx-Engels Selected Works_, Vol. I, p. 38.

66. Karl Marx, "Excerpts from The Civil War in France": in _Marx and Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy_, p. 363.

67. Engels, _Origin of the Family_, p. 118.

68. _Ibid_., p. 142.

69. Stalin, _National Question and Leninism_, p. 3.

70. Starushenko, _op. cit_., p. 197.

71. Rogachev, _op. cit_., p. 29.

72. Starushenko, _op. cit_., p. 201.

73. Stalin, _National Question and Leninism_, p. 3.

74. P. Urban, _op. cit_., p. 37, quoting Programma i ustav KPSS (The Program and Statute of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow, 1964,pp. 189, 191.

75. _Ibid_., p. 45, quoting _Voprosy istorii_, No. 1 (1966), p. 34.

76. _Ibid_., p. 47, quoting _Voprosy istorii_, No. 7 (1966), pp. 72-81.

77. _Ibid_., pp. 47, 48.

78. _Ibid_., p. 46, quoting "_Osnovy nauchnogo kommunizma_" (The Foundations of Scientific Communism), (Moscow: 1966), p. 445.

79. _Ibid_., pp. 46, 47.

80. Engels, op. cit., p. 85.

81. Ibid., p. 84.

82. Ibid., p. 134.

83. Joseph Stalin, Marxism and Linguistics, (New York: International Publishers, 1951), pp. 58-61. Georg von Rauch holds that the idea of a supranational language of socialism did not fit the interests of the Soviet Union in its relation with the new socialist countries. Stalin had stated that when languages mix, "one of the languages usually emerges victorious from the mixture," e.g. the Russian language "always emerged the victor". This stress on the importance of the Russian language, says Rauch, went hand in hand with the development of Soviet patriotism during and after World War II. Russian was also the common bond of the socialist world and became the official language at all political functions.

Georg von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia, trans. Peter and Annette Jacobsohn (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 405.

Isaac Deutscher points out that the linguistics controversy arose at a time when the drive for conformism was raging in the press, from Lysenko's attacks on unorthodox biologists, to the Zhdanovist baiting of "decadent modernists in the arts," and the campaign against "rootless cosmopolitans" and "rotten liberals". In his letters on linguistics, however, Stalin presented himself as the "guardian" of academic freedom, attacking Marr's school for its suppression of the views of opponents!

Isaac Deutscher, Stalin. A Political Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 615-616.

84. Ibid., p. 34.

85. Ibid., p. 13.

86. Ibid., p. 22.

87. Ibid., p. 23.

88. Ibid., p. 13.

89. Ibid., p. 2.

90. Ibid., p. 11.

91. Ibid., p. 26.

92. Rogachev, op. cit., p. 16.

93. Matossian, op. cit., p. 491, quoting J.V. Stalin, Markazmi nacionalyj Vopros, Sochinenija (Moscow: 1946), II, p. 328.

94. Stalin, Marxism and Linguistics, p. 53.

95. Starushenko, op. cit., p. 196.

96. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago: Charles K. Kerr, 1904), pp. 11-13.

97. Marx-Engels Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 38.

98. Rogachev, op. cit., p. 18.

99. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, p. 37.

100. Ibid., pp. 195-196.

101. "Correspondence with a Reader: Is National Form Outmoded?" Literaturnaya gazeta, March 16, 1965, p. 3, CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 15 (May 5, 1965), p. 15.

102. I. Braginsky, "The Debate Continues: Methodology or Tautology - Who is Simplifying"?, Literaturnaya gazeta (March 25, 1965), pp. 2-3, CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 15 (May 5, 1965), p. 16.

103. Dzhunusov, op. cit., p. 26.

104. Rogachev, op. cit., p. 17.

105. Dzhunusov, op. cit., p. 26.

106. Yu. Surovtsev, "What is National Character? In the Grip of a Preconception," Literaturnaya gazeta (November 19, 1965), pp. 2-3, CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 15 (May 5, 1965), p. 13.

107. Ibid., p. 12.

108. Rogachev, op. cit., p. 17.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid., p. 18.

111. Ibid., p. 17.

112. Karl Marx, "Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," in Marx and Engels, Basic Writings, p. 263.

113. Starushenko, op. cit., p. 197.

114. F. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," in Marx and Engels, Basic Writings, pp. 104-105.

115. Karl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", in Marx and Engels, Basic Writings, p. 42.

116. Karl Marx, "Russia's Pattern of Development," in Marx and Engels, Basic Writings, p. 440.

117. Karl Marx, "The Bourgeoisie and the Counter Revolution", Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 67.

118. Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1964), pp. 146-147.

119. Marx and Engels, "Communist Manifesto", op. cit., p. 20.

120. Starushenko, op. cit., p. 233.

121. Ibid., p. 201.

122. Rogachev, op. cit., p. 19.

123. Stanislav Ossowski, Class Structure in the Social Consciousness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 174.

124. Ibid., p. 116.

125. Marx and Engels, "Communist Manifesto", op. cit., p. 7.

126. Ibid., p. 8.

127. Ibid., p. 20.

128. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

129. Marx-Engels Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 38.

130. Marx and Engels, "Communist Manifesto", op. cit., p. 11.

131. Lenin, Imperialism, p. 74.

132. Jane Degras, The Communist International, 1919-1943, Documents (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), Vol. I, p. 141.

133. R.A. Ulyanovsky, "Leninism, Soviet Experience, and the Newly-Free Countries"; New Times, No. 1 (Jan. 1, 1971), p. 18.

134. Lenin, Right of Nations, p. 242.

135. R.A. Ulyanovsky, "Leninism, Soviet Experience", op. cit., p. 18.

136. Lenin, Rights of Nations, p. 105.

137. Marx and Engels, "Communist Manifesto", op. cit., p. 41.

138. A. Sobolev, "National Democracy, the Way to Social Progress," WMR, Vol. VI, No. 2 (Feb. 1963), pp. 41-42.

139. Ibid.

140. Degras, op. cit., p. 144.

141. Lenin, Imperialism, p. 240.

142. R.A. Ulyanovsky, "Leninism, Soviet Experience and the Newly-Free Countries" Part 2, New Times, No. 2 (Jan. 13, 1971), p. 20.

143. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, p. 216.

144. Ibid., p. 20.

145. Communique of Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties, Pravda, Dec. 2, 1960, p. 1, CDSP, Vol. XII, No. 48 (Dec. 28, 1960), p.3.

146. Statement of Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties, Pravda, Dec. 6, 1960, pp. 1-4, CDSP, Vol. XII, No. 49 (Jan. 9, 1961), p. 3.

147. Philip E. Mosely, "Communist Policy and the Third World," The Review of Politics, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (April, 1966), p. 227.

148. Sobolev, op. cit., p. 44.

149. N.S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress, February 14, 1956 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), pp. 44-45.

150. Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. October 31, 1961. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House), p. 39.

151. "The Tasks of the Class Struggle against Imperialism at the Present Stage and the Unity of Action of the Communist and Workers' Parties and all anti-imperialist forces." Basic Document adopted by the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on June 17, 1969, Pravda, June 18, 1969, pp. 1-4, CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 28 (Aug. 6, 1969), p. 14.

152. L.I. Brezhnev, "For Strengthening the Solidarity of Communists, For a New Upswing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggles." Speech at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on June 7, 1969, Pravda, (June 8, 1969), pp. 1-4; CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 23 (July 2, 1969), p. 9.

153. Ibid.

154. Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p.111.

155. Samir Karam, "George Lukacz," AT, Vol. VII, No. 7 (July 1971), p. 74.

156. C. Wright Mills, The Marxists (New York: Dell Publishing Co. Inc., 1962), p. 383.

157. Leonhard, op. cit., p. 233.

158. Programme of the Communist Party -- 22nd Congress, p. 24.

159. Ossowski, op. cit., p. 111.

160. P. Kopnin, "On the Question of the Contradictions in Social Development," Pravda, Feb. 10, 1966, pp. 2-3; CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 7 (March 9, 1966), p. 15.

161. Ossowski, op. cit., p. 111.

162. P. Gendev and A. Politin, "Does Garaudy Offer a New Model?" Bulletin of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, in AT, Vol. VI, No. 11 (November, 1970), p. 120.

163. Kopnin, "On the Question...", op. cit., p. 14.

164. Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union," Class, Status and Power, ed. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 156.

165. T.B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1965), p. 47.

166. Ibid., p. 51.

167. Ibid., p. 52.

168. Mills, op. cit., p. 206.

169. XXII Party Congress, The New Soviet Society: Final Text of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, quoted in Roger E. Kanet, "The Rise and Fall of the 'All-People's State,' Recent Changes in the Soviet Theory of the State," SS, Vol. XX, No. 1, (Jan. 1969), p. 81.

170. Bottomore, op. cit., p. 58.

171. Stefan C. Stolte, "Communist Polycentralism and the Conferences in Belgrade, Peking and Moscow," BISU, Vol. XVI, No. 7 (July, 1969), p. 6.

172. Gendev, op. cit., p. 119.

173. Marx-Engels Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 38.

174. K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 57.

175. Marx-Engels Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 46.

176. Lenin, Right of Nations to Self-determination, p. 74.

177. N.S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress. February 14, 1956 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), p. 41.

178. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, pp. 195-198.

179. Lenin, op. cit., p. 67.

180. Lenin, "Critical Remarks on the National Question," quoted in Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, p. 196.

181. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question*, p. 126.

182. *Ibid*., p. 127.

183. Khrushchev, *Imperialism*..., p. 17.

184. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, Vol. I, p. 27.

185. Lenin, *Right of Nations to Self-determination*, p. 69.

186. Marx-Engels *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 332.

187. Marx-Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, pp. 37-38, quoted in J.A. Petrus, "*Marxism, Marxists, and the National Question*" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, University of Texas, 1965), p. 46.

188. Lenin, *op. cit*., p. 104.

189. *Ibid*., p. 65.

190. Starushenko, *op. cit*., pp. 53-54.

191. *Ibid*., p. 70.

192. Stalin, *National Question and Leninism*, pp. 11-17.

193. Stalin, *National Question and Leninism*, pp. 12-13. cf. Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 516-517.

194. *Ibid*., p. 209.

195. *Ibid*., p. 207.

196. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities" *Prospects for Soviet Society*, ed. Allen Kassof (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 165-166.

197. E.V. Tadevosian, "The Further Convergence of the Socialist Nations of the U.S.S.R.", *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 4 (1963), *S. Soc*., Vol. II, No. 3 (Winter 1963-64), p. 10.

198. MS. Djunusov, "A Contribution to the Description of the Process of Coming Together of Soviet Nations in the Course of the Building of Socialism and Communism", *Istoriia SSSR*, (1962), *S. Soc*., Vol. I, No. 2 (Fall, 1962), p. 21.

199. Tadevosian, *op. cit*., p. 11.

200. Harry Lipset, "The Status of National Minority Languages in Soviet Education," *SS*, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (Oct. 1967), p. 189.

201. *Filosofskie nauki*, (4/71), pp. 43-48, *Absees*, (Jan. 1972), p. 37.

202. *Programme of the CPSU adopted by the 22nd Congress*, p. 103.

203. Tadevosian, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

204. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

According to Nove and Newth, the boundaries between the Soviet republics "are subject to constant flux, and although the local people may in practice have some voice in such decisions, the ultimate right remains in the centre, and local politicians who are too vocal in their objections to the arbitrary transfer of land to other republics (e.g. parts of southern Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan) are liable to be dismissed for carrying their legitimate nationalism too far."

Alex Nove and J.A. Newth, *The Soviet Middle East. A Communist Model for Development.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 120.

205. As in other multinational, industrialized countries, like Canada and the U.S.A., the trend in the U.S.S.R. has been towards a mixing of different nationalities as a result of urbanization. Isaac Deutscher considers the tempo and scale of Soviet urbanization to have been without parallel in history. In the 1930's the government used coercion to drag the sullen mass of peasants into the towns. In the recent past, however, there has been a spontaneous rush of people from the country to towns.
Isaac Deutscher, *The Unfinished Revolution. 1917-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 42-45.

206. Tadevosian, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

207. Djunusov, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

During World War II some Crimean Tartars organized in battalions and fought against the Red Army. For this collaboration, Stalin abolished the Crimean Autonomous Republic in 1944 and deported the Tartar population to Uzbekistan. In 1954 their peninsula itself was given to the Ukrainian Republic as a gift. In 1967 Podgorny declared the charge of collaboration as having been without foundation and restored to the Tartars their political rights as individuals, but their national-ethnic rights and their territory were not restored.

V. Stanley Vardys, "The Case of the Crimean Tartars," *The Russian Review*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (April 1971), pp. 101-110.

208. *Programme of the CPSU...22nd Congress*, p. 102.

209. Djunusov, *op. cit*., p. 20.

210. Tadevosian, *op. cit*., p. 12.

211. Carew-Hunt, *op. cit*., p. 242.

212. A. Powell, "The Nationalist Trend in Soviet Historiography," *SS*, Vol. II, No. 4, (April 1951), p. 374. *Cf*. Joseph Stalin, *The War of National Liberation* (New York: International Publishers Co. Inc., 1942), p. 38.

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CHAPTER IV

ARAB SOCIALISM AND ARAB NATIONALISM IN EGYPT

1. Arab Nationalism and the Bourgeoisie[1]

Over the ages, the idea of nationalism has changed in content and in aim. For the purposes of the present study, which focuses on the stand taken by Arab socialists in Egypt towards Arab nationalism, we shall deal briefly with the Egyptian nationalist movement of 1919, as this constitutes the historical framework in which Arab socialism arose.

In its struggle for independence and democracy, the Egyptian nationalist movement opposed any attempt to draw it beyond its Egyptian framework through slogans of Pan-Islamism or Pan-Arabism.

This attitude was given ideological expression in the writings of Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyed, an outstanding spokesman for Egyptian nationalism, who was called "ustaz al-Gil" (teacher of the generation). A lawyer by training, he became editor of the Al-Jarida newspaper, the official mouthpiece of the Hizb al Umma (Party of the Nation), founded in 1907 by a group of big landowners, and intellectuals. It demanded a constitution and the assumption of the Khedive's powers by the representatives of the people. It also favored gradualism and held that Egypt could only be liberated by Egyptians themselves, and through reform. Turkey was regarded as helpless, and actual Turkish rule was out of the question because of Turkey's previous record.[2]

The same attitude may be seen in a book written by a shari'a (Islamic law) judge, Sheikh Aly Abdel Razeq, called "Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm" (Islam and the Principles of Government).

At a time when Egyptians were still closely related to Ottoman Turkey and its Islamic ideology, and nationalist leaders like Mustafa Kamel[3] often sought Turkey's support against the main enemy of the moment - the British occupation, Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyed introduced secularism and emphasized the Egyptian identity, independent of Ottomanism and of any links with Islamism or Arabism. He called for the creation of an Egyptian personality, for without it Egypt could not achieve real independence.[4] He stated:

> I insist on supporting the Egyptianity of the Egyptians because some of them claim to be Arabs, and others claim to be Turks or Circassians. We Egyptians must insist on our Egyptianity and not being affiliated with any homeland other than Egypt, regardless of whether our origins are Higazi or Syrian, or Circassian, or some other. We must preserve our nationality and respect ourselves and our nation.[5]

Al-Sayyed wanted "Egypt for the Egyptians," and was opposed to both Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism. Egypt, he said "cannot progress if it is too timid to seek its own interest and relies on the illusions and fantasies which some call Pan-Arabism and others Pan-Islamism."[6]

When in 1911, two leaders from Syria and Lebanon came to Egypt in an attempt to achieve a union between Syria and Egypt, Lutfi al-Sayyed did not agree with their viewpoint, not only because of the difficulties involved, but because he did not see it to be in Egypt's interest.[7]

He adopted a utilitarian viewpoint, and sought above all Egypt's interests. History and human nature, he said "has taught us that nothing holds people together except interests."[8]

When Turkey claimed the Egyptian village of Taba in the Aqaba Gulf and the British claimed it belonged to Egypt, Lutfi al-Sayyed defended Egypt's rights; and when Turkey warred with Italy over Tripoli and called on Egyptians to help, he adopted a neutral attitude as Egypt had no interest in the matter. This aroused a storm of protest against him. Some accused him of opposing the Islamic Caliphate, others of being an atheist. The press launched a violent campaign against him, forcing him to resign from the al-Jarida newspaper.[9]

Despite the ideological importance of the role played by Lutfi al-Sayyed, one must take into account the fact that in studying any historical period one may find more than one ideology, and it is therefore necessary to assess the historical importance of the various trends of thought. In the case of Lutfi al-Sayyed, though his writings were of great importance in bringing out the Egyptian personality, and opposing Pan-Arabism and

Pan-Islamism, he was writing at a time when traditionalism was still prevalent, and he himself represented the rising trend. He thus had to bear the impact of the clash between the new outlook he was introducing and the reigning Islamic and Ottoman traditionalism. In his defence of an independent Egypt and an Egyptian personality, he had to stand in opposition to prevailing public opinion.

As significant as Lutfi al-Sayyad's writings, was the book "Islam and the Principles of Government" by Sheikh Aly Abdel Razeq. When Turkey abolished the Caliphate in 1924, the "ulamas" (learned men of Islam, teachers, judges...) were deeply shocked. They feared that with the abolition of the Caliphate "the Islamic nation had returned to the 'Jahiliyya'" (pre-Islamic state of ignorance and paganism). Many calls for a Caliphate Congress were heard, Al-Azhar University (the leading center for Islamic studies in the Muslim world), leading the movement. King Fuad was openly known to be a candidate for the Caliphate. The Congress convened on May 13, 1926 in Cairo, but failed to achieve any concrete results, largely on account of internal opposition in Egypt. The book "Islam and the Principles of Government" published by Aly Abdel Razeq at this juncture was considered a direct challenge to the King, and aroused the ire of the Palace as well as of the ulamas at Al-Zahar University.[10] In it, the author had totally opposed the unity of religion and politics, and made a sharp separation between the Caliphate and religion:

> We do not find any proof for those who consider the Caliphate a religious belief and one of the rules of religion.[11]

He also disconnected Islam from Arabism, stating that Islam was "universal, not an Arab cause, not Arab unity, nor an Arab religion."[12]

Seeing that religion was one of the means used for reaching beyond the boundaries of Egyptian nationalism and towards Arabism, a weakening of the political role of religion constituted an ideological attempt to destroy Islamic links and to secularize Egyptian nationalism through a reinterpretation of religion.

Though Aly Abdel Razeq had to face the opposition of the religious quarters he had shocked, he found strong support from the various political parties and the public. If Lutfi al-Sayyed had laid the ideological seeds for the emerging Egyptian personality, Aly Abdel Razeq represented the now prevailing national trend. The latter's historical importance is revealed by the impact of his book on the political scene. Firstly, he was tried by the Higher Council of Ulamas at Al-Azhar University and ousted from the Council and from his position as shari'a judge.

Secondly, as a result of the publication of his book, the coalition government, including members of the Ittihad (Union) Party - the Palace Party - and the Liberal Constitutionalist Party (big landowners and liberal intellectuals favoring gradualism and the achievement of independence by conciliatory means) fell, as the latter defended the author. The leader of the Liberal Constitutionalist party, Abdel Aziz Fahmy, was Minister of Justice at the time and was responsible for handling the matter and was expected to fire Aly Abdel Razeq from his post as shari'a judge. The Liberal Constitutionalist Party, however, defended the author on the basis of freedom of thought and constitutional rights, and objected to his being dismissed from his post. The upshot of the matter was that the Minister of Justice was ousted from his position, and the Liberal Constitutionalists resigned from the Cabinet, bringing down the government.[13] A new coalition government was formed, including members of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and the Wafd Party (backed by the vast majority of the populace).[14]

Aly Abdel Razeq was supported by the Wafd and its leader Saad Zaghloul. The Wafd Party considered the matter to be a political and constitutional matter and not a religious one. They supported the right of intellectuals to think and express themselves, and stood by the author against the king.[15]

Mohamed Hussein Heykal the well known politician, writer and editor of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party's weekly journal al-Siasa, who stood up for liberalism and freedom of thought, asked Saad Zaghloul for his opinion about the Caliphate. The reply was, "My opinion about the Caliphate is like yours." The Liberal Constitutionalists' stand was that the Caliphate was a heavy burden borne by

Turkey, and that no good could come of Egypt's carrying it.[16] Aly Abdel Razeq's book thus had a tremendous impact on the country. The various parties joined together against the Palace and its Ittihad Party,[17] and public opinion disapproved of the Orthodox Islamic stand and the measures taken against the author.[18] The writer Mohamed Hussein Heykal satirized the Azhar for its contradictions. It was the Shiites, supposedly, and not the Sunni Muslims who considered the Caliphate as a basic part of religion, he said, and yet the Sunni Azhar was behaving like the Shiites and defending the Caliphate.[19]

Though Aly Abdel Razeq called for secularization, the means he used was the reinterpretation of religion rather than the language of science. This was necessitated by the political conditions of his time. The autocratic monarchy was trying, with the support of Great Britain, to use religion in reviving the Islamic Caliphate. The natural reaction was to weaken this political manoever by depriving the Caliphate of any religious foundation.

The trend towards secularization may also be seen in the work of the famous writer Taha Hussein, who represented Egyptian liberal thought. Drawing inspiration from Descartes' scientific method, Taha Hussein sought to study Arab literature in an objective manner and stated that "we should forget our national and religious emotions."[20] He supported free enquiry in scientific research in his book "Fil Shi'r al-Jahili" (Jahiliyya

Poetry). This book was considered a challenge to Islam by some sections of the population, particularly the traditionalists, and aroused their indignation. A controversy arose in the press, and several books were published against Taha Hussein. Accusations were made against him and requests made that he be punished and fired from his position as professor in the Faculty of Arts at the Egyptian University.[21] The book was withdrawn from circulation, and an investigation carried out with the author by the public prosecution, and a political enquiry by the Parliament.[22] Taha Hussein later became Minister of Education under the Wafd government, and was responsible for the introduction of mass education.

An interest in the Egyptian character was reflected in the works of Taha Hussein and other literary figures. Taha Hussein called for the revival of Pharaonic culture. In poetry, Hafez Ibrahim, called the "Poet of the Nile," wrote of Egypt as his only hope, and recalled the glory of the Pharaonic days. The poet Ahmed Shawki called for supreme loyalty to Egypt. When the French bombed Damascus in 1925, he differentiated between Egypt and Syria, even while bewailing their common unhappy lot.[23]

The sculptor Mokhtar turned to Pharaonic art for inspiration, in an attempt to create an Egyptian art. The Sphinx was a favorite theme, and Mokhtar's statue "The Renaissance of Egypt" was influenced by it.[24]

The Liberal Constitutionalist Party's weekly journal al-Siasa, whose editor was Mohamed Hussein Heykal, was an advocate of the Pharaonic trend. Heykal claimed that close psychological ties between ancient and modern Egypt made the country an eternal historical unity.[25] He advocated the creation of a unique Egyptian art, and al-Siasa urged the establishment of an Egyptian literature.[26]

The Pharaonic movement was opposed to both Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism. It stressed the glorious ancient history of Egypt as the factor uniting Egyptians. The Arabs were considered as conquerors, no different from the Persians, Greeks and Romans, except in giving the Egyptians their language and religion.[27]

In the political field, the secular Egyptian nationalists opposed Pan-Islamism, repudiated the idea of Arab unity, and confined their interest to Egypt. When the Syrians contacted the nationalist leader Saad Zaghloul in Paris during the Versailles Conference following the first world war, and tried to win him over to their cause, he told them "Egypt's revolution is Egyptian, not Arab."[28] Approached by Abdel Ranman al-Azzam in 1924 and asked why Egypt refused to join the Arab unity movement, Saad Zaghloul replied: "If you add one zero to another zero, what will be the sum?"[29]

As for the political parties, they aimed at independence from foreign rule, and were not interested in Arab nationalism. A glance at their programs shows no mention of the idea of Arab nationalism.[30]

To give but one example, on October 20th, 1922, the al-Siasa magazine reported a speech by the head of the Liberal Constitutionalist party, Adly Yakan Pasha, in which he said that the aim of the party was the removal of the British protectorate over Egypt, and the recognition of Egypt as an independent monarchy.[31]

The idea of Arab unity appears only in the programs of two organizations, Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt), and the Muslim Brotherhood. In its Bulletin No. 101, issued on January 1st, 1939, the Misr al-Fatat Party stated that its goal was:

> That Egypt should be above all, a great empire including Egypt and the Sudan, and an alliance of Arab states, leading Islam.[32]

In its program of 1948 Misr al-Fatat stated:

> Work towards the unification of Arab countries, by abolishing customs tariffs, uniting the nationality, granting equal rights and obligations to all Arabs in all the Arab countries; form a single army, adopt a single foreign policy guided by a Higher Council including an equal number of representatives from all the Arab countries.[33]

The goal of the party became:

> That Egypt should become a great state consisting of Egypt and the Sudan till the sources of the Nile, an alliance of Arab countries united into a single state, leading Islam.[34]

Later, the party changed its name to the "Socialist Party", and its aim became to "unify the Arab countries into a single state called the United Arab States."[35]

As for the Muslim Brotherhood, their final goal was the establishment of one great Muslim fatherland, and Arab unity was just a step in this direction. They advocated the reestablishment of the Caliphate, and of a theoratic state based on the Islamic law. Both private and public life should be remodelled according to the teachings of Islam, they held. There should be a return to the Koran and puritanism in daily life. All luxuries, including the consuming of spirits and tobacco should be banned, and women should remain in their proper place at home.[36]

Some Western writers like Walter Laqueur, and the Egyptian communists have called Misr al-Fatat and the Muslim Brotherhood fascist. The term "fascism" has been used rather loosely to describe parties with anti-democratic tendencies. One must keep in mind, however, that while in Europe fascism and Nazism were linked with the big monopolies, in Egypt this material base for fascism was non-existent. Accusations of fascism were based instead on such factors as a non-democratic, individual leadership, a military organization, a rejection of the class struggle, and close relations with fascist Italy or Nazi Germany. One should also note here that some Egyptians looked to Germany more for assistance in getting rid of British occupation than out of admiration for her political system.

In the case of Misr al-Fatat, it had a semi-military organization of storm-troops called "greenshirts." Its ideology had certain points in common with the Fascist and Nazi parties: the restoration of the old glory of Egypt, the establishment of a great empire, a corporative economic system, and the stress put on faith and action. Ahmad Hussein made several trips to Rome and declared that Hitler and Mussolini had the full support of their peoples, that Italy and Germany were the only true democracies in Europe, all the others being parliamentary plutocracies, and that like Mussolini he wanted to introduce social justice and thus looked for inspiration to the Fascist Carta del Lavoro. With the downfall of Fascism and Nazism, these ideas became unfashionable, and Ahmad Hussein became "socialist" and renamed his party accordingly. In the 1950's the Communists collaborated with him and stopped calling him a "fascist agent" as they had in the past.[37]

The Muslim Brotherhood have been called fascist by Western writers like Elie Kedourie, Walter Laqueur.... Their organization was authoritarian in structure, with the "Supreme Guide" appointing the executive and making all the decisions. They had semi-military storm-troops called "al-Gawwala ," and used terrorism. They advocated a kind of Muslim national socialism without class struggle, and they made pro-Axis propaganda during World War II.[38]

The Muslim Brotherhood were closely connected to the Nasser regime at the beginning. One of their leaders, Sheikh Hassan al-Baquri, became a minister under Nasser, and some members of the military junta were known to have been members or sympathizers of the Brotherhood. When all political parties were abolished, the Brotherhood was permitted to continue. The final break occurred when a Muslim Brother attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954.[39]

Writings on Arab nationalism tend to link it with the ruler or the state, without giving a clear picture of the attitude of the nation in general and of the various classes in particular. They also throw no light on the relationship between the bourgeoisie and Arab nationalism.

Elie Kedourie, for instance, stresses the role of the king in the creation of the Arab League (in 1945). He quotes the account given in Mohamed Hussein Heykal's memoirs about the subject. King Farouk, without consulting or informing the Ministry, invited the Arab kings and presidents to his estate at Inshass and discussed with them the policies of the Arab states and the Arab League. In this meeting, decisions were made, one of them being the creation of an Arab nationality. Heykal points out that "people then understood that King Farouk's personal policy had for its aim the establishment of his personal leadership over the Arab states."[40]

What is left out in Kedourie's account is the opposition of Egyptian nationalists to Pan-Arab measures. At the time of this meeting, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyed who opposed Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamism. He was understandably not invited to attend the meeting.

Mohamed Hussein Heykal, the writer of the memoirs, was head of the Senate at the time. He had previously supported the liberal Egyptian nationalist thinking of Sheikh Aly Abdel Razeq when the latter challenged King Fuad's ambitions to become Caliph. Now he openly voiced his doubts about the Arab League:

> It is doubtful whether the union will be a political union; it is doubtful whether, in case one of the Arab states is attacked, the others will hurry to its aid. It is also doubtful if an effective cultural union, or a union of some other kind could take place, because the history, the legal codes, agriculture and industry are necessarily different in the different Arab states.[41]

In his memoirs he showed that King Farouk's action was an autocratic one, taken without the knowledge of the Ministry. Under these circumstances, there is not the slightest doubt that the idea of Arab nationalism had no support except from the king. It was a continuation of the attempt by Farouk's father Fuad to obtain the Islamic Caliphate for himself. The Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arab ideas were non-contradictory, and both led to multinational unity, from the Egyptian point of view. The opposition between Islamism and Arabism only appeared at the time when the Arabs were trying to free themselves from Turkish rule, and Turkey clung to Islamism in order to preserve her hegemony.

Western writers (ex. Kedourie, Binder, Siegman, Major...) as well as Arab ones agree that the Arab League was of British inspiration. In 1941 the British government expressed its desire for the establishment of a regional body uniting the Arab states to assist it in the war. In the British House of Commons in February 1943, the Foreign Secretary delcared that it was "natural and right" that cultural, economic and political ties among the Arab countries should be strengthened, that many Arab thinkers desired a greater degree of unity, and that the British government would give full support to any scheme that commanded general approval.[42]

Though the Wafd leader Mustafa al-Nahhas compromised with the British and the King on this question, this did not denote any change in the Wafd's emphasis on Egyptian nationalism. The constitution of the Arab League made it clear that the Arab states had entered an alliance and not a union. The signatories were careful to deprive the League of any power over its members. The sovereignty of the member countries was guaranteed.[43]

The foregoing shows that the Egyptian nationalist movement, headed by the various political wings of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, delineated the Egyptian personality along modernized, liberal, secular lines, and opposed both Arab and Islamic unity.

Arab Socialism and Arab Nationalism

It is against this setting of Egyptian nationalism that Nasser's Arab socialist regime started the movement for Arab nationalism. The Charter criticized the idea of Egyptian nationalism:

> The revolutionary leaders at the time were unable to gaze across the Sinai and to define

> the Egyptian personality. They were unable to learn from history that there is no conflict whatsoever between Egyptian and Arab nationalism.[44]

The Egyptian bourgeoisie was accused of opposing Arab nationalism, even after the Nasser regime liquidated political parties, replacing them with a single political organization representing the "whole working population." Although Egyptian nationalism was deprived of any political means with which to express itself, it still survived as an idea, and continued to oppose Arabism. The conflict between Egyptian and Arab nationalism took many forms:

Firstly, there was an attempt to wipe out the Egyptian personality and its Pharaonic history. Even before the union with Syria, Al-Ahram printed an article by a Syrian stating:

> President Gamal Abdel Nasser has lifted the imperialist veil from Egypt's beautiful face and revealed that Egypt is purely Arab. He put in Article 10 of the new Egyptian constitution that Egypt is an independent Arab state, and the Egyptian people is a part of the Arab nation. He has revealed the truth about the Egyptians, and anyone who opposes this article will be punishable by law.

Egyptians, he stated, were Arabs even before Islam, and he even considered as Arabs the Hyksos[45] invaders from the East who razed cities and enslaved the Egyptian population. Where they actually came from is a debatable question, but the ancient Egyptians spoke of them as Asiatics.[46]

Any mention of the Pharaonic past was looked upon with disapproval. During the union with Syria, the Syrians insisted on using Arab inspiration only, and complained about any manifestations of Pharaonism.

At the meetings held for discussions concerning the second attempt at unification between Egypt and Syria, the Syrian Luai al-Atassi complained about "Egyptian currents having no connection with Arab nationalism" and about "Pharaonic plays being shown in Egypt."[47] Abdel Rahman al-Bazzaz said:

> Today, as we build an Arab nation, identity and culture, we should draw inspiration from our Arab roots, primarily...any emphasis on the old cultures would be a cause of separation, not unification.[48]

Anouar Abdel Malek, a leftist writer who fled to France in 1959 at the time of the persecution of Communists and took the post of lecturer on the sociology of national movements at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, wrote:

> It was a matter of convincing the Egyptian public opinion of the basic, indeed, ancestral Arab character of Egypt.... The name itself, 'Egypt' vanished from the postage stamps on February 23, 1960...group treatises, manifestos and research works flowered on 'Arab nationalism' and 'Arab society'...the new programs in the elementary and secondary schools...completely ignoring six centuries of Coptic history, and dealing allusively with the Egypt of the Pharaohs. In the same way the 1919 period which marked the predominance of the liberal and humanistic tendency with the Wafd, was virtually erased from existence...more than a third of the total Egyptian book publishing of recent years...(consisted of) Islamic works.[49]

Secondly, Egyptian nationalism was accused of being an agent of imperialism. Ismail Sabry Abdalla (Minister of Planning under Nasser, and formerly one of the founders of the Communist Party in Egypt)[50] blamed the division of the Arabs on imperialism:

> Division is the result of imperialist intervention. Even after the fall of the Caliphate and the breakdown of the political unity of the Islamic Arab Empire, the Arab countries remained open to all Arabs; there were no administrative or legal obstacles to the movement of any Arab from one emirate to another.... Before the Western occupation, all Arabs were 'Ottoman subjects', no matter in which Arab country they lived. The division began only with the occupation....[51]

In Egypt, he blamed the British for trying to isolate the country from both the Mashreq (Levant) and the Maghreb (North West Africa). They had the Al-Umma Party (The Party of the Nation), their puppet, raise the slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians." There was much talk about Egypt's Pharaonic history, and a campaign to use the colloquial language.

He blamed the leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement for the failure of the Arab revolts against imperialism and made them look pro-imperialist. The Arab revolution against European occupation, he said, took the form of isolated uprisings, the 1919 revolution in Egypt, 1920 in Iraq, 1920-21 in Palestine, 1921 in Iraq:

> The feeble attempts made to coordinate them failed, because of the lack of interest of the Egyptian leadership, represented by Saad Zaghloul, who did not realize the truth of the common Arab destiny. The bourgeois leaderships everywhere kept on orienting themselves to the European capitals, seeking a way out through the party struggles or the imperialist rivalry between them.[52]

Nasser himself had also accused imperialism of dividing the Arab world.[53] Mustafa Tiba considered regionalism and isolationism to be instigated by imperialism. The secession of Syria from its progressive union with Egypt, he said, represented an attempt to destroy the idea of Arab unity with its new socialist content. It was a "reactionary, imperialist plot."[54]

Thirdly, Egyptian nationalism was accused of being a "bourgeois" idea - an accusation which under a socialist regime is the equivalent of "traitor." Accusations were made against the bourgeoisie for having isolated Egypt from the Arabs in the past. Ismail Sabry Abdalla wrote:

> Following the two world wars, there was a tendency among government circles, bourgeois leaders, and some intellectuals to isolate Egypt from her Arab brothers.[55]

Even after the revolution, he said, when Egypt's Arabism became a reality, the isolationist trend could still be found in traditional bourgeois circles.

Until today, there are some people who want Egypt to stand alone. Ibrahim Saad al-Din divides them into two categories, the first being the bourgeois who want Egypt to be part of the world capitalist camp. They see no point in a struggle against world imperialism in the Arab world or in Egypt. Their final aim is a capitalist Egypt, in which they could make the maximum profits for themselves. The second category of isolationists consists of nationalists who distinguish between Egypt's struggle for her own liberation and social progress and her joint struggle against world imperialism with her Arab brothers. They consider that, even though this struggle helps the Arabs to achieve independence and progress, any assistance given is at the expense of Egyptian resources and people. All these Egyptian resources should be concentrated for the interest of Egypt's population, particularly as the Egyptian struggle by the side of the Arabs does not find a proper response. The Arabs often retreat from the struggle and from doing what is necessary for the defence of their own interests, and blame Egypt instead.[56]

The accusations made about the Egyptian nationalists being pro-imperialist are groundless. To take one example, the al-Umma Party took stands that revealed a pro-Egyptian rather than a pro-British attitude. When Britain sided with Italy in its war against Turkey over Tripoli (Lybia), the al-Umma Party took a stand against the British. When the British clashed with Turkey over Egyptian territory in the Aqaba Gulf which the Turks were trying to appropriate for themselves, the al-Umma Party sided with the British, but their aim was the preservation of Egyptian territory. In the Caliphate controversy they defended Aly Abdel Razeq against the British-inspired Caliphate.

The bourgeois are attacked as imperialists, yet praised for their anti-imperialist stand when they defended Aly Abdel Razeq and opposed the imperialist-supported Caliphate.[57] Such contradictions show that the terms "bourgeois" and "imperialist" tend to be used simply as insults and accusations according to political convenience, regardless of the facts.

Despite the accusations made against Egyptian nationalism, public opinion in Egypt remained apathetic towards Arab nationalism. In a conference held in Egypt in 1962, the historian Arnold Toynbee, though supporting Arab nationalism, pointed out the existence of local national feelings in the Arab world. Mohamed Anis answered him by trying to deny the importance of this localism, saying that it is not widespread, and tracing it to the influence of Arab "reactionaries."[58]

P.J. Vatikiotis also points out that Arabism has not deeply influenced the Egyptian public. He writes:

> Arabism...does not appear as vitally important or attractive to the Egyptian masses...the Egyptian...was never really aware of an Arab nation.[59]

Nasser's spokesman Mohamed Hassanein Heikal wrote an editorial in the al-Ahram on November 3, 1961, giving reasons for the breakdown of the Syrian-Egyptian merger, one of which was that "Egyptian public opinion was not ready for or oriented towards Arab unity."[60] He admitted the conflict existing between Arabism and national independence, saying: "Arab unity or national independence? This is the question that came to the fore after the second world war."[61]

The 1967 defeat seemed to strengthen the isolationist tendency in Egypt. In 1971 a letter was published in the Al-Tali'a magazine by a member of the Socialist Youth movement in the Sharqiyya Province (Zaqaziq), saying:

> There are strange political currents now prevailing in many Arab countries, including Egypt. Their content is that Egypt's isolation is the road to safety, and her drawing away from the Arab nation and its problems is the path to salvation. The strange thing is that these tendencies rule over the minds of many of our youth.[62]

Once again there was talk about seeking the "Egyptian personality", and the famous writer Tewfik al-Hakim wrote an article on the topic in the al-Ahram, in which he showed the Egyptian character to have begun in the distant past - not only with the Arab phase of the country's history. His book "Ahl al-Kahf" (People of the Cave) drew its inspiration, he said, from the Koran, from Christianity and the pagans (Pharaonic era). His love for Egypt made him "try to link these currents of thought from the various epochs of her long life." Egypt's character lay in the "complementarity of her features and thoughts over the centuries."[63]

The writer Louis Awad sharply criticized the distortion of history that had taken place in the schools in order to create an Arab state of mind. He wrote:

> I searched in vain in the elementary school curriculum of ancient Egyptian history for the word 'Pharaoh" or 'Pharaonic' but could not find it even though it was all about Pharaonic Egypt - as though the intention was to wipe it off the record and the memories of our children.

He gave the cause as being the attempt to please the Baathists during the days of union with Syria.

> Most of the textbooks were selected during that period when we were required to wipe the name of Egypt off the map, our memory and the pages of history, and be content with calling ourselves the 'Southern Region'. We were asked to remove the statue of Ramses II from the railway station square because it strengthened the 'shuubiyya' (localist) tendency among Egyptians. We were asked in the Egyptian and Arab papers to glorify the Hyksos and their conquest of Egypt as they were the first Arab peoples to invade Egypt 2,000 years before the Islamic conquest.[64]

The attempt to instil Arabism in the minds of the children, he continues, could be seen in the "stupid songs" printed in the school textbooks. One such song written for 6-7 year olds ran:

I am an Arab. I love the Arabs.
My father is an Arab. He loves the Arabs.
My brother is an Arab. He loves the Arabs.
Long live the Arabs.
Long live the Arabs.
My country is Arab. Long live my country.
My country is Arab. Long live my country.[65]

During the celebrations of Cairo's thousandth anniversary in 1969, Louis Awad questioned the accepted idea that the city of Cairo originated with the Arab Fatimids. He gave it a pharaonic origin, and said that the Arabic name al-Qahira was simply a modification by the Fatimids of the Coptic (based on ancient Egyptian language) name Ebkahi enra (Land of Ra).[66] Though his idea is far-fetched, it shows a revival of the Pharaonic trend.

Heikal, Nasser's spokesman, admitted that during the union with Syria in particular "any mention of ancient Pharaonic Egypt was considered an unforgivable sin or a mistake that necessitated an apology," but now (in 1968), he considered this a "strange thing," for even in the case of individual personalities "a person cannot be described by a single characteristic alone." The Nasser regime, he explained, faced the problem of defining the Egyptian identity, and was for a long time unable to do so. The result was "cultural upsets that led to confusion and hesitation."[67]

It is difficult to gauge public opinion under a single party system, but the very fact that the above mentioned trends of thought have been expressed in the press reveals the state of mind of the public.

Arabism was attacked so strongly that socialist arguments were no longer sufficient to back it up, and "socialist" writers, ironically enough, resorted to Islam in support of Arab nationalism. Ismail Sabry Abdalla defended the Islamic Caliphate and spoke about the "Arabization" of Turkey (the Ottoman Empire as an "Arab" state).[68] It is strange to find a socialist writing in this vein, especially if we remember that the "bourgeois" were more secular in their attitude and that they had attacked the Caliphate. In fact, Ismail Sabry Abdalla sounds even more conservative than the Pan-Islamists, like Al-Afghani, who turned away from the Ottomans and were drawn to Arab independence on seeing the attempts of the Ottomans to impose a policy of Turkification on the Arabs. In writing of an "Arab" Ottoman state, Abdalla ignores the facts of history, for Arab nationalism arose largely as a reaction to the Turkification policy.

A recent trend has been the attempt to reach a compromise between Arabism and Egyptianism, by accepting the continuation of the Egyptian personality, and including within it the various cultures that Egypt has known. This may be seen in the article by Tawfik al-Hakim that we have already quoted. Ismail Sabry Abdalla also tries to show that there is no contradiction between Arabism and Egyptianism and that there is a continuity in Egypt's personality which includes many cultures. He disapproves of the sharp division made by scientists of Egyptian history into three distinct periods: Pharaonic civilization, the Greco-Roman period, and the Islamic period, as it does not show the continuity between them.[69]

In response to prevailing public opinion, President Anwar Sadat changed the name of the country and reintroduced the word "Egypt" into it. It now became "Arab Republic of Egypt," instead of "United Arab Republic."

Weakness of the Bourgeoisie

In order to understand the relation of the Egyptian bourgeoisie to Arab nationalism from the economic point of view, it is necessary to find out the degree of economic development and strength of the bourgeoisie in Egypt.

The Marxist historical materialist model is based on the development of European history. The circumstances in Egypt, however, were very different.

Under the feudal system in Europe, the lords had broad legal powers over their fiefs, and a good deal of political autonomy and local economic self-sufficiency. In Egypt, on the other hand, the system of artificial irrigation has always required the presence of a unified central power. From the Pharaohs to this day, Egypt has always constituted a single entity.[70] All the land was the property of the ruler, and he granted the multazimin (tax collectors), who were usually Mamelukes and Turks, large areas whose taxes they collected, and some tax-free land for themselves. He could withdraw the land at any time.

Both Anouar Abdel Malek and Ibrahim Amer compare the Egyptian system to Oriental feudalism (Karl A. Wittfogel's Oriental Despotism) rather than Europe's traditional feudal system. The bases of this Oriental feudalism were the absence of private property (in land), and the centralism of the state's power in the domain of agriculture.[71]

In 1805 the Albanian ruler Mohamed Ali seized the Mamelukes' lands, and in 1811 he massacred the Mamelukes themselves. In 1809 he abolished the iltizam (tax-farming) system, thus starting a revolution in the system of land tenure. Tax farming was abolished, and peasants paid their taxes directly to the government. Between 1813 and 1818 he established a registry of land titles, and distributed the communes land among the peasants and certain categories of functionaries. He also distributed half a million feddans (one feddan equals 1.038 acres), or one fifth of all the land area to his relatives and followers. This became their property and was exempted from taxation.[72]

The movement started by Mohamed Ali towards the introduction of private property in land never stopped. In 1858, his son, Sa'id Pasha, promulgated a regulation that instituted private property, the right to lease land for three years, to mortgage it, to sell the rights of use to a third party, and bequeath titles. In 1871 a law allowed conveyance of title to land against the lump sum payment of 6 years' taxes in advance.[73] This was called the "mukabala" law, and was meant to provide the government with funds with which to pay the enormous debts it had accumulated and which eventually led to Egypt's becoming a colony. By 1891 the right of property for all owners whether or not they had paid mukabala meant the final establishment of the private property system.[74]

As we have seen, there was no European-type feudalism in Egypt dividing the country into autonomous fiefs. Authority was centralized; the ruler owned all the land, the tax collectors were government officials rather than independent lords. Thus there was no need for the bourgeoisie to assist the monarch in centralizing the country into a single nation-state, as happened in Europe. The circumstances of its birth were different, and the Egyptian bourgeoisie did not follow the classical evolution of its

European counterpart - the path of commerce - manufacture - industry.

The historical circumstances in Egypt did not favor the development of a strong bourgeois class. During the reign of Mohamed Ali, trade was conducted under a system of monopoly. The ruler bought the crops from farmers at low fixed prices and resold them to foreign exporters at great profits. He also directly imported about two fifths of the goods brought in Egypt. A similar monopoly was used in an attempt to build up a modern industry. By 1830 factories were turning out cotton, woollen, silk and linen textiles, sugar, paper, glass, leather, sulphuric acid and other chemicals. A foundry supplied the needs of the government armament plants and arsenal. Labor was conscripted and paid low wages. The market for the output of the factories was provided by the armed forces.[75]

According to Adel Ghoneim, the reign of Mohamed Ali (1805-1849) did not allow for the development of capitalism, but rather delayed it. The land, factories and trade were monopolized by the ruler. The aim of industrialization was the establishment of a strong military industry to serve Mohamed Ali's expansionist policy.[76] Mohamed Ali's plans to industrialize the country were not long-lived. The compulsory reduction of his armed forces in 1841, following his defeat at the hands of the Great Powers removed most of the incentive that made him seek to industrialize. The factories declined, and did not survive

Mohamad Ali's death in 1849.

It was difficult for Egyptian entrepreneurs to make a start, as they had to contend with foreign competition. The enforcement of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838 permitted foreign traders to buy and sell anywhere within the Ottoman Empire, including Egypt, thus exposing Egyptian industry to the competition of European industry. The capitulations exempted European entrepreneurs from taxes, while Egyptians were not. In addition to these taxes which discriminated against them, Egyptian entrepreneurs realized that industrial investment involved a great risk because of the small market and the competition of European goods.[77]

From 1882 to 1914 the invasion of Egypt by European capital, largely on account of cotton, had reached its height. Foreign capital rose from L.E. 21,280,000 in 1902 to L.E. 100,152,000 in 1914, exclusive of the Suez Canal. French capital dominated at first, but was later followed by British and Belgian capital. Europeans were given monopoly privileges to build transport and utilities, to extract minerals, and to put factories for the processing of local agricultural products.[78] Foreigners controlled finance, large-scale commerce, industry and even petty trade.

The British colonialists were definitely opposed to the industrialization of Egypt. Lord Cromer claimed that since Egypt was by her nature an agricultural country, industrial development would lead only to the neglect of agriculture and divert Egyptians from the land, both of which would be disasters for the country. Egypt was expected to export cotton to Europe and import finished goods from abroad. The traditional crafts were seriously affected by the influx of foreign goods, and succumbed to competition. Egyptian merchants could not compete with the foreigners as the latter were exempted from taxes and duties.[79] When Egyptian businessmen and bankers appeared, they were at first associated with foreign interests. Over time, they tried to stand on their own feet.

As the British administration had no desire to industrialize Egypt, only a few food-processing, textile and building-materials industries were established, and in 1916 the total number of manufacturing enterprises was only 15; employment amounted to 30,000 - 35,000, the bulk of the workers being in the sugar industry. The need for industrialization was first realized during the first world war, owing to the shortage of imported manufactured goods. Several minor industries came into being, some of them surviving the war.[80] It was only after the 1919 revolution against the British that serious attempts at industrialization were made.

In 1920 Talaat Harb set up the Misr Bank with a capital of L.E. 80,000, and appealed to the big proprietors for support. This bank was Egyptian, with Egyptian directors, and its aim was to encourage the industrialization of the country. Growth was slow, and deposits rose to only L.E. 296,000 during the first year. In 1922, the Wafd party, which headed the nationalist movement, decided to boycott English products and issued a call to the people to deposit in Misr Bank.[81]

Misr Bank established 22 companies in all. Cotton was the basis for its investments; it set up companies for ginning, spinning, weaving, dyeing, marketing, exporting and transporting cotton. In addition, it founded companies for the spinning and weaving of artificial silk and linen, for paper, cigarettes, leather, oil products, cement, tourism, insurance, fishing, mining, navigation and the cinema.[82] The cotton industries were successful and so were the artificial silk and insurance companies. They became the basis of Egyptian industry during the period between the two world wars. Some projects, i.e. paper, tobacco, fishing and linen...failed. The mining and film industries had a very limited success, and the government provided assistance only for those industries related to public service, such as aviation and maritime navigation.

Up until 1930, very little capital was available, ranging from L.E. 5,000 for the Misr Printing Company to L.E. 40,000 for the transport and navigation company, and L.E. 300,000 for the spinning and weaving company. If local industry was to survive it required government assistance, thus in 1930 the government changed the customs structure in order to protect it. It abolished the tax on the production of mechanical looms and issued a decree giving preference to Egyptian products in government adjudications even if their price was up to 10% higher than foreign ones.[83]

Unlike the small beginnings of entrepreneurs in Europe, Egyptian industry was monopolistic in character right from the start. Misr Bank controlled a large portion of all industry, and in 1960, it represented 28% of the total banking capital in the country (L.E. 120,285,000). Charles Issawi gives several reasons for this concentration of Egyptian industry, including the narrowness of the market, the dearth of entrepreneurial ability, and the lack of funds for investment in industry, which made it difficult for small entrepreneurs to set up business.[84]

Even Misr Bank itself had to face foreign opposition. During the second world war, for example, the Egyptian government withdrew a large part of its funds from Misr Bank, thus giving rise to a shortage of liquid assets. Misr Bank turned to the foreign-controlled Egyptian National Bank for help, and requested a loan. The latter refused to do so except on condition that the founder of the Misr Bank, Talaat Harb and his colleagues resign. Misr Bank was forced to accept this condition, and was thenceforth directed by public figures known for their reactionary and anti-constitutional tendencies, like Ismail Sidqi, M. Abboud, Ali Yehya, Al-Ibrashi, etc., with the aid of foreign accountants. The bank left the field of economic investment to foreigners.

The Misr Bank case shows the limited possibilities open to the national bourgeoisie to undertake independent operations and its weakness in the face of foreign interests, the shortage of capital and technical expertise, and the non-existence of a large market.[85]

The Egyptian industrial bourgeoisie, therefore, was not born out of private enterprise, following the classic path of the European middle class (commerce - manufacture - industry). It was the large landowners who began to create industry.[86] The members of the Misr Bank board of directors were themselves large landowners.[87]

Most of the industries that arose in Egypt were small-scale industries, many of them hardly more than artisans' workshops. By 1950, 80% of all industry employed less than 10 workers, and produced only 13% of all industrial output. The number of these firms was 20,000.[88] Industries employing less than 5 workers constituted 60% of all operations. Only 400 industries employed 100 or more workers. One third of these ventures had a capital of less than L.E. 50; three fifths of them had a capital of less than L.E. 500; and less than 1,000 firms had a capital of over L.E. 1,000.[89]

Egyptian capitalism was unable to build any heavy industry, as this, beside being risky, required an enormous capital outlay. It invested in areas giving quick profits and not involving risk, i.e. spinning and weaving, and the food industries. In 1953, 55.9% of all investments went into spinning, weaving, cotton pressing and ginning, 19.4% into the chemical and petroleum industries, 8.7% into the engineering and electrical industries, and 8.5% into mining.[90]

Despite all efforts at industrialization, Egypt remained an agrarian country, deriving over one third of its national income from agriculture.[91] About 60% of its working population was engaged in agriculture, and agricultural products, with cotton at the top, constituted about 95% of the value of its exports.[92] Land remained the main source of prestige and power.[93]

While the population grew, the increase in cultivated land lagged behind, and there was less and less land per capita as time went by. The population rose from 11.3 million in 1907 to 22 million in 1954, with an average increase of 2% per annum; and the number of agricultural laborers rose from 2.3 million to 4.5 million, with an average increase of 2%; yet the cultivated area only grew from 4.5 million feddans to 6.1 million feddans, an average of 0.3% per annum.[94]

The land was fragmented into small plots. In 1952, 97% of all landowners held plots less than 10 acres in area, and covering 44.3% of all agricultural land in Egypt. By 1956, 97.1% of the landowners held plots less than 10 acres in area, covering 46.6% of all cultivated land.[95] This is hardly an encouraging picture for any entrepreneur seeking a market for industrial products. And as for the generation of capital, it is difficult enough for the small peasant to meet his basic physical needs without trying to put aside any savings.

Growth of Public Sector

As we have seen, the bourgeoisie in Egypt has always been weak, even under the capitalist system, and was unable to industrialize the country to any large extent.

After the 1952 revolution, the Nasser regime began to enlarge the public sector at the expense of private enterprise. By attempting to control private capital, it eventually destroyed the bourgeoisie.

In 1953, the Permanent Council for National Production was established to lay down a program for economic production and to study and carry out projects directly or in cooperation with the private sector. The "General Petroleum Authority" was founded in 1954, and the "High Dam Organization" in 1955.

Until 1953, the share of the government in industry was negligible, consisting of a petroleum refinery, some printing presses and repair shops for railway, cars and ships.[96] According to the 1958/1959 Economic Organization's Yearbook, in 1953 the role of the state in the economy was limited. The national income was distributed as follows:[97]

Private sector (capitalist)	84%
Traditional state sector (services)	14%
Basic government investments (railways, post, electricity and gas, government oil refinery, Cairo municipality)	2%
Total	100%

In 1956, the Ministry of Industry was established and laid down the first five-year plan for industrialization (1957-62) on the grounds that the state would provide 61% of the necessary financing for investment, and undertake to build heavy industry, leaving the light industries with high profits to the private sector.[98]

In 1956, the government's policy was characterized by the Egyptianization of foreign establishments, by closer state control of business, by nationalization and sequestration first of foreign and then of Egyptian property. A series of external political events triggered these results. The Tripartite attack on Egypt in 1956 led to the sequestration of British and French property and the seizure of much Jewish property. The Congo crisis was followed by the nationalization of Belgian property in December 1960.[99]

The public sector began to expand. The "Petroleum Organization" was set up in March, 1956, and the "General Petroleum Company" in July, 1957; and the government shared in companies for the exploitation of minerals and marine transport, oil refining and trade. In January, 1957, the

"Economic Organization" was founded to take over British and French property and participate in the formation of new companies.[100] It became the nucleus of the state sector. Its investments increased over time from L.E. 22,386,088 in 1957 to L.E. 67,224,714 in 1958; and to L.E. 80 million in 1960. Its share of the capital of many joint stock companies established in 1954-58 reached 18.5%. The investments of the public sector as a whole rose to 45.4%.[101]

The "National Planning Council" was established to prepare an overall national plan for economic and social development to be carried out in a specified time, and to mobilize all efforts in the public and private sectors for its realization.[102] In 1958, the first industrial planning legislation was promulgated, permitting the Ministry of Industry to intervene in order to specify the types of industrial investments required.[103]

If we analyze the investments of industrial companies established in the years 1954 to 1958, we find that the public sector had played the main role in financing the chemical and petroleum and mining industries, and contributed to the food and tobacco, contractors and construction industries.[104] The public sector provided 52% of all new industrial investments in joint stock companies.[105]

In 1957, the "Cairo Water Company" was nationalized. On February 11, 1960, the "Egyptian National Bank" and the "Misr Bank" were nationalized. It was in 1961, however, that the Egyptian economy decisively changed in a socialist direction. Law No. 117 nationalized all banks and insurance companies, as well as 42 large industrial, transport, commercial, financial and land reclamation companies. Law No. 118 decreed the partial nationalization of 82 companies (at least 50% of the shares to be owned by a public organization). Law No. 119 prohibited any person or corporate entity from owning shares with a market value of more than L.E. 10,000 in 148 companies. Whereas the previous measures had marked merely a gradual extension of state control or had applied only to foreigners, the laws of July 1961 constituted a liquidation of the Egyptian bourgeoisie and the final impoverishment of the landowners, who had previously been reduced in wealth and power by the Agrarian Reform Laws. Manufacturing and mining were overwhelmingly under government ownership or control (95%). Public transport and communications were entirely owned and operated by the state. Foreign trade came under the control of the government.[106] The assets of big landowners and capitalists, totalling L.E. 90 million, were sequestrated. The nationalizations continued in 1963 and 1964.[107]

In 1960/61, the public sector invested L.E. 239.2 million, while the private sector put up only L.E. 56.1 million. In 1961/62, the figures were L.E. 293.2 million for the public sector and only L.E. 61.7 million for the private sector.[108]

The percentage of public sector investments in the Five Year Plan increased from 82.7% of the total in 1960/61 to 94.1% in 1964/65.[109] The share of the public sector in the total industrial output in 1964/65 reached 80%.[110] By 1968, the public sector was responsible for about 90% of the national production (excluding agriculture), and provided over 90% of total investments.[111] Between 1961 and 1964, the public sector owned 85% of all the means of production, excluding agriculture.[112] By 1965/66, the public sector employed 87% of the workers in industry, as against 13% for the private sector. The value of the public sector's industrial production reached 93% as against 7% for the private sector. The wages of workers in the public sector amounted to 92% of the total as against 8% for the private sector.[113]

As the public sector grew, the openings for private enterprise kept shrinking, and consisted mainly of agriculture (controlled by cooperatives), internal trade, and contractor operations, and even here the government tightened its control. In 1955, 75.8% of private investment or L.E. 47.3 million went into real estate.[114] In 1960, the 2,000 contractors in the construction industry provided work for 170,000 laborers. The government nationalized the large contracting firms, and acquired a 50% interest in most of the others.[115]

In 1962, most of the merchants operating were very small ones; 57.5% made a profit of less than L.E. 250 per annum, and 34.2% made over L.E. 250 and less than L.E. 500 per annum. Only 3.9% made over L.E. 1,000 per year.[115]

The foregoing shows how the Egyptian bourgeoisie faced great difficulties in getting started, and always remained weak. This was due to strong foreign competition, the opposition of imperialism to local industrialization, the shortage of capital and skills among other reasons.... With the coming of the Nasser regime, the bourgeoisie was first brought under control and finally practically liquidated.

The weakness of the bourgeoisie throws light on its relation to Arab nationalism. Unable to control its own internal market, it could hardly expect to expand abroad and succeed in controlling the surrounding Arab markets. It thus had little economic interest in advocating Arab unity. Therefore, there is no relation whatsoever between the idea of Arab nationalism and the economic ambitions of the Egyptian bourgeoisie.

Conclusion

While Marx looked upon nationalism as being linked to the bourgeoisie and its unification of countries into a single nation, Arab writers do not link Arab nationalism with the bourgeoisie. The Arab nation is not considered to be a recent phenomenon. Its origin is traced back to ancient times. According to Ibrahim Goma'a, Arab nationalism is not an imitation of European nationalism. It is older than the latter; in fact it even preceded the appearance of Islam.[117]

One writer, Abdalla al-Rimawi, specifically criticizes the Marxist theory on this point. He states that nations, especially in Asia (for example the Arab nation) arose before the stage of bourgeois production. Today, he says, we find nations that have all the characteristics specified by Stalin, yet are not capitalist. Communities - especially in Africa - are developing into nations without necessarily passing through the stages of production mentioned by Marx. The nation does not disappear with the transition to socialism.[118]

The Egyptian President, Anwar al-Sadat, speaks of an "Egyptian personality" which has retained certain basic features over time, the nobility, strength and faith of a nation with a recorded history covering 7,000 years. Conquered time and again over the years, it has never disappeared, but has, instead, absorbed all its conquerors.[119]

With regard to the relation between the Egyptian bourgeoisie and nationalism, we find that in the period of the Egyptian national liberation movement preceding the Nasser regime, the various wings of the bourgeoisie played a leading role in the movement for national independence and in defining an autonomous Egyptian identity. This, however, meant an Egypt independent of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism - a localist type of nationalism that isolated Egypt from the other Arab countries.

The Nasser regime was strongly in favor of Arab nationalism and used all possible means in trying to indoctrinate the Egyptian masses to consider themselves "Arab". Yet even after the liquidation of the bourgeoisie, politically and economically, its Egyptian nationalism and ideological opposition to Pan-Arabism survived and exerted an influence on the people that became particularly apparen after the 1967 defeat. This forced the Nasser regime to acknowledge its existance and seek a compromise (at least verbal) between the Egyptian and Arab identity. There is thus no relationship between the growth of Arab nationalism and the Egyptian bourgeoisie.

If we try to apply the Marxist model of the formation of nations to the Arab world as a whole, we meet certain difficulties. For here we find no central politic authority to facilitate the centralization process (the ro played by the monarch in European history), and no autonomous economic centres having an interest in expanding thei scope of activities through unification. And as for the rising bourgeois class, which is the main figure in the Marxist interpretation, we have seen that even in the most advanced Arab country - Egypt - it was too weak to play any part in the unification of the Arab countries into a single state.

2. Objective and Subjective Factors of the Nation

In the present section we shall examine the Arab world from the point of view of the various elements of the nation we have discussed in the preceding two chapters, in order to find out whether one can realistically speak of an "Arab nation," and whether the basic factors of Arab nationalism are objective or subjective ones. Under "objective" factors we shall deal with economy, territory, race, language, the state, religion and national character, and under "subjective" factors, the will. Our examination of the factors will touch upon the process of modernization and secularization, around which Arab socialism and Arab thought center.

Objective Factors

Economy

In the factor of "economy," we shall survey the present conditions of the Arab economies from the viewpoint of their complementarity or lack of it. We shall then discuss the Arab aspirations towards changing the existing conditions and effecting an economic unity through treaties, the implementation of these treaties, and the problems relating thereto. We shall also deal with the recent attempts to form an economic union between Egypt and Libya. The focus of our study will be to find out whether the economic factor is an objective reality or whether the important thing in the Arab logic is the stress on aspirations and the creation of a state of mind, by simply drawing up treaties but without studying their feasibility, or actually applying them.

No Complementarity

Can we say that the Arab countries have a common economy, or even complementary economies? Advocates of economic union between the Arab countries try to show that they are complementary from the viewpoint of land, labor and capital. Aref Zaher, Assistant Secretary of the Arab League, points out that there are vast agricultural lands that are not exploited. The population pressure in the U.A.R. constitutes a heavy burden on her plans and development projects, as it absorbs the greater part of her economic growth. On the other hand there is a shortage of workers in Libya and the Sudan. The development projects which followed the discovery of petroleum in Libya require laborers. In the Sudan only 8% of the agricultural land is exploited. Both Libya and Sudan would benefit from Egyptian workers and skills.[120]

Rashed al-Barrawi, in similar vein, points out that the number of inhabitants in Syria and Iraq is small in relation to their agricultural possibilities. If real cooperation takes place between the Arab countries it would accelerate the utilization of resources by providing sufficient manpower.[121]

Isam Rifaat points out that there is a surplus of Arab capital. It is estimated that the reserves kept by the Arab countries in the financial centers of the advanced industrial countries amount to 4 billion dollars, and this reaches 5 billion if the private deposits are included.

Experts of the Industrial Development Center of the Arab League estimate that the surplus capital of some Arab countries amounts to 19 milliard dollars, while the amount needed for economic development in other Arab countries does not exceed 10 milliard dollars. Through cooperation between the Arab countries it is possible for the Arab world to reach self-sufficiency in financing.[22]

Ibrahim Shehata and Hazem al-Biblawi divide the Arab countries into two groups from the point of view of the availability of the elements of production. The first group includes the countries that have reached a certain level of industrialization (U.A.R., Syria, Iraq). The second group includes the countries in which there is practically no industry (ex. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan). It is possible, say the writers, to compare between the two groups from the following angles;

1. The first group has a number of conditions favoring industrialization...the existence of an industrial core has led to the creation of the necessary experience and technical skills, monetary systems, banks, communications, electric networks etc. The potentiality for industrialization is thus high in these countries, and they can absorb the investment of capital.

These countries suffer from balance of payment problems. They export agricultural raw materials basically (except for Iraq which exports petroleum), and so their capacity to increase their revenue from exports is very limited. They thus show a basic contradiction - a great capacity for absorbing capital, on account of their relative industrial development, and a shortage of capital as a result of the limits of their external trade, which is based on the export of agricultural raw materials.

2. The second group has the opposite situation. In view of the non-existence or extremely small size of their industrial sector they lack the basic conditions for industrialization in the way of technical experience and skills, monetary systems, communication networks, electrical networks, etc. In addition, some of them have an insufficient population, ex. the Gulf Emirates. Their ability to absorb capital is very limited. On the other hand, they have a large revenue from their exports which - apart from Jordan - consist of petroleum. As the demand for petroleum is flexible, it guarantees them a large revenue determined basically by the size of supply. This great capacity for export allows these countries to accumulate capital. These countries thus show a basic contradiction of a non-existent or low capacity to absorb capital on the one hand, and a surplus of savings and capital on the other, i.e. the exact opposite of the first group of countries.[123]

Advocates of Arab economic unity tend to support their viewpoint with general descriptions rather than detailed systematic research. A quick glance at the Arab economies (all of them producing agricultural goods and raw materials) shows that they are not complementary even where agricultural products are concerned. For instance, they all suffer from a shortage of grain production, and cannot meet their own local needs, let alone those of their fellow Arab countries. They find it necessary to import grains from abroad, and these imports have been growing over time.[124]

Trade between Arab countries is very limited. As shown in Table I, in the years 1953-59 it did not exceed 10% of their total external trade.[125] In the years 1960 and 1967 (see Table II)[126] there has been no overall improvement in inter-Arab trade.

Egypt's trade with Arab countries has generally been very low. In 1939 it was less than 3%.[127] In 1960 only 5.2% of Egypt's imports came from Arab countries and 7.1% of her exports went to them. In 1967 the figures were 5.9% and 7.7% respectively.[128] The main export is cotton, and this is not needed by the other Arab countries. The sale of Egyptian cotton to Arab countries has remained consistently extremely low. From 1948 till 1971 it dipped as low as 0.1% of her total export of cotton (in 1958-62), and never rose higher than 0.5% (in 1970-1971).[129]

Even if we consider the projected union between Egypt, Syria and Libya, we find the three economies are not complementary. Both Egypt and Syria produce cotton (though of different kinds), and Libya petroleum (in 1970 it constituted 99.5% of her total exports).[130]

There is little trade in industrial goods between

TABLE I

Trade between Arab countries, and its Percentage to their Total external trade (in millions of U.S. dollars)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Total exports	1538	1707	1771	1886	1986	2103	2069
Exports to Arab countries (including petroleum)	103	124	131	148	172	122	150
% of Total	6.7	7.2	7.4	7.9	8.6	5.8	7.2
Total imports	1222	1284	1520	1619	1665	1738	1768
Imports from Arab countries	175	155	161	193	209	161	174
% of Total	14.3	12.0	10.6	12.0	12.0	9.3	9.8

Ibrahim Shehata and Hazem al-Biblawi, "Arab Economic Cooperation," *Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi* (December 1st, 1965), Appendix p. 18.

TABLE II

Trade Between Arab Countries

	1960				1967			
	Imports		Exports		Imports		Exports	
	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%
Algeria (in million dinars)	158.7	2.5	26.2	0.8	42.4	1.3	50.2	1.7
Iraq (in million dinars)	5.35	3	5.01	2.1	7.87	5.2	16.9	5.7
Jordan (in million dinars)	7.75	18.1	2.11	60.6	10.56	19.2	5.43	54.4
Kuwait (in million dinars)	4.48	5.2	3.76	45.4	15.84	7.5	6.95	45.5
Lebanon (in million lires)	164.88	19.3	144.92	66.5	292.39	16.4	290.91	64.2
Libya (in thousand pounds)	1,589	2.5	463	14.9	8,240	4.8	53	0.01
Maghreb (in million dirhems)	25.4	1.2	146.3	8.2	49.5	1.9	32.4	1.5
Saudi Arabia (in million riyals)	247.5	27	521.1	15.7	347.6	15.2	230.2	3

TABLE II (continued)

	1960				1967			
	Imports		Exports		Imports		Exports	
	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%
South Yemem (in thousand dinars)	27,283	35.6	10,839	18.1	1,936	21.5	5,545	8.2
Sudan (in thousand pounds)	6,319	9.9	4,879	7.7	4,113	5.5	6,332	8.5
Syria (in million lires)	87.19	10.8	114.17	33.2	22.37	1.2	223.95	37.9
Tunis (in thousand dinars)	1,262	1.6	6,231	12.4	1,267	0.9	5,683	7.3
U.A.R. (in million pounds)	11.76	5.2	13.52	7.1	20.36	5.9	69.04	7.7

Taysir Abdel Gaber, "Role of the Private Sector in the Development of Arab Economic Relations," Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, No. 374 (March 15, 1971), p. 25.

the Arab countries because of the small size of the industrial sector in their economy.[131] Even Egypt, the most industrialized Arab country was unable to develop producer industries (only 3% in 1960), and had mainly consumer industries (65% in 1960).[132]

Even after the Arab countries achieved their political independence, they retained their economic relations with the former colonists. Most of their trade is directed towards European countries till today, and consists of the export of raw materials and the import of manufactured goods.

Libya's petroleum exports go mainly to European countries, headed by West Germany and then Italy. Her imports also come from Europe (with Italy leading), followed by the United States (See Tables III and IV).[133]

The trade and economies of Tunis, Morocco and Algeria are still oriented toward France in particular, and the European Economic Community in general.[134]

In the case of Egypt, England played an important role in Egypt's foreign trade in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. The British occupation in 1882 led to a great increase in trade between the two countries. This decreased in the following years, particularly during World War I, as Egypt was trying to open new markets for herself, and seeking independence from the English economy. In 1952, England's importance decreased sharply, and her position

TABLE III

Libya's Petroleum Exports
(daily average in millions of barrels)

	First Quarter 1969	First Quarter 1970
Federal Germany	787.5	846.2
Italy	560.7	765.2
France	331.8	481.4
Britain	337.5	475.8
Holland	229.2	449.0
Belgium	133.2	156.4
Spain	179.6	153.9
U.S.A.	161.9	125.9

Lutfi Abdel Adhim, "About the New Libyan Measures," Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, No. 392 (December 15, 1971) p. 7.

TABLE IV

Libya's Imports, 1969
(in thousands of Libyan pounds)

Total	241301	100%
Italy	54788	22.7%
U.S.A.	45152	18.8%
Britain	29768	12.4%
Federal Germany	21426	8.9%
France	12015	5.0%
Holland	8871	3.7%
China	5388	2.2%
Other Countries	63893	26.3%

Lutfi Abdel Adhim, "About the New Libyan Measures," Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, No. 392 (December 15, 1971), p. 7.

was taken by the U.S.A. After the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, the Communist bloc gained importance.[135]

Trade between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. increased ninefold between 1952 and 1963. The Eastern bloc became the main purchaser of Egypt's exports. England was replaced by the Communist Bloc which now became Egypt's main trading partner. In 1965 it took 48.5% of Egypt's exports (a higher proportion than England ever got), and accounted for 22.2% of her imports. By 1969/70 the position of Eastern Europe became even more predominant, taking 59.8% of Egypt's exports, and providing 32.9% of her imports.[136] In Table V we show Egypt's trade with England for the years 1836-1955. Table VI shows Egypt's foreign trade, by geographical area for the years 1960-65, Table VII Egypt's External trade in 1969/70.

Jordan constitutes an exception to the general trend, as her most important customers are the Arab countries. In 1970 they bought 76.8% of her total exports. Her main imports, however, are from Britain and the U.S.A.,[137] and one needs to take into consideration the important part played by Western aid in Jordan's very survival, as this greatly reduces the importance of the figure shown by her exports.

An article written in the al-Ahram in 1970 by the Sudanese Abdel Hafidh Ibrahim 'Abdun showed a hesitant reaction to Egypt's talk about "complementarity." Egypt has a surplus of population and a shortage of capital, so

TABLE V

Egypt's Trade with England. Percentage to Total Egyptian Trade (1836-1955)

Year	Exports %	Imports %
1836	9	22
1883	43	30
1913	43	30
1920-29	39.4	25.3
1937	31.5	27.5
1939	34.5	21.7
1950	21.7	19.2
1951	19.2	17.3
1952	4.4	13.1
1953	10.8	9.1
1954	10.3	12.8
1955	5.7	12.9
1957	0.6	1.5
1958	4.9	4.3
1959	2.7	7.2
1960	2.3	8.5
1961	2.4	7.2
1962	4.8	8.4
1963	3.5	8.8
1964	4.1	6.8
1965	2.8	5.1

Rifaat al-Mahgub, The Socialist System in the United Arab Republic (Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya, 1967), pp. 63, 189.

TABLE V-I

Egypt's Foreign Trade, by Geographical Area (1960-65)

Year	Arab Countries		East Europe		West Europe		U.S.A.		Far East		Other	
	Expts	Impts	Expts	Impts	Expts	Impts	Expts	Impts	Expts	Impts	Expts	Impts
1960	10.6	8.8	43.9	25.2	18.3	36.5	7.4	17.9	18.4	9.4	1.4	1.9
1961	14.5	7.4	43.2	24.9	18.9	31.3	9.0	21.3	11.3	12.1	3.0	3.0
1962	11.0	6.2	38.8	23.3	26.6	31.8	8.7	25.6	11.6	10.0	3.4	3.1
1963	8.6	7.1	43.9	17.8	25.1	35.8	6.7	29.0	12.8	7.4	2.9	2.9
1964	9.0	8.2	44.8	18.3	24.3	32.8	5.8	31.0	12.8	7.6	3.3	2.3
1965	7.6	8.1	48.5	22.2	20.8	33.2	4.8	22.4	15.7	11.5	2.6	2.6

Rifaat al-Mahgub, *The Socialist System in the United Arab Republic* (Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya, 1967), p. 190.

TABLE VII

Egypt's External trade (in millions of pounds) 1969/70

Region	Imports	Exports
East Europe	107.1	196.4
West Europe	117.2	49.4
Asia	44.8	43.9
Arab countries	20.1	23.1
Africa	3.8	9.7
North America	24.7	3.8
Middle America	0.5	0.6
South America	0.7	0.3
	324.8	328.1

"Egypt's External Trade, 1969/70," Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, No. 387 (October 1, 1971), pp. 34-35.

articles on the "complementarity" of Arab countries usually propose to provide Arab countries with Egyptian labor that would work their vast virgin lands, and invite them to invest their capital in Egypt. As unity is a touchy topic, Abdun wrote diplomatically, pointing out that the Sudanese population was growing at the same rapid rate as the Egyptian one, that the fertile and watered areas in the Sudan were already densely populated, and that the Sudan also needed capital. He concluded:

> Coordination should be carried out in such a manner as to meet the interests of the countries concerned, and should not harm their interests, whether collectively or individually.[138]

Despite talk of complementarity, the Sudanese and Egyptian economies are in fact competitive. As Ibrahim Shehata points out the Sudan grows the same long staple cotton as Egypt, and the two countries compete on world markets.

> The situation here is thus one of pure competition with no complementarity whatsoever.... So it is necessary to study the effect of unification on the marketing of cotton in the U.A.R. and the Sudan.[139]

Hopes of Integration

The Arab countries had aspirations of changing the existing conditions and effecting an economic unity through treaties. With the aim of encouraging the movement of capital from countries enjoying a surplus to those suffering a shortage, the Economic Union agreement was drawn up in 1964. It guaranteed the investor a just compensation in case of nationalization, and permitted him to transfer the net capital, the interest and profits to his country of origin.[140]

Arab capital, says Kamal Abu al-Eid, wanted to free itself from the fetters of politics, so as to participate in the development of the Arab countries. The law No. 65 of 1971 was issued in Egypt to encourage the investment of Arab capital, and it annulled all previous laws and decrees dealing with the investment of foreign capital, insofar as Arab capital was concerned.[141]

If large-scale industries were to be created, they needed a large market unhampered by customs tariffs. In 1965, Rashed al-Barrawi wrote that it was important to consolidate trade relations and extend the sphere of economic cooperation with Arab markets, to help establish a stable base for heavy industries. Coordination with the Arab countries was necessary, he said, so that there should be no competition uncalled for by the interest of the Arab economy as a whole.[142]

The Economic Unity Agreement, which went into effect in 1964, was signed by Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, the U.A.R. and Jordan. The parties stated that their aim was to establish complete economic unity among themselves, that would ensure the freedom of movement of persons, capital and goods.... They promised to make their countries a single customs entity with a unified external tariff and unified customs laws and regulations; to unify their export and import policies and regulations, and their transport and transit regulations; to coordinate their agricultural, industrial, commercial and economic policies... to coordinate their monetary and financial policies and regulations as a prelude to the unification of their currencies; and to conclude jointly trade and payments agreements with foreign countries. To determine the measures necessary for the implementation of the foregoing, the contracting parties provided for the establishment in Cairo of an Arab Economic Unity Council.[143]

According to Saad Maher Hamza, developing countries can take a big step towards closing the technological gap between themselves and the advanced countries by means of agreements for joint production in agriculture, industry, and internal and external transportation. Joint production projects would:

1. expand the size of the market (in many countries of the Middle East the purchasing power is very low and this makes the projects too small);
2. permit the adoption of modern techniques;
3. provide Arab industries with capital which they lack;
4. help towards the success of national development plans;
5. develop export industries;
6. help create strategic industries needed for wartime, such as heavy industries and internal and external means of

transportation;

7. help to achieve economic cooperation between Arab countries, leading to economic complementarity and consolidation of the Arab common market.[144]

The Arab League tried to set up Arab regional companies to carry out joint projects, such as the Arab Potassium Co., founded with the aim of exploiting the Dead Sea Salt in Jordan; the Arab Airline Organization to carry out joint Arab aviation projects; the Arab Oil Tanker Co., the Arab Maritime Navigation Co.; as well as the Arab Financial Organization for economic development.[145]

The Industrial Development Center for Arab states was set up with the aim of establishing new foundations for Arab cooperation in the economic field in general and industry in particular. According to its Director, Ezzat Salama, it was to meet the need of Arab countries for information required in development. Eight centers were set up to gather the information needed for the development of certain major industries which have been given priority; ex. the center for spinning and weaving is in Cairo, that for food industries in Khartoum, that for engineering industries in Iraq. These centers should develop into institutes for planning and industry.[146]

When Egypt, Syria and Libya decided to unite, a Union Committee for Planning, Economic and Social Affairs was formed.[147]

One objection made to union between the Arab countries was the fact that some of them have a socialist system, while others have free enterprise. Egyptian writers have tried to disprove this argument. Adnan al-'Amad states that it is untrue to say that the difference in systems has proved an obstacle to trade between the Arab countries, for historically, the low volume of trade goes back to the time before there was a difference in economic systems. The only thing that happened after that was that the Arab countries which chose the socialist path increased their trade with the socialist countries, while the countries that chose the capitalist path increased their trade with the capitalist countries.[148]

Shehata also denies any incompatibility on account of differences in system. On the contrary, he considers the socialist countries, which lack capital, and the capitalist ones which have an abundance of it, to be complementary, and urges them to cooperate economically and unify their currency laws and financial and customs systems.[149]

Some critics suspected that Egypt was using Arab unity to obtain the capital she lacked from the other Arab countries. Charles Issawi points out that integration would give Egypt help in dealing with her foreign exchange difficulties. He writes:

> Egypt would become the workshop of the Arab countries, supplying them with manufactured goods...it could draw on the vast inflow of foreign exchange resulting from exports of Arab petroleum.... One may...question whether the

> other Arab countries would welcome an arrangement which offers them few economic advantages in return for their contribution to a solution of Egypt's problems...[150]

This kind of argument was denied by Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, who wrote that "When Egypt needed hundreds of millions of pounds for investment in big development projects that could build up the self-sufficiency of the whole Arab nation - she did not think for a single minute ...to seek funds...from the Arab countries. She got what she needed through loans from Russia...the U.S.A., Yugoslavia, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and others."[151]

No Integration

Though the Arab countries started out with great hopes about economic integration, and a number of agreements were drawn up to this effect, it would be misleading to confuse the agreements with concrete reality, for they tended not to go beyond the planning stage.

Decisions on economic integration tended to be of a political nature, and no attempt was made to carry out studies beforehand in order to ensure their feasibility. The decision concerning the Economic Union was taken by the Political Committee of the Arab League in 22/5/1956 and not, as one would expect, by the Economic Council. In the sessions there was no detailed discussion about the trade, financial, and currency policies of the Arab countries or the development of trade between them. When the Lebanese delegation insisted that these matters be studied in detail, its proposal was not always greeted with enthusiasm by the other delegations. The latter held that it was necessary to begin by creating a framework, and that the studies necessary for its implementation would follow.[152]

This lack of study resulted in a large number of problems, and in 1965 (9 years later), the Council called for studies of the various topics mentioned in the agreement in an attempt to cover the loopholes resulting from the non-existence of studies preceding the agreement.[153]

In fact there was no implementation of the agreements made, and meetings degenerated into little more than information-gathering sessions, and all important decisions kept on being postponed. In 1970 Hassan Gheneima expressed his frustration at the lack of progress made, and described the Arab Economic Union meeting as "returning to its slow ways", "not fulfilling any hopes", and "not taking a single decision." He wrote:

> The Council used a policy of postponement in the important matters such as the payments union, even though...all the principles, rules and technical measures needed for its functioning were ready. It considered the Union as existing for the purpose of merely gathering information and statistics.[154]

The Arab Common Market was founded not as a further step beyond a successful Economic Union agreement, but as a means to help apply the faltering agreement. Alphonse Aziz writes:

> In view of the difficulties met in applying the clauses of the Economic Union Agreement, the Economic Union Committee decided..., in August

> 1964 to found the Arab Common Market as a necessary step to fulfil the aims of the Economic Union Agreement in the long run.[155]

As Ibrahim Shehata points out, the aims of the Arab Common Market were the same as those of the Economic Union agreement, and included the same members.[156]

The Arab Common Market was no more successful than the preceding agreement, however. In 1969, Adnan al-'Amad wrote that the enthusiasm shown by most Arab states for the Common Arab Market project at the end of the 50's and the beginning of the 60's had begun to "recede before the difficulties facing the execution of the project."[157]

One cannot say that the Arab League members have not had time to carry out the agreements. The draft Economic Union agreement was approved by the Economic Council on 3/6/1957, and it came into effect in 1964; yet till now nothing has come of it.

Trying to explain the failure of the agreement, Shehata points out that some people considered that it was not sufficiently specific and consisted merely of "hopes and general objectives". Others said it was insufficient to fulfil its basic aim which was to assist economic development in the Arab countries and put an end to the competition between Arab economies; and that it opened the door for the signatory states to escape from its stipulations through the exceptions mentioned in it.

From the time it was approved by the Economic Council in 3/6/1957 till it began to be signed in 6/6/1962, Shehata continues, the draft agreement was looked upon with doubt by the Arab countries themselves.[158]

Attempts have been made to facilitate trade between the Arab countries, as it has so far been very low. It was hoped that the members of the Arab Common Market (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan and Yemen) would form a free trade area. Yet despite these efforts, trade remains very small. According to Hassan Ghenaima, in 1965 the percentage of imports by Arab Common Market countries from each other in relation to their total imports was 2.3%. In 1966 it rose to 2.9%, in 1967 to 3% and in 1968 to 4.1%. Important commodities are imported from outside the Market even though they are produced by other countries within it, and exported abroad. For example, the Market countries require cotton cloth for about 9 million sterling pounds, yet they buy from each other less than one million pounds' worth of the product. The rest is bought from outside.[159]

An agreement for facilitating trade and organizing transit trade between Arab countries was approved by the Arab League Council on September 7, 1953, yet in 1970 Ihab Surur wrote that there were still differences on the matter, and no decisions had been taken.[160]

I. Shehata pointed out that this agreement did not stipulate the abolition of administrative restrictions on import and export permits, and that it was these that made all customs exemptions null and void.[161]

There were obstacles to trade even between Egypt, Syria and Libya after they planned to form a union. Aly Rifa'a al-'Ansari blames these on the local regulations and authorities. A good example may be seen in the attempts made to export Libyan leather to Egypt. As Libya has a "free currency" market, Egypt prefers to buy leather elsewhere. Some Libyan exporters tried to export raw leather and buy Egyptian products in exchange, but the Egyptian authorities objected on the basis that regulations did not permit it. Some Libyan entrepreneurs tried to use Libyan leather for manufacturing in Egypt and reexport the finished products. The Egyptian customs insisted that, apart from customs fees, an insurance be paid amounting to the value of the goods, and that the cost of tanning and manufacturing be paid in foreign currency. The entrepreneurs also had to submit accounts to the Industrial Control, and show the amount of waste materials, without getting rid of them.[162]

Ihab Surur wrote that in their attempts to increase inter-Arab trade, the Arab countries were meeting many difficulties. The continuous deficit in their balance of payments results in their placing quantitative currency and administrative restrictions on imports. He pointed out the contradiction between their desire to increase trade and give trade privileges and customs preference, and the strong desire to industrialize and protect local production against competing imported products.[163] Thus we find Iraq, Syria and Egypt reserving a substantial number of products from tariff reductions, and Jordan, Saudi Arabia Lebanon and Kuwait objecting, as they consider that trade can only be facilitated if tariffs are reduced.[164]

A. Musrey explains the reluctance of most Arab countries to dismantle their controls on inter-Arab trade in industrial and agricultural products on the basis of the shortage of convertible foreign exchange. In order to increase their supplies of such currencies, countries have applied prescription of currency requirements to their most important exports, as well as to products in short supply domestically, necessitating payment in a convertible currency. In order to conserve these foreign exchange earnings, these countries have applied comprehensive systems of quantitative controls to imports and capital movements. For balance-of-payments purposes, many articles have been prohibited from importation or have been subject to restrictive quotas or licensing. This has made it difficult for the Arab countries to increase their trade with each other. They have either lacked convertible currencies or have been unwilling to allocate such currencies for imports of consumer products from each other. They have also been unwilling to permit their own products to be sold for other than convertible currencies. The shortage of foreign currency has also impeded the expansion of Arab industrial production, which is dependent on imports of capital goods, and in some cases of raw materials and intermediate products from outside the area.[165]

I. Shehata points out that free trade and complementarity may be in the interest of some Arab countries, but not of others. The "socialist" Arab countries which are trying to industrialize, need customs protection, and find "complementarity" useful. The free enterprise group of countries, however see little interest in having their capital tied up in the Arab market and no longer free to seek more profitable investments and trade abroad. Free trade would undoubtedly give special privileges to the socialist countries by providing them with the necessary conditions for their industrialization. Removal of all trade barriers would hurt the small handicrafts that exist in the petroleum producing countries, as their production is uneconomic and would not withstand competition.[166]

Yet even for the industrializing countries free trade poses problems, for they are heavily dependent on foreign sources of supply for machinery, parts, raw materials, and various other products, and they have outlets in such countries for only a small number of their own products.[167]

According to Alphonse Aziz, trade between the Arab countries has not increased in the past few years, as compared to before 1965, when the decisions for the creation of the Arab Common Market were started. Studies have shown that not only has overall trade decreased, but also the volume of trade in certain groups of commodities that were freed of customs restrictions fell after 1965.[168]

Joint ventures in the field of industrialization have shown just as little success. Industrialization is one of the important nationalist slogans in the Middle East, and holds out the promise of economic independence for countries that have always been exporters of raw materials. Yet industrialization in the present age of advanced technology is no easy matter.

As Danial Abdalla points out, developing countries are characterized by technological backwardness, shortage of capital, surplus of unskilled labor, suffering from open and hidden unemployment, an acute shortage of foreign currency required for the import of capital and intermediate goods, and a low purchasing power of the people. Modern factories are made for large-scale production. So if the local market is limited, the production is greater than local requirements and it becomes necessary to export it.

Any factory set up in a developing country is imported in its entirety from abroad by means of a loan, on which a high interest is paid. This increases the cost of production. Most of the requirements for production in the factory are imported from abroad, and thus cost more than they do in the advanced countries because of the difference in price of the requirements, the interest on loans needed for their import, and the cost of shipping and transportation. Developing countries also need the assistance of highly-paid foreign experts. No more than one or a very few factories of the same kind can be set up. This does not encourage the developing country to establish factories for capital goods and spare parts, for these factories. They thus continue to import these from abroad, and lose any foreign currency they may have saved by setting up the factories.[169]

All these technological problems discourage the investment of capital in industry, since it turns out to be of little profit to do so.

The Arab League worked towards the establishment of joint Arab companies to carry out the projects that the national companies could not tackle on an economic basis. Despite the many efforts made to this effect, however, they have met with no more success than the agreements for facilitating trade. The companies established have remained mere documents. The Arab Potassium Company which was to exploit the salts of the Dead Sea in Jordan, had a nominal capital of 4,500,000 Jordanian dinars. The Arab governments appointed their ambassadors in Amman as members of the board of directors (an unfortunate decision) and apparently the administrative expenses used up all the nominal capital.[170]

The aim of the Arab World Airlines Organization was the establishment of a joint Arab Airlines Company that could face the competition of international airline companies. Its capital was 17 million sterling pounds.[171] The project of creating a new company was rejected as it would constitute a new company in addition to the existing ones, and need a great amount of financing, which might not be available, especially at present. The idea of merging the present airline companies into a single joint stock company was also rejected for practical reasons.[172]

The Economic Council approved the draft agreement for the establishment of the Arab Petroleum Tanker Company on 17/4/1961, with a capital of 35 million sterling pounds, but nothing came of it.

The Economic Council approved the draft agreement for the establishment of the Arab Maritime Navigation Company on 7/6/1962, and the U.A.R. and Kuwait signed it on the same day. When the deadline passed without its being signed by any of the other states, the Economic Council drew up a new agreement on December 1963 without stipulating a deadline in it. This was signed by Jordan, Iraq, Syria, U.A.R., Kuwait. It has not yet been implemented.[173]

Writing in 1970, Alphonse Aziz bewailed the fact that none of these joint projects have yet been implemented. He summed up the situation as follows:

> In general it is possible to say, that in the area of industrial coordination, the Arab member countries in the Economic Union Council have not achieved any results. The only result of the Council's meetings in this regard is just the issuing of preliminary recommendations.[174]

In 1970 a plan was drawn up for an Arab Petroleum

Organization to coordinate the petroleum policy, tighten the economic links between the member countries, and develop their resources. This was not a new idea by any means. In August 1964 the Arab Petroleum Experts Committee had discussed the creation of an Arab Petroleum Organization as a means of implementing the agreement for the coordination of petroleum policy, and the Economic Council approved the recommendation in December 1964. Again in November 1969 the Arab Petroleum Experts Committee studied the project and submitted it to the Arab Economic Union for decision.[175]

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya actually established an Arab Petroleum Organization limited to countries in which petroleum is the main source of income. According to Salah Muntasir,

> No one can pretend till today that this organization has been able to achieve anything.... Even its decision that a single delegation would represent it in petroleum conferences, and especially in the Arab League Petroleum committees was not carried out. Following the Libyan revolution, Libya sent a separate delegation to represent it in all petroleum conferences.

Muntasir showed a lack of confidence in the seriousness of the new project for a petroleum organization, and in the likelihood of its being any more effective than its predecessor.[176]

The Director of the Center for the Industrial Development of Arab countries, Dr. Ezzat Salama, in an interview taken in 1971, gave the impression that everything was still in the study stage, and that there was still no implementation of projects. He mentioned that the Center was having difficulty obtaining the confidence of the Arab governments in the sphere of technical experience.[177]

Even the most industrially advanced Arab country, Egypt, is technologically backward. Its most important and oldest industry, the spinning and weaving industry, has to depend on a subsidy in order to export its products. In 1969/70, the subsidy amounted to L.E. 8.9 million, i.e. 15% of the value of the exports. The subsidy dates back to 1949, but at that time it was only half a million pounds. Isam Rifaat explains that the high cost price in the spinning and weaving industry is caused by low productive capacity, the shortage of some of the necessary ingredients of production, particularly those imported from abroad, the absenteeism of workers, the delays in maintenance and repair because of worn-out machinery, the high waste of raw materials, the low standard of raw materials of their nonaccordance with specifications, the low level of technical skills of workers and foremen, and the low standard of internal supervision over the utilization of raw materials.[178]

The price of exports, especially to the free currency markets, do not cover the cost of production, or even reach the price of local sales. Figures taken from 21 exporting companies show that the difference between the price of exports and that of local sales reached L.E. 20.5 million. To give but one example, on the markets of East Africa, bedsheets from China sold at 27 pence, those from India at 28, from Bulgaria at 33, from Poland at 40, and from Egypt at 65.[179]

An Arab Common Market would benefit Egypt by providing large markets, but the Arab consumer would have to pay the high price of Egypt's backward technology, instead of seeking better bargains elsewhere.

The attempts made to unify the currencies of Arab countries have been just as unsuccessful as projects in the field of trade and industry. In 1954 the Economic and Financial Committee of the Arab League studied the matter and decided to postpone taking a decision until it had finished studying the currency systems in the Arab countries and the relations linking them, currency-wise, with other countries. In April 1955, Khaled al-Adhm submitted an optimistic proposal to the League aiming at issuing a unified Arab dinar, equal to the sterling pound, to be adopted by all the member states of the Arab League. In February 1958 an Iraqi proposal was submitted to the League. The League consulted a Belgian expert, Paul Van Zeland concerning the draft agreement it had drawn up for the unification of currencies. He showed preference for a retention of several issuing centers (and consequently several currencies) on the basis that the policies should be coordinated, and that there should be free circulation of the currency issued in the various Arab countries. This report apparently dampened the enthusiasm that had surrounded the previous unification projects, and the matter was not brought up again for discussion until the appearance of the Arab Economic Union project.[180]

More recently, in 1972, Egypt and Libya tried to work out a unification of their currencies as part of an overall economic integration. Differences in national interests between them, however, overshadowed the idea of Arab unity.

As the Egyptian pound has a low value on the international market, Egypt tried to base the new joint currency on the internal value of the currency. Hazem al-Biblawi wrote that the external value of the Egyptian pound is low and its internal value high, while the Libyan pound on the contrary has a high value externally and a low value internally. The external value of the Egyptian pound is low because Egypt produces relatively few commodities for the international market, and the demand for them is limited. The value of the Libyan pound is high externally because it produces petroleum, which is in very high demand. The local purchasing value of the Egyptian pound is much greater than that of the Libyan pound because Egypt's production for the local market is relatively abundant. Libya's production of locally consumed goods, however, is very low, and therefore the prices are high, and there is inflation. In order to achieve economic unification and protect the real income of the people, the internal value of the Egyptian and Libyan pounds should be taken as a basis for fixing the exchange price between them and the new currency.[181]

Noury Abdel Salam Barioun of the Bank of Libya, disagreed with this argument, and wrote in al-Ahram:

> The argument that the source of a currency's strength lies in its local purchasing power is mistaken, for it gives preference to currencies having a limited market over those having a large market.... In dealings with the outside world, the Egyptian pound is valued at 2.30 U.S. dollars. Its market price in comparison with other foreign currencies is low and reached about 50% of the above-mentioned official price. The Egyptian authorities give an attractive allowance to cover the difference for purposes of tourism. So the price of the Libyan dinar equals about L.E. 2.

The tourism allowance given by Egypt, he went on, is equivalent to an unofficial devaluation of 32% from the official exchange rate. Consequently the prices of goods and services in Egypt are cheap for tourists, while they are expensive for Egyptians. The inflation in both Libya and Egypt in the period 1965-71 was the same, about 50%. The inflation in Libya was due to the great increase in demand because of the great increase in the state's income in foreign currency which was being spent on development projects, and raised consumer demand. It was also due to the high prices in the countries from which Libya obtains its imports.

He pointed out that while the Libyan dinar has a 100% coverage in gold and convertible foreign currencies, the Egyptian pound had only a 6.5% coverage in March 1972.

Biblawi's idea of adopting the internal value of the currency would lead to a contradiction in the exchange policy of Egypt towards non-Egyptians. Would it be reasonable to grant the American citizen about L.E. 2 for 3 dollars, and give the Libyan citizen less than L.E. 1 in return for the Libyan dinar, which is worth 3.4 dollars? Also, the Egyptian market would lose its attraction for Libyan citizens, and this would have a contrary effect to the aim of the union, which is to link the Libyan market to the Egyptian one. This cannot happen unless Egypt gives a worthwhile export allowance which will make Egyptian goods and services available at low prices on the Libyan market.

Barioun's conclusion was that "coordination... requires a long-range plan beginning with a place for the regulation of the movement of labor, commodities and capital, and ending with the unification of currency, based on the exchange price between the two countries, and the international strength of the local currency."[182]

The Economics Professor of Cairo University, Ahmed al-Ghandour proposed that economic integration should start with the coordination of production and trade. Egypt could send Libya labor resources, and Libya could provide Egypt with foreign currency. Trade restrictions should be introduced to protect the products of the two countries from foreign competition. Like the Libyan banker, he concluded:

> This coordination would facilitate the unification of currencies, which should constitute the final stage of the economic integration of the two countries.[183]

Thus, despite all the enthusiasm about unity, financial interests proved to be stronger than any rhetoric about Arab nationalism.

Despite statements to the contrary, the difference of economic systems did have a discouraging effect on Arab economic cooperation. Tayseer Abd al-Gaber wrote that the investment of Arab capital is threatened by laws of nationalization, ownership, and the specified amount of particicipation of local capital stipulated.[184] Adnan al-'Amad stated that:

> Economic cooperation, based on the free movement of capital, people and skills, still stumbles before the argument of the differing economic systems.... What actually happens today is that capital is either put in savings by its owners, or it is invested abroad in the form of deposits at a yearly interest.[185]

Investors could hardly be expected to forget that the property of Saudi Arabians had been sequestrated in Egypt. The list of persons affected was headed by the name of King Feisal and his family - 109 of his sons, brothers and assistants. Their bank deposits, buildings, lands, jewels, antiques and cars had been sequestrated.[186]

Now Egypt was trying to attract Arab capital, and a law was promulgated guaranteeing it against nationalization or sequestration, and giving investors the right to transfer profits to their country, and to transfer the capital back to its country of origin after the passage of 5 years. Tax exemptions were also granted on commercial and industrial profits for a period of 5 years. Isam Rifaat even asked "Are 5 years enough?"[187]

As economic integration proved to be a slow and problem-filled affair, people turned to political unification as the answer. Adnan al-'Amad wrote about "a nationalist current that rules Arab economic polies and wishes to push them towards merging by means of political unification, on the basis that economic unity will automatically be achieved when political unification takes place."[188]

Yet political integration had also been tried in the past, with the same enthusiasm and lack of careful study, and had failed. Following the breakup of the Syrian-Egyptian union, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal admitted that the union had been formed without any study or information:

> Cairo did not know the truth of the situation in Syria to enable it to make a firm decision about it. Even Damascus herself did not have a true picture of the circumstances of the Syrian nation and its conditions....
>
> The new force created by the union went to Syria and found itself in the position of a spectator...waiting. It was waiting for the statistics, but these were not ready...in fact they were hidden by the ruling vested interests.[189]

When Egypt and Libya decided to unite, one would have expected that they would learn a few lessons from the Syrian-Egyptian fiasco. Abdel Malek 'Oda's article in al-Ahram stressed the need for research, and a rational gradualism.

> The achievement of aims resulting from the formation of the new state will not necessarily occur all at once, in fact it is necessary to implement them in stages, according to priorities set.... It will take one year of research and discussion.... The aim is the creation of a new organism, and not merely the addition of two societies, governments and viewpoints into a single structure, from above, called a single state. It is wrong to look at societies from above in a generalized manner, without taking into consideration the facts of life, the relations of communities and ordinary citizens, classes, social strata, linguistic matters, and the varying local needs. Previous experiments in the Arab world have shown that such differences do not disappear with the stroke of a pen, or through logic or enthusiastic talk.... The traditional Functionalist theory on the integration of states makes time a basic element in the building of the infrastructure and the gradual integration of the sectors of society.... Even though the Egyptian-Libyan union...is based on the political approach, aiming at building a political union, yet it does not overlook the benefits of the Functionalist approach.[190]

This rational gradualism was ignored, however, and despite the difficulties encountered in fulfiling economic unity, it was decided to put the union between Egypt and Libya into effect. This shows once again that the achievements of Arab unity are merely formal, consisting of the conclusion of treaties motivated by the political aspirations of the leaders, despite the failure of economic integration.

Conclusion

The preceding study shows that Arab nationalism lacks the factor of economic unity (in terms of complementarity), and that the traditional problems of competition and national aspirations towards industrialization even at the expense of unity, have been multiplied by the effects of the modern technological revolution.

In addition to these economic difficulties, another cause of the failure of economic integration may also be traced to ideological differences. This failure is cloaked by the conclusion of treaties of economic and political unification, but the gap between the treaties and their application is great.

The difference between the Marxist concept of nationalism and that of Arab Socialism, lies in that the former considers the economy to be one of the preconditions of the nation, while Arab Socialism places the emphasis on the idea of nationalism rather than on economy - it is philosophically idealist, and stresses the subjective factor.

Territory

Before dealing with the stand of Arab socialism with regard to the factor of territory, one needs to have some idea about the cultural background, the Arab, Islamic and Egyptian nationalist view of territory.

In the era preceding Islam, the tribal, desert life, with its scarce resources, made mobility essential, and therefore rendered territory of little importance. It was replaced by the tie of blood as a factor of cohesion, as shown in Ibn Khaldun's "asabiyya". Attending to camels and living in tents only, the Arabs represented "pure" nomadism to Ibn Khaldun, for they were not bound to a certain locality, which is necessary for those who herd other animals or have more permanent dwellings.[191]

Constantly on the move, they left no monuments or ruins behind them. There were only a few traces of their passage on the sands, the "atlal" or remains of an Arab camp that has just packed up and left, that is so often mentioned in ancient Arabic poetry.

A pre-Islamic King of al-Hira, Al-No'man ben al-Mundhir, described his fellow nomads as follows: "Their fortress is their horse, their bed is the earth".[192] The writer Ibrahim Ahmed al-'Adawi speaks of the Arab as "the son of nature, which has not limited him with boundaries."[193]

With the coming of Islam, mobility remained important, but took on a religious meaning. It now became necessary to spread the faith, and al-Jihad (Holy War) became one of the bases of traditional Islamic thought. As noted by Ibn Khaldun, under the Caliphate, not only defensive but also offensive war was obligatory. Islam legislated the institution of holy war in order to spread its message.[194]

For the Muslim Arab, territory was now divided into Dar al Harb (in which there was Jihad), and Dar al Islam.[195] The rise of the Islamic state no doubt led to a relative stability, as compared to tribal life, with regard to the factor of territory; but with the idea of Holy War, territory had no definite boundaries - it could expand and contract depending on the victories and defeats of the Jihad. Thus religion became the basis of cohesion instead of the blood tie of tribal days. In both cases the element of territory was deemphasized.

With the appearance of Egyptian nationalism led by the liberal Egyptian bourgeoisie, it was inevitable that a clash would occur between the traditional, Islamic, non-territorial viewpoint and the modernized, secular Egyptian thinking. This centered around the question of Jihad.

Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyed opposed the idea of Jihad, and the Islamic division of the world into Dar al-Harb, and Dar al Islam. At a time when the links with the Islamic Ottoman empire were still strong, he rejected Panislam as an imperialist principle. To those who said that the land of Islam was the country of all Muslims, he replied,

> This is an imperialist principle exploited by every imperialist country wishing to expand its territory and spread its influence...to the surrounding countries.... It accords with...the strong nation conquering other countries in the name of religion.[196]

He was alluding to the fact that Panislam served the Ottoman over the countries under its rule. Instead, he put forth the idea of independent nationalities.

Reinterpreting religion, Sheikh Aly Abdel Razeq rejected the Jihad as a basis of Islam, thus depriving it of the sacredness and strength it derived from religion. He considered it a purely political matter, and wrote, "Jihad is not just for the spreading of religion but for the consolidation of power and the expansion of territory."[197]

He also opposed the Jihad on the ground that religion should not use coercion, and quoted the Koran to this effect. Coercion, he said, was "not appropriate for a cause whose aim is to guide the hearts and purify beliefs."[198]

Egyptian nationalism thus destroyed the non-territorial, Islamic view, and replaced it with an Egyptian national territorialism. The Egyptian borders, identity and national interests gained a separate existence, apart from the Ottoman Islamic Caliphate. Ahmed Lutfi al Sayyed proclaimed the "Egypt for Egyptians" slogan.[199] The Umma Party, for which he was a spokesman, called for the creation of an Egyptian personality.[200] Egypt, said the "teacher of the generation" is "limited by natural boundaries which almost isolate us from others."[201]

This new interest in Egypt as an independent unit may be seen in the Aqaba incident. In 1906 Turkey occupied the village of Taba in the Aqaba Gulf and claimed it to be her territory. The British said it belonged to Egypt. This led to a crisis between Turkey and England, which ended with Turkey's withdrawal. The Egyptian newspapers al-Mu'ayyid and al-Lewa sided with Turkey and said that Egypt did not object to Taba's becoming Turkish.[202] Lutfi al-Sayyed's comment on the incident was, "The country resented the British occupation and hated anything connected with it, even if it was in Egypt's interest."[203]

The foregoing is the cultural background preceding the rise of Arab Socialism. Arab Socialism had to face and oppose the cultural heritage of Egyptian nationalism, in order to overcome the idea of Egyptian territoriality.

The Charter stated, "For a long time in the past there were no boundaries between the countries of the area in which the Arab nation now lives."[204]

Arab Socialism faced an ideological contradiction, for, on the one hand it needed the logic of Islamic non-territorialism to overcome the actual division of the Arab countries into various states, yet on the other hand, it did not wish to appear non-secular, and thus more backward than the liberal Egyptian bourgeoisie.

The Charter accused the leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement of isolating Egypt from the Arab world:

> The revolutionary leaderships at that time were unable to stretch their gaze across Sinai, to delineate the Egyptian personality, and to understand from history that there is no clash whatsoever between Egyptian nationalism and Arab nationalism.[205]

Yet it did not mention religion as the basis of nationalism, replacing it instead with the factors of language and culture.

In the mid-1960's there was an attempt to sound secular and to separate Arabism from Islam. Lutfi al-Kholi wrote that

> There is a widespread and mistaken idea in the world that equates the 'Arab' with the 'Muslim'....

> Religion is not the criterion.... This misleading idea is the creation of imperialism and the reactionary Arabs.[206]

There was nothing but criticism for the "Islamic Pact" and the religious slogans of the religious extremists like the Moslem Brothers. Tareq al-Bishri wrote:

> The Moslem Brothers...called for...an 'Islamic Pact' against the enemies 'Eastern Atheism' and 'Western immorality'.... They raised the banner of 'Godliness not Nationalism', 'Faith in God is more permanent and richer than faith in the land', 'the question is that of godliness and the Crusades'.... These were slogans raised deliberately in opposition to the nationalist movement, and tried to raise an artificial contradiction between faith and nationalism, and prepare the ground for military pacts.[207]

Following the defeat of 1967, when the press began to acknowledge the real attitude of Egyptian public opinion (as shown in "Nationalism and the Bourgeois State"), and its isolation from Arab nationalism, Arab socialism resorted once again to the religious theme and even praised the old Islamic Jihad, in an attempt to give Arab nationalism religious support.

In the Program of March 30, 1968, we read:

> In the case of the Arabs a few men came out of a desert peninsula, armed not with weapons but with a divine constitution for the reform of individuals.... This law was in the Arabic language, and it was a revelation from God. It was a blessing from God that honored them with these conquests, to spread the message that came down to Mohamed.... The formation of Arab society was a miracle which came about in an area of 11 million square kilometers, with a length of 5,000 kilometers and a breadth of 3,000 kilometers. The Arabs set up a state and a civilization built on the ethics of the Koran.[208]

This was reminiscent of a similar tendency that had previously appeared in the writing of Ibrahim Goma'a in 1960. He wrote that at the height of their strength, the Arabs did not seek power, though they could have sought pleasure, humiliated others and appropriated the wealth of the nations. He praised Omar Ibn al-Khattab for refusing to seize the lands of the conquered people who fled before the Arab army, and contenting himself with the kharaj tax. He glorified Omar Abdel Aziz for rejecting advice to the effect that he should stop people from converting to Islam as this meant they stopped paying the tax. He painted the Jihad in glowing colors:

> The Arabs did not resort to arbitrary rule and tyranny. They glorified freedom of the individual for all races and colors.... History has never seen more merciful conquerors than the Arabs.[209]

With any mention of the Islamic Jihad, the element of territory necessarily becomes fluid again, and tends to be replaced by rhetorical terms. The Program of 1968 compares the Arab nation to "a bird with outspread wings, the body consisting of Egypt and Sudan, and the wings of the Arab Mashreq and Maghreb...Egypt occupying the place of the heart."[210]

Conclusion

From the viewpoint of objectivity vs. subjectivity, a survey on the evolution in the attitude of Arab Socialism towards territory shows that even though this factor appears to be an objective one, it is in reality subjective, as it is difficult to separate it from present ideology and past culture.

This subjectivity revolves around traditionalism and modernization. As territory is linked to ideology, it is not a stable factor, but can expand with the idea of the traditional, Islamic Jihad, and contract with the modernized ideology of Egyptian nationalism.

Following the 1967 defeat, Arab Socialism reverted to the traditionalist Islamic heritage (a regressive step when compared to the secularity of Egyptian nationalism), in order to overcome the reality of division.

The Arab Socialists' desire for a fluid, traditionalist treatment of territory, does not accord with Stalin's insistence on a defined territory as a basis for the nation, but it is in keeping with the modern Soviet writers who place less importance on the element of territory.

Race

If we study the stand of Arab Socialism toward the factor of race, we find in the Charter a general statement that takes the existence of the Arab nation for granted. It says:

> The Arab nation no longer needs to prove the fact of unity between its peoples. Unity has passed this stage, and has become the reality of the Arab existence itself.[211]

A question we may ask here is whether "Arab nation" implies a single Arab race. If we study the various trends of thought dealing with this factor we find a recent one that brings up the question of an Arab race and dates it back to the historical era preceding the emergence of Islam.

At first sight this trend seems to contradict the traditional Islamic tendency expressed by Gamal al-Din al-Afghani that religion replaces nationality: "Moslems know no nationality except in their religion and beliefs."[212] He criticizes Western writers for their unfair attacks on Moslems calling them prejudiced because they speak of the religious bond. He asks what rational basis they have for priding themselves on national fanaticism alone, calling it love of nation.[213] The Koran itself states that there is no difference between Arab and non-Arab except in piety.[214]

M. Darwazah provides one example of the trend of thought dating the Arab nation back to pre-Islamic times. He says that the Arabian Peninsula was inhabited by groups similar in features and characteristics, and speaking a common language, with different dialects. They were wrongly called Semites - they were Arabs. All the Semite groups are branches of the same nation, and all the Semite dialects are branches of the same origin - the Arabic language. He tries to show the Arab origin of the various Arab countries through migrations of Arabs in pre-Islamic times, to the north of the Peninsula, to Syria, Iraq till Iran, then to Ethiopia and the Nile Valley. He claims the ancient Egyptians were Arab,[215] and even the Hyksos invaders.[216]

Ibrahim Goma'a also traces the Arab nation to pre-Islamic days,[217] and Aly Husni al-Kharbutly speaks of Arab Semites spreading to Ancient Egypt and the Fertile Crescent and establishing civilization.[218] Ibrahim Ahmed al-'Adawi agrees and speaks of "racial Arabization" of the area:

> The Arab tribes went out from their homeland in successive waves, first to Iraq, then Syria, then Egypt, and went south till Nubia and the valleys of the Sudan. The Arab immigrations also went to the Maghreb, and spread out in Barqa, Tripoli, Tunis and Algeria, reaching to the ends of the Maghreb. They intermarried with the inhabitants of the area from the Gulf to the Ocean; their blood mixed, and a new generation emerged and carried the banner of Arabism and Islam in the Arab homeland. This phenomenon is known as racial Arabization.[219]

To face the differences existing in racial origin, 'Adawi uses the term "extension" of a single Arab origin, but refuses to consider the existence of different "branches".:

> The Arabs today...are an extension of a single Arab origin, not branches. Imperialism at present tries to give the illusion...that they are branches of the Arab stock, and that the branch can evolve and acquire characteristics that differ from those of the original stock. By this, imperialism aims at destroying the unity of the Arabs.[220]

Thus, on the basis of the nomadic mobility of the Arab tribes, advocates of Arab nationalism use the term "migration" to assume the spreading of the Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula to the neighboring empires and civilizations like Persia and Pharaonic Egypt. From this they conclude that the peoples of the whole area are an "extension" of the common Arab stock, "extension" being a flexible word expected to cover up the actual multiplicity of races and civilizations revealed by history.

As usual, instead of concrete evidence, generalized statements are used, as though they were facts not needing proof (to use the words of the Charter).

Assuming that migrations of Arab nomads actually took place, one needs to ask whether they led to a settlement of the nomads, and in such a case did their settlement result in their mastering the original civilizations they encountered, or were they themselves swallowed up by the latter. If we look at the work of scholars, we find little support for the picture given by the Arab Socialist Charter of an Arab unity that "needs no proof."

There is little agreement between Western scholars on the origins of the Egyptians and the Arabs. G. Sergi considers the Egyptians to be of "Mediterranean" stock,[221] Jacques Pirennes believed they were a mixture of Mediterraneans and Alpines.[222] To G.W. Murray they were "Arabs,"[223] to Sabatino Moscati they were Hamito-Semitic.[224] According to C.E. Woodruff, Egypt was first inhabited by Turanians from Central Asia and later conquered by Semites.[225] Philip K. Hitti thinks Egypt was first populated by Hamites, and later the Semites came.[226]

As for the "Arabs," Sergi[227] and Woodruff[228] see them as "Mediterranean," Murray[229] as Hamito-Semitic, with Armenoid influences. Seligman believes the North and South

Arabs were Semitic, but Keith, Krogman, Burton and Maitland think the South Arabs were Hamitic (later mixed with Mongoloids and Caucasoids, according to Keith and Krogman). Bertram Thomas sees the Arabs as Hamitic, Mediterranean and especially Armenoid.[230] G. Sergi believes the Semites and Aryans had a common origin,[231] and Woodruff sees the possibility of the two language families having once been united.[232] Murray, Seligman and Thomas trace an Armenoid influence in the Arabs.

G.W. Murray points out that the effects of the climate in various stages of the earth's history made it difficult for human groups to contact each other, because of the appearance of deserts in the age of desiccation, when the tribes began to be transformed into races. Two races appeared, one Arab, isolated between the Nile and the Euphrates, and the second the Libyans, dark, mixed with Negro blood in the south and whiter along the coast as a result of European influence.[233]

Aly Ahmed Abdel Qader points out that "Arab" is used to describe the residents of the Arabian Peninsula and sometimes those of Syria and Iraq. As for the inhabitants of North Africa, they are usually called Maghrebis, and the Egyptians have preserved their original name of "Egyptians" through the ages.[234]

Mahmoud Azmy shows that the Hyksos were invaders, and the Pharaonic Egyptian people carried out a national liberation movement against them.[235] This contradicts the image that the advocates of Arab nationalism try to give that Egypt was Arab as a result of the Hyksos invasion.

As for the migrating Asiatic tribes that settled in Egypt, they were granted residence by the east border of lower Egypt (the Sinai Peninsula) and Upper Egypt (on the mountains and by the shore of the Red Sea. Up till the 6th Dynasty (2200 B.C.) they were differentiated from the native Egyptians. When they revolted, they had to be punished.[236]

Louis Awad mentions that the bedouins of Egypt lived in tents on the border of the villages so as not to mix with the peasants. During the days of the Mamelukes, they had a higher status than the peasants and did not mix with them.[237] This lack of assimilation continued, for during the Orabi revolution of 1882 the bedouins looted shops.[238]

Darwazah and Kharbutly speak of the Arab state of Manadhira in Persia. Hassan Ahmed Mahmoud shows that it was set up by the Sassanids as a buffer princedom to protect them from the threat of bedouins and defend the borders of the country with Iraq.[239] It did not constitute an Arabization of Persia by any means, and it was destroyed by the Sassanids themselves at the beginning of the seventh century A.D.

Darwazah claims that the Berbers were Arabized.[240] Yet Hussein Fawzy points out that little is known of their origin,[241] and that they have kept their own language for everyday speech while Arabic is used for sermons and speeches.[242]

While Darwazah claims that the Kurds in Iraq and Syria are being Arabized,[243] the Iraqi government accuses the Kurds of retaining an independent nationality against all attempts at assimilation. The Kurds refuse to consider themselves Arabs and resist assimilation and discrimination. They accuse the Iraqi government of carrying out an Arabization policy, of not giving them a share in government, and of coercion (strafing and bombing Kurdish villages).[244]

Mohamed Hassanein Heikal admits the "complex constitution" of the Middle East, and says there are "at least four nationalities: Arab, Kurd, Berber...southern Sudanese."[245]

As the whole question of racial origin is obscure, Aly Ahmed Abdel Qader concludes that the study of the origin of the residents in the area "does not make much difference as a basic factor in understanding the meaning of Arab nationalism."[246] He considers the term "Arab to have a cultural rather than a racial meaning.

> If we speak of Arabs as a race, we mean by it the possibility of their belonging to a single homogeneous civilization and not to their belonging to a single origin from the physiological point of view.[247]

When the element of race is replaced by that of culture, this means that it is dropped altogether.

Since the factor of race has little scientific and historical basis, why is there this trend among Arab writers to date Arabism back to tribal times? They would have been on safer ground had they linked it to the emergence of Islam. But in our age of modernization and secularization it is difficult to use religion as a basis for Arab nationalism. Thus in order to appear secular, these writers turn to the obscure past, even though this leaves them open to attacks for being unscientific. Anyway, the assumption of an ancient Arab nation that they make on the basis of the past, serves the purpose of creating the state of mind required in promoting Arab nationalism.

When we turn to the attitude of Arab socialist writers towards the question of race during the Islamic age, we find that they look at it as an Arabization of the other nationalities. For example, Darwazah glorifies Saladin despite his Kurdish origin. He writes:

> Saladin...ruled Egypt in 569 H. and was able through his ambition and activeness to spread his rule to Syria, Libya Hejaz and Yemen and to unify all these countries under his banner. The effect of the strong comprehensive unity was the great sweeping victory over the Crusaders in Palestine and Syria.[248]

Other writers, Kharbutly, Abdel Qader, 'Adawi..., also praise Saladin as a heroic figure in Arab history.

Another illustration may be found in Kharbutly's considering the Mamelukes as Arabized:

> The Mongols reached the city of Gaza in Palestine and were at the doors of Egypt. Egypt was ruled at the time by the Mamelukes, who, though they were of non-Arab origins, had become Arabized, represented the hopes of the Arab nation, and

considered themselves it's protectors.[249]

'Adawi Arabizes the Mamelukes and the other rulers of Arab countries:

> The Ayyubids and Mamelukes in Egypt, the Murabits and Muwahids in Maghreb, interacted with the new Arabism. They came under the Arab nationality, supported Arab culture, protected the Islamic religion, and played a vital part in preserving the Arab heritage.[250]

What does Arabization mean? It means that the factor of race has given way to that of culture - an Islamic one.

It is not the aim of the present work to delve deep into history, but we need to cast a rapid glance at one specific period - that of Saladin and the Crusaders, since the Arab nationalists extol his exploits. Old historians like Ibn Wassel (12th century) and Al-Jabarti (18th - 19th century), give a very different picture.[251] The period actually witnessed schisms and a multiplicity of rulers who were constantly warring against each other and making alliances with the aim of expanding their dominion. They also made alliances with the Crusaders, out of sheer self-interest.

As for the people, they did not do the actual fighting, which was left to the Mamelukes. Saladin, for instance, depended on the Kurds, and allied himself with some Turkish leaders. According to the historian Ibn Wassel, a siege of Jerusalem, which had been planned failed on account of differences between Saladin's Kurds and the Turks. It is difficult to conceive of the common people, tyrannised as they were by this military caste, as constituting a closely knit, integrated national unit. Any cohesion that existed would be primarily a reaction to external threats - whether from the invading Crusaders or other expansionist rulers in the area. Religion was used by the various rulers as a rationalization for their private interests.

In short, there is a difference between history as it actually happened, and the myth about it as told by advocates of Arab nationalism. Ironically enough, when they are faced with the facts of history, they admit bluntly that history needs to be distorted with the aim of creating the required nationalist state of mind.[252]

The same applies to the Mamelukes. The true story may be seen in what Hussein Fawzy, one-time Under-secretary of State for the Ministry of Culture, and one of the intellectuals of the Egyptian nationalist era, writes about them:

> The Mamelukes and Ottoman occupation army became highway robbers.... The image that has remained with us of these truly 'dark ages' is a black and dark red one, with here and there a hellish light appearing, showing Egyptian life at the time to have been like the lowest levels of Dante's hell.[253]

There is an exception to this "Arabization", however. Writers confirm the existence of Arab unity in all Islamic ages except one - the Turkish. Where the Ottoman sultanate is concerned, there is an attitude of disengagement, and no talk of extensions of an original Arab stock.

This separation of Arabs from the Turkish caliphate re-introduces the element of different races, which Islamic thinking had long struggled to suppress and hide.

Turkey's tyranny made Islamists resort to the element of race and Arabism. But this did not mean giving up Islamic unity, it was simply a unit that excluded Turkey. The Syrian Abdel Rahman al-Kawakibi for instance, accused Turkey of tyranny and called for a Caliph who would be not a Turk but an Arab, and from the Qureishi tribe, to which the Prophet belonged.[254]

While Ibrahim al-Adawi praises Saladin, he attacks the Turks, calling them "barbarians" and bewailing the fact that the capital of the Islamic world was in a non-Arab country.[255] Kharbutly and Abdel Qader show the same praise for Saladin and condemnation of the Turks. In actual fact, the Turks and the Kurds both fought together against the Crusaders. Yet while Saladin the Kurd is held up as a heroic figure, the Turks are treated as villains.

The utilization of the element of race here, and the replacement of the idea of Islamic unity by that of Arab nationalism, has at least the appearance of secularity. Pfaff, however, understood the Islamic content of Arabism when he wrote that "the Arab must extol the Islamic past, but identify it as Arab."[256]

Advocates of Arab nationalism get caught on the horns of a dilemma. If they speak of a unity of races and nationalities on the basis of religion, this is not in keeping with the secular spirit of the times. If, on the other hand, they accept modernization at the expense of religion as an element of unity, they are forced to recognize the difference in nationalities.

One recent solution to this dilemma is to accept a formal modernization by using the term "Arab" unity instead of "Islamic" unity, in opposition to the past, when conflicts between races and nationalities were hidden behind a facade of religious unity. This may give an impression of real secularization, but it is only a formal one, and is soon uncovered.

In some cases the Islamic content reappears on the surface again. One example here is Darwazah, who joins the two approaches of secular Arabism and Islamism. On the one hand he speaks of a common race, and tries to show the various countries as being Arab in origin since ancient times. On the other, he utilizes religion as a unifying bond between the various different nationalities of the Islamic world. Like the other writers he glorifies Saladin despite his Kurdish origin, but unlike them he also links the Turks with Islamic unity, stating that under the Turks unity was not disturbed:

> The Arab Mashreq,...was united under the Abbassids, the Ayyubids, the Turks, the Circassians, the Ottomans....257

As for Ismail Sabry Abdalla, in order not to show Islamism openly like Darwazah, he changes history with regard to Turkey. Instead of calling her Islamic, he uses the secular term i.e. Arabism, and considers Turkey as Arabized. The historical facts, however, show that far from being Arabized, Turkey was trying to impose Turkification on the Arabs; and the core of Arab nationalism was a revolt against the Ottoman sultanate.[258] Thus the term Arabism turns out to be merely a secular-looking external form, the content of which is Islamic.

A strong contrast may be noted between this apparently secular but actually traditional stand of Arab nationalist writers, and the clearly secular stand taken by writers during the days of Egyptian nationalism. Then there was no desire to create myths either of Islamic unity or Arab unity. There was no attempt to provide an Arab origin for all the countries of the area, or to hide the divisions that existed among the Arabs themselves.

Taha Hussein, for instance pointed out that the Arab tribal history was unknown.[259] There was no single Arab nation or race, the one element that united the heterogeneous countries of the area was Islam:

> The Arab countries...included different nations and tribes, with different dialects, from distant places, and having different political units as well. All these heterogeneous nations gathered at the time of the Prophet, around the cause of Islam and under its banner, and became...brothers.[260]

This did not mean any mythical Islamic unity wiping out the different nationalities, however. The Caliphate which succeeded the Prophet constituted an Arab state, backing Arab hegemony. Aly Abdel Razeq contradicts the myth of

Islamic unity by showing that it was one nationality dominating the others.

> The new state was created by the Arabs, it was an Arab state and Arab rule, but Islam...is the religion of all humanity, neither Arab nor non-Arab.... It was an Arab state supporting Arab power and Arab interests....[261] Islam...is for the whole world....it is not an Arab cause, or Arab unity or an Arab religion.[262]

Conclusion

In appearance the factor of race may seem to be objective, but in reality it cannot be separated from the writers' perception and subjective attitude towards it.

Here, as in other factors, the contradiction of Arab thought centers around the conflict between traditionalism and modernization.

In opposition to historical facts, which show that Islamic history consists of an interaction between religion as an integrative factor and the heterogeneity of nationalities, Arab Socialism emphasized the precedence of the race factor over religion, with no scientific basis.

Thus, contrary to its general trend, Arab Socialism tried in this factor of race to appear secular, but its secular-looking formula was only formally secular, in contrast to the real secularity of the Egyptian nationalist stand.

In the final analysis the factor of race tends to be transformed into that of culture, as Arabization takes the place of a common Arab origin.

Language

In studying the factor of language we shall divide the topic as follows:

1. An introduction on the emergence of Arab nationalism at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century.
2. The period of Egyptian nationalism.
3. The period of Arab socialism.

The ideological differences within Arab thought, and the changes it has undergone with respect to the factor of language show that the core around which the whole controversy centers is traditionalism vs. modernization.

Arab nationalism arose within the context of the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate, which relied on religion as the basic factor of unity. In trying to rid itself of Ottoman rule, Arab nationalism found a replacement for religion in a common language, and therefore necessarily tended towards secularization. This trend was best represented by the Christian Arab nationalists of Syria and Lebanon.[263]

Describing Turkish rule, Mohamed Rifaat writes about their arrogance. The Arab was not allowed to look into the face of the Turk, and in the unusual event of a Turk and an Arab walking together, the Arab had to walk to the left of the Turk in a humble manner.[264]

There was a conflict between the idea of Arab nationalism and that of Turkification or Turanianism, which tried to Turkify the administration of the various provinces and imposed the Turkish language on schools and courts.[265]

Sobhi Shafik points out that the imperialists described the Arabic language as an inferior or dead language. The advocates of Arab renaissance proved the capacity of the language to keep up with modern progress. The Syrian Scientific Society, headed by Sheikh Ibrahim al-Yazgi and Sheikh al-Asir called for the recognition of Arabic as the official language. There was widespread study of the Arabic language among Syrian and Lebanese intellectuals who advocated Arab unity.[266]

The two pioneers of the movement of Arabic literature and thought in Syria were Nassif Yazgi and Butros al-Bustani. They provided the first spark that lit the spirit of Arab nationalism in the minds of the Arabs. Yazgi wrote poetry and books on the Arabic language. Bustani founded three newspapers, and a school, and he wrote the first Arabic dictionary and an Arab encyclopedia. They encouraged a spirit of tolerance in an age of religious fanaticism. The Turks incited hatred between the religious communities, and in 1860 a massacre of Christians took place in Lebanon and Syria. Butros al-Bustani opened the first national school in Beirut in 1863; its slogan was "freedom of education and of religious belief." The slogan of his newspaper was "love of country is a part of religion." Ibrahim al-Yazgi wrote a nationalist poem which was sung by people in secret for fear of reprisal by the Turkish government. It called upon Arabs to "put aside fanaticism, and stand up as a nation against Turkish tyranny."[267]

Even those who called for a revitalization of Islam like al-Afghani, also underwent an evolution in their thinking. At first the traditionalist Islamic outlook of al-Afghani made religion the basis of nationality.[268] As a result of Turkish tyranny, he turned from religion to language as the basis, saying, "the only way to differentiate one nation from another is through its language."[269] Stressing the importance of language, he showed that religion can only be understood through language. His secularization was not complete, however, and a religious note always remained. Every religion has its language, he said, and the language of Islam is Arabic.[270]

Nationalist thought thus evolved and replaced religion with language, in keeping with the trend towards secularization. Yet the secularization was not total. While its external form was Arab, its core remained Islamic unity, though with the exclusion of Turkey.

The secular, Egyptian nationalist stand with respect to the factor of language is well represented by Taha Hussein, who was Minister of Education in the Wafd majority government, and by Mohamed Hussein Heykal, who occupied the same position in a minority government. Despite their political differences, the two men had the same secular ideological stand, as expressed by Taha Hussein when he wrote that in the field of scientific research one should adopt a sceptical attitude and not be influenced by religion or nationalism.

The trends of thought shown by Egyptian nationalists with regard to language and Arab nationalism may be outlined as follows:

Firstly, they denied the existence of a unified Arabic language in the pre-Islamic Jahiliyya period. Taha Hussein pointed out that the language of Kahtan was not that of Adnan. Scholars who studied the Kahtan languages (Himyaritic, Sabean and Minean) had shown that the Himyaritic language was different from classical Arabic and closer to the ancient Ethiopian language. The similarities between the two languages was no greater than that between classical Arabic and Syriac or Hebrew. The Arabic-speaking Arabs were the Adnan. The Kahtan adopted Arabic only after the appearance of Islam. The Adnanis lived in the northern Arab countries in Hejaz and Nejd, the Kahtanis in the south.[271]

The importance of this trend may be seen when we note that advocates of Arab nationalism like Darwazah try to prove the existence of an independent Arab nation before the emergence of Islam. He writes:

> These Arab tribes and countries were known as Arabs centuries before the rise of Islam...the language they spoke was Arabic.... It was evolving towards classical Arabic, and reached the height of its development one century or more before the Prophet's mission.[272]

The Egyptian nationalist trend results in denying the existence of such an Arab nation before the appearance of Islam, and links it with Islam. Taha Hussein states:

> Islam...unified the languages and removed much of the differences in pronunciation...the Koran imposed on the Arabs a single language and similar pronunciation....[273] ...It became the official language of the Arabs and then their literary language. After the conquests, it became the official and then the literary language of all the Islamic states.[274]

This contradicts what Pfaff says about the lack of interest shown in the Jahiliyya period:

> The period before the birth of Muhammad is the 'period of ignorance' (jahiliyya), and until very recently was a period that was simply ignored by Arab historians.[275]

Secondly, the myth concerning the existence of a unified Arabic language on the basis that the Koran was inspired in Arabic was denied by Taha Hussein, who carried out historical research on the subject, and stated that the Koran had been written in seven languages. He wrote:

> The meaning of the Koran was inspired in seven 'ahruf', which means...seven different languages.... Following the death of the Prophet, his followers continued to read the Koran in these seven languages, each according to the language he had heard from the Prophet. Differences and disputes concerning this increased until it almost led to an insurrection among the people and the Moslem armies which were invading...distant ports.... The matter was submitted to Othman. He feared lest differences should divide Moslems concerning the text of the Koran as had happened between Christians concerning the Biblical text, so he gathered the 'Imam' Koran and spread it throughout the countries, and ordered that the other versions be destroyed. And thus six out of the seven languages were destroyed, and only one remained, the one we read in 'Othman's' Koran. It is the language of Koreish.[276]

Thirdly, the Egyptian nationalists stress the differences between the Arabic dialects in various countries today. They point out that local dialects have almost reached the point of being different languages, and the various peoples can hardly communicate with each other in these dialects. According to Mohamed Hussein Heykal:

> The dark ages which these countires have passed through has made the language sink to the level of dialects, each of which pretends to be Arabic and denies that the others are. The Maghrebi is unable to understand the dialect of the Egyptian or Iraqi, and the Egyptians cannot undetstand the dialect of the Iraqi or Maghrebi.[277]

In fact, people living in Egypt can understand the dialect of Syria and Lebanon, and be understood, but as one goes further away from this core area, it becomes more difficult to communicate.

Fourthly, during the period of Egyptian nationalism, there appeared the call for the utilization of the colloquial language. The importance of this trend may be seen when we note that Arab nationalists attack the use of the colloquial language as being an imperialist ploy. 'Adawi blames it on Turkish imperialism:

> Alien words entered into the Arabic language. This led to the creation of the colloquial language which tried to take the place of classical Arabic. Long foreign stories were translated into the colloquial language to please the taste of the masses with their incorrect Arabic. The advocates of the colloquial, then began to call openly for its spreading.[278]

Darwazah blames the colloquial movement on British imperialism:

> The British...encouraged the movement for the use of the Egyptian vernacular in education, literature, journalism, acting, writing...and government correspondence, with the argument that it would facilitate the spreading of education and create an Egyptian literature, language and culture.... Their aim was to isolate it...from classical Arabic, and... isolate Egypt further from the Arabs and Arabism.[279]

In reality, those who called for the utilization of the colloquial language were leaders of thought and of the Egyptian movement of independence. Their aim was the democratization of literature, for they had noticed a communication gap between themselves and the masses, on account of the latter's widespread illiteracy. It is they who started the campaigns against illiteracy, and who spread education on a mass scale. Taha Hussein introduced free education on the basis that it should be like "water, light and air." He wrote:

> I cannot imagine a man believing in true democracy and the popular suffrage it implies, and at the same time...wanting to narrow public education to a few Egyptians.[280]

These Egyptian thinkers looked at the question of the vernacular in a realistic manner. Mohamed Hussein Heykal pointed out that the classical language could become generalized only if the Arab countries overcame the problem of illiteracy.[281]

Thus we see that language is related to the nation, as Stalin said, but it also had a class connotation, as shown by the polarization of classes and illiteracy of the masses in Egypt.

In trying to democratize and to seek communication with the masses, the Egyptian intellectuals tended to separate themselves still further from Arab nationalism, for the basis of the unity of the Arab nation lay in the classical language of the Koran. The attitude of Egyptian nationalists towards language was a purely secular one, without any religious overtones.

Arab socialism appeared against the background of the foregoing trends of thought of early Arab nationalism and Egyptian nationalism, both of which had adopted a secular attitude, with certain differences between them, as we have shown. In the Charter we find the factor of religion replaced by that of common language. It states that: "It is enough that the Arab nation has a common language which creates the unity of thought and mind."[282]

Despite this we find that the thinking of advocates of Arab nationalism in the period of Arab socialism does contain certain non-secular overtones, like the linking of language with religion. 'Adawi writes:

> The unity of religion and language began to take place in the nations from the Gulf to the Ocean, and made them think with a single mentality and enjoy a single culture.[283]

Aly Abdel Qader shows some ambivalence. In one place he tries to show that there was a common origin to the languages of the Middle East before the rise of Islam. Then he stresses the relation between the language and religion:

> Since it interacted with the new Islamic religion the Arabic language gained a written support in the form of...the Koran. The Arabic language provided a means for expressing the meanings of the Koran and the guidance of Heaven. The Koran preserved the language over the generations in its classical form.[284]

Darwazah shows a similar ambivalence. In one place he says the classical language reached the height of its development about one century or more before the Prophet's mission. In another he stresses that the Koran was inspired in Arabic.[285]

Broad generalizations are made about a common language without taking into account the problems previously brought up by the liberal Egyptian nationalists concerning this topic. Arab nationalists overlook the class connotations of the classical vs. colloquial language controversy, and the attempts of the Egyptian nationalists to democratize the language in order to reach the illiterate masses. They content themselves with attacking the colloquial language as a ploy of imperialism, as we have seen. The split between the classical language and the vernacular is caused by widespread illiteracy, and all efforts to erase it are proving to be in vain because of the population explosion. It is only a minority of people who are familiar with the classical language, and under such conditions the call for its use results in elitism.

The crisis caused by illiteracy forces Arab Socialism to seek support - political and religious - in its call for a common language. This is no difficult matter, for classical Arabic, to which it turns for a common language, is the language of the Koran.

Thus, ironically enough, it turns out that the Egyptian nationalist bourgeois took a democratic and secular stand in trying to simplify the language and stress the vernacular. Arab Socialism, on the other hand, because of its call for Arab nationalism, has to stress the classical language of the elite, and in order to face the problems of illiteracy and the cultural isolation between Arab countries, has to seek the support of religion.

Arab Socialists also ignore the differences in dialect between the Arab countries throughout history and at present. Darwazah tries to play down the differences between the dialects in various Arab countries[286] and so does Aly Abdel Qader.[287]

They ignore the possible conflicts that may occur between factors like language and religion. In one place, Darwazah stresses the primacy of language, saying the most important factor of unity is a common language, even if there is no common religion....[288] In another place he uses religion as the basis of unity and glorifies the conquests "under the banner of Arabism and Islam" which spread Arabism to Constantinople, India, China, Andalusia....[289] The only possible unity between these countries was a common religion, as they differed in language. Thus Darwazah shows a contradictory logic, using both traditionalism and secularism.

In manipulating the various factors in order to prove the existance of an "Arab nation," writers sometimes contradict themselves without realizing it, once stressing religion in traditional manner, and another time language, in more secular vein.

By remaining on the level of broad generalization it becomes easier to create the state of mind required for Arab nationalism.

Realizing the existance of all these problems with respect to a common language, some writers tend to de-emphasize the factor of language and turn to a common culture instead,

The differences of local dialects aside, a common language does not necessarily mean a common culture. The trend towards modernization and secularization has led to a cultural isolation between the Arab countries that cannot be bridged by a common classical language. Aisha Abdel Rahman points out that while Egyptians read European books, they are quite isolated from the literature of the other Arab countries though it is written in Arabic.[290]

Zaki Naguib Mahmoud points out that even in the past there was a disconnection between culture and language. Language among the Arabs was not a means for carrying culture, but was culture itself. The greatness of the writer was judged on the basis of his skill in the use of the language, not on the content. Language was a decoration.[291]

When difficulties arise with regard to any factor of the nation, Arab Socialist writers deemphasize it and turn to another factor. In cases of crisis, they may even drop all the factors and use abstractions about the "national personality," without reference to any factors at all. When Arab nationalism faced a crisis after the 1967 defeat, and as a result of the reappearance of writings on the "Egyptian personality," Ismail Sabry Abdalla, the Minister of Planning, came out with a new viewpoint about the continuation of the nation's personality, despite the loss of language. Nationality thus became a total abstraction, disconnected from any of its factors, and permitted an evasion from any confrontation of the factors and the various cultures. He wrote that:

> even though language and culture changed time and again throughout the ages, Egypt kept her 'personality' intact.[292]

Conclusion

The significance of emphasizing the factor of language emanates from its historical context, when Arab nationalism in the 19th century tried to disassociate itself from Islamic Ottoman rule, and replaced the factor of religion with that of language as the basis of the nation.

Unlike Egyptian nationalism, Arab socialism overlooks the limitations of the factor of language stemming from the differences in territory, the strong class connotations because of illiteracy, and the effect of Westernization on culture.

This ignoring of problems, the utilization of generalizations concerning the unity of language, and the occasional regression of writers advocating Arab nationalism to a traditionalist linkage of language with religion, leads us to the conclusion that the aim of Arab socialism here is primarily to create the state of mind required for Arab nationalism, and is therefore quite subjective.

The State

Arab Socialism calls for Arab unity, yet in actual life it has to face the fact that the Arabs are divided into a number of different states. As in the other factors, it turns to the past and tries to paint a picture of a unified state as part of the historical heritage. As an example of Arab unity, Mohamed Emara writes about the brotherly relations and sharing of wealth that the Prophet introduced among his followers and the other emigrants during the Hijra to Medina, in response largely to the call for brotherhood stipulated in the Koran.[293] Despite the existence of different caliphates and political states, and the many conflicts that took place between them, Kharbutly considers that the very fact that they were Islamic is enough to say that they were unified.[294]

'Adawi includes in the framework of Arab unity the various nationalities conquered by the Arabs. He writes:

> The four centuries following the Islamic conquest of the area stretching from the Gulf to the Ocean (610-1050 A.D.), constitute the stage of formation of the Arab nation, which was crowned by political and cultural unity within the natural boundaries of

> this nation. The height of this development in the area was the new meaning gained by the Arab nationality. Arabness was no longer just belonging to an Arab tribe or having Arab ancestry, it now meant everyone who spoke Arabic and adopted the Arab culture.[295]

Darwazah tried to prove the myth of Arab unity by pointing out that there were no taxes on Moslems in the past. If we look at the picture as a whole, however, we still find divisions, for religion was the equivalent of nationality in Islamic thought, and taxes were imposed on non-Moslems. There were also divisions between the different Caliphates that existed simultaneously, ex. the Fatimids in Egypt and the Abbassids in Bagdad; the Fatimids for instance taxed Moslems from other countries not under their rule.[296]

In reality, however, one need only look at a map to see what a large number of different political units, including republics, kingdoms, sheikdoms, emirates, sultanates, imamates...the Arab world is divided into.[297]

Arab Socialism faces a dilemma with regard to the factor of "state," for Arab political unity was affected historically under Islam, as represented in the Caliphate, yet Arab socialism, as we have seen in every factor of the nation, tries to give itself the appearance of secularism. It is not possible to solve this problem of secularism by returning to the pre-Islamic Jahiliya period to seek a common state, so the Islamic term "Caliphate" has been replaced by a more secular-sounding one - "heritage."

This term is not free of difficulties, however, the most important one being that Egyptian nationalism has itself become a part of the ideological "heritage," and is in conflict with Arab Socialism's view of the Islamic heritage.

Egyptian nationalism showed that Islam did not provide a real national unity, that Islamic history reveals conflicts between the different nationalities within the framework of a single Caliphate, and that after a while the Caliphate came to have only an illusory existence, lacking any power. On various occasions, there was a number of Caliphates and political entities coexisting simultaneously. Aly Abdel Razeq shows the history of the Arabs to be one of division into different political units, quite unlike the myth of Arab unity. He writes:

> The Arab countries...included a variety of different tribes and nations, with different dialects, living in distant places, and also different political units, some of them subordinated to the Greek state, and others independent.[298]

Rationalist thought revealed that the history of Islamic unity was in reality the domination of an Arab state over different nations. Aly Abdel Razeq states that the Caliphate was "an Arab state, supporting the rule of the Arabs and defending their interests.... They colonized the other countries."[299]

He shows how under the Abbassids, the Ayyubids and the Mamelukes, the struggle over the Caliphate led to conflicts, and the deposition and murder of kings.[300]

The Caliphate, he said, was not basic to Islam, thus depriving it of its religious foundation.

> We do not find...a proof for those who consider the Caliphate a religious belief.... The Book does not mention the Caliphate, neither does the Sunna, nor the Ijma'. Is there any proof left then in religion aside from the Book, the Sunna and Ijma'?[301]

If we glance at some historical works, we find the idea of Islamic unity little more than a myth. For example, the rise of the Abbassid state was a result of the national Persian revolt against the Arabs, as represented by the Umayyad Caliphate.[302] Under the Abbassid state, it was the Persian nationality that ruled. Islamic culture became Persian in content, Arabic in language. The Persian language held cultural attraction for the Arabs themselves, as they found in it food for thought that they could not find in Arabic. They read it and wrote Arabic literature that combined Arabic rhetoric and Persian meanings. Persian literature had a strong influence on poetry, literature, government, legends and customs. With time the Persian language replaced Arabic, and many of the princes spoke Persian and did not understand Arabic. The renaissance of Persian started in the east of Persia, which was furthest away from the heart of Arabism in Bagdad. The Arabization movement did not have a deep effect on East Persia, and this allowed the first attempts at a renaissance to grow and strengthen in this area.[303]

The Abbassid Caliphate became weak after al-Wathiq, and historians wrote about the imprisonment, murder, torture or dethronement of Caliphs and the limiting of their authority.[304]

In Iraq the Buwayhids held power and did not hesitate to attack the Caliph's person. The Caliph al-Mustakfi was arrested, and when they came to depose him he accepted to step down on the condition that they would not cut off any of his limbs. But his eyes were gouged out, and al-Moti' was named Caliph after him, only to be deposed soon after. The Buwayhids ruled the whole Islamic world in the name of the Caliph, who had no real power (in the 4th and 5th centuries H.).[305]

Describing the fragmentation of the Islamic world, Henry Siegman mentions the Umayyad Caliphate in Spain (in 756, A.D.), the rulership of Ahmad ibn Tulun in Egypt, Palestine and Syria (868 A.D.), the Persian Samanid dynasty (874 A.D.), the Fatimid dynasty in Tunisia, Egypt, Western Arabia, Palestine and Syria (early 10th century A.D.). The Abbasside fell under the domination of the Buwayhids (middle of the 10th century A.D.). The various dynasties in Asia were superseded by the Seljuk Turks. The Fatimids in Egypt were deposed in the 12th century by the Kurd Saladin, who also ruled inland Syria. The successors were deposed by the Mamelukes. In the 13th century the Asian empire was overrun by Mongol invaders. The entire area was again brought together under Ottoman rule in the 16th century, but this too was divided. Lebanon was governed by princes (Ma'anid and Shihabi dynasties). Egypt was governed in practice by Mameluke dynasties, and became virtually autonomous under Mohamed Ali an Albanian Turk in the early 19th century. There were numerous petty dynasties of shaykhs, amirs and imams in the Arabian peninsula. Morocco was under the rule of the 'Alawite dynasty, while Algeria, Tunisia and what is now Libya were ruled by various petty dynasties. As Siegman says, this hardly suggests a tradition of political unity.[306]

Though Arab Socialism seeks a myth about the historical unity of the state and seeks it in the historical heritage, when it comes to the Ottoman Caliphate, it shows an inconsistency by acknowledging the opposition that existed between the Ottomans and nationalism. The Ottoman Caliphate, it admits, was nothing but admonition of the Turks over the other subject nationalities.

'Adawi writes that at first the Arab countries were overjoyed at the conquests of the Moslem Ottomans, and their messengers rushed to congratulate the Ottoman Sultans on the basis that they were a new force able to revive the Islamic Jihad and to spread Islam in Europe. But the Ottoman Turks spoiled this beautiful dream and spread their domination over the Arab world.[307] As for the Egyptian people, they rejected Ottoman imperialism, masked in the name of the Caliphate.[308]

The Charter speaks of "the darkness of the Ottoman conquest."[309] Mohamed Rifaat writes that the Ottoman Turks were not Arabs and had no relation to Koreish or the descendants of the Prophet. They obtained the Caliphate because Turkey was the strongest Islamic state at the time, and dominated the Arab countries and the sacred places.[310] Kharbutly says that the Ottoman rule though Islamic was not Arab.[311] Aly Abdel Qader accuses Turkey of stealing the Caliphate from the Arabs.[312]

It appears that the nationalist movement against the tyranny of the Ottomans has not yet faded from the public's memory, while the truth about the distant past has been entirely forgotten. The illiteracy of the public (over 85%)[313] in the Arab countries is related to this lack of conscious memory about the divisions that existed in the Arab world, and encourages the creation of myths and the use of subjectivity.

While stressing the element of nationality in the case of the Turks, writers give greater importance to the Islamic element when they go further back into history. While condemning the Turks, writers like Adawi, Abdel Qader and Kharbutly praise Saladin, though he was not an Arab, but a Kurd.

This contradictory stand towards Turkey is not in keeping with the views of traditional Arab nationalists like Darwazah, who includes Turkey in Islamic unity. He writes:

> The Arab countries from Algeria to the Basra Gulf were united...under the...Ottoman Turks to whom they were linked by Islamic unity....

> The Arabs did not consider themselves foreigners in the framework of this state but rather associates.[314]

If we try to review Arab socialist thought with regard to the factor of the state and heritage in terms of traditionalism and secularization, we note the following trends.

One trend is very conservative, criticizing the secular heritage left by Egyptian nationalism and defending the Caliphate as one of the basis of religion. Its proponents attack the Kamal Ataturk movement in Turkey which abolished the Ottoman Caliphate. The importance of this way of thinking lies in the fact that its representative is Sheikh Ahmed Hassan al-Baquri, a member of the Moslem Brotherhood, who became a Minister of Waqfs under Nasser. He calls for the Caliphate and attacks the Arab nationalist movement for being against Turkey:

> The Arab leaders in modern times bear much of the blame for destroying the Caliphate...those leaders who urged the Islamic Arab nation to fight the Islamic Caliphate under the banner of the Crusaders in World War I. This foolish action prepared the way for the Caliphate to be mastered by Europe.[315]

He makes the rejection of the Caliphate a sin; and says that with its destruction the Islamic nation returned to the Jahiliyya.[316]

The modern version of the Caliphate is the stress on an integral unity, which is advocated by the Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi. Fahmy Huwaidi writes:

> Unity, according to the Libyan leadership is an integral unity. In the Libyan conference...the

> resolution calls upon the 'Revolution of the Conqueror'...to continue to achieve an integral unity between the countries ready for it.[317]

'Adawi also considers the Caliphate as part of religion:

> This new unity of the Arab nation was consolidated by the governmental system (the Caliphate) set up by the Arabs which lasted six centuries... until it became a basis of their creed.[318]

This traditionalist rend of thought on the Caliphate and political unity is opposed to the ideas of Egyptian nationalism. Aly Abdel Razeq deprived the idea of a single state from any religious support, saying that the cal for a single state is not a religious one, and Islam is a universal religion.[319]

This shows the conflict between Arab nationalism which was non-secular, and Egyptian nationalism which was liberal and secular. Compared to the secular thinking of Egyptian nationalists, this trend of thought under Arab socialism constitutes a regressive step into the traditionalist, religious past.

A second trend is to ignore the facts of history and the conflicts that have taken place between the various nationalities. The aim here is undoubtedly to create the appropriate state of mind for Arab nationalism. Darwazah for instance reduces the importance of political divisions by speaking about them as a mere disturbance of the atmosphere. Of the rise of the Umayyad dynasty he writes: "The atmosphere was disturbed...for a short while, but it soon became clear again."[320] He repeats the same phrase with regard to the rise of the Abbassid dynasty.[321]

The facts of history are ignored in an attempt to create the required state of mind. Arab unity is glorified and represented by historical figures like Saladin. As Pfaff says,

> To give his nationalism a historical dimension, the Arab must turn to Islamic history, for the two are inseparable. But the Islamic history is a history of Muslims, whether Turk, Kurd, Persian, or Arab. To obtain a discrete Arab nationalism, then, the Arab must extol the Islamic past, but identify it as Arab. Suggestive of this style of thought is the Arab's pride in the exploits of Saladin - who was a Muslim Kurd.[322]

When they are faced with the actual facts of history, Arab socialist writers admit the attempt to create a historical illusion. A Syrian, Abd al-Magid al-Qot, wrote the Al-Tali'a magazine criticizing an article by Mohamed Emara and pointed out that the Ayyubids were mercenaries and had tyrannized the Egyptians. In reply Emara admitted the following:

> Saladin the Ayyubid...and his army...were foreign mercenaries. But history and folklore have made Saladin a legend and epic that lived and still lives in the conscience of the Arab; it was sung by the peasant and workers and intellectual; it is sung now by the heroes of Al-Fateh on their return from operations against the Zionist enemy in Palestine, because Saladin's mercenary army was defending the nation from the greater danger, the fear of destruction coming on the heels of the Crusaders.... Because of the need for national unity and Islamic solidarity...we should not speak sharply of the distant past...we should stress the good aspects, and know the circumstances of the darker side.[323]

The conflict between nationalities and the multiplicity of political units is not merely a historical issue, it is still very much alive today. The historical division of the Islamic Caliphate between Bagdad and Cairo still has its effect on the conflicts between the Socialist Baath Party in Bagdad and Nasserism in Cairo. Describing the Baath in Iraq, Mohamed Aly al-Shahari writes:

> Its head was filled with pictures and visions of the ancient struggle between the capital of the Abbassids in Bagdad, and the capital of the Fatimids in Cairo.... The Baath...is trying to make modern Arab history submit to its...will.... Bagdad should once again become the official center of the Arab state, whether under the leadership of the Abbassids or their successors the Baathists.[324]

Using his own peculiar version of historical materialism, al-Shahari considers Cairo as the inevitable center of the Arab world.

> The law of historical development...in keeping with historical materialism...has made it inevitable...that Cairo become - from the time of Mu'iz Li Din Allah al-Fatimi and al-Nasser Salah al-Din till Gamal Abdel Nasser...the capital of the modern Arab state.[325]

In the face of the traditionalist trend there was a rationalist one that tried to give unity a rational basis without any abstractions about the past. It considered nationalism as necessary for civilization. Hassan Saab saw the fulfillment of Arab unity as depending on reason and a creative will, not on nature or thought or metaphysics. Arab unification meant the creation of a better Arab future.[326]

A revival of traditionalism may be noted in the period of crisis following the 1967 defeat, and the attempt to find a basis in the historical heritage to consolidate Arab nationalism. A proof of this crisis may be seen in the fact that Nasserism was forced to admit and accept the national realities, and the necessity of dealing with governments, while in the past it used to deal directly with the "peoples" in the name of Arab nationalism, and ignore the existence of different governments. In the Charter, it is stated that:

> Those who try to attack the idea of Arab unity from its base, taking as proof the differences between the Arab governments, look at matters from a superficial view.[327]

In 1971 Mohamed Hassanein Heikal wrote, "Arab unity or national independence? This was the question that became clear after the second world war".[328]

The return to traditionalism may be seen in an article by Ismail Sabry Abdalla, Minister of State for Planning. He not only returns to the Islamic Heritage, but he also revises the usual stand taken by writers towards Turkey. He glorifies the Ottoman Caliphate and Turkey despite its tyranny, and in order to appear secular, describes it not as Islamic but as an "Arab state",[329] even though in fact it tried to Turkify the subordinate nationalities. As Morroe Berger describes it:

> The chauvinism of the Young Turks disillusioned the Arabs, who then adopted autonomy as their political goal. The Ottomanization policy meant the discouragement of Arabic language and literature, and the imposition of Turkish in administration and education.[330]

The claim that Turkey was Arabized is thus contrary to historical fact. The core of Abdalla's argument is a return to the non-secular stand. Calling Turkey an Arab state is just a means of hiding this Islamic trend.

This constitutes a regression from the stand taken by Egyptian nationalists. According to the well-known writer Al-Aqqad, the 1919 revolution was an independence movement not only against England but also against the Ottoman Caliphate, and stood for a purely Egyptian personality and independence. He praised the nationalist leader Saad Zaghloul for taking this purely Egyptian stand, and contrasted him with the nationalists who preceded him like Mustafa Kamel, who had mistakenly sought Turkish protection from the British.

> The generation of Saad...was closer to true Egyptian nationalism than the preceding generation at the beginning of the British occupation. Saad's generation fought a class of Turks... rulers who monopolized high positions and looked down on the majority of the population. It was natural that he should struggle for Egypt alone and make his nationalist slogan 'Egypt for the Egyptians'.... The generation which followed the occupation did not pursue this course in its nationalism, because it pretended to be wise and thought it could shorten the distance by playing off the British occupation against Turkish authority. It insisted meaninglessly on being under the Ottoman state in its cause which aimed at liberating the nation and achieving independence. It continued in its mistaken path until Saad, following the Great War, put the nation on the correct path once more, and made the slogan again 'Egypt for the Egyptians'.... Ottoman domination and British domination became the same in the view of those seeking independence and calling for freedom.[331]

Conclusion

Arab thought is divided into traditionalist, which relies on religion and the historical heritage in seeking support for Arab nationalism; and modernized, which is linked to Egyptian nationalism.

Arab Socialism, with its lack of ideology, has taken inconsistent and unstable stands. At times it agreed with the traditionalists in its reliance on the historical heritage (which is implicitly Islamic), yet rejected the Ottoman Caliphate, thus drawing closer to secular Egyptian nationalism on this specific point. But it was not consistent in this, for in the period of the crisis of Arab nationalism, it returned to a traditionalist stand, reinstating the Ottoman Caliphate to its place in history. Yet here too, it was not completely at one with traditionalism, for it pictured the Ottoman Caliphate in falsely secular terms, by considering it Arabized.

Despite Arab Socialism's lack of consistency and ideology, one may say that in trying to seek support for Arab nationalism by any means, it takes a basically traditionalist stand, but clothes it with a formal secularization.

This attitude makes it adopt a subjective and selective stand with regard to the unity of the state in history.

If we compare Arab nationalism with Marxism, we find it agrees with Stalin's refusal to make the state a precondition for the nation. Yet the context is different, for Stalin was supporting the self-determination of nations against imperialism, while Arab nationalism deals with already independent national states. As for the modern Soviet writers, they admit that the existence of the state can have an effect on the creation of the nation, at the expense of the tribal condition, but they adopt a flexible stand that can allow for the self-determination of "peoples." The context is different with regard to Arab nationalism, for here there is no overall Arab state to create affiliation to itself, and its creation would face, not a weak tribal situation, but national states having a greater stability than tribes. Thus the agreement between Arab nationalism and Marxism is limited to the Stalinist view of the state - and this from the formal point of view only, for the context is different.

Religion

We have already seen in studying the various factors of the Arab nation, that disagreements center around the interpretation and reinterpretation of the element of religion. It is the axis around which turns the controversy between modernization and traditionalism, as represented in the cultural heritage.

The present section on religion as a factor, will therefore be limited to the question of whether in the opinion of the Egyptian elite, religion is capable of being an integrative factor.

We shall select the relation between Egypt and Libya as a test case, the reason being that here a number of variables may be treated as equals. From the economic point of view in both Egypt and Libya the state controls the main sources of revenue in the country. In Egypt the public sector controls most of the economy, and in Libya the state controls the petroleum industry which is the main source of income. From the political point of view both states are the result of a military coup d'etat but claim to have the support of the masses. Both of them believe in Arab nationalism and have drawn up agreements concerning the formation of a union between them, as a nucleus for a future overall Arab unity. Ideologically speaking, neither of them can be called a traditional autocracy like Saudi Arabia or Jordan, and both call themselves "Arab Socialist."

Where religion is concerned, it was emphasized in Egypt particularly following the 1967 defeat. In the Manifesto of March 30, 1968 the slogan of "common history" was explained in terms of religion once again:

> The Arabs were armed with a divine constitution.... God granted them the honor to launch wars for the spreading of the message.... The Arabs established a civilization based on the ethics of the Koran.[332]

A new religious tone may be noted even in the Arab Socialist Union's Draft Agenda for Political, Ideological and Organizational Action in 1972. It states:

> Our socialism believes in the heavenly religions, and what they include in the way of principles

> and values to guide mankind in all times and places...it does not accept the materialist philosophy, which denies spiritual forces and the need for them in the structure of society.[333]

In speaking of the members of the Arab Socialist Union, it says that their behavior must be in keeping with the principles of these heavenly messages, and that "the apparatus of the political organization and leadership must double their efforts in calling for the fusion of behavior and religious principles."[334]

Religion presents all the necessary solutions and makes one dispense with any earthly ideologies:

> The stable truth, in our opinion, and its origins in the depths of history...in the law of justice and of God makes us believe that we have what will make us dispense with (the beliefs, ideologies and systems found in the world); what we have presents the right scientific solutions to the problems of life, and gives humanity the values, ideas and wisdom that it needs.[335]

Nasser himself had occasionally touched upon religion in the past. He had stated in "The Philosophy of the Revolution,"

> Is it possible for us to ignore the fact that a Moslem world exists to which we are bound by ties that not only are those of religion, but are attested by history.[336]

In an address to the National Assembly in 1964 Nasser had said:

> We did not say that our socialism was materialist ...we did not say that our socialism was Marxist. We did not say we had abandoned religion...nay, we said that our religion was a socialist one, and that in the Middle Ages, Islam carried out the first socialist experiment in the world.[337]

It should be noted, however, that previous to the 1967 defeat there was no emphasis on religion, and the secular writings of Leftists were influential. Abdalla al-Rimawi refused to link nationalism with metaphysics, and called for a rational, scientific attitude.[338] Lutfi al Kholy wrote:

> There is the mistaken idea spread throughout the world that Arab is a synonym for Moslem.... Religion is not the criterion with which we differentiate the Arab from the non-Arab.... This misleading idea springs from the imperialists and Arab reactionaries.[339]

In Libya, Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi states his religious views loudly and openly. The Al-Ahram (9/2/1973) quotes him as saying:

> Religion and nationality rule the movement of history. Despite the importance of the material or economic factor, it does not constitute the primary or only factor in the movement of history.[340]

Using Islam as the ideology of the Libyan revolution, he speaks of its comprehensiveness, and of its embracing the behavior of the individual, the family, the nation and international relations.[341]

The religiosity of the Arab countries has made the Soviets recognize the importance of the religious element, and accept it as a fact of life in the backward countries. R. Ulyanovsky wrote in 1968:

> Religious belief penetrates deeply in the social thought of these countries till now.... These are the facts of life in these countries, and Marxists...must take them into account.[342]

The Soviets even go so far as to send delegates on pilgrimages to Mecca, and try to persuade the Arabs that Moslems have religious freedom in the Soviet Union.[343]

Advocates of Arab nationalism assume that religion represents a cultural unity based on the Islamic legal system. Religion is the basis of legal unity; the shari'a courts were the same in all parts of the Arab world because they were based on Islamic jurisprudence.[344]

What we have seen so far of the various trends of thought shows that the factor of religion cannot be dealt with in such simplified terms and broad generalizations, however.

When Qadhafi began to proclaim his interpretation of Islam in a number of measures which were literal applications of the Islamic shari'a as it was laid down in the 7th century A.D. (ex. punishing thieves by cutting off their hands...), a reaction set in in Egypt, in the form of a polite questioning.

In April 1972 a discussion was held between Qadhafi and some of the leading figures in Egyptian thought, representing various different tendencies. We shall quote some of the opinions and trends expressed in this debate, as they reveal differences in the interpretation of the religious factor.

Qadhafi spoke of the Islamic religion as a universal cause, as a common factor for all. All people should be converted to Islam, and then conflicts would cease. Religion lays down a universal system, that covers relationships, rights and obligations, and regulates the conditions of non-Moslems as well. The Koran is the source of all science, and to prove this point Qadhafi says:

> Who taught us astronomy? In the Arabian Peninsula there are no scientific institutes or technology or research. Who taught us? It came down from heaven.[345]

Qadhafi's way of thinking, which is reminiscent of the Islamic puritanism of the Wahhabi movement, may be understood in the light of the statement he made, "I was a bedouin...I still live in a tent."[346]

Louis Awad deemphasized religion, making it a matter of conscience rather than law, and stressed the importance of the stages of history instead. History, he said should be used only symbolically, not as eternal truths. Tewfik al-Hakim spoke of free interpretation, of opening the door of "ijtihad" in Islam. Ahmed Baha al-Din also spoke of many interpretations in religion. Religion, he said does not stop social conflict, which may be found in all social systems and religions. Hussein Fawzy stressed the element of rationalism, and demanded it in Islam.[347]

Aisha Abdel Rahman rejected the idea of a single Islamic unity, and pointed out the differences between the Islam of the various countries:

> Islam here is different from Islam in Libya or Islam in Maghreb, or Islam in Saudi Arabia. Each understands Islam in a special way.... I attended a congress of Islamic ulemas...we were fifty people, all speaking in the name of Islam. No two of us were alike in thinking, mentality, vision, or attitude towards

> the universe and life. What then is this Islam that we are presenting today?

She pointed out that different foreign cultures have influenced the various countries, nay each country, and each family.

> Foreign schools of thought came to this area... there was an ideological and cultural estrangement between the members of a single generation, even between the children of a single house. One was educated in a French school and knew nothing about Arabic or Islam, and his brother attended an English school and acquired an English culture.

Egypt, she said, had been influenced by various different cultures:

> When I say I am Egyptian it means Egyptian, Arab, Islamic, Pharaonic.... It includes everything because this is my history. I cannot cut it off and throw it out.

She rejected Qadhafi's idea that science can be traced to the Koran:

> Some people want to find all the sciences in the Koran. This is very strange, for there is nothing in it about technology.348

She had written about this topic outside the discussion with Qadhafi, and had criticized this kind of thinking sharply:

> It is laughing at people's minds to find in the Koran all the sciences and modern technology, and call it a modern interpretation of the Koran. The children of this age are not so stupid as to believe that we knew about jet planes from the (Koran).349

Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, the editor-in-chief of the Al-Ahram newspaper which had been the scene of the discussion with Qadhafi, wrote about the divisions of the Arab world into different sects:

> There is an infinite number of creeds and sects ...Sunni, Shiite, Zaidi, Shafei, Alawi, Druze, Mahdi, Khatmi....[350]

The points of difference that appeared in the discussion may be summarized as follows:

Firstly, the theory of a monolithic religion that Qadhafi calls for is countered by that of the freedom of criticism and multiple interpretations, and the independence of science from the Koran.

Secondly, Qadhafi's idea about the unifying effect of Islam and its comprehensiveness is countered by that of the existence of many different types of Islam, and a deemphasis of the unifying role of Islam, on account of the submission of religion to the stage of civilization and to the different foreign influences on the various countries.

If we analyze the discussion from the point of view of its constitution, we find in it the remnant of the intellectuals who contributed to the Egyptian liberal nationalist movement (Tewfik al-Hakim), leftist tendencies (Louis Awad), and Islamic tendencies (Aisha Abdel Rahman who uses the pseudonym Bent al Shatei).

If we analyze the various Egyptian trends objectively we see that the lowest common denominator between them was a call for freedom of religious and rational interpretation. This stand does not differ from that of the movement for the revitalization of Islam led by al-Afghani and Mohamed Abdu at the beginning of the twentieth century during the rise of Arab nationalism. What must be emphasized in the revitalization of Islam is its attempt to adapt medieval Islam to modern civilization. In order to do this it goes back to the source - the Koran, and tries to purge contemporary Islam from the encrustations of tradition.[351]

The stand of these intellectuals does not reach the secularity of the Egyptian nationalist movement which had totally separated religion from politics. The tendency of secular modernization, though it had its roots in the period of the French campaign and Mohamed Ali, achieved an absolute victory in the period of the national independence revolution of 1919, led basically by the Wafd Party. In the words of Hussein Fawzi, former Under-secretary of State in the Ministry of Culture, it showed "no trace of religion or cult."[352] This tendency of Egyptian thought was of modernist, rationalist and liberal democratic inspiration.

Politics were shaped on constitutional, democratic principles. Culture was built on a secular basis. We may give some examples of the modernization trend. Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyed propagated the Aristotelian methods and democracy. Taha Hussein introduced the historical method into the field of religion. Aly Abdel Razeq preached the separation of religion and state. Shibli Shemeil, a Syrian, introduced evolutionism, Salama Mussa called for Fabianism.[353] The list covered law, literature, art, music and other fields of culture. The struggle was not an easy one for these men, most of whom were accused of atheism, and suffered political persecution, but they became the political and cultural elite of the time.[354]

Western writers make note of this liberal, secular trend. Hans Kohn wrote about a "secular, rationalist, middle class consciousness," and that "all religious differences seemed to vanish. Mohammedans and Copts in Egypt fought side by side for a revolution in their political conditions."[355] Amos Perlmutter speaks of the Egyptian nationalists as intellectually Western; "they attempted to integrate nationalism with liberalism."[356]

To sum up, the stand taken by the Egyptian intellectuals in the debate with Qadhafi, was liberal but still Islamic. Its origins can be traced to the movement for the revitalization of Islam, and it was influenced to a limited extent by the ideological liberalism of the Egyptian nationalist movement, despite the fact that the latter's political force has long since been destroyed in Egypt. Its modernizing effect on the Egyptian legal system cannot be overlooked, however.

The meeting point between liberal Egyptian nationalism and Arab socialism is in the confrontation with the revival of Islamic traditionalism represented by Qadhafi. In comparison to the extreme traditionalism of Qadhafi, the Egyptian Arab Socialism looks progressive, but relative to the Egyptian nationalist movement it is a regression to the level of the movement for the revitalization of Islam at the turn of the century.[357]

Qadhafi and the advocates of Arab unity make certain assumptions about Islamic legal unity. In Libya, Qadhafi has attempted to apply the Islamic shari'a in the country's laws, forbidding the sale of liquor, banning nightclubs....[358]

The case is quite different in Egypt. Farhat Ziadeh's book "Lawyers, the Rule of Law, & Liberalism in Egypt," shows that the Egyptian legal system was based on the modernized Western legal system, and that it had become a part of the social structure, and was supported by the lawyers, who constituted the elite that led the Egyptian nationalist movement.

> The rise of lawyers to a dominant position in Egypt and their influence in many aspects of the life of the country during the first half of this century was in essence a facet of the process of westernization that had begun in Egypt with the Napoleonic invasion. The influence of new Western concepts led Egyptian lawyers to propagate Western-born doctrines of constitutionality, rule of law, and progressive nationalism, and moved them toward a liberal outlook on many aspects of national life....
>
> Unification of the millah and national courts were vehemently demanded by progressive lawyers in the face of strong opposition by conservative elements and vested interests....In the matter of reform of the civil law most lawyers seemed to want a new civil code based on positive or comparative law instead of on the shari'ah or traditional religious law.[359]

This reveals the difference between the liberal, Egyptian nationalist movement and the Islamic trends of Arab nationalism. It also raises the question of how the traditionalist legal system represented by Qadhafi can harmonize with the modernized Egyptian legal system within the framework of integral unity that Libya and Egypt are now using as a political slogan.

Another question that shows how the unity of religion is affected by differences in the level of modernization to the point of resulting in a variety of "Islams" rather than a single Islam, is the feminist cause. We have selected this question because it became a social issue and constituted an obstacle in the path of the integral unity advocated by Qadhafi.

A discussion was held on July 5, 1973 between Qadhafi and representatives of the Egyptian feminist movement. Qadhafi proclaimed that the Koran and Islamic shari'a stress the differentiation between male and female. He warned that the trend in the Arab world of women's working in all fields like European women would lead to disintegration, as it did in the West.

The statements made by the Egyptian women showed a rejection of this type of Islam. One women, Naguiba Abdel Rahman stated that women want to prove themselves through education and work. She inquired about the role women would play in the unified state - a question revealing the anxiety felt about Islamic traditionalism. Leila Takla challenged Qadhafi's stand, saying that history is on the side of women, and she implied opposition to integral unity, by proposing that each region should run its own affairs independently.

This discussion undoubtedly revealed the anxiety Egyptians felt about the extreme traditionalism of Qadhafi. A Libyan girl student brought to the meeting by Qadhafi commented that the Egyptian people showed a sensitivity concerning the projected union.

In order to fulfil his dreams of integral unity, Qadhafi seemed to be relying on providing financial incentives, for he proclaimed, in the name of the Libyan nation, that "the Libyan people believe in unity, and are prepared to sacrifice their wealth."[360]

The attitude shown by the Egyptian women in the discussion is the same as that adopted by Egyptian liberalism in the 1919 revolution, as expressed by the "liberator" of Egyptian women, Qassem Amin; and forms part of the Egyptian liberal tradition. It was further advanced by the 1952 revolution when the state undertook the obligation of providing jobs for all female as well as male university graduates.

Conclusion

The attitude of Arab socialism with regard to the factor of religion has regressed from the secularism of Egyptian liberal nationalism, and become similar to that of the period of the revitalization of Islam, the Islamic liberalism of the period of emergence of Arab nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century.

It is this Islamic liberalism which made the Soviet Marxists change their views and accept religion as one of the realities of the Third World.

Despite its regression, however, Arab Socialism in Egypt has not reached the level of Qadhafi's Islamic primitivism. This difference constituted a problem that had to be faced if a workable union was to be achieved between the two countries, and it could not be solved by slogans about the unity of religion, as there is a variety of "Islams" rather than one.

National Character

The topic of national character is related to a number of areas, like history, culture, literature, arts, folklore.... Studies on this subject tend to concentrate on a narrow portion of the field, like Sayed Eweis's book on the idea of immortality and the soul in the life of modern Egyptians and its relation to the Pharaonic culture. In order to speak authoritatively on the Arab national character, one would need to base himself on comparative studies of the character of the various Arab countries, but what actually happens is that the topic is dealt with on an impressionistic basis.

Here we shall give a few illustrations of the following:

1. How the elite representing the Egyptian nationalist movement viewed the Egyptian national character.
2. How the advocates of Arab nationalism view the Arab national character.

During the emergence of Egyptian nationalism, writers adopted a scientific, objective attitude, and frankly admitted the shortcomings of the Egyptian national character. A good example here is Lutfi al-Sayyed. In diagnosing the maladies of the Egyptian character, he made use of the traditional songs and sayings of the people. He wrote:

> Utter submission and passivity resulted almost in a deification of government officials.... Out of fear or from the desire to integrate themselves with authority, people effaced themselves until they became nothing; there was no sense of honour and dignity...each expected the one lower than him to submit to him...(The word) ma'laish - 'never mind'...turned the virtue of forgiveness and toleration into a vice.... People used the expression not to forgive others but to forgive themselves....(It revealed) a deep weakness in the face of evil. Forgiveness and toleration...seemed to be rooted in a kind of cowardice.... Egyptians tended to have a low view of themselves and also of others...feeling of inferiority.[361]

The excuse he gave for this was that the general level of morality in a society deteriorates with autocratic rule, and this is what had existed in Egypt throughout history. A series of foreign governors had taught the Egyptians to be ever on the defensive, although in their hearts they might curse their rulers, they must show their loyalty in order to survive.

> This habit of two-faced behaviour was handed down from father to son.... Freedom of thought never bloomed...moral courage was stifled.[362]

Just as the ruler lorded it over those under him, the man who had no other power tyrannized his wife and children. The spirit of oppression..permeated every individual.[363]

The spirit of public morality in Egypt needed to be changed, but Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyed felt that this change could only take place gradually. Proper education would recreate the habits of freedom to replace those of servitude.[364]

This was reminiscent of the late 19th century leader Al-Afghani who painted a picture of submission to tyranny, and tried to awaken the Egyptians to a sense of dignity and freedom:

> You Egyptian people were born under slavery, and bred under tyranny. Centuries have passed and you bore the burden of conquerors, your governments imposed injustice and tyranny and humiliation on you, and you were patient, even accepting. They bled you of your livelihood and the food you gathered with the sweat of your brow, using the ...whip, and you remained asleep. If there is any blood in your veins, and any nerves in your heads that feel dignity and fervour, you would not accept this humiliation and misery.... You have passed through the hands of Hyksos,... Greeks, Persians, Romans, Arabs, Kurds, Mamelukes, French, and Alawite and all of them tore your skins with...their greed, and crushed your bones with their tyranny, and you remained like a stone ...without feeling or voice. Wake up from your sleep. Shake off the dust of stupidity and indolence. Live like the other nations, free and happy, or die like...martyrs.[365]

At a later stage in the development of the national movement (in 1936), Abbas al-'Aqqad still admitted the shortcomings of the people, but blamed them on imperialism. The submissiveness of the Egyptian to foreign conquerors was pictured as a kind of dissent. In form it was not nationalistic, but in content it was revolutionary.

> The Egyptians were no different from all other nations in ancient times...they did not care who ruled over them, whether natives or foreigners, as they were robbed and oppressed in either case. They tolerated the ruler until he exceeded the limits of their endurance, and then revolted against him and conspired with his enemies, whether these were foreign or natives. The idea of nationalism in the modern sense of the word did not appear until the idea of government by right and in the interest of the governed came into being, and the idea of government by the conqueror, by the force of money and arms disappeared. Humanity has been slow in inventing democracy and the idea of nationalism.[366]

This trait of "patience" and submissiveness is also mentioned by a present-day social scientist working in the National Institute of Social Research, Dr. Sayyed Eweis (in 1971).[367]

During the period of Egyptian nationalism, the emphasis was on the Egyptian national character, not the Arab. Any mention of the Arabs revealed no sense of pride in belonging to them.

Taha Hussein wrote (in 1928) that the Koran tells about the Arabs' roughness, their godlessness, hypocrisy and lack of refined feelings.[368]

Zaki Naguib Mahmoud holds till today that the vast majority in Arab society belong intellectually to the agrarian, bedouin, clan and tribal mentality, that cultural life is still in the stage of magic, and life does not differ greatly from that of primitive man.[369]

When advocates of Arab nationalism speak of the Arab character, they base it on the ancient tribal condition and limit it to the Arabian Peninsula. The reason for this is that admission of the existence of ancient civilizations and their evolution, and their differing degrees of modernization, would lead to a recognition of the differences of the various national characters, and would not be conducive to unity.

It was thus necessary to create an abstract image of the Arab personality, of the noble nomad. 'Adawi, a modern writer, gives a glowing picture of the pride, courage, generosity, freedom, lack of submissiveness, the vengefulness, the bravery, the refined feelings, imaginative poetry...of the Arab nomad.[370]

The element of subjectivity is preponderant here, for the aim of such an abstract picture is to create a state of mind that has little to do with actual history.

As Sylvia Haim points out, the term "Arab" is used in a derogatory sense by Egyptians, and denotes a shiftless nomad to be looked upon with contempt.[371] N. Keddie also points out that in Arab countries for centuries the word "Arab" had the connotation of "desert bedouin," and was often a pejorative term.[372]

Accounts given by old historians are more in keeping with Taha Hussein's views than with those of Arab nationalists. Ibn Khaldun (14th century) mentioned the barbarism of the Arabs, their roughness and pride. Nomadic life, he said, engenders the love of personal feuds and indifference to authority, and the habit of appropriating whatever is in sight regardless of the rights of others. The Arab nomads developed social and psychological attitudes preventing them from creating a civilization, and driving them to destroy the civilization they may dominate.[373] Al-Jabarti (18th century) tells of how the Arab nomads used to steal even sacred objects and attack the caravans of pilgrims on their way to Mecca.[374]

As the abstract picture of the noble nomad was insufficient to create the required state of mind, Arab nationalism resorted to a non-secular path, seeking real pride in the civilizing mission of Islam.

Ibrahim Goma'a glorifies the Jihad and the Arab conquerors for their love of freedom, justice, generosity, humaneness, egalitarianism, feeling of responsibility, lack of greed, lack of racial or religious fanaticism....[375] Darwazah speaks of the Arab countries as the birthplace of the prophets, and of the Islamic state as the ideal human state, setting up justice, virtue.... He quotes the Koran to the effect that the Arabs are the best nation if they keep the faith.[376] Abdel Latif Sharara speaks of the Arab character as humanitarian, and tending to learn from experience rather than being interested in theories and philosophy.[377] Aly Ahmed Abdel Qader states that Islam knows no discrimination, and is in keeping with humanitarian nationalism.[378] Ibrahim Ahmed Razqana says that the Arabs set up their state and civilization on the basis of the Koranic ethics. The Koran taught them not to lie or spy or be conceited, or extravagant, or hypocritical....[379]

Aly Abdel Qader also links pride with language, and this is poetic and romantic in style of expression.[380] This may seem secular, but one must not forget that the language is linked with Islam, which unified the languages.

At times present day writers show that they are not unaware of historical accounts about the Arabs. Louis Awad quotes al-Jabarti's description of the condition of Cairenes after the Cairo revolution was put down during the days of the Napoleonic expedition:

> If one wants to flee to the farthest place and be safe...from his kind, he cannot find a way, especially from the accursed Arabs, who are the vilest of races and the greatest calamity fallen upon people.[381]

Writings are sometimes not exactly flattering of the Arabs. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal mentions the characteristic of talking a lot and doing nothing,[382] and the instinctiveness and fiery emotions:

> In a moment we are angry and in a moment we calm down...we threaten each other with weapons, and after awhile we embrace...each other as though nothing had happened.[383]

Nasser himself once told the Syrians, during the 1963 Unity talks: "The easiest thing for you is making revolutions...shooting...."[384]

Malak Girgis, who recently carried out a study of the Arabs in the area south of Kena and Aswan, between the Nile Valley and the Red Sea, describes them as not caring for authority, individualistic, and despising any work except the herding of sheep or camels. It has been impossible to get them to work in the mines and other industries, because they cling to their desert life, and consider it sacred. If ever they do work, they stop as soon as they have saved enough money to buy a camel and a few sheep, and return to the desert. Very few actually work in the companies of the area, and these are blamed by their tribes for having abandoned their families and been drawn to a life of humiliation and stability.[385]

The Lebanese writer Emile Bustani uses a psychological analysis of Arab nationalism. He writes:

> In the years when the Arab States were going through their political childhood, the British treated them in a manner (which would)...lead inevitably to the creation of phobias and neuroses among them....
> Today they are politically adolescent.... They quarrel among themselves, they are sensitive and easily hurt, they are proud and sometimes perverse....
> There is still a tendency in the West to look down upon the Arabs.... Arabs incline to think that all Westerners take this view, whether or not they do in fact. Perhaps this feeling among the Arabs has become a sort of racial complex.[386]

Albert Hourani also considers Arabs to be lacking in self-confidence, and speaks of:

> a need to justify themselves, which might manifest itself equally in an uneasy defensive clinging to traditions or in the eagerness to abandon them and accept the manners and thoughts of the Western world....
> The victim of power can never forget his inferior status.... He is tempted to sudden and violent self-assertion, to prove - first of all to himself - that he is something.[387]

Conclusion

The extolling of the "national character" reveals that one of the characteristics of nationalism is pride. If pride is excessive, however, as in some Arab nationalist writings, it opens the door to psychological explanations of nationalism.

The differences in viewpoint concerning the national character are associated with the stand towards Arab or Egyptian nationalism. This difference reveals the conflict between the two types of nationalism, as well as the subjectivity of the attitude towards this factor, and its relation to the creation of a nationalist state of mind.

The Arab nationalist writings show the same inclination towards traditionalism in this factor as we found in the preceding ones.

Subjective Factor: Will

In our theoretical analysis we have seen that the Soviets link the element of will and self-determination with the type of system. The will of the people is supported if it brings society closer to socialism. If it does not, then it is ignored. As for the Western writers, they tie the will to democracy - the expression of the will of the masses, and a greater degree of their participation in national affairs. Here we shall deal with the will according to the Western meaning, i.e. freedom and participation of the masses.

The advocates of Arab socialism claim the support of the masses for the idea of Arab nationalism. This raises certain questions: Is there any objective means of proving this claim? Is it the will of the whole nation or of certain strata? How is this will expressed? In answering these questions we shall deal with the attitude of the various strata: the bourgeoisie and intellectuals, the workers, and the peasants, as seen in their organizations; and the clues given in the press about public opinion. At the outset it is necessary to point out that political parties are banned by law, a kind of single party system has been established, and the press is owned by this apparatus.

Advocates of Arab socialism accuse the bourgeoisie of opposing Arab nationalism. Our previous analysis shows that the national liberation movement of 1919 aimed at an independent Egyptian identity, and was linked with modernization and secularization. This was necessary if the Egyptian identity was to break its links with traditionalism, Islamic and Arab.

As for Arab Socialism, despite its claims of being progressive, its call for Arab nationalism has made it resort to traditional, non-secular ideas, as we saw in the previous factors, with the aim of creating a state of mind favorable to Arab nationalism.

In other words, Arab Socialism found itself necessarily in ideological opposition to the liberal heritage left by the Egyptian nationalist movement. In view of the fact that political parties have been abolished, and there is therefore no organized means of expression, this opposition does not take place in the political arena. It takes place in the field of ideology, centering around modernization and traditionalism. It can also be seen in social change, as illustrated by the legal system.

The ideological remnants left by the Egyptian nationalist attitude towards Arabism and Islamism does give some basis to the Arab Socialists' accusation that the bourgeoisie opposes Arab nationalism.

When in a "socialist" society, however, Egyptian nationalism is linked with the "bourgeoisie," this constitutes a kind of accusation, and aims at banning such ideas, and creating the required "Arab" state of mind.

In actual fact, when the bourgeoisie and intellectuals advocated Egyptian nationalism they were not taking a class stand, for the independence movement was a truly national one, which expressed the will of the whole nation. One should also note that the economic position of the bourgeoisie has always been weak, and that it deteriorated sharply after the nationalizations. The banning of political parties had deprived it, as well as all other classes of the population, of the possibility of taking part in political activity.

Arab Socialists claim that the workers and peasants support Arab nationalism, and that they constitute 50% of the Arab Socialist Union, which advocates the Arab nationalist cause, along with other workers' and peasants' organizations.

Certain reservations need to be made about these claims, however, for during the periods of crisis that faced the regime and made it resort to short-lived waves of autocriticism, the Arab socialists themselves revealed some facts that need to be taken into account.

With regard to whether the Arab Socialist Union really represents the workers and peasants and expresses their views, Fathi Ismail stated at a discussion in the Arab Socialist Union concerning its electoral program in 1968:

> Where are the workers in the Socialist Union? They constituted 15% of the leaderships...as opposed to 15,000 spectators sitting, not representing any workers...the workers did not have great faith in the Socialist Union.[388]

In 1971 revealing statistics were gathered from a sample of the members of the General National Congress which numbered 564. It was found that among the representatives of the "workers and peasants" in this sample there were:

> one former minister, one former army major-general, 4 chairmen of boards of directors of companies, 25 Directors of companies, banks... and various government departments, one university president, and one vice-president, one professor in an institute of higher studies, 117 clerks, accountants and pharmacists, 29 heads of sections of departments and of accounting departments, two journalists, one radio director, one muezzin, and one butcher.[389]

At a meeting of the Working Committee, in 1972, Dr. Ahmed Kamal Abul Magd pointed out that the real power was concentrated in the hands of the authorities:

> It was the authorities who established the political apparatus..., the revolutionary council remained the real center of power after the creation of the constitutional institutions.[390]

The same theme appeared in an article in 1972 by Rifaat al-Sa'id who wrote that decisions were made by authorities, not popular action.[391]

The report of the First Secretary of the Central Committee admitted that the public was apathetic and did not have any say in decision-making:

> The reasons of the apathy...of a large part of the population lie in their feeling that they cannot play an effective role in public life through the organization, either because the present framework does not accommodate them or give them enough chance to express their opinion. Or because they believed that such expression - when it takes place - has no...effect on the course of events, and cannot therefore be considered as a form of participation.[392]

Dr. Mohamed al-Khafif compared the Arab Socialist Union to a "club" rather than a political party:

> Some...see it not as a party or a front or an alliance, but merely a political club...in my opinion just an assemblage of individuals.[393]

One may ask whether the trade unions express the views of the workers any more than the Arab Socialist Union does. Here again, according to Abdel Hadi Nasef, all control is centered in the hands of the one party, and the masses have no faith in the trade union movement:

> One of the most important causes of the degeneration of the trade union movement in the 50's and remnants of which exist today, was the almost total control that the centers of power in the Liberation Rally and the National Union were able to impose on it.... They adopted as proteges

> certain opportunistic trade union elements, and fought and tried to destroy the honest, sincere ones.... They helped their proteges to acquire material gains...and in the name of security, used the state apparatus to eliminate many of the good elements from the trade union movement as a whole.[394]

Attiyya al-Sirafi pointed out the

> ...lack of independence of the trade unions... because of the interference of the Ministry of Labor in the most private affairs of the trade unions, permitted by the stipulations of the new law.[395]

There was no internal democracy in the trade unions according to the carpenter Al-Hag Abdel 'Adhim Serhan (formerly president of the Carpenters' Cooperative Union):

> The leadership of trade unions has become hereditary like the monarchic system...I believe...they should be removed and free democratic elections should be held without interference by the authorities.[396]

Abdel Moneim al-Ghazali repeated the same complaints about lack of democracy, the public's loss of faith in the trade unions, and the inactivity of the trade union movement:

> There is a formal increase in the membership of trade unions...but without any trade union activity or struggle.... This formal growth has led to the spread of bureaucracy in trade unions...democracy has disappeared, and the people have lost their faith in trade unions and treat the leaders as they do government officials.[397]

The same question may be asked with regards to the agricultural cooperatives: do they represent the peasants? Dr. Aly al-Nueigi and Dr. Galal Ragab show that they are run by the authorities:

> Egyptian peasants have lost the right to participate in planning their own affairs... the cooperatives have fallen under the hand of the government apparatus...which imposes its control on the boards of the cooperatives....
>
> The multiplicity of controlling apparatuses and quarters responsible for them make the boards of directors...formal.... This has led to depriving the agricultural cooperatives of their popular character.[398]

Government control of the cooperatives has resulted in bureaucracy and the peasants' loss of faith in the cooperatives, according to Fathi Abdel Fattah:

> Before 1970, the cooperatives were run by supervisors, without any boards of directors.... These mistakes led to results contrary to those hoped for from government supervision of cooperatives. Theoretically, it should have meant the government's providing the cooperatives with technical facilities and machines to improve their effectiveness.... As a result of bureaucracy...the supervision...was transformed into fetters on cooperative work. This made many of the peasants lose faith in cooperatives, and the enthusiasm required to make the cooperatives work.[399]

Thus, if we take as a criterion the existence of political and popular organizations as a means of expression of the public's opinion and will, there is no objective proof to show that the Egyptian public supports the idea of Arab nationalism.

It should be pointed out here, that the Egyptian masses suffer from widespread illiteracy, and problems of sheer survival. As compared to the required intake of 3000 calories and 58 grams of animal proteins per day, the average Egyptian in 1962 had an intake of only 2530 calories (84% of necessary amount), and 12 grams of animal proteins (20.7%) per day.[400] This limits the capacity of the people to show "will" relating to anything lying outside their immediate daily problems, and at the most to problems within the borders of their own country.

The remaining source of "will" is the charismatic leadership.[401] Ibrahim Goma'a, an advocate of Arab nationalism, links the Arab nationalist cause bluntly to charismatic leadership, saying that:

> Abdel Nasser emerged from the unknown to lead the Arab nation.... Every Arab is Abdel Nasser. And every Arab will remain Abdel Nasser for ever. The Arab nation has realized its being under his leadership.[402]

Aly Ahmed Abdelkader writes of Nasser's charismatic leadership and states that "Arab nationalism is identified with Gamal Abdel Nasser."[403]

Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, the spokesman of Nasserism, spoke frankly following the crisis of Syria's secession from the Syrian-Egyptian union, saying that the union depended on the "hero," not the public.

> ...the danger...facing the union set up in 1958 because of its reliance basically on the personality of the 'hero'.[404]

This was said with the aim of using the public as a scapegoat because it had not reached the proper level of consciousness.

> The Arab people in Egypt had not yet reached a stage of complete readiness for Arab unity.[405]

In 1973 Heikal repeated this theme, frankly tracing Arab nationalism to Nasser himself rather than to the will of the people.

> The Arab nationalist movement was not organized or linked by a single idea...it was directly influenced by the personality of a single man, subject, in the final analysis, to the fate of all men...in many cases, the authorities acted ...instead of the popular will....[406]

Nasser himself spoke of his own mission in mystical terms.

> A wandering character in quest for a hero to bring him to life...collapsed...on the borders of our country enjoining us to make a move since no one but us could do it so well.[407]

If the source of nationalism depends on the leader's will, the question remains of how it is possible to transfer this will to the public, in the absence of any effective organizations.

The advocates of Arab nationalism play an important role in creating the required "Arab" state of mind. As we have previously seen, Louis Awad wrote about how history has been distorted in order to wipe out all traces of the Egyptian personality and replace it with an Arab one.

Munif Razzaz overlooks the objective factors of the nation and stresses the subjective feeling of belonging:

> The nation is not limited by any of these factors, but first and foremost by a feeling of a group of people that they belong to a single nation.[408]

Michel Aflaq of the Syrian Baath Party, sees nationalism as "love...an identity as intimate as one's name or physiognomy."[409] Ibrahim Goma'a speaks of the metaphysical power given to the area by God, and of the masses' instinctive feeling of Arab nationalism.[410]

Mustafa al-Shihabi in his lectures on Arab nationalism to the 1959 class of the Higher Institute of Arabic Studies, said:

> Arab nationalism is a belief. It has 2 constituent elements, from the ideological point of view:
> 1. the feeling and...belief that the Arab peoples ...are one nation....
> 2. the will to work in order to realize that nation's political, economic, cultural and social goals.[411]

Ibrahim Goma'a also speaks of the element of the "will" of the people:

> The current of unity joined the Arabs of the north in Syria and those of the South in Egypt, with a pure Arab will of the people.[412]

Some Arab nationalists use metaphysical, mystical language. According to Aly Ahmad Abdelkader, it is the subjective-idealistic aspect of nationalism that looms largest in Arab writings, and colors their prose with spiritual conceptions.[413] In a speech before the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union on the second anniversary of Nasser's death, President Anwar al-Sadat stated that "Arab unity is destiny."[414] Michel Aflaq also speaks of "destiny...God's will."[415] Ibrahim Goma'a repeats the same theme of Arab unity as an "eternal aim...an inevitable destiny."[416]

Mustafa Tiba repeats the same mystical theme of inevitability, but gives it a Marxist form:

> Since the U.A.R. moved from the nationalist stage to the socialist one, Arab unity has acquired a socialist content, and has become a 'historical inevitability', drawing its inevitability from that of socialism.[417]

In addition to this propaganda for Arab nationalism, no expression of dissent is allowed. Dissenters can be brought to court, accused of being agents of imperialism, of the bourgeoisie, and even of the Soviets (at the time when the Marxists were being persecuted).

Ibrahim Saad al-Din accuses the bourgeoisie of regionalism.[418] Ibrahim Goma'a accuses imperialism of fighting the unity of language and culture among the Arabs.[419] Darwazah makes similar accusations:

> Enemies of Arabism, regionalists, imperialists ...and their agents...called for the discarding of the classical language, and the use of the colloquial.... This would evolve into a different language, and the bond between Egypt and Arabism would be broken.[420]

A remaining question is whether this subjectivity, and the "will" from above, have succeeded. As we saw in the section on Nationalism and the Bourgeois State, the idea of Egyptian nationalism reappeared following the 1967 defeat, in the press. Though the articles were few in number, they provide a clue to public opinion, because ordinarily such ideas may not be expressed at all. They are only likely to appear at a time of crisis when they can no longer be ignored.

Ibrahim Saad al-Din points out that isolation from Arabism is found not only among the bourgeois but also among some nationalists.[421] There is also an isolationist trend apparent among Egypt's youth.[422]

Conclusion

There is no objective proof of the Egyptian public's spontaneous support of Arab Nationalism through institutions and popular organizations, or of any active interest rather than mere submissiveness.

The predominant factor seems to be a political one originating from above, rather than a social movement of the masses. The main factor is the will of the charismatic leader, who uses the traditionalist idea of "destiny," and the authority of the state to create an Arab state of mind and an Arab identity, in opposition to the one built up by Egyptian nationalism.

3. Class Struggle and Cohesion

In dealing with the topic of class struggle vs cohesion, we shall take the year 1961 as a starting point.

As we have seen in the factor of "Economy", the nationalization laws of July, 1961 enlarged the public sector until it eventually included about 90% of the economy.

This does not mean that the class struggle only began at this time, however, for ever since 1952 the state had started to take a number of gradual economic measures having class implications.

In a speech to the National Assembly on March 25, 1964, Nasser stated:

> Successive blows were aimed at exploitation, starting with the Agrarian Reform, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the Egyptianizations, the nationalization of banks, insurance companies and the cotton trade; the glorious July decrees, those of August, 1963 and of March, 1964 which ended the problem of compensations for the nationalizations....[423]

The nationalization of foreign capital was called "Egyptianization" as an expression of the nationalist aspect of these measures, while their socialist essence was only implied. As Manfred Halpern wrote, "it was easy to miss the socialist features that were connected even with the most dramatic nationalist event."[424]

The significance of the year 1961 lies in the extent and comprehensiveness of the nationalization of Egyptian capital in addition to foreign capital. This raised the question of the socialist ideology, and demanded the adoption of some stand with regard to the class struggle or national cohesion.

Here we shall give a brief summary of Arab socialist thought with regard to the class struggle.

Analyzing the characteristics of Arab Socialism, the Minister Kamal Rifaat said that it "aims at serving all sections of society without trying to make socialist thought a means of serving only one element - for example, the State." The character of the state, he said, is that of the whole people, "...laborers, peasants, white-collar workers, intellectuals - whoever works for wages and takes part in social development."[425]

Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Nasser's spokesman, wrote that with regard to social classes and the class struggle, while Communism offers the solution of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which means "the suppression of other classes by one class in a complete and definitive fashion ." Arab socialism calls for "a process of dissolving the contradictions of class in the framework of a national union within which revolutionary interaction will occur; the transformation of the society into a single class within which individuals' positions will vary in accordance with their work, totally devoid of any class barriers that might arise to bar any individual's progress or block his road."[426]

This is related to the meaning given to property, he continues. While Communism considers every owner an exploiter, Arab socialism distinguishes between two kinds of property: first, "property representing labor, and this lies in an area that does not allow the individual to exploit and dominate others...here we are dealing with a right that must be broadened to reach the greatest possible number of those who are deprived of it;" second, the property of the exploiter, who must not be killed but who must simply be stripped of the weapons that enable him to exploit others, and then be admitted into the new society. While Communism believes in "expropriation", Arab socialism prefers "compensation" for nationalized properties, "Private property is a right, indeed an objective, provided that it be kept in a framework that prevents exploitation."[427]

The Charter also speaks of a peaceful solution to the class struggle and the dissolving of differences:

> Democracy, even in its literal sense, is the power of the people...the power of the whole people.... The inevitable and natural struggle between classes cannot be ignored or denied, but its solution should be peaceful within the national framework and by means of dissolving the differences between the classes.[428]

Despite these statements about the alliance of the popular working forces, and national cohesion, this does not negate the existence of the class struggle.

This class struggle may be divided into two types:

Firstly, a struggle against the classes outside the alliance, i.e., the big landowners and the exploiting capitalists. Here, the state faced a contradiction between the requirements of national cohesion during the fight for independence, and those of the class struggle.

In "The Philosophy of the Revolution," Nasser wrote that Egypt was passing through two revolutions at once, a political one aimed at freeing the country from foreign domination, and a social one - a class conflict that would end in social justice for all. The circumstances of these two revolutions were conflicting and contradictory.

> Unity, solidarity, and the cooperation of all elements of the nation and self-denial and self-sacrifice on the part of the individual to ensure the safety, prosperity and integrity of the motherland are the fundamental factors for the success of a political revolution. (On the other hand)...dissension and discord among both classes and individuals...form the foundation of social upheaval.[429]

Secondly, an internal contradiction within the framework of the alliance between the forces constituting it, i.e. basically the workers, peasants, national bourgeoisie and intellectuals.

At the Khartoum Conference of March 15-22, 1970, an Egyptian delegate Mufid Shahab, member of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, spoke of them as secondary non-antagonistic contradictions, and said that the conflict resulting from them would be solved in a peaceful manner.

> The contradictions between the forces in the alliance are only secondary and nonantagonistic, and the conflicts arising from them are solved peacefully, while the contradiction with the classes opposed to socialism is basic and antagonistic. The revolution dealt with it by breaking the alliance with these enemy forces and isolating them from the political organization and from positions of power.[430]

Cohesion is thus explained as meaning the existence of secondary, nonantagonistic contradictions but not basic, antagonistic ones. To understand nationalism in these terms, it becomes necessary to find out whether the contradictions (whose existence is inevitable) are of a nonantagonistic, secondary type or of a sharp, antagohistic one.

The degree of contradiction depends on the interaction between the following factors:

1. An objective one, which is the stage of history (contradiction is greater at times of rapid social change);

2. a subjective one: the consciousness about the existing degree of contradiction.

One needs to take into consideration that these two factors do not necessarily coincide. Sometimes the objective situation is ripe, but there is a "false consciousness," and at other times the state of mind is ripe, but it remains latent because of suppression.

These considerations make it necessary to examine the stand of the Egyptian Left as this will reveal the truth about the claim that cohesion exists.

On March 11, 1965, the underground Communist movement surfaced and was granted the freedom to publish the news of its own dissolution.[431] This was referred to by one of the Egyptian Marxists, Lutfi al-Kholy, in a study submitted to a Conference of Arab Socialists in Algeria in June, 1967. He said that the Communist organizations had put an end to their own independent existence, that their members had joined the Arab Socialist Union as individuals committed to the Charter and its leadership. This, he said, was a solution limited to the Egyptian case and circumstances.[432]

Since this time began the close relationship between the Egyptian Left and the military regime. This might be taken to imply that the Left accepted the principle of national cohesion, and of collaboration with the single party system with a view to solving the secondary contradictions in a peaceful manner. One should note, however, that this step came as a conclusion to efforts made by Nasserism ever since 1958 to achieve national cohesion - by means of coercion.

According to Anouar Abdel Malek, in September, 1958,

> Anwar al-Sadat sent for a leader of the Egyptian Communist Party, a prominent figure in the literary world, and for seven consecutive hours endeavoured to persuade him to bring his party into the National Union, otherwise, he said, the Communists had to understand that they would undergo the fate of the Moslem Brotherhood, which meant destruction by way of torture.[433]

The Al-Tali'a magazine became the mouthpiece of Leftist thought[434] though there was no recognition of a Leftist organization. We shall thus rely on the Tali'a for our analysis of Leftist trends of thought.

The Egyptian Marxists justified the dissolution of their organization with rationalizations about the historical stage and type of nationalism. They spoke of the "non-capitalist path" of the development through which Arab Socialism was passing and the amalgamation of the national liberation movement with the socialist revolutionary movement, and the "marriage" between the goals of the liberation movement and the social revolution with its "socialist horizons,"[435] (despite the weakness of the proletariat).

National cohesion was strengthened by a reduction in the struggle for power, for the Leftists accepted the possibility of fusion without any proletarian leadership. In fact it occurred under a revolutionary petty bourgeois leadership.[436]

In keeping with this logic, the Egyptian Marxists redefined the military coup d'état and stated that its description as a coup d'état rather than a revolution constituted an outdated liberal stand.[437] Any clinging to the old idea about coup d'états now constituted "ideological rigidity" for national liberation revolutions start out with military coups rather than mass movement.[438]

By ideological rigidity, the Marxists meant the stand taken by the Egyptian Communist movement in 1958-1959, when it resisted the efforts of Sadat and described the military regime as bourgeois. In the words of Anouar Abdel Malek:

> The Marxist analyses oscillated between branding the government the representative of the national middle class (...the DMNL) or labeling it the instrument of the monopolist upper middle class (Egyptian Communist Party).[439]

The formula of alliance between the military and the Left persisted and only became shaky following the 1967 defeat. The situation worsened and reached its climax during the succession crisis following the demise of Nasser. Though it was a crisis in the relations among the military themselves, it spread to the Leftists as a consequence. The centers of power of the military elite were divided between two apparatuses: first, the state apparatus controlled by the President of the Republic, and second, the political organization, controlled by his rivals.

The conflict naturally ended with the victory of the first and the liquidation of his rivals in view of the weakness of the merely formal political organization (as we have shown in the factor of "Will"). This conflict between the military elite automatically resulted in purges of their rivals' base, i.e. in the political organization, which the Leftists had joined in 1965 in the name of national cohesion. This power struggle was followed by an ideological struggle. Without understanding the framework of the power struggle, however, the ideological struggle appears to be nothing but contradictions.

Here we shall give a summary of the ideology or rationalization given by both sides concerning national cohesion.

The General Secretariate of the Socialist Union was reconstituted by a decree of the President of the Republic and President of the Arab Socialist Union. In showing the viewpoint of the authorities, we shall rely on the documents issued by the Socialist Union, the report of the General Secretariate (approved by the Central Committee) and the draft political, ideological and organizational Work Agenda. These confirm the reliance of nationalism on cohesion, and reject the theme of class struggle. The principle is "total commitment to national unity".[440]

The alliance embodies the "sacred national unity" and the principle of alliance "rejects any inevitable correlation between carrying out the social revolution and resorting to violent, bloody means."[441]

In application of the principle of "opening up to the public"[442] proclaimed by the President of the Republic, the organization would be a "pulpit open to the Masses."[443] With regard to the freedom of parties, however, the Secretary General stated that the idea was "strange...contradicting all Charters."[444]

As for the Left, it noted that national unity meant "accusing socialists of hindering social development."[445] It also noted that the Work Agenda had refused to recognize the existence of classes in Egyptian society, and that the term "alliance of classes" had been replaced by "alliance of forces of the working people."[446]

The Left also changed its position with regard to the Arab Socialist Union. It was now considered not a party, association or alliance, but merely a "political platform" a gathering of individuals,[447] not classes or "forces." An alliance should mean an alliance between political organizations, each representing certain classes, and this was not the case. The Left called timidly for the creation of parties or independent political organizations within the framework of an alliance, on the basis that this was the only way to transform the Arab Socialist Union into a real alliance.[448]

As for the idea of national cohesion, its failure was obvious, and the Leftists replaced it with the term "differentiation," a milder version of "class struggle." This provided a rationalization for the freedom to form political organizations or "political clubs."[449]

As for the military authorities, they kept the term "alliance" unchanged. The report of the General Secretariate criticized the "attempts to interpret the Charter in ways that do not take into account the real Egyptian and Arab situation, but rely on imported doctrines and ideologies not in keeping with the personal characteristics of our people."

Yet this uniform ideological terminology did not mean anything, for despite talk of unity, first the feudalists and capitalists were eliminated from the alliance, and later the Leftists.

As for the Left, its non-acceptance of the idea of national cohesion necessitated new ideological rationalization and this was provided by a redefinition of the type of the regime and its historical stage.

The military regime was now considered as bourgeois. In an article entitled "With the Bourgeoisie of the Third World and the Non-Capitalist Path" it was stated that the bourgeoisie found that the best means of striking the big bourgeoisie was to form a public sector that would inherit the big bourgeoisie and bear the burden of breaking the vicious circle of poverty. This could be accomplished by the public sector's taking over the industries which lead to development but do not make a profit (and may even incur losses). The profitable enterprises would be left to the private sector.

The regime supported an "opening up" - to a limited extent - towards the Socialist countries in order to be able to face the intrigues of imperialism. It became an instrument of the bourgeoisie, raising the banner of socialism on the condition that it be a local socialism.

In the absence of political organizations in which the classes would be differentiated, progressive conditions were used to suppress the class consciousness of the workers and make it difficult for them to acquire such consciousness. The alliance with the workers and peasants just made appearances look different from the reality. The real leadership lay in the hands of the bourgeoisie, who ruled from behind the scenes.[450]

It no longer constituted "ideological rigidity" to describe the military regime as a "coup d'état," and as "bourgeois." The comprehensive nationalizations now were considered "bourgeois" measures though they had previously been looked upon as characteristic of the "non-capitalist path" and of the "marriage" with socialist goals.

Since every objective measure was open to contradictory interpretations, only one criterion remained for determining national cohesion - the criterion of power. This was expressed by Ibrahim Saad al-Din who wrote:

> The question is one of power. It is necessary to form a new power for the purpose of building a socialist model. The army is a tool of power representing the social strata whose influence it destroyed.[451]

Since the question was one of power, the Left found that it needed to demand democracy. In addition to the call for the freedom to form parties, even though within the framework of the alliance, it spoke of

> the continuous violations of human rights and dignity, and the authorities' legitimizing these violations so that they have become the general rule. A group of bureaucratic centers of force have crystallized in the state, covering the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie with revolutionary garb and socialist slogans. The cause can be traced to the nature of the political regime, the democratic climate, and the relationship between the people and the army.[452]

An analysis of the Leftist stand shows an ideological division within its ranks. Now it demanded freedom and parties, though previously it had supported dictatorship, describing it as representing the non-capitalist stage of development and the "marriage" with socialism. Sensing this lack of consistency, one member expressed his fear of the new line of the freedom of parties, saying:

> the idea of forming parties constitutes a grave danger to the workers, peasants and national and progressive forces. Where are the Charters of the Revolution? They are gone...and have lost their power of coercion.[453]

A Leftist who had proposed freedom of parties explained that he was only suggesting political organizations within the framework of the alliance.[454]

Though this demand for democracy has appeared among the Leftists only recently and because of the power struggle, this dissident voice is an expression of the inconsistency which faces Marxism in the Middle East. In the name of the class struggle and the elimination of reactionary classes and thought, and of pushing the march of history towards socialism, Marxists believe in the one-party system, or clothe their own opinions in the name of the government of the people, yet when they face a crisis as a result of the power struggle, they call for democracy.

The power struggle ended with purges in the Socialist Union, and most of the Marxists who had voiced the above opinions were ousted. This also meant they were not allowed to work in the Egyptian press.[455]

The relationship between Arab Socialism and the Egyptian Left was expressed by the delegate of the Syrian Baath Party Al-Sayyed Abdel Karim Zahhour, during the unity talks between Egypt, Syria and Iraq, in the meeting held on April 7, 1963:

> When in power, revolutionary movements...find that they have to review many of their former ideas, for during the popular struggle they say they want democracy, the bourgeois kind of democracy, in order to obtain the best conditions to work under; but when they are in power, they find this bourgeois democracy a serious danger to the revolution, and elections would mean a setback to the revolution.[456]

In defining its relation to the Syrian people, the Socialist Baath wanted to monopolize power and refused to grant the people democracy. Speaking of the elections to parliament, Zahhour stated:

> We shall make up the lists (of candidates) and tell the people, whether you like it or not, these are your representatives.[457]

On the level of the relation between the Syrian Baath and Arab Socialism in Egypt, however, the Baath demanded freedom of parties. In the meeting of March 19, 1963, in the unity talks, Michel Aflaq stated:

> From the theoretical point of view only, it is possible to say that a plurality of nationalist socialist parties is a guarantee of a certain amount of political freedom.... No matter how democratic the single party may be, it is by its nature a kind of coercion...a kind of limitation of freedom.[458]

In contrast, the President of the U.A.R. (Nasser) repeated his views on the unity of nationalist currents, the abolition of political organizations and the necessity of amalgamating them into a single political organization.

> As all the forces will fight the union in an attempt to separate, there must be a unity of the nationalist current...to fight the enemies of the union.... There should no longer be a Baath and a Socialist Union.[459]

He stated that the real difference during the Egyptian-Syrian union in 1958-1961 that led to secession was not caused by ideology: "In my opinion there are no ideological differences...and no differences in application."[461]

Conclusion

The slogan of national unity does not deny the existence of a class struggle, in fact Arab Socialism has used it in establishing an alliance of some classes in order to liquidate other classes.

The meaning of national unity is limited to the form of the struggle and its peaceful character, on account of the strength of the authorities and their mobilization of the forces of the alliance with a view to weakening the class opposition.

The slogan of national unity is used by the authorities in order to contain and lead the forces in the alliance. It can be used in the struggle for power, even when there are no basic ideological differences, as in the case of Arab Socialism and the Egyptian Left, and between Arab Socialism in Egypt and that in other Arab countries. At the most, the authorities will allow only democratic centralism within the framework of an alliance or single party.

The establishment of socialism does not necessarily mean the attainment of cohesion. The struggle simply takes a new form - that of a demand for democracy, and participation in decision-making, not within the framework of the national unity or democratic centralism within the party, but in a multiplicity of parties. This is the new trend followed by the Egyptian Left and the various Arab socialisms in their relationship with the ruling Arab Socialism. This is a democratic tendency in keeping with the new Leftist trends in Europe (ex. Garaudy in France).

In comparing the socialist applications in Egypt and the Soviet Union, at least formally Arab Socialism (the military regime) follows Khrushchev's theory of the "all people's state" rather than Stalin's theory of the intensification of the class struggle, though both have the same aim of controlling power.

As for the Communists (not in power), they call for democracy (as far as they can). Ossowski's theory about rebels using the class struggle theme and rulers using a functionalist approach should thus not be limited to the relation between bourgeois authorities and rebels of another class. It can also apply to socialist countries where the rebels are socialists outside government demanding the right to participate in decision-making and to give their own interpretation of Marxism.

4. Nationalism and Internationalism

The idea of nationalism and internationalism has two bases in Marxist thought. The first is related to the unity of the working class in the political struggle against the common enemy; and the second is ideological, nationalism being considered a characteristic of the bourgeois stage of history while internationalism characterises the proletariat and is related to the socialist stage of history.

Where Arab nationalism is concerned, Khrushchev rejected it on the basis of the abovesaid theoretical framework. As he said during his visit to Cairo in 1964, "there is only one unity, the unity of the working class."[462] In his speech at Aswan, he pointed out,

> Certain speakers have addressed us here. I have listened to their words: We are Arabs, we are Arabs, unite, Arabs, and so on. If you take this position, it might seem that we Russians have nothing to do here among you Arabs: should we pack up and go home? We are not Arabs.[463]

In reply Nasser asked him the following questions:

> You say there is only one unity, the unity of the working class. How then can you explain the fact that the Soviet Union and China are quarrelling - and these are the two countries where the working class rules? You remember, Mr. Chairman, how you used to tell me about the war. You call it the Great Patriotic War. Why? Why don't you call it the Great Ideological War?464

This discussion revealed a conflict in the interpretations given by Marxism and by Arab socialism to Arab nationalism.

Marxism starts out with the actual existence of national states in the Middle East, and considers that the means of transcending them is internationalism and the unity of the working class, within the framework of Marxism. This provides a place for the Russian working class alongside the Arab one.

Arab socialism, on the other hand, starts out with the assumption that the Arab nation has an independent existence, its own history and factors. This is in keeping with the state of mind that it is trying to mold, (as mentioned in the Objective and Subjective Factors of the Nation).

It does not deny the existence of national states, but (and this is what interests us in the present section) it does not feel the need to use the idea of an international working class, in order to achieve unity, for Arab nationalism exists per se and is sufficient for the purpose.

An Arab writer who has provided an abstract formula expressing the logic of Arab socialism (which accepts socialism yet rejects the Marxist internationalism of the working class), is Abdulla al-Rimawi, formerly Secretary General of the Baath Party in Jordan. He can be considered to represent the viewpoint of both the socialist Baath and the Egyptian Arab socialism, for, as Abu Jaber points out, he was expelled from the Baath by the National Command for his support of Nasserism.[465]

Rimawi considers both nationalism and Marxism as full-fledged ideologies, and gives them equal weight.[466] This expresses the essence of the Nasser-Khrushchev discussion, in which Arab socialism rejects the internationalism of the working class and substitutes Arab nationalism for it.

The question now is, if we start with the actual existence of national states, does Arab nationalism achieve the required internationalization, as Marxism would.

There is no doubt that, in trying to transcend the existing national states, Arab socialism does claim a sort of internationalism under the guise of Arab nationalism. It differs from Marxism, however, in that it does not mention the internationalism of the working class as such. The idea of unity is addressed directly to the peoples of the Arab nation.

On August 17, 1962 Heikal wrote that "Cairo does not consider its ruling regime as a mere government, but first and foremost as an Arab revolutionary movement. And

Cairo will not give up its natural right to contact directly the Arab peoples in all parts of the Arab nation."[467]

On March 9, 1962 he wrote that "social currents in any Arab country do not respect the boundaries of these countries. The doors are opened to them by the unity of the Arab nation."[468]

This unity did not include "reactionary forces-feudalist forces intriguing against us," however, according to a speech by Nasser on February 21, 1965.[469]

It also excluded the Communists. Heikal stated that the union between Egypt and Syria "struck a blow at Communist penetration of the area."[470]

As a sign of how successful this blow had been, Heikal described Khaled Bekdash, the leader of the Syrian Communist Party, as a "wandering Jew. He rode a big Czech plane which set out from Prague, but finding no place in the Middle East that would accept him, it tookhim back to Prague."[471]

Under the slogan of "unity of revolutionary forces" in 1967, however, this internationalism opened up to admit the "progressive forces, the nationalist forces, the revolutionary forces."[472]

The Charter did not hesitate to mention the Egyptian policy of intervention.

> The U.A.R. believes itself to be a part of the Arab nation, and it must transmit its cause and principles so that they are at the service of every Arab citizen. One should not hesitate

> a single second before the old, outworn argument which may consider this as intervention in the affairs of others.[473]

When Lebanon complained to the U.N. Security Council that the revolution in Lebanon was a result of infiltration from the U.A.R., Nasser contented himself with accusing the Lebanese leaders of exaggeration and of turning an internal affair into an international one.[474]

On April 17, 1959, Nasser theorized the right of intervention in Iraq, once in the name of defence against the Iraqi threat ("If a danger collects within Iraq and gathers its forces in order to pounce on the Arab countries....") and another time in the name of protecting Iraq's independence from "the Communist control over Qassem" ("We are an Arab nation and therefore every Arab state has the right to protect Iraq's independence".)[475]

In order to understand slogans, one should not content oneself with the words alone. It is necessary to examine the attitude of the Left to find out whether the slogans have a real international content that transcends the national states under the guise of Arab nationalism, or whether they are only revolutionary slogans used by the military regime in putting pressure on the traditionalist Arab governments with a view to reaching a compromise in the Yemeni conflict (see the section on Types of Nationalism).

The Left began its relationship with the military regime on the basis of the abolition of its own organization.

Thus the military guaranteed the ineffectiveness of the Left, except insofar as it served the purposes of the authorities. When the slogan of the "unity of revolutionary forces" was adopted, the question came up of who was to be included as revolutionaries. The Left was apprehensive that the authorities would use a personal criterion, and decree who was to be considered as progressive and who as reactionary.[476]

There were also objective reasons which made it difficult to determine the revolutionary forces, namely the reinstitution of the utopian theory permitting the jumping of historical stages and the passing from national liberation straight into a stage having "socialist horizons." This was to be achieved through the action of the authorities, though the bourgeoisie and proletariat were both weak.

As a result, the "revolutionary forces" came from "various class and ideological sources," and this made it difficult to define them from the point of view of class or ideology. An alternative criterion could have been provided by the active political struggle, but this was not possible since there was no freedom of association. It thus became inevitable that the selection of "revolutionaries" would be left to the ruling authorities.[477]

Conclusion

Arab socialism accepts internationalism only insofar as it helps to overcome the boundaries of the individual

Arab national states and leads to the larger unit specified by Arab nationalism. But it rejects the Marxist idea of an international working class on a world-wide scale.

In its relationship to Arab countries, Arab socialism started out with an aggressive interventionist policy (which preceded the Brezhnev doctrine). At first this was aimed against both reactionaries and the Left, and the Arab peoples were addressed directly while their governments were ignored. During the period of the "unity of revolutionary forces" the door was opened for the participation of the Left, but under the control of the authorities, who determined who was to be considered as "revolutionary."

The "revolutionary forces" came from varied class and ideological backgrounds as a result of the theory of jumping historical stages. Nationalism and internationalism are thus imposed from above, and depend entirely on the actions of the authorities.

5. Types of Nationalism

In the theoretical part of the present study we dealt with the "Type" of Nationalism from two angles, firstly its linkage to the stages of history in Marxist thought, and secondly, its defining of the characteristics of nationalism and the ruling ideology. We also examined the relation between nationalism and ideology.

We shall divide the present section into two parts:

1. The "stage of history" of Arab nationalism, and the

changes that have occurred in Marxist thought concerning the stages of history.

2. The relation between socialist ideology and nationalism.

Stage of History

As we have seen, in the opinion of Western scholars, the "type" of nationalism consists of its characteristics, while in Marxist thought nationalism is linked to the bourgeois stage of history. Its bourgeois nature can thus be considered a characteristic defining its type in Western terms, and determining its historical stage in Marxist terms.

In the opinion of Arab Socialism in Egypt, Arab nationalism is of a Socialist type. Mustafa Tiba writes,

> The 23 July Revolution, by passing into the stage of socialism, has changed the meaning of Arab unity.... It has become a personification of the movement of change, and its tool. The fusion of the social struggle and the nationalist struggle has placed the question of unity in the hands of leaders from among the people.[478]

The main line of the modern Arab revolution is "liberation, socialism, unity", according to Hamdy Abdel Gawwad.[479]

The claims of Arab Socialism are open to debate, however, from the point of view of the Egyptian Left. The viewpoints expressed by Leftists may be divided into three stages:

First: At the time of the military coup d'état, Leftists described it as bourgeois.

Second: In the period following the amalgamation of the Marxists with the Socialist Union, and the dissolution of the Communist underground organization, the Tali'a magazine wrote that there are three trends in defining the present stage of the revolution:

1. It is a national democratic stage, and the Egyptian revolution has not gone beyond this stage, which is of a bourgeois nature, despite the socialist measures taken. There is an interpenetration and marriage with the socialist stage which will succeed it.
2. The revolution is at present passing through a transitional stage from capitalism to socialism, and is developing along the "non-capitalist" path, despite the weakness of the working class, and its strong attraction to the middle and petty bourgeois strata.
3. The revolution has entered the stage of the socialist revolution since July 1961.[480]

Along this same line, it was stated in October 1967 that "in the bitter struggles for the building of a national economy, more than one country concluded that socialism was the ideal solution."[481]

In December 1966, an article entitled "Struggle Against Imperialism in Africa in the Present Stage" stated that fusion had taken place between the tasks and aims of the national liberation revolution and the social revolution "with socialist horizons."[482]

Third: In the period following the succession crisis, the

Left changed its viewpoint and described this stage as bourgeois.

Thus in the first and third stages, the Leftists described the Egyptian revolution as bourgeois (as shown in the section on Class Struggle and Cohesion). As for the second stage, a variety of different viewpoints were put forth, ignoring Marx's stages of history, where the backward countries were concerned, bypassing the capitalist path and jumping from a backward stage straight into socialism.[483] The jumping of the capitalist stage logically leads to an interpenetration of the still undeveloped bourgeois stage and the succeeding socialist one.

In comparing the three aforementioned trends within the second stage, we find that they are similar, differences between them being merely a matter of emphasis. The first trend, which stresses the bourgeois aspect allows for interpenetration and "marriage" with the succeeding socialist stage. Though the third trend confirms the socialist aspect, its terms are not decisive, as it considers the stage to be one of social revolution with "socialist horizons." The second trend takes a passive stand, that the stage is a "transitional" one going along the "non-capitalist" path of development.

When in the last stage the Leftists described Arab Socialism as bourgeois, they found it necessary to criticize the idea of the fusion of stages. At the Khartoum Conference in 1970, Michel Kamel stated that the Arab peoples had not yet completed the stage of the national democratic revolution, and criticized those Arab thinkers who wipe out the specific characteristics of the two stages of the revolution and merge them arbitrarily into a single stage, under the slogan of "fusion". The extreme left, he said, wanted to bypass a whole historical period and imagined it possible to do so without completing the required characteristics. This trend reigned among the "petty bourgeoisie" with its utopian nature and its characteristic hastiness and impatience.[484] Yet his criticism of the "fusion" between the stages did not prevent him from speaking of the "interpenetration" and "marriage" between them. This criticism of the idea of "fusion" aimed mainly at preparing the ground for a redefinition of Arab socialism as bourgeois, without any mixing with socialism. Yet the replacement of "fusion" by "interpenetration" is not likely to put an end to conflicts in thought.

These differences, which are treated by the Tali'a as merely ideological, are in fact linked to the power struggle and to the new forms of struggle that appear under socialism between those in power and those outside it (as shown in the Section on Class Struggle and Cohesion).

The modification of the Marxist stages of history (the core of historical materialism), by jumping the capitalist stage in the developing countries, and the idea of the interpenetration of stages, contains an element of realism, for it is in keeping with the requirements of the underdeveloped countries; but it also includes a utopian element.

This development in Marxist thought has opened the door to ideological differences relying basically on subjective interpretations concerning the nature of the stage and the extent of interpenetration between the stages.

More important, the theory of stages has degenerated from its theoretical position in historical materialism, to a mere rationalization of new forms of struggle around the need for democracy. It is thus no longer possible to use the theory of stages as a basis for determining the "type" of Arab nationalism until it has been isolated from and stripped of its usages in this struggle.

Regardless of the political uses to which the theory of stages has been put by Leftists in the struggle for power, and of the description of the military regime and the measures it adopts once as socialist and another time as bourgeois, the one common factor that has not changed is the non-democratic aspect of this type of nationalism.

Relation Between Socialist Ideology and Nationalism

We have already examined the changes in Marxist thought, which at one time gave priority to socialist ideology rather than nationalism (Marx), at another to nationalism instead of ideology (Lenin, in relation to the colonies; and Khrushchev, with regard to the developing countries); or adopted a flexible compromise between the two positions (Stalin and Brezhnev).

Here we shall examine the viewpoint of Arab Socialism with regards to the relation between Arab nationalism and socialist ideology. The year 1961 will serve as a starting point, because, following the comprehensive nationalization measures it became necessary to formulate an Arab Socialist ideology.

We shall divide the evolution of the relationship between Arab nationalism and ideology into four stages, starting from 1961.

First Period: "Unity of goal." The Charter stated that "the stage of social revolution developed this superficial meaning of Arab unity and pushed it a step forward into a stage where a common goal became the form of unity."[485] Unity of goal, in the Charter, means the inevitability of a socialist solution.[486] This formula may seem to strengthen Arab unity by providing it with ideological homogeneity, but it does not answer the question concerning the priority of socialist ideology over unity.

An examination of Nasser's speeches, statements and tendencies shown in the press, however, reveal without a doubt that at the time Arab Socialism was first formulated, priority was given to socialist ideology rather than nationalism. In a speech given on July 5, 1964, Nasser stated that the slogan of a common goal constituted the basis for the establishment of unity.[487] His spokesman Heikal wrote on August 17, 1962:

> It is no use clinging to the external appearance of the unity of rank, at the expense of the unity of goal.... The transition to socialism was not the result of the unity of rank. On the contrary, following the transition, the mirage of unity was dissipated.[488]

In clear terms Heikal stated "We do not need Arab solidarity. We need complete separation, if we really live the revolution."[489]

The Arab League, as an expression of the Arab unity of rank, was considered useless as an implement of United Arab Republic policy.[490] Under the title "Alone in the Struggle" Heikal wrote that socialism should precede unity and prepare the way for it.[491]

In summary, during the period of formation of Arab socialism, priority was given to socialist ideology rather than Arab nationalism. One should note that the priority of socialism here is limited to the relative relationship between socialism and nationalism. Socialism does not have internationalist implications (as shown in the section on Nationalism and Internationalism).

Second Period: "Summit meetings and Joint Arab Action"

In 1963 the idea of the priority of socialist ideology over nationalism began to weaken somewhat, as Arab socialism held summit meetings with the traditionalist countries concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On December 23, 1963 Nasser sent an urgent invitation to the Arab kings and heads of state to hold a summit meeting in Cairo, with a view to facing the Israeli threat.[492]

Regardless of the circumstances, this represented a regression from the viewpoint of revolutionary ideology. Instead of priority being given to socialism, it was now placed in a secondary position. Arab unity was now considered to be "absolute", while the unity of goal was "relative."[493]

In a speech given on February 22, 1966, Nasser explained, "We wanted to set up a unity of Arab action for the sake of Palestine. For this we compromised with Arab reaction and said that each one is responsible for his own country, and that there should be coexistence between the various systems."[494]

The purpose here is not to discuss whether the summit meetings aimed at taking a step with a view to confronting Israel, as claimed, or whether the Israel question was used as a tactic for uncovering the reactionaries (as stated in an article by Mustafa Tiba in March 1967),[495] or whether there was another reason, not declared during this period - namely an attempt to end Egypt's involvement in Yemen. (It was only eight years later that the real reason was revealed, and Heikal wrote "Egypt used the spirit of the summit meetings to end the war in Yemen").[496]

What interests us here is that the arguments reveal that where there is a tendency to stress nationalism and a policy of summit meetings, less priority is placed on socialist ideology.

Third Period: "Unity of Revolutionary Forces":

On February 22, 1967, Nasser announced the failure of "unity of action" and a new slogan was coined, namely "unity of revolutionary forces."[497]

The Leftists tried to stretch this slogan to mean a priority on socialist ideology rather than nationalism. They changed the slogan from "unity of revolutionary forces" to "unity of progressive forces," (the term "progressive" as used in Egypt being the equivalent of Leftist.) They considered this slogan to be a legitimate offspring of the previous "unity of goal."

The stretching of the revolutionary slogan resulted in a polarization of forces. The question was no longer one of "we are all Arabs" but of differentiating theoretically and practically between "progressive Arabs confronting reactionary Arabs allied with imperialism."[498]

The importance of this explanation lies in the attempt of the Left to push the ruling military regime as far as possible by giving an exaggerated interpretation to its slogans that was not originally intended.

In order to evaluate the extent of priority given to the socialist ideology over the idea of nationalism in the Arab Socialist thinking of this period, we shall deal with the subject from two angles.

1. An examination of Nasser's speech at a meeting held with the representatives of the Arab Lawyers' Congress, concerning the unity of revolutionary forces.
2. The objective conditions of this period.

Regarding the first point we shall quote Nasser's own words as certain statements are of particular interest:

> Many people ask themselves why I do not personally intervene in this matter (the unity of revolutionary forces). The truth is that it is impossible for me to intervene.... It is the Arab revolutionaries and Arab nationalists themselves who can reach a formula.... We do not need to insist on amalgamation...there will not be a unity of Arab revolutionary forces in the Arab nation unless there is a unity of forces within each country.

He then pointed out that in the application of socialism, each country has its own special conditions; for instance in Lebanon there is no need for an exchange control.[499]

The ideological intent of these words was to reach a compromise and lead to an amalgamation between Arab revolutionaries and Arab nationalists. It was not limited to the Leftist progressive forces, as interpreted by the Egyptian Marxists. Socialism was explained in a manner allowing for differences in the conditions of its application. There was even an acceptance of economic freedom.

Moreover, the idea of the amalgamation of parties which had previously appeared during the Syrian-Egyptian union, during the unity talks following the secession, and in the period of the "unity of goal," was not mentioned. The impression given was one of non-interference. This constituted a partial truce with the traditionalist rulers on the basis that there would no longer be "revolutionary" interference in other countries.

As for the second point - the circumstances prevailing in this period, the summit meetings took place at the time of Egypt's involvement in Yemen in a futile military attempt to make a society, still in the stage of tribalism, evolve through Egyptian intervention. This coincided with the new trends of Marxist thought which reinstitute utopian views by accepting the jumping of stages and their interpenetration through foreign assistance.

The summit meetings were held in the name of the Israeli conflict yet the basic issue of the meetings at Jiddah and Harad, was the Yemeni question. The situation had become so critical that Nasser threatened to "strike the base of aggression in Saudi Arabia."[500]

Heikal wrote that "there appears to be no hope of a quick, peaceful solution at present on the borders of Yemen and Saudi Arabia."[501]

When Nasser decided to postpone the summit meetings, he gave as a reason the fact that they had taken no action with regard to Plaestine.[502] Thus the Arab-Israeli conflict was used only as an apparent reason for the summit meetings.

If we compare the third period with that of the summit meetings we find that it laid greater emphasis on socialist ideology, but in comparison with the first period of "unity of goal" it did not. It compromised not only with nationalists but also with the Arab reactionaries, by not intervening to aid the revolutionary movements in the various countries.

While the Leftists say that the slogan of "unity of progressive forces" is the offspring of the previous "unity of goal," it would be more correct to say it was an offspring of both the "unity of goal" and the summit meetings i.e. of both Arab socialist ideology and nationalism.

The stand of Arab socialism was not governed by belief in socialism or nationalism. Socialism was merely used to put pressure on the traditionalist countries, with the aim of reaching a compromise and allowing Egypt to extricate herself from her "little Vietnam."

This aim was not achieved, however, and circumstances led to an increased emphasis on the socialist ideology at the expense of nationalism.

Fourth Period: "Nationalism and the 1967 Defeat":

The defeat of 1967 led to a greater priority being given to nationalism at the expense of socialist ideology. The rapidity of events led to a shifting from one extreme stand to the other. Heikal expressed this by saying:

> In this period of danger for the whole Arab nation there was a mixing between the reasons for unity and the Arab revolution, which cannot ignore the social contradictions within the Arab world.[503]

At the time of the Khartoum congress Heikal said it "proved that the common destiny of the Arab nation as a whole was stronger than the causes of social contradiction within some of them."[504]

The deemphasizing of ideology in the interest of nationalism did not mean a strengthening of Arab nationalism i.e. Arab unity, however. On the contrary, the trend that emerged was one of respect for the national sovereignty of the Arab countries. Heikal wrote that "Egypt faces independent governments in the Arab world, and it is important that we deal with them as independent governments."[505]

The Arab League, previously attacked during the prevalence of the slogan of "unity of goal," was now praised as "an objective, reasonable solution to the biggest Arab contradictions."[506]

There was also a renewed respect for the theory of stages, and a withdrawal from the utopianism of modern Marxists which allowed the jumping of stages by means of external assistance - the basis for the socialist military intervention in Yemen. Heikal wrote:

> The movement of history cannot be pushed beyond the factors of natural evolution, even though much can be done to assist the natural evolution of these factors.[507]

This is in keeping with the new policy of non-intervention. It negates the policy of "adventures by night" which had led to a deepening of divisions, to use Heikal's terms. This trend was not a stable one, however, for praise of the Khartoum congress was linked to the decisions taken concerning financial support, which enabled the Arab countries open to economic blockade "to breathe and to fight."[508]

On the other hand, when the Egyptian military regime accepted the ceasefire by a unilateral decision and was criticized for so doing by the other military regimes and by the Palestinian resistance, Arab nationalism came under attack:

> The rapprochement of the leaderships of the Arab nation in this stage of development was superficial...an alliance of necessity.[509]

Arab socialism thus turns to Arab nationalism when it is in its interest (in case of defeat and the need for financial assistance); or withdraws from it whenever it touches upon its unilateral decision-making power. The same applies, as we have shown above, when the socialist ideology is emphasized at the expense of nationalism.

Conclusion

In the relationship between the socialist ideology and nationalism, our study shows that the relative weight of nationalism has steadily increased at the expense of the socialist ideology, the basic reason being the weakness stemming from the wars of Yemen and of 1967.

This applies only to the relative internal relationship between the two factors, however. In the final analysis the nationalist factor meant not so much Arab unity as a respect for the national sovereignty of each state. And the ideological factor meant not so much unity as a policy of non-intervention.

Thus, contrary to all the rhetorical statements about Arab nationalism, the separatist tendency began to appear in both the fields of Arab nationalism and revolutionary socialism. The extent of this separatist trend becomes very clear when contrasted with the aggressiveness and internationalization of Arab nationalism (shown in the Section on Nationalism and Internationalism).

This separatism coincides with the reappearance of the Egyptian personality and the compromising attitude adopted by the military towards it, (as previously shown in the section on the Bourgeoisie and the Nation).

The viewpoint of the Egyptian military regime, i.e. Arab Socialism, centers around the consolidation of power. Its attitude towards nationalism is unstable and depends on its usefulness in fulfilling the interests of the ruling authorities in obtaining financial support, or in being able to make unilateral decisions. It turns towards the socialist ideology only insofar as this serves its interests in the struggle for power.

Despite the tactical aspect of this fluctuating policy, the ideological discussions used in rationalizing the change in slogans, reveals the existence of a conflict between nationalism and the socialist ideology. Socialist ideology has degenerated to a levelof merely providing justifications for policy.

The conflict between the socialist ideology and nationalism revealed by the study of changes in Arab socialist thought is quite similar in its results to the conflict which Soviet Marxism has experienced in its views on the Third World. This shows that modern Marxism has been influenced by the problems of the Third World.

6. Relations between Marxism and Arab Socialism

In the theoretical part of our study we found that the long-range strategy of the Soviets is the consolidation of Marxism, and that their support of the national liberation movement in the stage of imperialism, and of the "non-Marxist socialisms" (to use Ulyanovsky's words) in the socialist stage is a tactic open to change.

In the present section we shall discuss the relationship between Arab socialism and Marxism from the former's point of view. We shall focus on the period in which the relationship between the two became strained in 1971-72, for though the period preceding it already contained the seeds of the crisis, it is open to equivocal interpretation. This vagueness is increased by the fact that merely tactical policies are usually pictured as being strategic and stable.

We shall also make a comparison between the two periods in order to distinguish between the decisive factors in the situation and those of secondary importance.

To understand the views of Arab Socialism on the relationship with the Soviets it is necessary to examine its attitude towards Neocolonialism, for the relation with the Soviets represents an alternative to Neocolonialism in Arab Socialist thought.

There is no comprehensive Arab theory on neocolonialism, its definition, characteristics and goals. Articles and statements, however, though political rather than theoretical, do reveal the Arab nationalist state of mind. The main ideas may be summarized as follows:

Firstly: economic relations with the West following independence;

The achievement of political independence may constitute the beginning of a new type of dependency on imperialism based on a domination of the vital sectors in the national economy. For this reason imperialism granted some colonies independence in the expectation that this would be the basis of a new relationship that would preserve its influence for a long time.[510]

Secondly: Western Aid with Conditions:

On February 22, 1967 Nasser told the story of Egypt's relationship with Washington, and the importing of U.S. arms in 1953:

> They agreed to give us arms, but on the condition that they would send an American mission to train us in the use of the arms. We were still trying to get rid of the British. We had a complex about British missions, and said we would never accept an American mission.[511]

As for the gifts of wheat, he said,

> They asked us to stop producing rockets, to give the Americans the right of inspection, and to stop enlarging the army. From that time they started to say 'We are giving you wheat and economizing your currency'. They started to use threats about stopping the wheat.[512]

Thirdly: unfair economic conditions:

There is no criterion for the unfairness of economic conditions. Ernesto Guevara contented himself with a rejection of the laws of the market as its prices were the result of economic exploitation.[513]

This view of neocolonialism affected the attitude of Third World countries towards their relationship with the Soviets, for they expected that here there would be no economic exploitation and no political conditions for granting aid.

The most important ideological formulation at the time was the linking of the "non-capitalist path of development" and cooperation with the Socialist countries. The capitalist path of development was linked with the relationship with foreign capitalism.[514]

This trend of thought was not limited to the Leftists alone, but became generalized. Hussein Zulficar Sabry, member of the General Secretariate of the Socialist Union and vice-minister of Foreign Affairs expressed it:

> The short-sighted intellectual class is dazzled by Western technology and insists on Western aid with its conditions. It is attracted by the deceptive glitter of wealth or power.[515]

The implication in the article is that any relationship with the West may be equated with being an agent of imperialism. This establishes a conditional relationship between the type of nationalism and of government, and the direction of economic relations. Relations with the West were not permissible per se. They were rejected in advance because they were opposed to the choice of the non-capitalist path. In contrast, the relationship with the Soviets was not only a matter of assisting in development but a condition for the achievement of development and fusion with socialism. We noted in Chapter III that this opinion was prevalent among the Soviet Marxists too.

Applied without reservations this logic would limit the relationships of the Third World to the Socialist bloc alone, and create an actual monopolistic situation by means of doctrine rather than military occupation. It would also mean the collapse of the non-alignment policy which, in its beginnings, had opened the door to relations with the Soviet Union as an alternative to a limitation to the Western bloc. Despite its importance this point did not constitute a limitation for the national interest of Arab socialism, for two reasons.

On the one hand the shortage of hard currency did not allow a choice that might have led to a theoretical clash. On the other hand, when the Soviets found themselves unable to meet the many requirements of the Third World they changed their attitude toward Western aid. Resorting to it was no longer considered to constitute neocolonialism, (as we showed in the theoretical part of our study). In other words the theory had fulfilled its main purpose of politically isolating the backward countries from the West.

The economic point of view was of lesser importance, for the technological revolution had changed the traditional meaning of imperialism.[516]

The question now is, were the expectations of Arab Socialism fulfilled, and was neocolonialism replaced by a more just relationship from the Arab Socialist point of view?

According to the statements made by Nasser, particularly from the time of the Suez war, and even during the period of his clash with the Soviets in 1959, the relationship with the Soviets never failed the Arab Socialist expectations insofar as political support, unconditional economic aid, and non-intervention in their internal affairs were concerned. For instance in 1964 Nasser stated,

> We are a non-Communist state, but this has no effect. This is an application of principles of interaction between countries having different social systems.[517]

On February 18, 1965 Nasser said,

> We all remember the differences of 1959. We did not hear a word of threat or any implied threat. The differences did not affect the High Dam agreement or the agreement for industrialization.[518]

There seems to be another side to the truth, however. It is not by coincidence that on October 15, 1971 Heikal published, with his memoirs, the text of the secret correspondence exchanged between Nasser and Khrushchev, following their disagreement in 1959.

In a letter dated April 1959 Khrushchev says,

> I hope you understand that this is not a warning on our part but just an expression of our anxiety concerning the campaign against the Soviet Union in the United Arab Republic. It will be difficult for us under such conditions to fulfil our obligations stipulated in the agreement that has been signed with you.

Yet Nasser made no mention of this letter when he said "We have not heard a word of warning or implied warning."[519]

The National Liberation Stage

In order to evaluate this stage it would be preferable to define it as being one of national liberation, characterized by a struggle for independence and a rejection of military pacts. It reached its climax in the Suez war.

Soviet aid was undoubtedly a real help, but it was not completely without pressure. The secret correspondence published in 1971 gave the lie to Nasser's statements about there being no pressure. And what gets published is usually less than the truth. One must note, however, that these pressures never reached the point of a threat to cut the aid. In the stage of national liberation, priority was given to the national liberation movement rather than to socialist ideology. The latter could wait until this first stage gave all it had to offer. This tactic did not mean a total ignoring of strategy, however. Attempts at pressure could be made but never to the extent of creating a crisis, though in 1959 the brink of crisis was reached. In other words, one may say that this stage represented Khrushchev's application of Leninism.

One can also say that Nasserism, realizing the priority given to the common fight against imperialism, resisted Soviet pressures which it knew to be of a limited nature. Thus there was no need to make resistance reach the level of crisis.

In summary, Soviet aid was of a tactical nature and was linked to the stage of national liberation. As for ideological interests, they were postponed until this stage had fufilled all its potentialities.

Stage of Non-capitalist Development

If the national liberation movement provided one good reason for Soviet aid, the stage of non-capitalist development added another. If limited, secret pressures were placed in the first stage, with a view to bringing socialism closer, there was no longer any reason for such pressures in the transitional phase, which was described by some as a period of fusion with socialism (see Types of Nationalism). It may be said that in this stage the prospects for socialism were real and the Soviet aid (non-utilitarian and based on principle) as an alternative to neocolonialism did not fail Arab socialist expectations. The reason was simple; there were no opposing Soviet interests. The Soviet strategy of consolidating Marxism, previously postponed, was now actually beginning to be applied, or at least there were hopes that it would be.

The Leninist policy had been the basis in consolidating the national fronts rather than the class struggle in the period of national liberation. The logic of this policy continued to be applied at the beginning of the socialist stage, and support was given to the revolutionary democratic leaderships. Here Khrushchev applied Leninism but on a higher level, i.e. the beginning of the transition to socialism.

This does not mean that there were no problems in this stage, however. As we have seen, there were internal pressures in the Soviet economy making it difficult for the Soviets to meet all the needs of the Third World.

The reaction could be seen in the request made by the Egyptian Left to the Soviets in April 1966, at the height of the period of fusion with socialism. Lutfi al Kholi wrote:

> The Socialist bloc concentrates its unconditional aid in bigger quantities to the revolutionary regimes alone without wasting it uselessly on a broad front in which there are vacillating, compromising countries, for this strengthens them within the front against the real revolutionary forces.[520]

The competition between the socialist countries over the priorities of Soviet aid, and the need of Arab socialism for more Soviet aid did not - alone - lead to conflict with the Soviets in this stage.

Stage of National Conflicts

We shall attempt to specify some of the basic issues of the conflict and try to reply to the question of whether the Soviet policy lived up to the expectations of Arab socialism that it would be a very different alternative to neocolonialism.

1. Ideology:

In 1972 there was a trend to confirm the individuality of Arab Socialism. The report of the General

Secretariate, approved by the Central Committee of the Socialist Union, stated:

> The documents of the revolution clearly show that socialist freedom and unity are the principles which constitute the ideology of the revolution, its obligation and evolution. Though these principles are clear in the conscience of our people and have their native roots in its individual thinking and special characteristics, yet daily political action over a long period of time reveal that attempts have been made to explain these principles in a manner that is not in keeping with the genuine Egyptian and Arab reality but relies in its content on imported doctrines and ideologies.[521]

This individuality finds confirmation and support in the religious heritage.

> Our heritage and religion...(is) confirmed by the existence of basic laws ruling the universe and life, for the good of people and humanity in all times and places. Any ignoring of these rules would undoubtedly make our socialism lose its scientific basis.[522]

The Agenda of Political Ideological and Organizational Action does not forget to utilize Marxist terminology; it describes Arab Socialism as scientific, but in the final analysis this means no more than the terms prosperity and justice. "The scientific basis of our socialism means that it seeks to achieve its goals of prosperity and justice on correct scientific bases."[523]

The Agenda utilized the expression "dissolving the differences between social strata," instead of "classes," and this was criticized by the Left.[524]

The question one may ask is whether this rejection of Soviet Marxism constituted a new phenomenon that was sufficient cause for a conflict with the Soviets.

In fact it was not a new phenomenon, for the Charter included a number of phrases showing a negative attitude towards the Marxist theory. It said that "the revolutionary march started out without a complete theory of revolutionary change,"[525] that "the Arab revolutionary experience cannot copy what others have reached,"[526] and it spoke of "belief in God, his prophets and holy messages."[527]

On the other hand, the Charter also spoke about the existence of classes and the dissolving of differences between them. This opened the door to conflicting interpretations between the Leftists and others, each of them selecting from the Charter passages that confirmed either Scientific Socialism (Marxism) or Arab Socialism. The Soviets also used this style. In Chapter III we saw how Ulyanovsky considered the Charter as Scientific Socialist by selecting certain passages about the truth of the socialist solution, and leaving out the other parts, which advocates of a special Arab socialism use to support their arguments.

As for the Egyptian Left, it noted, since 1966, the existence of a "national socialism" and criticized it on the basis that it was a kind of chauvinism, saying:

> The attempts to refute scientific socialism take the form of propaganda for a special kind of national socialism, a middle of the road socialism, in short Arab Socialism. Here the insistence on being different from Scientific Socialism becomes mixed with the desire to defame Marxism and the socialist countries, with enmity towards Communism, and with blind nationalist fanaticism which considers as sacred everything that is local or national.[528]

The Left continued its criticism in 1972 as we saw in "Class Struggle and Cohesion." What is new then is not the existence of this unique type of socialism, but the fact that in 1971 it was considered an issue of conflict with the Soviets. Sadat said, "We have had differences in March 1971, October 1971, February 1972, and May 1972" (the dates of the power struggle following Nasser's death). He did not openly clarify the causes of the conflict, but he made hints about promises or expectations that had not been fulfilled on time until the "year of decision" had elapsed. This had placed him in a whirlpool, and made him lose control of events, because of the student demonstrations and the people's patience giving out. The most important impression he gives is that of mixing the dates of the conflicts with the statement that his ideology was not that of the Soviet Union, and that he would not become a Marxist.[529]

Heikal threw further light on the matter:

> The Soviet Union was mistaken to imagine that there was an ideological vacuum in the area that it could fill.

If we add to this what we mentioned in Chapter III that the Soviets criticized the various non-Marxist socialisms in 1972, we find that in 1972 they rejected what they had previously accepted or at least not rejected. They were now doing what would have been considered intervention in the past.

2. Power

Ideology alone is not sufficient, it has to be supported by Power. Marxism appreciates this when it speaks about an idea becoming a material force only when it is accepted by the people. In "Class Struggle and Cohesion" we examined the conflicts that took place between the military regime and the Egyptian Left, and the liquidation of the latter following the succession crisis and the power struggle between the military. Here we shall show the reaction of the Soviets to these happenings.

In an article entitled "And Egypt," Heikal wrote:

> The Soviet Union felt anxious because it imagined that the elements in the centers of power which have gone, were closer to it than others. Egypt signed the treaty of friendship and cooperation to reassure the Soviet Union that the relationship between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. was a strategic one and not a tactic.531

This opinion throws light on what Sadat said in a speech,

> We disagreed in March 1971. Certain events occurred in our country. The rectification was made in May. In May, President Podgorny, the President of the Soviet Union came to me and we signed the Soviet treaty. I think that the treaty should give them confidence.532

He was referring in the speech to the succession crisis and the liquidation of his enemies, to the anxiety of the Russians as a result of the internal crisis, and his attempt to give them a feeling of confidence.

The Soviets deny any intervention on their part, but it should be noted that the signing of the treaty was contrary to the policy of non-alignment, at least as it concerned the psychology of the nationalist stage, when the struggle was against occupation in the guise of pacts, and the "complexes" mentioned by Nasser with regard to military missions sent for training purposes.

In summary, while Egypt's need for aid was the reason for the treaty, the immediate cause of its signing was the crisis of confidence resulting from a purely internal matter, namely the power-struggle within the military elite and the consequent purge of the vanguard organization which was the center of the Marxist Left. This was a new situation, and it meant that the expectations of Arab Socialism that Soviet policy would be different from neocolonialism were not fulfilled.

Political Interests

Here we shall discuss three questions: non-alignment, Arab nationalism, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

With regard to the principle of non-alignment, the Agenda calls for the liberation of the Arab will and a guaranteeing of its independence vis-a-vis the interests and ambitions of world powers. The Left objected to this, saying:

> In view of our experiences over the past years, it seems strange to place all the big powers and world forces in the same basket. Our relation with the Soviet Union is of a special kind, and is generally positive. It has been given legal form in a treaty.[533]

An examination of the tendencies of the Left shows that they called for a limitation of the non-alignment policy and the signing of a treaty with the Soviets. In October 1967, following the defeat, Al-Tali'a called for the creation of "centers of joint revolutionary defence."[534]

In April 1971 it called for "reciprocal defence" between Egypt and the Soviet Union.[535] These phrases are reminiscent of the military pacts which were the basic issue in the national liberation movement and became synonymous with imperialism.

The treaty did not mention military bases or centers of joint revolutionary defence, however, as the Marxist Left had requested.

Many comments may be made about the treaty; that it is not in keeping with the principle of non-alignment which the advocates of Arab nationalism considered as one of its characteristics, and that the stipulation that Egypt was socialist would open the road to her being included in the socialist bloc and invite an application of the Brezhnev doctrine as in Czechoslovakia. The inclusion of the principle of "training" is reminiscent of Nasser's words concerning the refusal of American aid because of the "complex" he had about training. One should add to this the conditions under which the treaty was signed and its relation with the struggle for power.

The Soviets would no doubt deny this and consider any criticism as bourgeois. There is also no doubt that this constitutes a new position in the Soviet policy, and differs from the expectations of Arab Socialism of finding an alternative to neocolonialism. The ousting of the Soviet military experts formed part of a nationalist reaction to the disappointing realization that the Soviet presence was not solving what came to be known as the crisis of "no war and no peace."

Arab Nationalism

We have previously examined the Soviet rejection of Arab nationalism as expressed in the discussion between Khrushchev and Nasser (in Nationalism and Internationalism). For political rather than ideological reasons the Soviet policy continued to support Arab nationalism. This policy gave an impression differing from the truth which was revealed on the occasion of a split in the central committee of the Syrian Communist Party over a number of questions, one of which was that of Arab nationalism. It was considered necessary to take the opinion of the Communist Parties of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. When no solution was found to the differences, it was decided to consult the Bulgarian Communist Party. Again no solution was reached, so it was decided to resort to experts in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The reply to the Syrian Communist Party came as a secret - though official (to use Heikal's terms) - document.

> There is nothing called the Arab nation - there may have been an Arab nation under formation, but one cannot say that the Arab nation is formed. One must use the characteristics of the nation given by Stalin. There is one

> factor that is absent i.e. a common economy. Stalin did not say a common market but a common economy. Naturally a denial of the Arab nation would be harmful politically. But it would be incorrect to put it in the program, for Marxism-Leninism denies it.[536]

Sadat's reaction was to say that this report came as an "electric shock."[537]

About the Arab-Israeli conflict the report states:

> One should not look at all the issues of the Arab world through Palestinian glasses. The slogan of removing Israel is incorrect, not only tactically but in principle as well. Israel is a reality.... It is not possible to support the self-determination of one nation at the expense of the self-determination of another nation. The slogan of destroying Israel is not a class slogan or a class stand. It is possible only to struggle against the racism of the state of Israel and its reactionary and imperialist character, but it is not permissible to talk about liquidating Israel. Also the phrase 'liquidating Zionist institutions' found in the program means liquidating the state of Israel.[538]

This is reminiscent of the stand taken by the Egyptian Communist movement in 1947-48. According to Anouar Abdel Malek, the Left in the Arab countries supported the creation of the state of Israel, as it was "capitalist and middle class, and therefore one social stage ahead of the Arab nations, the most advanced of which was defined as a 'feudal' state."[539]

Conclusion

The foregoing shows that the expectations of Arab Socialism with regard to the relationship with the Soviets as a different alternative to neocolonialism have not been fulfilled. This disappointment is due to the attempt of

Arab Socialism to consider as permanent a form of relationship which the Soviets considered only as a tactic appropriate for the stage of national liberation and the beginning of the transition to socialism. In this stage the Soviets can adopt stands not entirely in keeping with Marxist ideology, with a view to adapting to local national interests. They justify such policies by speaking of the requirements of the specific stage of history. A later denial of the policy (once the stage is past) may come as a shock to people, and raise questions about Marxist ethics, but it should be noted that this ethic is directly related to the scheme of historical stages.

The stand of Arab Socialism towards national questions is traditionalist rather than ideological.

When a Marxist government comes to power, however, it becomes involved in complex relationships, and has to take political considerations into account, to distinguish strategy and tactics, and to decide on priorities. As all other socialist governments have to do the same thing, this can lead to differences and even clashes between them, despite their common ideology.

FOOTNOTES

The reader will note that the following abbreviations have been employed in these notes:

The Egyptian magazine Al-Tali'a is represented by AT.

The newspaper Al-Ahram is rendered as AA.

The economic magazine Al-Ahram Al-Iqtisadi is referred to as A. Iqtisadi.

1. "Bourgeoisie" here means capitalist.

2. Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., "The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 1892-1919," in P.M. Holt, Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt (London: Oxford Univesity Press, 1968), pp. 37-39.

3. Mustafa Kamel was the leader of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, which led the popular opposition to the British occupation in Egypt until the 1919 revolution. The formal leadership of the party came mainly from the wealthy beys and pashas at first, but a number of younger members prominent in the press and other areas were elected to the 1911 administrative board. Goldschmidt op. cit., pp. 308, 310.

4. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer. A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (London: John Murray, 1968), p. 189.

5. Sami A. Hanna, and George H. Gardner, "Al-Shu'ubiyyah Up-dated. A Study of the 20th Century Revival of an 8th Century Concept," The Middle East Journal, Vol. XX, No. 3 (Summer 1966), p. 347.

6. Hassan Abd al-Aziz, "Haraka: al-Fikr al-Qawmi Fi Misr Min Hukm Mohamed Ali ila al-Harb al-'Alamiyya al-Thania" (Nationalist Thought in Egypt from Mohamed Ali to World War II), AT, Vol. III, No. 1 (January 1967), p. 107.

7. Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyed, Qissat Hayati (Story of My Life), (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1962), p. 137.

8. Ibid., p. 70

9. Hassan Abd al-Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 105. For the role of the "ulama" in Egypt's history, see Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, "The Role of the 'Ulama' in Egypt during the Early Nineteenth Century", in P.M. Holt (ed.), *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 264-280.

10. Mohamed Emara, "Sheikh Aly Abdel Razeq. Ma'araka Fikriyya" (Sheikh Aly Abdel Razeq. An Ideological Conflict), *AT*, Vol. VII, No. 11 (November, 1971), pp. 92-93.

11. Aly Abdel Razeq, *Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm* (Islam and the Principles of Government), (Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, 1966), p. 45.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

13. Mohamed Hussein Heykal, *Mudhakkirat fi al-Siyasa al-Misriyya* (Memoirs in Egyptian Politics), II, (Cairo: Matba'at Misr, 1953), pp. 233-234.

14. According to Anouar Abdel Malek, the national, liberal and democratic middle class found its expression in the Wafd Party. It included a section of the big landowners, which was to become preponderant only after the Second World War, the average rural middle class, the urban middle class, the professions, the intellectuals, the lower middle class, and especially the government employees, and the merchants, a substantial number of agricultural workers, and a certain category of urban workers, especially those employed by the state. It was a genuine expression of the entire nation. The basic political force in the country for thirty years, it was dedicated to parliamentary democracy, the promotion of greater justice in the daily life of the country, as well as national independence.
Anouar Abdel Malek, *Egypt: Military Society*, trans. Charles L. Markmann (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, Inc., 1968), pp. 10, 12, 19.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

16. Mohamed Emara, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

20. Taha Hussein, *Fi al-Adab al-Jahili* (Jahiliyya Literature), (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'aref, 1969), p. 68.

21. Mohamed Emara, "Mawqi' al-Fikr al-Islami al-Hadith Min al-Ittigah al-Liberali" (Position of Modern Islamic Thought with Regards to Liberalism), *AT*, Vol. VIII, No. 8 (August, 1972), p. 30.

22. Book reviews. "Asr wa Rigal" (Eras and Men), by Fathi Radwan, *AT*, Vol. III, No. 4 (April 1967), p. 102.

23. Mohamed Rifaat, *Al-Tawgih al-Siasi Li al-Fikra al-'Arabiyya al-Haditha* (Political Trend of Modern Arabism), Cairo: Dar al-Ma'aref bi Misr, 1964), p. 80.

24. Farid Kamel, "Al-Fan al-Misri Bein al-Rasmalliyya wa al-Ishtirakiyya" (Egyptian Art between Capitalism and Socialism), *AT*, Vol. I, No. 11 (November, 1965), p. 100.

25. M.I.M. Ismail, *Nationalism in Egypt Before Nasser's Revolution* (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1966), p. 172.

26. *Ibid*., p. 173.

27. Mohamed Ezzat Darwazah, *Al-Wihda al-'Arabiyya* (Arab Unity), Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Tigari, 1957), p. 343.

28. Mohamed Rifaat, *op. cit*., p. 81.
cf. Anwar G. Chejne, "Egyptian Attitudes Towards Pan-Arabism", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (Summer 1957), p. 253.

29. Aly Ahmed Abdel Qader, *Dirasat al-Dhahira al-Qawmiyya fi al-Mugtama' al-'Arabi* (Study of the Phenomenon of Nationalism in Arab Society). (Cairo: Dar al-Isnawi Li al-Tiba'a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi', 1965) p. 94.

30. "Watha'iq Tarikhiyya 'an al-Ahzab wa al-Tandhimat al-Siyassiyya fi Misr" (Historical Documents on Political Parties and Organizations in Egypt) (1), *AT*, Vol. I, No. 3 (March 1965), pp. 142-162.

31. *Ibid*., pp. 143-145.

32. *Ibid*., p. 156.

33. *Ibid*., p. 158.

34. *Ibid*.

35. "Watha'iq Tarikhiyya..." (2), *op. cit*., p. 145.

36. Ismail, *op. cit*., pp. 280-288.
According to W. Laqueur, the rank and file of the Muslim Brotherhood consisted mainly of the poor in the cities and

the fellaheen in the countryside. The militants were largely students, government employees of the lower echelons and teachers. Among the leadership the bourgeois, conservative, and respectable element prevailed.
Misr al Fatat was concentrated more in an urban setting and included many students.
Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 246.

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cf. Tareq al-Bishri, Al Haraka al-Siyassiyya fi Misr, 1945-1952 (Political Movement in Egypt, 1945-1952), pp. 108, 109, 113.

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Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1964), p. 17.

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Elie Kedourie, "Pan-Arabism and British Policy", The Political Quarterly, Vol. XXVIII (April 1957), pp. 139-140.

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John Major, "The Search for Arab Unity", International Affairs, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4 (October 1963).
The British had also supported the Arab nationalist revolt against the Turks in 1916. See George Kirk, "The Arab Awakening Reconsidered" Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (June-July 1962). Also C. Ernest Dawn "The Rise of Arabism in Syria", The Middle East Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (Spring 1962), p. 147.

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65. Louis Awad, "Galsa ma' Udaba' al-Ariaf" (Session with Writers from the Countryside), AA, March 26, 1971, p. 6.

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113. "Mawqi' al-Qita' al-Khass..." *op. cit*., p. 21.

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411. Mustafa al-Shihabi, *Muhadarat 'an al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya* (Lectures on Arab Nationalism) (Cairo: Jamiyyat al-Duwal al-'Arabiyya Ma'had al-'Arabiyya, 1959), p. 359. cf. Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States*, pp. 114-115, Geertz speaks of a "corporate sentiment of oneness," and describes Pan-Arabism as a longing to reunite a politically divided primordial community."

412. Ibrahim Goma'a, *op. cit.*, p. 135. cf. Sir Hamilton Gibb, *The Near East: Problems and Prospects* (Chicago: P.W. Ireland, editor, 1942), p. 70. Gibb also speaks of the Arab nation as the function of an act of will.

413. Aly Ahmed Abdelkader, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

414. *AA*, September 29, 1972, p. 4.

415. Rimawi, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

416. Ibrahim Goma'a, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

417. Mustafa Tiba, "Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya...," *op. cit.*, p. 84.

418. Ibrahim Saad al-Din, "Intima' Misr al-'Arabi...," *op. cit.*, p. 24.

419. Ibrahim Goma'a, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-247.

420. Darwazah, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

421. Ibrahim Saad al-Din "Intima' Misr al'Arabi..." *op. cit.*, p. 24.

422. Salah Zaki Sayed Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

423. "Mukhtarat Min Aqwal Abdel Nasser" (Selections from the speeches of Abdel Nasser), *AT*, Vol. VI, No. 11 (November, 1970), pp. 140-141.

424. Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 245.

425. Anouar Abdel Malek, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-295. Quoting "Khassa'ess al-ishtirakiyya al-'Arabiyya" (Characteristics of Arab Socialism) in *Al-Katib*, March 18, 1962.

426. *Ibid.*, p. 292, quoting Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Nahnu wa-al-Shuyuiyya" (We and Communism), *AA*, August 4, 1961.

427. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

428. The Charter, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

429. Paul E. Sigmund, ed., *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 144, quoting Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Cairo: Information Dept., 1954).

430. "Qadaya al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya ba'd yunyu 1967" (Problems of the Arab Revolution after June 1967), *AT*, Vol. VI, No. 5 (May, 1970), p. 47.

431. "Yawmiyyat al-Thawra" (Diary of the Revolution), *AT*, Vol. I, No. 7 (July, 1965), p. 215.

432. Lutfi al-Kholy, "Hawl Bina'wihdat al-Quwa al-Taqaddumiyya fi al-Watan al-'Arabi" (Building the Unity of Progressive Forces in the Arab Nation), *AT*, Vol. III, No. 6 (June, 1967), p. 39.

433. Anouar Abdel Malek, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

434. "Hal iltazamit al-Tali'a bima Qata'athu 'ala nafsiha?" (Has the Al-Tali'a carried out its promises?), *AT*, Vol. I, No. 2 (January, 1966), p. 156.

435. Lutfi al-Kholy, "Hawl Bina' Wihdat..." *op. cit.*, p. 20.

436. "Nadharat fi al-Wad' al-Rahin" (Views on the Present Situation), AT, Vol. III, No. 10 (October, 1967), p. 15.

437. Ismail Sabry Abdalla, "Thawrat Yulya wa al-Gunud" op. cit., p. 146.

438. Ibid., p. 161.

439. Anouar Abdel Malek, op. cit., p. 298.

440. "Awraq Siyassiyya..." op. cit., p. 98.

441. Ibid., p. 99.

442. Ibid., p. 90.

443. Ibid., p. 100.

444. "Igtima' al-Lagna al-Far'iyya Li al-Da'wa wa al-Fikr" (Meeting of the Branch Committee for Propaganda and Thought), AT, Vol. VIII, No. 6 (June, 1972), p. 45.

445. 'Awraq Siyassiyya...", op. cit., pp. 107-108.

446. Ibid., p. 108.

447. "Igtima' al-Lagna...," op. cit., p. 41.

448. Sa'id Khayal, "Ittigahat fi Munaqashat al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki" (Trends in the Discussions of the Socialist Union), AT, Vol. VIII, No. 7 (July, 1972), p. 93.

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450. Mohamed Fathi Attiya, "Bourgeoisiyyat al-'Alam al-Thalith wa Tariq al-Tatawwur al-Rasmali" (The Bourgeoisie of the Third World and the Path of Capitalist Development), AT, Vol. VIII, No. 11 (November, 1972), p. 11.

451. "Hiwar ma' Garaudy" (Discussion with Garaudy), AT, Vol. VI, No. 2 (February, 1970), p. 112.

452. "Laisa bi al-Alam Wihda...Ya'ish al-Insan al-'Arabi" (There is no Unity in Pain...Long Live the Arab Human Being), AT, Vol. VII, No. 10 (October, 1971), p. 11.

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454. Ibid., p. 93.

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456. Mahadir Galasat Mobahathat al-Wihda, p. 301.

457. Ibid., p. 562.

458. Ibid., p. 152.

459. Ibid., pp. 271-272.

460. Ibid., p. 272.

461. Ibid., p. 258.

462. Mohamed Heikal, Nasser. The Cairo Documents (London: New English Library, 1972), p. 149.

463. "Triumph of Friendship and Brotherhood of People of Labor - Rally in Aswan," Pravda, May 18, 1964 , p. 3; CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 20 (June 10, 1964), p. 7.

464. Heikal, "Nasser. The Cairo Documents," p. 149.

465. Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. History, Ideology, and Organization (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 50.

466. Rimawi, op. cit., p. 378.

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468. AA, March 9, 1962.

469. "Watha'iq...," op. cit., p. 136.

470. AA, November 3, 1961.

471. Heikal, "What Happened in Syria?" op. cit., pp. 150-151.

472. AA, February 8, 1967

473. Charter, op. cit., p. 137.

474. Majmu'at Khutab wa Tasrihat (A Collection of Speeches and Talks), Vol. II, (Cairo: Press U.A.R.), p. 136.

475. Ibid., p. 409.

476. Lutfi al-Kholy, "Hawl Bina...," op. cit., p. 24.

477. Ibid., p. 21.

478. Mustafa Tiba, "Ain Taqif al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Yom" (Where does the Arab Revolution Stand Today?), AT, Vol. III, No. 3 (March, 1967), pp. 22, 23.

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480. Ibid.

481. "80 Shahran min Hayat al-Tali'a," op. cit., p. 115.

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cf Lutfi al-Kholy, "Al-Kifah al-Mu'adi Li al-Imperialiyya Bi Afriqia fi al-Marhala al-Rahina" (The Struggle Against Imperialism in Africa in the Present Stage), AT, Vol. II, No. 12 (December, 1966), pp. 43-64.

483. Michel Kamel, "Hawl Amrad al-Salbiyya wa Gudhuriha al-Siyassiyya wa al-Igtima'iyya" (Diseases of Apathy and Their Political and Social Roots), AT, Vol. II, No. 3 (March, 1966), p. 84.

484. "Quwa al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Khass wa al-'Am... fi al-Waqi' al-'Arabi" (Forces of the Arab Revolution. The Private and the Public...in the Arab Situation), AT, Vol. VI, No. 5 (May, 1970), p. 35.

485. The Charter, op. cit., p. 132.

486. Ibid., p. 70.

487. "Mukhtarat min Aqwal Abdel Nasser" op. cit., p. 135.

488. AA, August 17, 1962.

489. AA, March 9, 1962.

490. AA, August 17, 1962.

491. Heikal, "What Happened in Syria?" op. cit., p. 156.

492. "Yawmiyyat al-Thawra" op. cit., p. 208.

493. Murad Wahba, "Al-Thawry wa al-Mutamarrid" (The Revolutionary and the Rebel), AT, Vol. I, No. 8 (August, 1965), p. 13.

494. "Mukhtarat min Aqwal Abdel Nasser," op. cit., p. 136.

495. Tiba, "Ain Taqif al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Yawm" op. cit., p. 24.

496. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Al-Sira' wa al-Ru'ya al-Tarikhiyya" (Conflict and Historical View), AA, December 22, 1972.

497. "Mukhtarat min Aqwal...," op. cit., p. 137.

498. Lutfi al-Kholy, "Hawl Bina' Wihdat al Quwa al-Taqaddumiyya fi al-Watan al-'Arabi" op. cit., p. 22.

499. "Al-Munadil Gamal Abdel Nasser Yatahaddath 'an al-Tariq ila Wihdat al-Quwa al-Thawriyya fi al-Tariq al-'Arabi" (The Fighter Gamal Abdel Nasser Speaks about the Unity of Revolutionary Forces in the Arab Path), AT. Vol. III, No. 5 (May, 1967), p. 14.

500. AA, May 2, 1966.

501. AA, May 6, 1966.

502. AA, July 27, 1966.

503. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Al-Hal bi al-Quwwa" (Solution by Force), AA, November 10, 1967.

504. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Nuqat 'ala al-Huruf" (Dots on the Letters0, AA, October 27, 1967.

505. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Ma'alem 'ala al-Tariq" (Signs on the Road), AA, February 2, 1968.

506. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Badalan min Ta'miq al-Tagzi'a wa al-'Itimad 'ala Mughamarat al-Lail" (Instead of Deepening Divisions and Relying on Adventures of Night), AA, February 9, 1968.

507. Heikal,"Ma'alem...," op. cit.

508. Heikal, "Nuqat...," op. cit.

509. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Ma Huwa al-Ikhtilaf wa al-Khilaf" (Where is the Difference and the Conflict?), AA, August 14, 1970.

510. Lutfi al-Kholy, "Al-Ishtirakiyya fi al-Watan al-'Arabi" (Socialism in the Arab Nation), AT, Vol. III, No. 6 (June 1967), p. 45.

511. "Watha' iq...," op. cit., p. 158.

512. Ibid.

513. "Basamat al-Isti'mar al-Gadid 'ala...al-magmu'a al-Ifriqiyya al-Asiawiyya" (Fingerprints of Neocolonialism on the Afro-Asian Block), A. Iqtisadi, No. 232 (April 15,

1965),p. 13.

514. Mohamed Ali al-Shahari, "Al-Yemen Bein Tariq al-Tatawwur al-Rasmali wa gheir al-Rasmali" (The Yemen Between the Capitalist and the Non-Capitalist Path of Development), AT, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (April, 1972), p. 90.

515. Hussein Zulficar Sabry, "Al-'Alam al-Thalith, Ab'aduhu wa Ittigahatuhu" (The Third World, Its Dimensions and Trends), AT, Vol. II, No. 4 (April 1966), p. 21.

516. Slowly, Communist writings have begun to reflect the changing relationship between the Western capitalist countries and the former colonies. In 1961 Paulino Gonzalez Alberdi wrote:

> ...technological progress has resulted in the industrial countries' needing less raw materials to produce the same quantity of manufactured goods,...they have increased their own production of grain, cotton, vegetable oil, fats, and other natural products and are using more synthetic raw materials.

As for the former colonies, they were dependent on the export of food and raw materials. Now, as a result of the shrinkage of the market for these exports and the fall in the prices paid for them, these countries found themselves unable to finance their imports.

Paulino Gonzalez Alberdi, "Industrialization of Economically Backward Countries", World Marxist Review, Vol. IV, No. 8 (Aug, 1961), pp. 9-10.

In 1966 Rymalov traced the new characteristics of Western aid to the developing countries. The aim of aid and loans was to strengthen the position of weakening world capitalism, and to retain the liberated countries in the system. Profit was secondary.

U.S. private capital goes to developed capitalist countries rather than to underdeveloped countries, which are too unsafe for investment purposes. Aid and loans to the former colonies are given primarily by the state, largely in the form of subsidies.

Formerly, the imperialist countries were accused of refusing to industrialize their colonies. Now much of the aid given to developing countries goes into industry.

The competition between the capitalist and socialist systems in wooing the third world has made the West greatly improve the terms for its aid.

The former colonies can no longer be considered the providers of raw materials as in the past. While their own agriculture has been in a state of stagnation, great surpluses of farm products have accumulated in some capitalist states, particularly the U.S.A., where agriculture has become mechanized. This surplus farm produce is used as a substantial part of the loans given.

Thus the developing countries have lost a good deal of their attraction as sources of raw materials to the capitalist countries. In fact, the socialist camp had to help the backward countries to sell their raw materials.

V. Rymalov, "New Phenomena in the Export of Capital from the Imperialist Countries", *Mirovaia ekonomika; mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 7 (1965), trans. *The Soviet Review*, Vol. VII, No. 2 (Summer, 1966), pp. 29-36.

517. "Watha'iq", *op. cit*., p. 154.

518. *Ibid*.

519. *AA*, October 15, 1971.

520. Lutfi al-Kholy, "Ma al-'Amal'" (What is to be done), *AT*, Vol. II, No. 4 (April, 1966), p. 16.

521. "Political Papers from the Arab Socialist Union," *AT*, Vol. VIII, No. 10 (October, 1972), p. 93.

522. *Ibid*., p. 101.

523. *Ibid*.

524. *Ibid*., p. 108.

525. Charter, *op. cit*., p. 6.

526. *Ibid*., p. 18.

527. *Ibid*., p. 13.

528. Fuad Morsy, "Al-Tayyarat al-Fikriyya fi al-Waqi' al-Misri" (Trends of Thought in the Egyptian Situation), *AT*, Vol. II, No. 10 (October, 1966), p. 25.

529. *AA*, July 25, 1972.

530. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Al-Hiwar al-Matlub wa al-Daruri" (The Required and Necessary Discussion), *AA*, August 11, 1972.

531. AA, July 7, 1972.

532. AA, July 25, 1972.

533. "Munagashat Hawl Mashru' Birnamig al-'Amal" (Discussions Concerning the Draft Working Plan), AT, Vol. VIII, No. 10 (October, 1972), p. 109.

534. "80 Shahran...," op. cit., p. 113.

535. "Ru'ya Wadinha fi Sa'at al Hasm" (A Clear Vision at the Times of Decision, AT, Vol. VII, No. 4 (April, 1971), p. 10.

536. AA, August 18th, 1973.

537. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Fi Mosku Waqfa Mawdu'iyya ma' Sadiq" (In Moscow, An Objective Talk with a Friend), AA, August 18, 1973.

538. AA, August 18, 1973.

539. Anouar Abdel Malek, op. cit., pp. 85-86.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Our study has shown that the Marxist treatment of the question of nationalism has passed through two stages:

- In the first stage it was ideological in nature. One could clearly trace the relation between the theory of the nation and the Marxist ideology, philosophically speaking, on a number of points, ex. dialectical materialism, objectivity, the relation between the economic infrastructure and the superstructure, historical materialism with its stages of historical development the rejection of utopian socialism, and the emphasis on the class struggle.

- In the second stage, modern trends in the Marxist conception of the nation reflect the problems of application, the adaptation of tactics and strategy, and the question of national interests in terms of power.

These changes were so far-reaching that they impelled Soviet Marxists to raise the question of the appropriateness of laying down a new comprehensive theory. Rogachev, for instance, considered the further elaboration of the theory of the nation imperative. Dzhunusov noted that some scholars felt that Stalin's definition of the nation should be supplemented, and others that it was basically wrong.

It is easier to pose the question of a new theory than to answer it, however. Though the creation of a comprehensive new theory may be more useful academically speaking, it has its dangers for Marxism, as the original theory of the nation was closely connected with dialectical materialism and the Marxist ideology generally. A new theory would open the door to a questioning of the validity of the Marxist ideology itself.

If, on the other hand, the new changes are rejected and the relation between the Marxist ideology and the theory of the nation is tightened, this also has its dangers. It can lead to a disconnection between the ideology and the international policies of the Soviet state, making the latter lose the faith of people and the power it draws from its connection with the revolutionary ideology.

The appearance of many Marxisms as alternatives may offer a way out of the dilemma faced by Marxism as it tries to meet the problems of application that threaten to invalidate it. Yet this also has its dangers, as it may lead to a loss of the unity which constitutes the core of socialist internationalism.

An examination of the changes that have occurred in the Soviet theory of the nation clearly reveals this ideological crisis. In trying to tackle this crisis, modern Soviet writers have given only partial explanations. Here we shall attempt to gather all these together, with a view to comparing between Soviet thought, Arab Socialism and the

Western scholars.

1. The Nation, the Bourgeoisie and Historical Materialism

In the first stage of Marxist thought, nationalism was considered to be a bourgeois phenomenon. This was a logical application of historical materialism, for the same economic and social changes that destroyed the feudal system also established bourgeois nationalism.

As we have seen, this point is not agreed upon by Arab Socialism, in its call for Arab nationalism, or even by Egyptian nationalism. The nation is traced back to the ancient civilizations and is considered to precede the bourgeois stage.

This stand does not necessarily contradict the materialist philosophy, for the economic factor, represented by an agrarian economy depending on the river rather than rain, played a vital role in establishing the ancient Egyptian nation and the centralized state. Thus the difference between Arab Socialism and Marxism does not lie in the question of materialism vs. idealism but rather in the fact that Marxism confined its explanation of the economic factor to the "bourgeois" economy, and to European circumstances, which do not apply to Egypt (as we saw in the section on the economic factor).

In the writer's opinion, Marxism has linked the idea of nationalism with the bourgeoisie largely on account of the theory of class struggle. The center of interest for Marxism is its struggle with the bourgeoisie. Just as the bourgeoisie uses the idea of nationalism and national unity in this struggle, Marxism tries to deprive nationalism of its attractiveness and weaken its effect by linking it to the bourgeoisie.

One may well question here whether this link between nationalism and the ruling class is limited to the bourgeois stage alone, or whether every regime - bourgeois and non-bourgeois - is inclined to use the idea of nationalism to consolidate its power. Thus the idea of nationalism should not be confined to a specific stage but may be found in ancient civilizations as well.

In the second stage the Marxist concept of the nation changed, for as we have seen, recent Soviet writers disconnect the nation from the factor of a bourgeois economy. This was necessitated by the adaptation to the realities of the new nations of the Third World, and the admission that nations continue to exist within the Soviet Union though they do not have a separate economy, and the policy of central planning is attempting to bring about a merging of the nations. This modern trend of thought, which disconnects the nation from the factor of the economy, contradicts the original theory from the viewpoint of the materialist philosophy which considers the economic factor as the dynamo of history.

As for Western scholars, they are generally not inclined to stress (or even mention) the economic factor. In this they are in disagreement with Marxism in its first stage.

True enough, H. Kohn linked nationalism with bourgeois democracy, but he did not do so on the basis of the materialist philosophy or the importance of the economic factor. The core of his idea was that democracy expresses the will of the people more than in the past.

The change that has occurred in Marxist thought, disconnecting nationalism from the economic factor, has effected a rapprochement between it and the ideas of Western scholars and Arab socialism.

Thus we find that nationalism is not confined only to the bourgeois system, but can exist at various times in history, and various types of regime can use cohesion to consolidate their power.

2. Objective - Subjective Factors of the Nation

In dealing with the factors of the nation, Marxist thought differentiates between itself and Western thought on the basis that its own theory is philosophically materialist while the latter is idealist.

There is no doubt that in the first stage, Marxism showed a close relationship with philosophical materialism, by utilizing specific materialist elements in defining the nation (see Stalin). Our study shows, however, that this application was not fully materialist right from the start, and that many changes have occurred in the second stage.

In dealing with the case of newly independent countries of the Third World, and particularly the African states which have inherited artificial borders, including several different nationalities and tribes, Soviet writers like Starushenko have used the term "people" instead of "nation," and defined it in a flexible, fluid manner. Here the factors of economy, territory and the state...are used or dropped at will, without any criterion. Since the Marxist theory of the nation was considered to be materialist because it used specific materialist factors in its definition of the nation, the attitude of modern Soviet writers towards the factors in "peoples" raises a question about whether their theory is still materialist.

It also raises a question about the validity of the original materialist concept of the nation and its appropriateness in a changing world, and a third question concerning the crisis existing in the adaptation of the theory to the tactical policies of the Soviets.

Modern Soviet writers are not unaware of these questions. In fact the present utilization of the term "people" instead of "nation" is an attempt to keep the original theory at a distance from all changes and questions. But there is no real difference between the two terms, for the "people" are treated in the same manner as the "nation," and are considered to have the same right of self-determination regardless of the difference in terminology.

What may appear to be an inconsistency turns out to be a deliberate stand, for if the "people" succeeds in its separatist movement, it can be granted the "nation's" right of self-determination. If, on the other hand, it is overpowered by the state, the flexible definition permits support being given to the state, on the basis that the secessionist group does not have the requirements of a "nation." This flexible policy explains the words of modern Soviet writers like Starushenko who say that all problems of self-determination must be solved concretely in each given case.

This raises the question of whether the theory can be considered as comprehensive any longer in modern times, and whether it is playing its historical role of a revolutionary vanguard or it has been reduced to taking disconnected individual stands, merely tailing events and rationalizing policies taken.

If we compare the Marxist interpretation of nationalism and those of Western scholars like H. Kohn, we find that Kohn speaks of objective elements of the nation like the "state." (He too contradicts himself, for in one place he states that the Jews were not a nation, though in another he accepts the mere "aspiration" towards a state as sufficient for nationhood.) It should be noted, however, that the enumeration of specific objective elements of the nation does not necessarily mean the adoption of a materialist viewpoint, for Kohn emphasizes the subjective element of "state of mind" and this reveals the philosophical difference between him and Marxism.

The changes revealed by modern Soviet writings, which tend to take a separate stand in each individual case, pose the question of whether the differentiation between modern Soviet Marxism and the Western interpretations is of any importance, since it has now become a matter of individual stands rather than of a comprehensive theory.

Stands taken in each individual case may be similar or different for reasons quite unrelated to philosophical ideas of nationalism. One example may be seen in the inclusion or exclusion of the "State" factor. Stalin adopted a revolutionary policy of excluding the state in order to support national liberation movements in the colonies. Modern Soviets, on the other hand, do take the state into consideration. They supported the Nigerian state against the Biafran people, thus taking a stand similar to Great Britain's. They also insisted on the state element in the case of the German nation's aspiration to form one state. In the case of nations within the Soviet Union, however, the support of separate states was merely a matter of tactics, not a right of the nations, according to Semenov.

It appears that the differentiation between the Marxist understanding of nationalism and the Western one is no longer based on the question of philosophical materialism and idealism. Philosophical differences seem to be confined to the realm of philosophy and do not affect the modern meaning of the nation.

If we turn to Arab Socialist views concerning Arab nationalismwe find that in attempting to overcome the actual divisions in the territory, state and economy of Arab countries, Arab Socialism necessarily adopts a subjective viewpoint, and even tries to create an Arab state of mind from above, in opposition to the state of mind already existing under Egyptian nationalism. This view is subjective, traditionalist and non-secular. Avoiding all facts about national conflicts that occurred in the past, it tries to create a state of mind and myths of unity by selecting from history.

Arab socialism is thus idealistic in viewing both the past and the present. Though this viewpoint is not in keeping with the materialist philosophy, the Soviets have supported it, but their support has been tactical, and unstable (as shown in Chapter IV, Stage of National Conflict).

In addition to the question of the theory of the nation's relationship to the materialist philosophy, there is also that of the relation of the infrastructure to the superstructure. The original Marxist meaning of the infrastructure is the materialist, economic basis of society, and the superstructure changes as a result of changes in the infrastructure, though after a time lag. The national question has affected this concept in a number of ways.

Criticizing those who put language in the superstructure, Stalin gave it an unsteady position in both the infrastructure and the superstructure. In theory, the superstructure was supposed to be changing in accordance with the new socialist infrastructure, yet language had proved to be relatively stable and could thus be harmful to the theory if left in the superstructure. At the same time, it could not be removed entirely and considered permanent, for attempts were being made to change the superstructure through Russification. Stalin tried to find a compromise between these contradictory elements. He could not escape making at least a partial change in the infrastructure by adding language to it, but on the other hand he preserved, at least partially, the principle of the superstructure changing as a result of changes in the infrastructure. His compromise did not protect the dialectics from the effect of the national question, however, for he was forced to admit that the dialectic does not apply to language.

As for culture, it too has remained relatively stable. Obviously the modern Soviet writers could not use Stalin's method in solving the language problem and put it in the infrastructure too, for that would have done away with the whole superstructure. They chose a less drastic solution, leaving culture in its place in the superstructure - but loosening its connection with the infrastructure - thus rendering historical materialism inoperative where culture is concerned.

The encounter with the Third World made direct changes in the theory of the nation. Language was dropped as an essential factor of the nation, while religion, left out by Stalin, was now considered one of the realities of life. Traditions too were introduced and simply reinterpreted in such a manner as to make use of their revolutionary possibilities. In other words, the national question constituted a theoretical crisis for the materialist philosophy with regard to the constitution of the infrastructure and superstructure and the relation between the two, as well as in the dropping of factors from the definition of the nation.

A comparison with Arab Socialism shows that it did not face any such theoretical crises for the simple reason that it did not bind itself to any specific philosophy, whether materialist or idealist. It looked upon socialism as a matter of economic application (and retention of power). Its problems were thus of a different type, namely proving its claim concerning a common language and culture in the Arab world, despite their actual limitation in fact.

These problems were solved by subjective means, by the creation of a state of mind, generalizations and slogans (in keeping with the illiteracy of the population), charismatic leadership, and the use of the state's power.

There is no doubt that the theoretical flexibility of modern Soviet writings has made ideological differences less important, and has brought the national question down from the level of theory to that of individual stands, depending on how friendly a country's relationship is with the U.S.S.R., rather than on theoretical criteria.

Turning to Arab Socialism we find it claiming that imperialism and its agent, the Egyptian bourgeoisie are behind separatism, yet the facts deny this, for British imperialism supported the Islamic Caliphate and the Arab League, with the aim of retaining power and leadership in its hands. Contrary to what advocates of Arab Socialism say, the Egyptian nationalist movement opposed these attempts on an ideological basis, in defence of democracy against autocracy, of secularism against traditionalism, and of national liberation against imperialism. During World War II when the British put pressure with the purpose of creating the Arab League, Egyptian nationalism accepted the Arab League as a compromise. It did not go to the extent of advocating Arab nationalism, however, but rather retained its policy of Egyptian nationalism.

As for the Western scholars, they mention the objective factors of the nation, but emphasize the subjective "state of mind."

In summary, Arab Socialism and Western scholars tend to emphasize subjective factors while mentioning the objective ones. Marxism clings to dialectical materialism from the philosophical point of view, but in application it tends to drop the objective factors of the nation, particularly in relation to the Third World, change the infrastructure (to include language), and treat the superstructure as relatively permanent (in terms of culture). This leads to a gap between the theory of the nation and dialectical materialism, and limits the latter's influence to the realm of philosophy, alone.

Will and Self-Determination

Our study has shown that Marxism recognizes the factor of "will" and self-determination only if they are in the interest of socialism, and help forward the march of history. Thus Marx had no objection to supporting colonialism since it modernized the colonies and pushed them into a more advanced historical stage. He approved of German control over the Czechs and Southern Slavs since Germany was more advanced than Russia, without paying any attention to the national identity of the Slavs. If Russia underwent an agrarian reform, however, he had no objection to its annexing the Poles.

If Lenin supported the national liberation movements it was in the interest of socialism, not of nationalism per se. The only difference was that Lenin estimated that support of the nationalist movements and the bourgeoisie in the colonies was of greater use to the socialist movement in Europe, while Marx held that colonialism would be of greater use in creating a proletariat and eventually leading to a socialist revolution in the colonies. Marxists do not hide the fact that when they support self-determination it is only a tactic.

If we make a comparison with Western scholars, we find H. Kohn, Robert Michels, Ernest Renan, Leonard Binder.... viewing the will of the people as basic to the nation, and unlike the Marxists, not questioning whether the will is based on a false consciousness and a lack of awareness of historical evolution. Marxism, on the other hand, considers itself to have the "true" consciousness, even though it may be supporting colonialism in the name of modernization.

As for Arab Socialism, which started out as a national liberation movement against imperialism, it has not actually clashed with Marxism, for it is only Lenin's support of the national liberation movements that is well publicized, not Marx's pro-colonialist views or the fact that the Marxist ideology gives no priority to nationalist movements at the expense of historical progress, as interpreted by Marxism. Our study shows that Arab Socialism has adopted a paternalistic attitude towards the national will, where Arab nationalism is concerned; and assuming itself to represent the "true consciousness," it has used charismatic leadership and the power of the state to create the required state of mind. As for Egyptian nationalism, which stressed the Egyptian personality rather than the Arab or Islamic, it constitutes a "false consciousness" and is even an agent of imperialism in the eyes of Arab Socialism - contrary to the facts of history.

The element of national will is taken into account in the new Marxisms and in the demand for democracy which constitutes one of the new forms of conflict appearing under socialism.

Thus we find that the Western, Arab Socialist and even modern Soviet writers stress the importance of the "subjective" factors of the nation and that the "objective" are not fully "materialist," and can be used in a subjective manner (as in Arab nationalism) to create the required state of mind.

3. Class Struggle and Cohesion

In comparing Marxism and Arab Socialism on the point of class struggle, an ideological study would give the impression that there is a difference between them, as the former stresses class struggle in principle, while the latter speaks about cohesion and the dissolving of differences between classes. But our study shows that ideological differences alone are insufficient to give a clear understanding, and that they should be seen against the process of achieving power. In this process a differentiation needs to be made between two stages: before and after the obtention of power.

In the first stage Marxism stressed the class struggle, but in the second stage, after it obtained power, it turned towards cohesion (if we except Stalin's manipulation of the theory of "intensification of class struggle"). As for Arab Socialism, it did not pass through these two stages, but carried on the class struggle while in power. For this reason, we find some contradictory formulae. At times we find a flexible formula like "dissolving the differences of classes" as well as "alliance of popular forces," expressing the actual class struggle taking place on the one hand, and the manipulation of cohesion to consolidate power on the other. By analysing the process of obtaining power, we find that the differences in ideology are not basic.

After socialism is in power and the class struggle is over, the expected cohesion is not realized, for new types of conflict appear. These have found an outlet outside the Soviet Union in the creation of new models of socialism, which give partial expression to this conflict. They have not yet been gathered to form a single comprehensive ideology, however.

As for Arab Socialism, it proclaims that it is a national socialism, contrary to the wishes of Soviet Marxism. It declares its right to independence from Marxism. In this it is similar to the new Marxisms. The difference is that Arab Socialism has not been able to produce any ideology of its own even concerning the application of socialism.

Yet while it clings to freedom in the face of Marxism, it refuses, in the name of cohesion, to give freedom not only to opposing classes but also to Marxists. Therefore the new type of conflict revolves around the issue of democracy, and participation in decision-making.

As for Western thought, it shows a long tradition of organic theory which stresses the element of cohesion, with the aim of preserving the status quo. Marxism, on the other hand, stresses conflict. This difference is limited to the theoretical aspect alone, however, for Marxism after obtaining power also uses nationalism to preserve the socialist status quo and to suppress the new types of conflict (if we overlook the Stalinist idea of the intensification of the class struggle).

At the same time, both the West and the Marxists utilize the idea of conflict in analysing each other's society. Cohesion thus becomes a domestic matter after the acquisition of power, and there is a projection of internal conflict outwardly.

Thus we see that the conflict theme can be used by rebels to obtain power, while rulers make use of nationalism and cohesion to tone down the class struggle in the West or the new types of conflict (for democracy, decision-making rights, power struggles) under socialism, while using conflict theory to describe enemy societies.

4. Nationalism and Internationalism

The study has shown the effect of power on the idea of internationalism. In the presocialist stage the internationalism of the working class was meant to be an ideology that would replace nations, and not only an alliance of national working classes with a view to achieving common interests.

After the working classes obtained power, however, they were exposed to new types of conflict that revealed that they were still nationalist rather than internationalist in ideology. Thus they protected their own interests in economic relationships, their independence in interpreting the Marxist ideology, and their right to decision-making. These were the same issues that had appeared on the domestic scene. The appearance of new Marxisms is a sign of nationalism rather than internationalism.

In these circumstances the idea of internationalism was transformed from an idea that put an end to nations, to a rationalization for justifying their existence. The application of the Brezhnev doctrine in Czechoslovakia, shows how interventionism can appear under the guise of internationalism.

In the conflict between Soviet nationalities over the factor of culture, the new Soviet writers used the idea of internationalism and tried to replace Stalin's tactical slogan "socialist in content, national in form" with "international in form." Internationalism thus became the term used for the Russification of culture.

As for Arab Socialism, it rejects the Marxist internationalism of the working class, and stresses its ideological independence, though it has been unable to create a theory of its own. It has utilized Arab nationalism as a tool to achieve an internationalism in the sense of cutting across the national boundaries of the Arab countries.

Arab nationalism is playing a similar role to the international one played by Islam, with the difference that it lacks the latter's power. Our study shows, however, that the role of internationalism is limited. It seems to undergo a cycle, starting with a strong ideology and ending with the formation of many nations, Islams or Marxisms, as the case may be.

As for Western scholars, (like H. Kohn, M. Ginsberg, C.J. Hayes...), they tend to deplore the expansionist, aggressive type of nationalism like Hitler's (though he had his own version of an international "new order"). In this they are in agreement with the Marxists who oppose the expansionism of any capitalist state.

In general there is no tendency in the West to regard internationalism as an ideology or a principle except in case of necessity; as happened following World War II as a reaction to the spread of communism. Some scholars like H. Kohn and Morris Ginsberg still point out the advantages of nationalism which guarantees a beneficial diversity, and fear that internationalism may mean the hegemony of one or two big powers over the world.

Thus we see that in the West, in Arab Socialism and even under socialism, the role of internationalism has been limited so far. Even after socialism, governments act in a nationalist manner (protecting their own economic interests, demanding the right to decision making and to giving their own interpretation of Marxism), and internationalism has been used to further national interests.

5. Types of Nationalism

Originally in Marxism there was a close relation between the type of nationalism and historical materialism, i.e. nationalism was related to a specific historical period - the bourgeois, and the jumping of stages was considered a kind of utopianism. Our study shows that the stages of historical materialism have been further subdivided; capitalism was divided into two stages by Lenin, the development of colonies into three categories by Stalin; the capitalist stage was replaced by the non-capitalist path, which in turn was subdivided into three types.... In these stages modern Marxists now accept what would have been considered utopian socialism in the past.

These new stages are characterized by a closeness to the facts of life. This may be considered as advantageous and as rectifying the shortcomings of simplified theoretical abstractions; yet the danger of these divisions for Marxism is that their very closeness to reality gives the impression that the Marxist theory no longer plays a revolutionary, leading role but rather is tailing the changes taking place in the Third World in particular. At first, the theory remained fixed in the face of the changes taking place in the world. After a while it began to keep up with the change, tailing it, sometimes speeding with it and entering into a "marriage," at other times hesitating, or turning back and redefining the stage of "socialist horizons" as having slipped back to a "bourgeois" level.

Our study showed the link between such redefinitions and the power struggle and the transfer of power; and pointed out that historical materialism's succession of stages had been lost on the way. In the Zhdanov period a number of countries were considered ripe for socialism. Then they were interpreted to be on the lower level of "national liberation movements" which were supported despite their backwardness. Then came a period of the "marriage" of these movements with socialism, followed by a period when they were looked upon as "bourgeois." This fluctuation in interpretation would be understandable if one were speaking of counter-revolutions, but as our study shows, the very same measure is defined and then redefined as progressive or reactionary, and the class background of the ruling elite is specified in accordance with the struggle for power and the problem of the transfer of power. This has led to historical materialism's falling from the level of a general theory to that of a political tactic.

Arab Socialism does not suffer from this problem as it does not have its own interpretation of historical materialism. Its relation to historical materialism is no more than one of borrowing terms, (to use the viewpoint of the Soviets following the dissolution of the "marriage" between them). Arab Socialism has had problems with these changing definitions of stages by the Marxist Left, as new types of conflict centering around democracy appeared. It has also had theoretical problems in relation to the Soviets on account of the conflict of national interests. From the point of view of Arab Socialism it is difficult to account for the Soviets' turning against it and the Left's bringing up the question of democracy, particularly as during the period of "marriage" between them, the Egyptian Left itself participated in creating the ideological facade for the military dictatorship. Thus from the Arab Socialist point of view this Marxist fluctuation in interpretations has no ideological justification and constitutes merely a struggle for power.

In summary, the study reveals that it is no longer possible to associate the theory of nationalism to the bourgeois stage, as stated by historical materialism, since this stage can be subdivided into further stages, and can even be skipped altogether. And since nationalism is not linked to a specific stage, it can persist and acquire various different characteristics.

This brings the Marxists close to the Western scholars who hold that nationalism exists per se and consider its type merely as characteristics. (Ex. Shafer, Kohn, Carr, Hayes, Snyder, Wirth...show that nationalism can be of various different types).

6. The Soviets and the Third World

Our study has shown that Soviet relations with the Third World revolved around a certain axis. In the period of "national liberation" there was the Leninist adaptation, the acceptance of a national front, and the emphasis on the role of the national bourgeoisie at the expense of that of the working class and its party. In the "non-capitalist" stage there was Khrushchev's adaptation, accepting the leadership of revolutionary democrats and an economist tendency (trade unions instead of the party), at the expense of the working class and its party, to the point of accepting the Communist party's amalgamation with the ruling party, as well as an acceptance of different applications of socialism.

Regardless of differences, the two stands were both adaptations, giving priority to nationalism, whether in the form of an independence movement or of the non-capitalist path, over the socialist ideology. It meant an acceptance of national interests even if these were not in accordance with Marxist ideology (Arab nationalism for example).

The important thing is that this adaptation constituted no more than a tactic while the long run strategy gave priority to socialism over nationalism (ex. the submission of the national will and self-determination to the world Socialist movement).

As this was a tactic, there was an eventual transformation from Leninism to Stalin's flexible stand. The same change was repeated later as Brezhnev's stand replaced Khrushchev's. The decisive factor in these changes was an estimation of whether circumstances were ripe for a socialist revolution and an attempt to transfer power to the Marxists, who represented the working class either alone or in a national alliance under their leadership. If this interpretation and the attempt to transfer power failed, there was a withdrawal to the tactic of adaptation once more. This means that the theory of stages submits to interpretation and the possibilities of carrying out the revolution.

During this struggle there usually is a redefinition of the stage, for example the stage formerly considered "socialist horizons" is now interpreted as "bourgeois," even though there has been no actual regression or counter-revolution. The theory of stages thus loses its "scientific" position in historical materialism and is utilized merely as a rationalization in the struggle.

Despite Stalin's fluctuations and occasional errors in estimating the ripeness of the Socialist revolution, one can understand his logic if one notes that he faced a clear situation - a case of transition from an independence movement, which he supported tactically, to a socialist one, which was his strategic goal.

In the case of modern Soviet writers, however, the "non-capitalist path," which they created, could be "married" to the socialist stage. This made the transition from the tactic of supporting non-capitalism to the strategy of socialism ideologically unclear and confusing.

In the transition from tactic to strategy the emphasis is laid mainly on the question of power, for the non-capitalist road may already have achieved the economic aims of socialism through nationalizations. Thus, in this stage, the Egyptian Marxists define socialism as the transfer of power, while the Soviets redefine the stage itself and the ruling revolutionary democrats as bourgeois. The transition from the tactic of non-capitalism to the strategy of socialism is thus related to the power struggle within the country, and to expansionism and interventionism in the relationship with the Soviet Union, rather than merely to ideology.

This makes the question of nationalism, in terms of independence, more explosive. A study of the crisis in the relationship between the Soviets and Arab Socialism shows that national differences were concentrated in the following main points:

Firstly: ideologically the right of independent interpretation of the theory. The important thing is not that there exist actual ideological differences or that a new Marxism has sprung up, but simply the right to choose one's own path. This constitutes the core of nationalism in general, which not even Marxism has been able to escape.

Secondly: economically, conflicts arise concerning the returns from economic relations, the amount of assistance given and its freedom from conditions, (this comes as a reaction to the effects of neocolonialism).

Thirdly: conflicts relating to national interests, and revolving around the question of whether or not to support them. (ex. Arab nationalism, or the Russian-Chinese attitudes with regard to aid to India).

Paradoxically, these conflicts increase after socialism comes to power instead of decreasing. For the Socialist ideology increases the expectations each side has of the other. Soviet aid is the alternative to neocolonialism and represents very elevated, almost romantic ideals. Economic aid comes to be looked upon as a moral commitment. As expectations increase, so do national frustrations, especially in the Third World countries.

The above conflicts show that the working class in power may acquire a nationalist rather than an internationalist character. These issues, which arise between socialist countries in the international field, are the same as the new types of conflict that arise on the local level after socialism assumes power. On both levels they played a role in the appearance of new Marxisms, as an expression of the national question.

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